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Résumé
Cette thèse de doctorat porte sur le rôle de l’expertise scientifique dans le processus décisionnel au
niveau fédéral en Suisse. Elle tente de comprendre comment des facteurs liés aux institutions po-
litiques ainsi qu’aux dynamiques politiques engendrées par des enjeux politiques particuliers in-
fluencent la distribution d’accès à l’expertise scientifique, sa valorisation par des acteurs politiques
comme ressource stratégique, et les effets qu’engendre sa mobilisation sur le processus décisionnel.
La thèse développe un cadre théorique qui postule que la distribution de l’accès à l’expertise scienti-
fique et sa disponibilité dépendent de l’allocation de ressources financières et organisationnelles dans
le système politique. Ceux qui en disposent vont évaluer l’utilité de l’expertise scientifique par rap-
port à leurs intérêts et à la lumière de la structure des conflits qu’ils anticipent comme dominante
dans l’arène politique. Les résultats empiriques montrent que la configuration institutionnelle du
système politique produit une forte concentration, dans les mains de l’administration fédérale, des
ressources nécessaires pour mobiliser l’expertise scientifique. Le parlement, les partis politiques ainsi
que d’autres acteurs de la société civile ne disposent que de peu de moyens à cette fin. De plus, les
producteurs traditionnels d’expertise scientifique issues du système de milice (p.ex. les commissions
extra-parlementaires ou les académies scientifiques) ne disposent pas d’un accès au pouvoir poli-
tique autre que celui dont disposent aussi les groupes d’intérêt. Ces producteurs sont de plus en plus
substitués par des homologues professionnalisés qui offrent leurs services à l’administration fédérale
sous forme de prestation. Par contre, d’autres changements comme la polarisation partisane crois-
sante dans le système politique ainsi que la diminution de l’inclusion des groupes d’intérêts dans la
phase pré-parlementaire ne semblent pas contribuer à une politisation croissante de l’expertise scien-
tifique. Finalement, la structure d’un problème politique exerce une influence à la fois sur la décision
de mobiliser l’expertise scientifique et sur les effets de cette dernière, car elle conditionne la structure
d’un conflit ainsi que son anticipation. Des problèmes structurés engendrent une superposition des
acteurs contrôlant la mobilisation d’expertise avec ceux qui en constituent l’audience. Ceci augmente
la chance que l’expertise puisse contribuer au contenu d’une politique. Par contre, cette influence
diminue en présence d’un problème peu structuré et marqué par des conflits de valeur.
Abstract
This thesis concerns the role of scientific expertise in the decision-making process at the Swiss fed-
eral level of government. It aims to understand how institutional and issue-specific factors influence
three things: the distribution of access to scientific expertise, its valuation by participants in policy for-
mulation, and the consequence(s) its mobilization has on policy politics and design. The theoretical
framework developed builds on the assumption that scientific expertise is a strategic resource. In or-
der to effectively mobilize this resource, actors require financial and organizational resources, as well
as the conviction that it can advance their instrumental interests within a particular action situation.
Institutions of the political system allocate these financial and organizational resources, influence the
supply of scientific expertise, and help shape the venue of its deployment. Issue structures, in turn,
condition both interaction configurations and the way in which these are anticipated by actors. This
affects the perceived utility of expertise mobilization, mediating its consequences. The findings of
this study show that the ability to access and control scientific expertise is strongly concentrated in
the hands of the federal administration. Civil society actors have weak capacities to mobilize it, and
the autonomy of institutionalized advisory bodies is limited. Moreover, the production of scientific
expertise is undergoing a process of professionalization which strengthens the position of the federal
administration as the (main) mandating agent. Despite increased political polarization and less inclu-
sive decision-making, scientific expertise remains anchored in the policy subsystem, rather than being
used to legitimate policy through appeals to the wider population. Finally, the structure of a policy
problem matters both for expertise mobilization and for the latter’s impact on the policy process, be-
cause it conditions conflict structures and their anticipation. Structured problems result in a greater
overlap between the principal of expertise mobilization and its intended audience, thereby increasing
the chance that expertise shapes policy design. Conversely, less structured problems, especially those
that involve conflicts about values and goals, reduce the impact of expertise.

To Sarah ... for not letting assumptions go unquestioned
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One
Introduction
. . . The [political] debate about the prolongation of the
[GMO] moratorium mainly centered on famers’ and
consumers’ alleged non-acceptance of genetically
modified crops, and the evidence-based research findings
from the national research program "Benefits and Risks
[of GMO]" were completely neglected. . . . The Swiss
Academies of Arts and Sciences expect Parliament to
deliberate on how to deal with GMOs based on the
national research program’s findings. Switzerland should
not incrementally ban GMO and novel breeding
technologies just because of transient economic interests.
Seldom is it wise to limit future options because of
short-term economic interests. . . .
Extract from an open letter the Swiss Adademices of Arts
and Sciences sent to Parliament (Courvoisier et al., 2013).
My translation.
1.1 Introduction
From environmental governance to social policy, many contemporary public policy
problems rely heavily on expert evidence, as provided by academic advisers, for
their resolution. A comprehensive literature on advisory processes has thus come
into being, motivated by the perception that the advice that is proffered is inade-
quately taken up by policy-makers, and driven by concerns about the potential for
democratic values to be undermined by technocratic decision-making.
This thesis investigates the causes and consequences of suchmobilization of sci-
entific expertise within policy formulation processes. It contends that both the na-
ture of the advisory system and the structure of policy problems influence themobi-
1
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lization of scientific expertise and its influence on policy politics and design. Empir-
ically, the thesis looks at scientific expertise and policy formulationwithin the Swiss
political system. By analyzing the organization of science advice and studying how
it is deployed in three policy formulation processes, the study demonstrates how in-
stitutional factors and issue-specific elements account for thewho, where andwhen
of the mobilization of scientific expertise. It also explores what influence this has
on the policy process.
The reminder of this introduction further establishes the object of this study,
introduces the site of inquiry, and explains the approach. It concludes with a defi-
nition of scientific expertise and a synopsis of the chapters that follow.
1.2 Aims of the inquiry
Science has occupied aprominent place in political life since earlymodernity (Ezrahi,
1990; Latour, 1993; Shapin and Schaffer, 1985). This prominence has increased sig-
nificantly during the 20th century, as the state expanded its reach into ever more
domains of society (Weingart, 2001). Today, science and the expertise it produces
are indispensable for governance in many policy domains, be it through the aca-
demic training of civil servants or through the formulation of policy advice.
This prominence has not come without scrutiny. It was during the 1970s that
sociological research on the role of science in policy and society began in earnest.
The historical context to this research was provided by unprecedented levels of
government demand and support for initiatives to draw on the fruit of scientific
inquiry in order to support public action. The expansion of the welfare state, in
particular, contributed to an ever increasing ‘scientificization’ of politics (Wein-
gart, 2001). Yet despite the scale of scientific involvement in public action, there
was widespread disappointment about its outcomes, which fell short of expecta-
tions. Social scientists from a wide range of backgrounds therefore embarked on a
research program which aspired to fashion a ‘sociology of knowledge application’
(Holzner and Fischer, 1979), known today as the knowledge utilization literature.
The biggest insight from research within this framework is that there is seldom a
direct pathway between expertise and policy. Instead, research has demonstrated
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time and time again that scientific recommendations cannot eschew politics in their
quest to inform policy, as politics more often entails contentious interaction than
engineering-like decision-making. The biggest challenge to furthering our under-
standing of these processes is to construe scientific expertise not as an act of infor-
mation processing by an individual, but as a process of social interaction. This is
the indispensable key for beginning to understand the role of scientific expertise in
the political arena and its outcomes on policy politics and design.
It was not only the perceived influence shortfall of scientific research on matters
of policy that drew researchers to study science in the context of politics. Moder-
nity is intrinsically interwoven with scientific and technological progress, but this
progress is also the origin of many contemporary problems, such as the environ-
mental crisis. Both Rachel Carson’s (1962) Silent Spring, which denounced the ef-
fects of pesticides, and the anti-nuclear movement were landmarks in raising pub-
lic awareness of the environmental risks produced by technology. The ensuing age
of ‘reflexive modernization’, in which public attention is turned to the very foun-
dation of what makes contemporary society possible (Beck, 1992), also created
new demands for scientific expertise in order to adjudicate the risks of technolo-
gies such as nuclear energy, genetically modified organisms, and fossil fuel based
energy sources. As scientific controversies erupted in public, academics such as
Dorothy Nelkin begun to study them (e.g. Nelkin, 1975). This and subsequent re-
search (e.g. Jasanoff, 1990; Wynne, 1996) has demonstrated that science is not (and
probably cannot be) a politically neutral party in controversies around technical and
environmental risks. As this work has argued, the distinction between matters of
‘fact’ and matters of ‘value’ is not given, but rather negotiated through boundary
work (cf. section 2.3). It follows that the production and propagation of scientific
expertise are thoroughly politicalprocesses, which cannot be understood in isolation
from political problem solving.
Building on the twin insight that scientific expertise is a political phenomenon
both because of its process and its engagement with inherently value-laden issues,
this thesis aims to further understanding of its role in the policy arena. More specif-
ically, this study seeks to enhance our insight into the relations between science
and politics by construing the relationship between scientific expertise and politi-
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cal problem solving in terms of two-way causality. Addressing this issue therefore
requires pursuing two distinct, yet related, analytical goals. The first goal is to in-
vestigate when and why scientific expertise becomes part of policy deliberation.
This implies examining the (possible) influence of a political system’s institutions,
the access of different groups to such expertise, and the nature of a specific policy
issue. The second goal builds on observations of particular instances of the use of
scientific expertise to ask if, and how, such expertise influences not only cognitive
but also social aspects of the policy process that brought it into being. Past research
has tended to construe expertise as an exclusively cognitive object, with cognitive
consequences (impact on policy proposal or policy learning), and has thereby ne-
glected the social dimensions that are verymuch present in the policy process. This
research remedies this omission.
For empirical purposes, this double objective translates into three distinct ques-
tions:
1. In a given policy formulation process, what instances of scientific expertise
can be observed, and in which sites do they take place?
2. Who initiates a particular process of scientific expertise, and what are the ra-
tionales for doing so?
3. What cognitive and social effects does an instance of scientific expertise en-
gender in the policy formulation process?
The relevance of this inquiry comes from concerns about efficiency, democracy,
and social theory, constituting three key rationales. The efficiency argument relates
to the processes by which expertise is crafted, deployed and received. There is a
widespread sense in the wider public and scientific community alike that there is a
persistent gap between what we know as a society as a result of scientific inquiry,
and howwe choose to act collectively through policy. This uneasiness disaggregates
into worries about the quality of expertise, the performance and accountability of
those institutions that dispense policy advice, and the opportunistic (ab)use made
of science in politics. Many ordinary citizens and scientists are familiar with in-
stances where scientific expertise has failed, was discredited by interest groups, or
was shunned by opportunistic policymakers for speaking up against powerful in-
terests. The scientific community (e.g. Sutherland et al., 2012), in particular, hopes
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that the gap between collective knowledge and action can be narrowed through bet-
ter understanding of how scientific expertise informs policy.
Academic interest in scientific expertise is warranted for democracy’s sake be-
cause scientific expertise shapes issues of great consequence for society although
scientific advisers are neither elected, nor operate under the direct control of elected
officials (as the core bureaucracy does). Scientific experts are also the dominant
participants in highly technical and complex policy areas. But since policy issues
are never devoid of value considerations, even technical and complex ones, an ex-
clusively technical issue does not exist. It is beyond debate that scientific experts
are of crucial importance and that their presence is desirable in many policy do-
mains. However, some argue that there is a risk that scientific experts monopolize
certain issues, crowding out other voices worthy of attention (e.g. Fischer, 2000;
Parthasarathy, 2010; Wynne, 1996). This risk increases with the trend that an in-
creasing number of important decisions are being taken in arenas not accountable
to elected representatives (Papadopoulos, 2010). Therefore, learning about how
social processes around scientific expertise in policy work, and what consequences
they engender for policy and politics, is in the interest of making such processes
transparent and accountable.
There is also a strong case for studying scientific expertise for social theory’s
sake. In sociological terms, scientific expertise is a hybrid activity, taking place be-
tween the social domains of science and politics, each of which have their own in-
dependent functional logics (Kusche, 2008), but which are mutually co-constitutive
and depend on each other in multiple ways (Jasanoff, 2004). Because scientific ex-
pertise as a social process operates in an environment of multiple and overlapping
social norms, its agents require special coping skills in order to reconcile these de-
mands. Moreover, given that science and politics operate in very different ‘time-
scapes’ (Brown, 2009: 194), demands for flexibility constitute a limit to institution-
alization. Social processes that take place in this kind of complex social ecology
constitute interesting case studies of fundamental social phenomena such as trust-
building and the shaping of collective representations of the world. As chapter 2
demonstrates, the existing literature contains important gaps. It focuses primar-
ily on micro-social processes and eschews the analysis of scientific expertise within
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the broader context of political institutions. For instance, there is a great deal of
evidence concerning the attitudes and (self-reported) behaviors of individuals en-
gaged in policy formulation and decision-making with regard to scientific exper-
tise. Moreover, there are many case studies of the production and negotiation of
scientific expertise within a particular advisory forum. But, thus far, there are sur-
prisingly few studies that attempt to understand scientific expertise in relationship
to the policy process itself.
1.3 Sites of inquiry
As the study title suggests, this research largely focuses on Switzerland. It analyzes
the way in which institutional factors and issue-specific political dynamics estab-
lish contexts that bestow authority on scientific expertise within the policy process.
There is value in and of itself in exploring the institutional and cultural idiosyn-
crasies of a particular country, especially since authoritative scholarship on scien-
tific expertise in Switzerland has been missing since the early 1980s (but see Frey,
2010a).
Moreover, Switzerland is often referred to – and self-identifies as – a Sonderfall,
or special case. This designated specialness pertains to the country’s political insti-
tutions: (grassroots initiated) direct democratic procedures in parallel with repre-
sentative institutions, federalism, and a collegial executive elected by but otherwise
independent of Parliament. Together those institutions produce a decision-making
process that is inclusive with regard to policy formulation, because a governmental
decision can always be challenged on the ballot. At the same time, the Swiss peo-
ple regularly vote on issues and consequently have to formulate opinions on what
can be highly complex issues. Does this render Switzerland also a special case with
regard to its system and culture of scientific expertise? This study makes a clear
statement about the nature of the Swiss advisory system by arguing that expertise
plays ‘second fiddle’ in Swiss politics. However, this does not constitute an answer
to the special case question because we simply know too little about similarities and
differences between countries. Jasanoff has argued that how societies collectively
know is the product of historically contingent cultural practices, expressed through
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nation-specific ‘civic epistemologies’ (Jasanoff, 2005a). These constructs are com-
plex enough that each country seems to warrant a special case status. Research on
scientific expertise in a comparative fashion, young as it is, has no institution-based
typologies to offer akin to the comparativist’s treasured ideal types of consensus, re-
spectively Westminster-style democracy (Lijphart, 1999). For instance, Switzerland
and theNetherlands both fall into the consensus democracy spectrum, but the orga-
nization of scientific expertise supply couldn’t be more different. The Netherlands
sports four public advisory bodies, each of which has an extraordinarily powerful
position in the political system (Halffman, 2009). In Switzerland the supply of ex-
pertise is fragmented, and advisory bodies need to build networks in order to secure
access to their target public, rather than being given such access through institu-
tional rules (cf. chapter 5). Comparing Switzerland to Germany and Britain offers
yet another illustrative example. While Switzerland and Germany face rather sim-
ilar degrees of power diffusion in the political system, Switzerland is much closer
to Britain in that the foundation for trust in experts tends to be based on personal
connections rather than on formal academic affiliation (cf. Jasanoff 2005a; chapter 5
this study).
These exemplars make the point that we currently lack the conceptual tools, as
well as robust findings from cross-country comparative research, that would allow
us to determine whether each national system of scientific expertise constitutes a
distinct type of its own or whether several cases share similar traits. Thus, choos-
ing to study scientific expertise in the Swiss political system is not grounded in any
pretensions to emulate a quasi-experimental research design, which would require
clear assumptions about similarities and differences to other cases. Rather, Switzer-
land is one case (amongst other possible candidates) which serves a purpose in an
enterprise of theory development. Thinking in comparative terms, then, serves two
functions: by reflecting the Swiss experience against the backdrop of other countries
it becomes possible to develop a reflexive distance toward the empirical context un-
der study; and, crucially, it informs reflections on the boundaries of generalization
of the empirical findings this study produces.
The comparison of institutional and cultural components of a national system of
scientific expertise sharpens the gaze on the Swiss context. However, this research
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ultimately revolves around a comparison of a different kind. Ever since Theodor
Lowi (1964, 1972) hypothesized that the substantive nature of a policy influences the
politics of policymaking, this has been a question of interest for students of public
policy. While there are several theoretical propositions about how this might apply
to scientific expertise (Boswell, 2009; Braun, 1998; Topf, 1993), empirical validation
is still lacking. Building on a policy issue typology developed by Hoppe (2010), this
study compares three policy formulation processes that differ regarding the degree
of structure in terms of the respective presence or absence of conflicts about values
and about the relevant knowledge at stake.
The first case involves the debate around research with human embryonic stem
cells, which engendered a sustained epistemic and value controversy. Stem cell
derivation is a fatal procedure for the approximately five day old donor embryo.
The issue came onto the political agenda when the Swiss National Science Founda-
tion agreed to fund stem cell research, amid protests about a lack of public consul-
tation and an ambiguous legal framework. The issue opposed the interests of cell
biologists, on one side, with those of a coalition protesting the instrumentalization
of human life. None of these groups participated in drafting the law, which was
accomplished in just a few months. While not having participated in policy formu-
lation, an external legal expert and advisory bodies from technology assessment
and biomedical ethics established themselves as independent voices, particularly
during the period that the case was deliberated in Parliament.
The second case explores the start and stop effort to introduce a tax on car-
bon dioxide emissions. This took place during the 1990s and represents a semi-
structured case, with little disagreement about climate change knowledge, butmuch
debate about the prioritization of goals. Gridlocked between the government’s
plans to raise revenue for infrastructure projects through energy taxation, and the
imperative of not disadvantaging energy-intensive industries by burdening them
with a tax, this policy underwent substantial reframing and modification of its de-
sign before it was ultimately adopted under the shadow of the Kyoto protocol. Sci-
entific expertise was mainly drawn upon to model the energy system and the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of the tax. Climate science was virtually absent from policy
deliberation, even as the Swiss climate science community started to organize.
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The final case is the reform of the fiscal equalization scheme between the fed-
eral government and member states (cantons). It is characterized by strong con-
sensus on reform goals, while unearthing several epistemic uncertainties. Dating
from 1959, the old transfer scheme aimed to decrease thematerial disparities among
cantons through an increasingly complex system of subsidies and allocations. Eco-
nomic theories of fiscal federalism substantially informed the policy design process,
which was conducted through an elaborate participatory scheme and lasted about
a decade. The reform project engendered a mandatory ballot vote, as it amended
multiple constitutional provisions.
The focus on policy formulation as the context in which to study scientific exper-
tise, rather than agenda setting or policy implementation, is a deliberate one, based
on this context being the most contingent environment for scientific expertise. As
Campbell Keller (2009) has convincingly shown for US clean air and climate policy
(and as is also argued by Hoppe et al., 2013), scientists engage differently with pol-
icy issues depending on the stage of the policy cycle. As the process moves from
agenda setting to policy formulation and ultimately to policy implementation, sci-
entists are confronted with an increasingly structured context. Their style of policy
engagement consequently changes from issue advocacy to portraying themselves
as pure scientists who ‘just present the facts’.
1.4 A situated perspective
The meaning of a situated perspective is that social action has to be explained by
understanding the meaning actors attribute to events and choices within the phe-
nomenon’s context. This is nicely captured by the dictum that ‘situations defined
as real are real in their consequences’ (Clarke, 2005: 7). The symmetry principle
proposed by the strong program in the sociology of scientific knowledge (cf. Bloor,
1976), takes this up when it decrees that the analyst must treat all knowledge claims
as equal. For the analyst, then, there are no analytical categories of scientific vs.
pseudo scientific claims, because he or she is interested in how social actors negoti-
ate epistemic credibility and construct such categories of knowledge. For the study
of scientific expertise this means that the analyst should refrain from declaring one
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way of using scientific evidence as more legitimate than others. Moreover, great
care is necessary to avoid the hindsight fallacy. While the analyst examining a re-
constructive case study is at a vantage point of knowing the end to a story, actors
in a process are not; what might be a clear outcome for the analyst can only ever
remain a contingent one in situ.
A situated perspective does not preclude the formulation of theoretical expecta-
tions. Claims to pure induction would not only misrepresent the research process,
observation without preconception is simply impossible. However, it demands that
the instruments of observation capture as much as possible the meaning actors at-
tribute to a particular situation, rather than to assess their actions based on a rigid
conceptual template imposed by the analyst (Clarke, 2005). This demands that situ-
ations in which actors make choices about things like scientific expertise are recon-
structed in order to identify what elements of a situation matter to its participants.
1.5 A working definition of scientific expertise
Having presented the research object, this study requires an operational definition
of scientific expertise before proceeding any further. The first element of this defi-
nition is that this study’s interest is in expertise relating to the substantive problem
of a policy issue. This therefore excludes expertise and advice about policy-making
strategy on which policymakers may draw.
The second element of this definition states that scientific expertise draws on sys-
tematic inquiry, rather than on individual experience. It is without any doubt that
experience-based expertise gained from professional practice is a very important
resource for political problem solving. Some even argue that it is the most impor-
tant source of political knowledge (e.g. Lindblom and Cohen, 1979).1 Nevertheless,
this study’s insistence on expertise grounded in systematic inquiry derives from the
social mechanisms involved in its production and in its epistemic authority, which
are qualitatively different from other sources of political knowledge.
This focus on expertise grounded in systematic inquiry entails yet another clar-
ification. The policy process has long been home to the production of its own sys-
1See also the contributions in Irwin (1996) and Leach and Scoones (2005).
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tematic knowledge in form of policy appraisal. Evaluations of the outcomes of pol-
icy measures are the best known form of appraisal. Regulatory impact assessment
(RIA), also called ex ante appraisal, is the younger cousin of evaluation and aims
at qualifying the potential effects of a particular policy design. Strongly pushed
by the EU and the OCDE, an increasing number of countries adopt RIA provisions
in policy formulation. While RIAs and policy evaluations are based on systematic
inquiry, this study nonetheless excludes them from its definition of scientific exper-
tise. The reasons is that they constitute policy instruments themselves. They are
standardized, legally mandated, evaluated to their effect, are diffused and are part
of standards of good governance. However, the mobilization of academic expertise
for policy formulation is not a policy instrument, it is a practice. As such, it is less
deterministic and gives actors more scope of action.
The third element of the definition pertains to the producer of scientific exper-
tise. As Siefken (2010) rightly notes, there is a proliferation of sources of policy
expertise. Indeed, providing science-based advice to decision makers is a business
with its own economy. Amid this functional equivalence, the answer to which pro-
ducer counts as scientific is one of attribution. In other words, for the purpose of
this thesis, it depends on whom policymakers turn to when they seek analysis with
scientific credentials to support its credibility.
The definition’s fourth point addresses the issue that there are several ‘bridges’
that connect scientific knowledge production to public policy-making (cf. Stone,
2002;Weiss, 1979). This research’s focus on scientific expertise entails that long term
mechanisms of knowledge transfer, like the academic training of the administrative
elite or social learning, are secondary phenomena. Equally, also purely individual
and routinized knowledge acquisition behaviors like consulting the scientific lit-
erature are at the phenomenon’s margins. In other words, this study stresses the
importance of the social in scientific expertise. It is an interactional phenomenon,
which is also demonstrated by the fact that political decision-makers turn to other
persons and not books for advice (Levin and Cross, 2004; Weiss and Bucuvalas,
1980).
The final point is about terminology. While I have thus far consistently used the
notion of scientific expertise, the literature abounds with descriptors for the cogni-
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tive product of systematic inquiry into the natural and social world which is ori-
ented towards, produced for, or drawn on by projects of political problem solving:
research, research information, evidence, systematic evidence, knowledge, science,
trans-science, regulatory science, fiduciary science, mode–2 science, post-normal
science, serviceable truth, science advice, policy advice, and expertise (cf. Nutley
et al. 2007: 20, Weingart and Lentsch 2008: 19). As I discuss in section 2.3, some
of these notions have a clear conceptual basis while others lack one. As this study
does not stray much into the territory of a sociology of scientific knowledge, these
notion’s subtleties and connotations do not carry an enormous weight. More im-
portant, though, is to make explicit what terminology I use and with what intent.
Apart from when reviewing the literature, I consistently, and interchangeably, use
the terms ‘scientific expertise’ or ‘science-based policy advice’ to denote the phe-
nomenon as defined in this section. For stylistic diversity and brevity I may also
use the short forms of expertise and policy advice.
1.6 Plan of the thesis
This thesis consists of 9 chapters. After this introduction, chapter 2 discusses the
state of the art in literature on scientific expertise. It begins with the delineation of
the review’s scope, followed by an analysis of the different modes of the science–
politics relationship and of how Western political cultures conceive them. An as-
sessment of literature on how political actors make sense of scientific evidence, and
how the latter acquires credibility in the policy arena, follows. Turning to the knowl-
edge utilization literature, the review identifies the key concepts of the field and
presents lessons as towhat determines its differentmodes. Scaling up from the con-
sideration of knowledge utilization by individuals, the review engages with public
policy scholarship on the place of scientific expertise in the policy process.
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework. Drawing on actor-centered insti-
tutionalism, discursive institutionalism, and problem governance theory, this out-
lines a notion of an advisory system and develops propositions as to how the struc-
ture of policy problems shapes expertise mobilization decisions and their conse-
quences on policy politics and design.
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The analytical strategy is outlined in chapter 4. It consists of a two step approach:
first, the Swiss advisory system and the distribution of access to expertise therein
are characterized. Second, determinants of expertise mobilization and its outcomes
are assessed in three case studies of policy formulation. The chapter details the
comparative case study research design, provides details of how interview data and
archival material were gathered, and explains the interpretive approach.
Chapter 5 marks the beginning of the empirical part of the study. It assesses the
demand and supply structure of scientific expertise in Switzerland, and discusses
how these components of the advisory system interact with the political system,
especially with regard to increased political polarization.
Chapters 6–8 are the case study chapters. Each details the role that scientific ex-
pertise played in a particular decision-making process. Chapter 6 analyzes the mo-
bilization of scientific expertise in connection with the federal government’s deci-
sion to initiate a legislative process to govern research with human embryonic stem
cells. Chapter 7 looks at themaking of theCO2 emission reduction act between 1990
and its final enactment in 2000. Chapter 8 looks at the new fiscal equalization re-
form, from its inception in 1991 to a public ballot vote in 2004. Each chapter contains
an overview of the decision-making process and other relevant background infor-
mation, details the influence of path-dependencies on the decision-making process,
and elaborates the mobilization of expertise by different actors. The case studies
then look at how this expertise is deployed in arenas of interaction. Finally, a con-
cluding section offers an interpretation of the findings.
The conclusion, chapter 9, brings the empirical findings from the preceding em-
pirical chapters together and assesses them against the backdrop of the theoretical
framework presented in chapter 3. A discussion of the generalizability of the find-
ings offers a foundation for outlining the study’s implications in terms of the ad-
equacy and efficiency of advisory processes, as well as with regard to democratic
accountability. The thesis concludes with an appraisal of the theoretical contribu-
tions of this research to the study of scientific expertise.

Two
State of the Art
2.1 Introduction
This literature review focuses on conceptual and empirical scholarship connected to
the puzzle of how science informs public policy. The chief rationale for conducting such
a review is the constitution of a frame of reference – a sort of baseline. It informs
the reader of existing research on the matter; it sets the backdrop against which the
relevance of the present research is argued; and it constitutes a substantial input for
the conceptual reasoning developed and presented in the subsequent chapter.
The literature on scientific expertise is massive. But it is profoundly compart-
mentalized. Work has been done in the fields of science and technology studies,
evaluation and knowledge utilization studies, organizational studies, policy analy-
sis and public policy, and – increasingly – by scholars working in economics, health-
care, and environmental sciences who reflect on their own advisory practice. To
date, there has been little sustained and fruitful interaction between the intellectual
communities studying science in policy. The mutual engagement amounts to little
more than political scientists borrowing the concept of ‘knowledge utilization’ from
the literature of the same name (e.g. Boswell, 2009; Schrefler, 2010; Weible, 2008),
while the latter and science studies have largely kept to themselves. An important
aim of this review is thus to bring these bodies of scholarship into contact with
each other. But claiming that one broadly defined phenomenon has commanded
different lineages of conceptual thought neither entails that they are lacking within
themselves, nor that they are a priori incommensurable.
All intellectual endeavors need boundaries in order to derive meaningful in-
sights. This applies to the present review, too. Thus some criteria are necessary for
identifying which scholarship is relevant regarding the phenomenon of interest. In
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Figure 2.1: Issue demarcation along two axes. Source: author’s illustration.
this case, these criteria focus on the direction of transactions between the social do-
mains of science and politics, as well as on the ontological scale of the phenomenon
(Figure 2.1). The first criteria entails a distinction between ‘science in policy’, to
denote the use of scientific inquiry and expertise to inform public problem solv-
ing, and ‘policy for science’, for alluding to policies aimed at governing the funding
and conduct of scientific research. This conceptual template has been laid out by
Harvey Brooks (1964: 76, cited in Jasanoff 1990: 4ff.). But as both he and Jasanoff
(1990) acknowledge, the governance of science (policy for science) cannot be fully
disassociated from science in policy. These different aspects of the relationship be-
tween science and politics are more like two sides of the same coin. For instance,
a particular science funding policy may be the result of the articulation of a prob-
lem through science, which has been taken up by the political system (e.g. climate
change). This reflexivity between science and politics in the production of policy-
relevant research has been acknowledged and advanced as a critique of the image
of science speaking truth to power in a straightforward, unidirectional and linear
fashion (e.g. Böcher, 2007; Habermas, 1976; Hoppe, 1999; Weingart, 2001). The in-
teractive nature of science and politics in society make it clear that distinguishing
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between science in policy and policy for science as an ontological statement falls
short ofwhat is being empirically observed. However, making use of this distinction
as a filter for identifying relevant scholarship dealing primarilywith how science in-
forms policy is quite useful. Occasionally, and as necessary, the aspect of policy for
science will enter this review and other sections of this research, especially when
dealing with science policy.
The second demarcation criteria draws on the continuum between micro and
macro processes of knowledge in politics, as proposed by Radaelli (1995: 177). In
this classification, micro processes are understood as individual or collective ac-
tion phenomena relating to the use of (social) scientific research in policy formu-
lation. Macro processes are located at the structural and institutional level, ex-
amples of which are discourse structuration (cf. Hajer, 1995), policy ideas in the
sense of paradigms (e.g. Hall, 1989), or themore recent ‘discursive institutionalism’
(Schmidt, 2008). This research, and consequently this literature review, is interested
in processes that are located toward the micro pole of the continuum. As a conse-
quence, the literature on policy ideas (e.g. Béland and Cox, 2011; Braun, 1998, 1999;
Schmidt, 2008) will only occasionally be drawn on.
The review is structured around substantively similar clusters of scholarship,
rather than around the research questions. However, the research questions will
serve as an interpretation template for the conclusions. The review begins with
the macro-level relationship between science and politics as it applies to scientific
expertise and explores normative aswell as historical aspects. It then zooms in to in-
vestigate how cognitive properties of policy-relevant science shape its mobilization
in a policy context. At this point, the credibility of such knowledge is discussed.
Next, the review begins to explore knowledge utilization dynamics. This begins
with the presentation of the knowledge utilization concept, followed by discussion
of the factors that shape knowledge use on the individual level. This provides the
stepping stone fromwhich to consider how policy politics and political institutions
influence expertise mobilization in the policy process. A conclusion synthesizes the
findings from the review and outlines the key findings.
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2.2 Ordering models of science in policy
There is a normative as well as an empirical dimension to the relationship between
scientific expertise and democracy. Until the 1960’s, science in policy was treated
primarily as a normative question of how to define the legitimate relationship be-
tween science and politics. This relationship was conceived in terms of a dichotomy
between facts and values, whereby science was considered the ontological domain
of matters of fact and politics as the one of matters of value. In the context of po-
litical problem solving, this fact–value dichotomy engenders a normative problem
of whose authority trumps the other’s in the definition and resolution of collective
problems. If primacy was assigned to politics, then science might become subject to
instrumentalization. However, if it was the other way round, then the democratic
social order would be threatened by technocracy – or guardianship, as Dahl (1998)
calls it. Either way, science in policy seems to constitute a problem of autonomy for
the implicated social domains.
Habermas (1976: 120ff.) takes up this issue in a conceptual-cum-historical analy-
sis where he identifies not only two, but threemodels of interaction between science
and politics, labeled with the adjectives of decisionist, technocratic, and pragmatist.
Habermas associates decisionism with Max Weber’s postulated value neutrality of
the social sciences and the subordination of expertise to the primacy of the polit-
ical. Weber (1949: 54) writes that “[a]n empirical science cannot tell anyone what
he should do – but rather what he can do – and under certain circumstances what
he wishes to do” (original emphasis). Decisionism, thus, presupposes political pri-
macy. For Habermas, this mode of interaction is matched to the rationality require-
ments of bureaucratization and the formation of the nation state. Technocracy, in
contrast, is for Habermas the degradation of politics to a mere agent of technical
necessity, which he diagnoses as the rationality requirement of the post World War
II (WWII) world. At the same time, however, Habermas rejects the idea of clear and
mutually exclusive primacy as too simple a characterization. Inspired by pragmatist
philosopher JohnDewey, he embraces the view that the science-politics relationship
is in fact interactive, because the production of expertise is often dependent on value
considerations for problem formulation, which is a political task. Consequently he
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labels this interactive model as ‘pragmatist’.1 Technocracy vs. decisionism as the
legitimate blueprint for the role of science in policy was subject to a broader intel-
lectual debate in the 1960s, with remarkable differences between the United States
and continental Europe. American scholars were rather distrustful of technocracy
and embraced a decisionist view, whereby science had a legitimate place in enhanc-
ing the rationality of the means of politics, but not as a substitute for politics. In
Europe, however, technocratic ideas had a more benign reception, with ideas about
political planning being en vogue (Maasen and Weingart, 2005: 1).2
But beyond these normative debates, something actually happened to the rela-
tionship between science and politics. After WWII, more and more scientists were
drawn into government to assist in the expansion project of the new welfare state.
As political demand for expertise increased for informing and legitimating policy
choices (the scientifization of politics), expert disagreement was increasingly car-
ried into the public arena instead of the sheltered realm of academia (Weingart,
1999, 2001). Weingart (1999) argues that such public disagreement among experts
contributes to the erosion of scientific credibility. Thus, drawing on expert advice
might actually engender a public controversy, rather than legitimating or enhancing
the instrumental rationality of politics. Finally, expertise has become democratized
because the pressure on the scientific community to be accountable for the public
funding it receives has increased, and because expertise is increasingly in competi-
tion with participation as mode of legitimacy of public action (Maasen and Wein-
gart, 2005). This means that justifying political choices with demands from social
movements, an electoralmandate, or stakeholder preferences obtained throughpar-
ticipatory processes has acquired more authority than referring to an expert opin-
ion. What has also changed since WWII is the structure of government, which in
the age of governance has become less centralized and more open to participation
(Maasen and Weingart, 2005). But how this affects the role and form of science in
policy is an open debate (cf. Falk et al., 2007; Koppo and Schölzel, 2009; Falk et al.,
2010).
1These three modes of interaction have found application as a quasi theory of policy advice
(Lompe, 2006; Sager, 2007) and served as conceptual backbone for more elaborate theories (Hoppe,
2005; Wittrock, 1991).
2On the rise and fall of steering optimism in Europe, see Braun (1995). At the same time, the
virulent finalization debate took place in Germany about the societal role of science (cf. Pfetsch, 1979).
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The normative perspective of how the science–politics relationship should be
organized and the empirical reality of how it actually works in practice may diverge
in their perspective, yet these images are actually interconnected and thereby shape
practices of science in policy. This interconnection comes about when politicians
appeal to the normative image and claim that their policies are substantiated by
objective and disinterested science. Thus, they allude to a clear separation between
politics and science, which for science advice does not exist in that form, but is
crucial for legitimating policy. As Weingart (1999) claims, this is not only rhetorical
action, as will be discussed in section 2.3, but also leads to patterns of drawing on
science advice as if its practice corresponded to the normative image.
2.3 The epistemic dimension of scientific expertise
Scholars investigating scientific expertise have paid much attention to the issue of
the authoritativeness of scientific expertise in the policy arena. Two interrelated
practical concerns have motivated this inquiry. Firstly, the adequacy of social sci-
entific inquiry for social problem solving is critically examined, and it is asked how
such research conforms to user expectations. Secondly, and building on the first
question, scholars are increasingly concernedwith the quality of scientific expertise,
having learned that the latter is subject tomultiple and sometimes contradictory cri-
teria of evaluation (cf. Clark andMajone, 1985). The ensuing scholarship comprises
the rather distinct literatures of knowledge utilization (KU) and of science and tech-
nology studies (STS). KU studies have been preoccupied with the question of what
makes science usable for a policy audience. Research has looked at what criteria
policymakers rely on when they assess policy-relevant science. STS scholars, how-
ever, have been concerned with the credibility and authoritativeness of scientific
expertise.
STS and KU research have problematized the nature of scientific expertise in
different ways. While the KU project is largely about policy-relevant research from
social scientific inquiry, STS has focused more on the ‘hard’ sciences. An important
practical difference is that there is a plurality of sources of policy-oriented social
scientific inquiry. Academic suppliers can be found alongside consultancy firms
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and think tanks. Natural scientific research, conversely, is conducted primarily in
university or government laboratories. Thus, the connection to science and basic
research is much stronger in the latter than in the former. KU scholars talk about
‘systematic evidence’, ‘research information’, ‘policy analysis’ or ‘policy advice’ to
describe the cognitive product of policy-oriented social scientific inquiry (cf. Nut-
ley et al., 2007: 21ff.). STS scholars more readily use terms like ‘science in policy’,
‘scientific expertise’, or ‘regulatory science’ (cf. Weingart and Lentsch, 2008: 19ff.).
There are also different demarcation issues at stake. Especially early KU schol-
ars attached much importance to the distinction between ‘ordinary’ or experience-
based knowledge and systematic inquiry. At issue was the added value of system-
atic knowledge in the professional field of policy, which is dominated by puzzling
and reasoning about highly case-specific and context sensitive issues. Lindblom
and Cohen (1979) argued that the importance of social research for policy formula-
tion is overstated by those who produce it. They contended that systematic inquiry
is but one source of policy-relevant knowledge. Indeed, they attribute a higher prac-
tical value to so-called ‘ordinary knowledge’ or experience-based knowledge for so-
cial problem solving.3 The distinction between ordinary and systematic knowledge
also led to the stance that the former constitutes part of the framework through
which policymakers assess the plausibility of policy research (Emmert, 1985).
For STS, the demarcation issue is about the difference between basic science and
expertise. The defining characteristic of expertise is that it addresses policy-relevant
issues under conditions of uncertainty. Weinberg (1977) argued that policymakers
primarily ask science for predictions rather than observations. Science’s capacity to
predict decreases the less homogeneous the unit of observation is (e.g. predicting
the motion of an inanimate object vs. predicting human action). Moreover, such
predictions often involve complex systems or non-linear effects. As a consequence,
the questions of policymakers to science are often trans-scientific because they reach
beyond the scope of questions science can answer. Nowotny (2000) characterizes
expertise in similar terms. For her, expertise inherently transgresses well defined
epistemic boundaries precisely because it is confronted with trans-scientific ques-
3Whether natural scientific knowledge is an appropriate model for practically relevant social re-
search is also doubted by Flyvbjerg (2001).
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tions. But expertise is also transgressive because it has to link together a very het-
erogeneous body of knowledge in order to derive predictions and because it needs
to communicate to a very heterogeneous and not exclusively scientific audience. It
is then not surprising that expertise is conflict prone. Jasanoff (2005b, 2010) shares
the same conception of expertise and just like Nowotny (2000) thinks that it is nec-
essary to rethink established practices and institutionalized routines of deploying
it. Jasanoff’s argument is that the production of expertise involves three bodies,
each of which needs to be addressed in order to ensure its legitimacy. They are the
knowledge base expertise draws on, the expert as a person, and the institutionalized
bodies through which experts act.
But for STS expertise has not only been an object of inquiry in relationship to ba-
sic research. In the context of risk appraisal, there has been a lively debate about the
place of ‘lay’ or ‘local’ knowledge within expertise. Brian Wynne and others have
persistently argued against the disqualification of local knowledge systems, which
at times uncover flaws of narrow expert rationality (Irwin, 1996;Wynne, 1996). This
has been reflected in the development of practices such as participatory technology
assessment, in which lay citizens deliberate on the risks and benefits of new tech-
nologies. But the recognition of the contribution of lay knowledge also introduces
a demarcation problem in its own right, which Collins and Evans (2007) attempt
to address with a substantive theory of expertise. Nevertheless, the STS debate on
the demarcation of scientific expertise from other knowledge systems should not be
mixed upwith the above-mentioned KU debate on ordinary knowledge; the former
is about the production of expertise, while the latter concerns utilization behavior.
The final difference on the treatment of expertise between KU and STS is the
underlying theory of scientific knowledge. The constructionist approach, predom-
inant in STS, stresses the social processes that underly scientific research. Truth
claims do not achieve credibility on their own, but it is people who settle knowl-
edge controversies. Moreover, social processes influence which problems receive
attention and get funded. An often cited example is the controversy between Pas-
teur and Pouchet about the issue of spontaneous generation of life. Pasteur main-
tained that microscopic life forms can only emerge through reproduction, whereas
Pouchet defended the point of view that such organisms spontaneously emerge. Ul-
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timately, the elite of the Parisian Academy of Sciences, well disposed to Pasteur, set
up a jury to decide the issue and ruled in Pasteur’s favor. That not a demonstration
of facts but a social agreement settled the controversy is one of STS’s core insight. It
is not nature that brings closure to a controversy but an agreement to stop arguing
(Yearley, 2005: 29ff.). Collins and Evans argue that such social mechanisms of set-
tlement also occur outside the walls of academe when experts engage with policy
and society (Collins and Evans, 2002, 2007; Evans and Collins, 2008). However, rec-
ognizing the social nature of knowledge production and validation does not entail
that scientific truth claims bear no resemblance to an external reality. The issue of
realism is a different one (cf. Hacking, 1999).
For the most part, writers in the KU tradition, and also much political science
writing on the policy process and expertise, blackbox the nature of expertise, which
is implicitly conceived as an ‘input’ into the political system. However, as ties be-
tween STS and political science intensify, the propositions that knowledge arrange-
ments are shaped by social forces (Hisschemöller et al., 2001) as well as that exper-
tise is the product of recursive science–politics interactions (Weingart, 2001: 133ff.),
are increasingly taken serious. For some like Nutley et al. (2007: 21ff.), foregoing an
explicit definition of knowledge is even a deliberate strategy because the definition
of accepted knowledge claims is subject to in situ contestation by social actors.
The following discussion will further elaborate on the initial characterizations
of science in policy by addressing two specific questions: firstly, what makes scien-
tific research ‘usable’ for political problem solving? Secondly, how does scientific
expertise acquire and maintain credibility?
The analytical paradigm of policy
Usability of scientific expertise is a matter of customer satisfaction. It therefore mat-
ters how the customer, i.e. civil servants and politicians, perceives such expertise
and what criteria he or she deploys in evaluating it. It is believed that the assess-
ment criteria of scientific evidence used by policy practitioners are not the same as
are used by scientists. According to Garvin (2001), scientists validate research find-
ings according to methodological criteria of validity whereas policymakers judge
them based on the anticipated political, economic and social implications should
24| State of the Art
they be acted on. Moreover, while there are elaborate rules in science for dealing
with conflicting evidence, such as peer review, the political analytical paradigm
deals with it expediently. Political knowledge, so Garvin suggests, is inherently
case specific and contextual and unlike (natural)scientific knowledge, does not lend
itself to generalization.
There is much evidence that the scientific and political analytical paradigms
function differently. For instance, there is no empirical evidence supporting the
claim that methodological properties of research influences its perception by the
policy community. A Canadian survey-based study found no evidence that social
scientific studies using qualitative or quantitativemethods of inquirywould byused
differently (Landry et al., 2001). This is also true in regard to other features of re-
search design. While it has been argued (but without supporting evidence) that
randomized social experiments – e.g. making a particular public service only avail-
able to a randomly chosen trial group in order to test the effectiveness of a policy
intervention – would generate knowledge especially usable because it is essentially
of the same kind of knowledge needed for policy (Stoker, 2010), empirical research
shows that evidence from social experiments is not endowed with special authori-
tativeness and is very much subject to political scrutiny (Greenberg and Mandell,
1991).
More evidence about the specific nature of the political analytical paradigm is
provided by Weiss and Bucuvalas (1980) who identified what they termed a ‘truth’
and a ‘utility’ test. The studied population – American civil servants in state and
federal mental health policy organizations – assess the truthfulness of research re-
ports in terms of scientific rigor (of the research process) and the plausibility of the
research findings on the backdrop of the civil servants’ personal knowledge in the
field. The assessment of scientific rigor becomes more important the more the find-
ings are counterintuitive to personal expectations. The utility test is based on the
perceived relevance of a study, if its findings can be easily translated into policy
(action orientation), and whether or not these findings challenge the status quo. A
study’s perceivedutility increaseswhen it charts possible action alternatives or chal-
lenges the status quo. However, action orientation becomes more important when
a study is not challenging and a challenging study is more likely to be positively
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assessed when its action orientation is low. The study finds no support for the hy-
pothesis that research evaluation is conducted according to political and ideological
criteria.
Also Hall (1989) observed something like a utility test in his explanation of why
the Keynesian framework of macro-economic policy-making has been adopted by
several countries. He argues that policymakers assess a policy idea in terms of its
problem solving capacity, which comprises the economic, administrative, and po-
litical viability. Moreover, he identifies the advent of a new policy elite trained in
the Keynesian paradigm as an important factor, allowing us to make a link to the
plausibility test identified by Weiss and Bucuvalas (1980).
Cash et al. (2002) find further assessment dimensions of scientific expertise. They
state that along with credibility, saliency and legitimacy matter. Moreover, they ar-
gue that these three factors are perceived differently by producers and addressees
of policy-relevant science. Saliency refers to the perceived relevance of scientific in-
formation whereas credibility stands for its perceived plausibility. Thus far, their
argument is congruent with the truth and utility tests identified by Weiss and Bu-
cuvalas (1980). However, legitimacy is a new dimension. It denotes whether the
institutions and procedures whereby the assessed expertise is produced lives up to
expectations of fairness. Thus, it integrates into the assessment the very processes
by which research information is produced and disseminated.
The question of what criteria define usable knowledge has also been studied as
the question of how usable knowledge may be produced. Haas (2004) approaches
this by suggesting that usable knowledge is composed of a substantive core (the
epistemic dimension of scientific expertise) and procedural mechanisms governing
its production and transfer. The characteristics of the substantive core are stake-
holders’ perception of the scientific credibility, political legitimacy and salience of
the knowledge claim. The procedural mechanisms are what insulates research pro-
duction against political interference of research production. Multiple sources of
knowledge, mediated and aggregated by one organization, improve the legitimacy
of knowledge as it decreases possible bias introduced by a single funder.4
Weingart and Lentsch (2008) and Lentsch and Weingart (2011a) further pursue
4See also Wilson (2007) who reaches identical conclusions in a literature review.
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the question about the quality of advisory science. As has been argued by others
(Clark and Majone, 1985; Haas, 2004; Jasanoff, 1990), and is reiterated by Lentsch
and Weingart (2011a), quality assurance of science advice is not to be confused
with peer-review of basic research. Certainly, science advice must be epistemically
sound. More importantly, however, it needs to accomplish the reconciliation of epis-
temic robustness with normative expectations from the world of policy. In short,
science advice has to be credible, it needs to be perceived as legitimate, and it is
required to cater to the decision maker’s knowledge needs. In the editors’ view,
quality assurance of science advice is essentially about how successful an advisory
process is in reconciling these demands, which they attribute to the institutional
design of advisory bodies.
Concluding this section, the literature discussed supports Garvin’s (2001) claim
that there is a distinct political analytical paradigm for the assessment of policy-
relevant science. It is, however, necessary to clarify certain points. Firstly, this lit-
erature seems to be based on the population of civil servants, which constitutes a
highly trained group of quasi experts. Thus, we are left in the dark about whether
this analytical paradigm also applies to elected officials. Secondly, how a study is
assessed does not tell us if and how it is integrated into policy formulation and
design. Finally, it remains somewhat ambiguous to what extend legitimacy and
credibility constitute distinct dimensions. We shall return to this point in the next
section where credibility is discussed in depth.
Scientific credibility as a negotiated product
The credibility of policy-relevant science is one of the assessment criteria discussed
in the previous section. The science studies literature has investigated scientific
credibility in depth and this iswhy the present section discusses this subject in some
detail. This particular literature stresses the importance of social processes involved
in securing the credibility of a truth claim. This means that what we come to be-
lieve about the world is mediated by whom we trust. In the words of Shapin (1995:
257), “[a]ll propositions have to win credibility, and credibility is the outcome of
contingent social and cultural practice”. Scientific credibility has been studied both
in a historical as well as in a contemporary context (e.g. Shapin and Schaffer, 1985).
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Here, however, we shall focus directly on research that looks at how scientific cred-
ibility is secured in the context of science in policy.
Different authors have pointed to the importance of boundary work in securing
the credibility of science (Gieryn, 1983, 1995, 1999; Jasanoff, 1987, 1990). Bound-
ary work is rhetorical fence-building by which ‘real’ science is symbolically demar-
cated from non-scientific claims and other fields of social authority such as poli-
tics (Gieryn, 1983, 1995). The central proposition of boundary work is that the de-
marcation of science from non-scientific systems of knowledge is not established by
Popperian or Mertonian norms of good science, but is the result of highly context-
specific negotiations of what counts as such (Gieryn, 1995: 394ff.). These occur
when “people contend for, legitimate, or challenge the cognitive authority of sci-
ence – and the credibility, prestige, power, and material resources that attend such
a privileged position.” (Gieryn, 1995: 405).
Boundary work takes place when scientists interact with policymakers in or-
der to provide expertise. As Gieryn (1995) argues, there is a symbiotic relationship
between science and politics as both stand to profit from proximity. Through the
delivery of expertise, science can demonstrate its social utility, which is essential
to justify public research funding. By the same token, political decision-makers
can legitimate their decisions by referring to scientific knowledge claims. However,
clear demarcation between science and politics is essential for upholding authority
within their respective ontological domains.
According to Jasanoff (1987), regulatory processes constitute such a situation.
They uncover the indeterminacy of science, which exposes it to strains and politi-
cization. Such deconstruction of scientific knowledge claims, especially in public,
are harmful for science as well as for politics. Not only does it threatens the author-
ity of science, it also reduces science’s capacity to legitimate policy choice on which
policymakers are dependent. Through several case studies on regulatory decision-
making within the United States Environmental Protection Agency and Food and
DrugAdministration, Jasanoff (1987, 1990) showshow such situations are dealtwith
bymaking use of boundarywork. She comes to the conclusion that epistemic uncer-
tainties and indeterminacies are dealt with within these decision-making arenas by
behind-closed-doors consensus-building negotiations between scientists and regu-
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lators, followed by sharp public demarcation in order to legitimize the decision as
being firmly founded on scientific evidence. The ultimate boundary workmust sat-
isfy public expectations about the division of labor between science advisers and
decision-makers in order to uphold the legitimacy of regulatory science. In the
United States context, these expectations frame a decisionist understanding of the
science-politics relationship. Thismeans that expert intervention in public decision-
making is admissible as long as it appears to increase the instrumental rationality of
decision-makers, but its social acceptability vanishes when experts appear to take
decisions (Jasanoff, 1987; Lengwiler, 2007).
Boundary work, it appears, is context sensitive. Jasanoff’s (1987; 1990) work on
regulatory policy-making and the following case studies are all set in the United
States federal government. But even within this particular institutional framework
do we observe differences. For instance, Zehr (2005) shows that scientists’ argu-
mentative patterns in congressional hearing on acid rain held during the 1980swere
characterized by scientists engaged in demarcation boundary work. In contrast, in
the climate change hearings of the 1990s, scientists offered their advisory opinions
muchmore readilywithout resorting to demarcation boundarywork. Zehr explains
this difference with the fact that climate scientists could back up their claims with
the IPCC and the environmental modernization discourse, which constitute argu-
mentative resources acid rain researchers lacked. Comparing the same domains,
Campbell Keller (2009) further shows that the institutional contexts proper to each
phase of the policy process increasingly curtails scientists’ expression of values and
requires ever more boundary work to reaffirm their political neutrality.
Boundary work is not the only concept used for investigating how credibility
contests play out. Looking at how advisory reports by the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) achieve credibility or fail to do so, Hilgartner (2000) argues that how
a study is ‘staged’ in public matters. He develops the concept of stage management
based on the sociology of role play in everyday interaction as proposed by Ervin
Goffman. A performance is staged in front of a public – it is visible. However, there
is also a hidden side of the performance taking place backstage. It must remain
hidden or its exposure would ruin the performance. Hilgartner claims that like a
play, stage management is crucial for the credibility of advisory science. An expert
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report’s credibility is severely affected if its production process involving possible
disagreement among panel members is exposed to the public.
The work of the authors surveyed here strongly suggests that the credibility of
scientific knowledge claims is not the product of prescriptive epistemological cri-
teria. Instead, credibility is the product of discursive strategies that aim to sepa-
rate science from other rival, or autonomy threatening, ontological domains and by
drawing a clear line between the backstage process of advice preparation and the
public presentation of the final product. Credibility is not a given, but the outcome
of a managed process (cf. Bijker et al., 2009). This survey also shows that boundary
work is contextual and may differ across arenas and issues. However, the literature
mainly investigates the American political context. While it is very plausible that
the concept of boundary work is also applicable to other contexts, it remains to be
seen whether it works similarly in different contexts.
2.4 Knowledge utilization
For the past 40 years, researchers working in fields as varied as evaluation stud-
ies, public health, management and organization studies, education, sociology, pol-
icy analysis, and political science have investigated how and under what circum-
stances research is used in policy and practice contexts. This field of the ‘sociology
of knowledge application’ (Holzner and Fischer, 1979), nowadays referred to as
the knowledge utilization (KU) literature, emerged in the United States during the
1970s when the federal government substantially invested into knowledge trans-
fer initiatives in order to stimulate economic growth, to make space and military
technology applicable for civilian purposes, and for adopting innovations by fed-
eral health, education, and human services agencies (Backer, 1991: 229). However,
it was perceived that despite these initiatives supporting the production of policy-
relevant social research, little research was taken up for the governance of social
problems. This perceived ‘mismatch’ between the supply and demand for research
constituted the trigger for much research on knowledge utilization (cf. Weiss and
Bucuvalas, 1980; Wittrock, 1982). Nowadays, the empirical context of knowledge
utilization studies is constituted by the evidence-based policy and practice move-
30| State of the Art
ment that has developedmost prominently in the United Kingdom (cf. Young et al.,
2002), as well as the international diffusion of policy appraisal practices like policy
evaluation and regulatory impact assessment (cf. Dunlop et al., 2012; Radaelli, 2004;
Turnpenny et al., 2009). It is fair to say that much of the KU literature is guided by
the instrumental aim of enhancing the evidentiary basis of policy. Or, in a weaker
formulation, one might say that KU research is problem-driven.
Knowledge utilization, it turns out, is a surprisingly complex phenomenon. The
relative simple assumptions that there is a direct and linear link between a research
finding and its application, and that research use necessarily leads to better out-
comes have been invalidated already by Weiss and Bucuvalas (1980: 9ff.). Yet, this
misconception of research use still lingers among us. Hisschemöller et al. (2001:
13ff.) capture the phenomenon’s complexity by the means of four general princi-
ples:
• The subjectivity thesis holds that any knowledge is ultimately subjectively con-
strued and acquires meaning by individual or collective interpretation. Pre-
existing knowledge, assumptions and beliefs of the knowledge user conse-
quently shape this interpretation.
• At the same time, the corrigibility thesis states that the evidential merit of a
knowledge claim may be assessed by non-arbitrary standards. Thus, there
are epistemic criteria by which knowledge claims can be judged.
• The sociability thesis postulates that the production, dissemination, and appli-
cation of scientific knowledge constitute social processes. These processes are
subject to the influence of social arrangements, which in turn are structured
by power, resources and status. However, such social arrangements, too, are
influenced by knowledge utilization, which makes it a reflexive process.
• Finally, the complexity thesis holds that the production, dissemination, and
use of knowledge constitute interdependent processes. This applies to their
properties as well as to their effects.
In what follows, I will first review how knowledge utilization is conceptualized.
This is followed by a synthesis of factors that enable or inhibit knowledge use.
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Making sense of knowledge use
Knowledge utilization (KU) is a polymorphous and partly contested concept. In
their book-length review of the KU literature, Nutley et al. (2007: Chap. 2) distin-
guish among discrete, continuous, and stage models of knowledge use. The follow-
ing discussion draws on this distinction for structuring the review, but relies for the
most part directly on the original literature.
Among discrete models, three modes of KU are commonly distinguished in the
literature. Instrumental KU broadly frames the translation of a research finding into
a matching practice or policy. It is based on the assumption of rational decision-
making with policy being the necessary outcome of evidence (Oh, 1997). But such
utilization is rarely observed in the real world (Albaek, 1995; Caplan, 1979; Clark
and Majone, 1985; Parsons, 2004; Shulock, 1999). Nevertheless, such a conception
of an instrumental science-to-policy link continues to circulate in the scientific com-
munity and thereby reinforces the view that policymakers systematically ignore
scientific evidence (Wilsdon and Doubleday, 2013: 11). Conceptual KU alludes to
what Weiss (1977, 1979) termed the enlightenment function of research. It captures
the idea that research does not have a direct influence on policy, but gradually al-
ters policymakers’ understanding of policy issues. Weiss (1977) argues that while
the influence pathways of such kind of KU are ambiguous, it nevertheless exerts a
substantial impact over time. And then there is political knowledge utilization. It
is commonly understood as the selective use of research evidence for the ex post le-
gitimation of decisions that have already been taken or of non-decisions. But the
use of research to legitimate rather than inform decisions is not synonymous with
abuse of research. Research information, for instance, can sharpen and substantiate
preexisting views and policy positions (Boswell, 2008; Hughes, 2007). Moreover,
research use in organizations fulfills the symbolic function of signaling the capacity
to take rational and informed decisions (Boswell, 2009). Feldman andMarch (1981:
2), for instance, argue that “information is not simply a basis for action. It is a repre-
sentation of competence and a reaffirmation of social virtue”. Albaek (1995) makes
an even stronger case for taking the legitimation aspect of knowledge in policy se-
riously. According to him, legitimation is an important factor in conflict resolution.
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Reasoned argumentation will not resolve conflicts of interest, he contends, because
such beliefs are more part of utopian ideas about enlightened despotism than the
reality of a democratic society.
There are also alternative conceptualizations of knowledge utilization. White-
man (1985), and building on his work Greenberg and Mandell (1991), have devel-
oped a more continuous utilization typology. It features a dimension distinguishing
between concrete and conceptual use, and another featuring a continuum ranging
from substantive, over elaborative, to strategic use. In this typology, instrumen-
tal and conceptual use are both classified as substantive modes of KU, only distin-
guished by their concrete or conceptual orientation, respectively. The elaborative
mode could be equated to what Boswell (2008) calls ‘substantiating use’. It frames
an incrementalist view where drawing on research evidence serves the purpose of
refining an already existing framework, either on the detail (concrete) or strategic
(conceptual) level. Strategic use, at last, signifies the tactical use of research as am-
munition (cf. Weiss, 1979) when conceived as concrete action, or as a reaffirmation
of preexisting beliefs and ideologies on a conceptual level.
The final kind of KU typology comprises stage models. For instance, Knott and
Wildavsky (1980) argue that KU is not a single discrete action. Instead, they con-
ceive of KU as a process of seven cumulative steps from coming into contact with
research, to cognition, to conviction, to arguing in favor of a congruent policy, to the
adoption of such a policy, to policy implementation, and to a positive outcome in
the real world.
After thoroughly reviewing the literature on the conceptualization of research
use and of the associated empirical findings, Nutley et al. (2007: Chap. 2) reach
some instructive conclusions. They describe research use as a complex process in
which one kind of use may lead to another. For instance, strategic use may en-
gender more instrumental use at a later point in time. But if and how one kind
of utilization leads to another is sometimes quite unpredictable. However, neither
the discrete nor the stage models of research utilization adequately capture such
an interdependence. Discrete utilization models only constitute ‘snapshots in time’
(Nutley et al., 2007: 46). Stage models also have a problematic aspect for they suffer
from the teleological conception that research use must ultimately be instrumental.
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Nutley et al. (2007) are not surprised that studies employing stage models show a
progressive decline of use with each subsequent stage, given that conceptual use
is more likely than instrumental use. Moreover, they see a key weakness in stage
models for they do not account for political or strategic use of research. Given that
one kind of research use may lead to another one, this seems problematic.
Determinants of individual knowledge utilization
After having discussed the utilization concept let us now turn to the factors that
are believed to influence it. There is a wealth of studies investigating knowledge
utilization in a policy and practice contexts. However, rather than reviewing indi-
vidual studies I draw on two authoritative syntheses in order to outline the most
important factors.
In a comprehensive review, Backer (1991) stresses that accomplished (instru-
mental) knowledge utilization implies that social change has taken place. Achieving
change, though, presupposes the availability of resources and awareness of rele-
vant knowledge. Moreover, as change redistributes resources, stakeholders have
to be convinced that the adoption of a particular research-informed idea will work
in the context of application, without engendering negative externalities or high
costs. Thus, change management is of importance. Facilitating conditions in this
process include interpersonal contact; planning and conceptual foresight about the
innovation adoption; outside consultation about the change process; user-oriented
transformation of information; individual and organizational championship for the
innovation; and potential user involvement as facilitating factors affecting knowl-
edge use.
Nutley et al. (2007: 81ff.) offer an even more comprehensive synthesis of the
literature on the determinants of knowledge utilization. They differentiate among
factors related to the research product, the personal characteristics of producers
and users of knowledge, the links between these two groups, and the contexts of
knowledge use. The identified research-related factors greatly overlap with the lit-
erature on the epistemic dimension of science in policy, discussed in section 2.3. On
the producer side, this implies that research has to be credible and provide uncon-
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tested findings.5 In following Lentsch and Weingart (2011a: 8), we can assimilate
this to the label of epistemic robustness. “[E]pistemically robust knowledge claims do
not leave any room for interpretation, cannot be disputed by competing evidence,
and, thus, cannot be abused.” (ibid). Moreover, and this is in linewith the definition
of political robustness,6 research needs high-level political endorsement, takes into
account local preferences, is timely and relevant for the user audience and takes its
preferences into account while being presented in an easily accessible format.
The personal characteristics of research users and producers comprise the fol-
lowing elements: Individuals are more likely to use research when they have a pos-
itive attitude towards the utility of research use and have the cognitive skills to in-
terpret research evidence. Similarly, researchers’ lacking knowhow about research
dissemination impedes knowledge utilization.
In terms of linkage properties, individual and organizational knowledge bro-
kers can effectively bridge between research producers and its audience. This also
applies for direct interaction between producers and its audience, especially when
this takes place in form of face-to-face interaction (also stressed by Shapin, 1995) or
through channels that allow for two-way exchange of information.
Nutley et al. (2007) also identify contextual elements from the literature, pertain-
ing both to research production and use. Contextual factors of the policy arena that
are conducive to research uptake are the congruence of the proposed research with
the prevailing ideology and agency interests, as well as with established ways of
thinking and acting. Also an organizational culture that is supportive of evidence
use is seen to matter. Moreover, an open political system and social arrangements
that bring researchers and policymakers into contact are judged favorable.
As instructive this literature is, it essentially focuses on the individual as unit of
analysis. Especially in survey research, it is the individual who looks for informa-
tion and processes it, andwhen contextual factors are examined, they are construed
as influencing the individual’s propensity to interact with research in a given way.
5In regards to the use of social science in environmental decision-making, Renn (2001) argues that
in case of expert disagreement, it is crucial that they agree at least on what they disagree about.
6“Political robustness of knowledge refers to the acceptability and the feasibility to implement
recommendations based on it. An advice is robust if it can be politically implemented and meets the
needs of the policymakers. Political robustness normally implies that the knowledge and the prefer-
ences of those who can be considered stakeholders are taken into account” (Lentsch and Weingart,
2011a: 8).
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For Nutley et al. (2007: 302), the consequence is that
"we know less about the potential for research to enter policy and practice at the organ-
isational or system levels, in ways in which individuals may in fact be unaware. Much
of what we do know about the use of research . . . concerns individual-level processes
alone."
Also limiting is the tendency of KU research to focus on practice and policy
domains where the state acts as a provider of services to individuals, as is the case
in education, the criminal justice system, and public health. This leaves a blind spot
on policy problems implicating complex social or ecological systems.
2.5 Expert advice in the policy process
From a public policy perspective, the Achilles heel of the aforementioned KU lit-
erature consists in its methodological individualism. Most empirical work is done
using survey methods to assess attributes of individuals, or how certain environ-
mental conditions affect those individuals. However, designing, adopting, and im-
plementing public policy are collective action processes which predominantly in-
volve composite actors (Scharpf, 1997: Chap. 3). Consequently, processes of in-
formation processing have to be construed in social rather than individual terms.
There is a growing body of (still primarily theoretical) scholarship that investigates
the role of scientific expertise, which takes the social ontology of the policy process
seriously. There are also some overlaps with the development of theories of policy
change.7 One way these policy process frameworks refer to academic expertise is
by ascribing to it a role in building, reinforcing and challenging a particular policy
frame. Because policy is conceived of as an actualization of a particular frame, ex-
pertise indirectly influences policy stability and change through shaping of frames
(Weible, 2008). The bulk of scholarship, however, does not belong to such a frame-
work. Among the contributions to be discussed below, some are concerned with
how particular conflict structures shape the mobilization of expertise. Others look
at the relationship between legitimacy seeking and the role of expertise therein. Fi-
nally, there is scholarship that looks at advisory systems.
7See the volume edited by Sabatier (2007) for a comprehensive overview.
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Conflict theories
The common denominator of the scholarship reviewed in this section derives from
a concernwith policy politics as the driver of expertisemobilization. Yet howpolicy
politics is conceived of varies between the different contributors. To begin with, the
‘advocacy coalition framework’ (ACF) (Sabatier andWeible, 2007) is an explanatory
framework of policy change that integrates traditional explanatory factors, such as
interests and resources, with cognitive ones, such as beliefs held by policymakers
about cause and effect relationships that affect the policy issues they consider. It
is believed that such causal beliefs shape decision-making. Research and knowl-
edge utilization are central aspects of politics within ACF because policy disputes
are conceived as disputes about the validity of causal beliefs about the world, as
embraced by a particular policy community (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1988: 123;
Sabatier 1988).
ACF scholars have conceptualized the role of science and scientists in policy in
two rather distinct ways. Firstly, scientists are seen as coalition members. Thus,
they are not apolitical bystanders. The ACF emphasizes coalition membership of
scientists because they constitute a strategic coalition resource. Coalitions use re-
search and analysis to learn how a given situation affects their interests and val-
ues. Research utilization thus aims to secure the coherence of their own coalition
through discrediting opponents’ views and enlisting the support of public opinion
(Sabatier andWeible, 2007: 152, 203). How research is used in a subsystem is a func-
tion of subsystem conflict levels (Weible, 2008; Weible et al., 2010). A distinction
is commonly made between unitary subsystems with a single coalition, collabora-
tive subsystems with two coalitions, and adversarial subsystems within which two
coalitions oppose each other. Weible et al. (2010: 528) assume that
• adversarial subsystems are conducive to the political use of expertise;
• instrumental use declines with increasing levels of conflict;
• learning in unitary and adversarial subsystems takes place within coalitions
and across coalitions, in the case of a collaborative subsystem;
• adversary subsystems more readily enroll scientists as coalition member;
• coalition members are more likely to coordinate with scientists when analyti-
cal approaches and policy core beliefs are congruent.
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But the view that (political) conflict drives research utilization is challenged by
Montpetit (2011), who argues that science itself may constitute a source of disagree-
ment. Hence, the division among scientists may not necessarily be the product but
the cause of subsystem conflict. He empirically substantiates this argument by draw-
ing on his research on biotechnology subsystems.
The secondway the ACF speaks to science in policy is more subtle and concerns
values about political participation embedded in actors’ belief system (Sabatier,
1988: 145). Such norms are about who legitimate participants in policy formulation
are. Implicit in these values is a double dichotomy between different and mutually
exclusive classes of policy participants, which pitches the elite vs. the public, on
the one hand, and experts against elected officials, on the other. As policy core be-
liefs concern a particular subsystem and also form the locus of coalition formation,
such participatory norms are likely to shape accepted ideas about how scientists
and political actors should cooperate in a particular policy domain. This is illus-
trated by a case study of a natural resource management subsystem (Weible et al.,
2004). It shows that a particular model of science-politics interaction asserting sci-
entific primacy (science-push) prevailed, especially among scientists, even after the
National Research Council revised its approach on natural resource management
from a science-centric to a participatory one.
In a theoretical contribution, Braun (1998) ponders the possible contributions
of scientific advice to political problem solving and how different conflict struc-
tures in policy arenas may influence this. His reasoning revolves around situations
of positive coordination in which all conflicting parties stand to gain from a solu-
tion, but processual uncertainties complicate the search for a welfare-maximizing
policy alternative. Braun contends that issues where positive coordination is pos-
sible are framed by conflicts about (monetary) distribution, conflicts about beliefs,
and ‘puzzling’. Issues fall somewhere between these three poles, and the politics
of their resolution strongly depends on relative proximity to them. Redistributive
and value issues (e.g. abortion) are not part of that problem circle, because they are
structured as a zero-sum game: what one party gets, the other loses. Braun argues
that in such situations, as well as in purely routine politics, there is little room or
need for scientific expertise. This also applies to purely distributional issues where
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other means than expertise (e.g. side payments) are necessary to obtain an opti-
mal solution. This leaves arenas marked by conflicting beliefs or by puzzling as
two possible avenues for scientific expertise. The former is dominated by advocacy
coalition politics, where ill-structured distributional conflicts are transposed onto
an ideational dimension. It is a situation where the question is not ‘who gets what’,
but ‘what is the acceptable definition of welfare’, and thus of whose definition wins
out. While such a situation is conducive for politicizing experts by enrolling them
into a coalition, Braun somewhat diffuses the specter of experts as mere guns for
hire to support whatever position is in demand. He reminds us that only reputedly
independent expertise enjoys authority and that experts are ultimately also depen-
dent on the functional constraints imposed by the science system. Thus, there are
limits to unfettered expert pluralism. In contrast to ideational struggle about wel-
fare definition, puzzling is induced by pressure from problems that are increasingly
interdependent and complex. In such situations experts play a key role as rational-
ization agents of politics. Advisory institutions as well as epistemic communities
provide a forum in which (technocratic) puzzling over complex problems is possi-
ble. While such experts are very much part of politics, their independence is as-
sured by the fact that they are not driven by the (material) payoff from a certain
policy alternative. Instead, based on their scientific insights, they strive for welfare
optimization for a given problem.
Based on these considerations, Braun (1998: 813ff.) proposes a list of situations
in which scientific expertise may be relied on as a resource for positive coordina-
tion. They encompass instances where scientifically reducible uncertainty means
that problem framing and the identification of solutions are delayed; when new
problems emerge that lack a problem solving routine; when problems are complex
and interdependent; and when policies implicate professional systems such as sci-
ence, law, health or education. Moreover, experts may arbitrate on contested matter
of fact issues in relatively depoliticized issues. Finally, expertise may be drawn on
for the evaluation of policy instruments.
Another way to frame policy politics and connect it to the mobilization of scien-
tific expertise consists of characterizing the context of political problem solving in
terms of conflict around the value–fact dichotomy. This theoretical construct lends
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Table 2.1: Value and fact conflicts in problem solving
Knowledge
Certain Uncertain
Co
ns
en
t
A Utopian rationalism based on scien-
tistic approach offering expert means
to achieve agreed ends
Decisionism: relying on the decision-
maker to choose from options and
give weight to particular experts
B Problem: technical; Solution: calcula-
tion
Problem: information; Solution: re-
search
C Science as problem solver Science as analyst or advocate
V
al
ue
s D Instrumental use (routine) Instrumental use geared towards
learning
D
iss
en
t
A Expert ‘neutrality’, which is diffi-
cult to achieve because of demands
for partisan advice to fulfill strategic
goals
Pragmatic rationalism is the aim,
seeking to clarify issues and to
reach robust conclusions to satisfy
commonly-found problems
B Problem: (dis)Agreement; Solution:
Coercion or Discussion
Problem: knowledge and consent;
Solution: ?
C Science as mediator Science as problem recognizer
D Strategic use Symbolic use or nonuse
A Ezrahi 1980; Rip 1985
B Douglas and Wildavsky 1982
C Hisschemöller and Hoppe 2001; Hoppe 2010; Hoppe and Wesselink 2011
D Schrefler 2010
itself to a four-celled typology, depicted in Table 2.1. The table compares themodal-
ities of expertise mobilization that different authors have come upwith. While indi-
vidual authors might use slightly different conceptual language, the patterns they
describe are strikingly coherent.
Expertise and political legitimacy
Alongside contributions that develop associations between conflict among (subsys-
tem) participants in the policy process are others that stress the need of represen-
tative governments to ensure the legitimacy of their rule. They conceive scientific
expertise as a means for securing legitimacy, which, under certain circumstances, is
more or less effective.
Topf’s reflection on how governments draw on expert advice concerns liberal
democracies. He writes that
“[t]he political formula of liberal democracy holds that the authority of elected gov-
ernments lies in their being responsible and accountable to the electorate. It is by the
success of their policies that governments submit themselves to judgment. By the same
40| State of the Art
token, it is by demonstrating the policy failures of incumbent governments, and the su-
periority of their own policies, that opposition parties (putative governments) seek to
replace them” (Topf, 1993: 184).
Topf further premises that the high value attributed to rationality in contem-
porary political culture obliges policymakers to demonstrate that they take into
account relevant and authoritative social knowledge about the policy area in ques-
tion. Such knowledge can either be ‘representative knowledge’ – that is, stakeholder
knowledge – or be founded on expert pronouncements (Topf, 1993: 189). What
matters, Topf argues, is not only whose knowledge is taken into account, but also
the perceived legitimacy of the process by which advice is proffered and received.
Topf contends that how and when governments draw on expertise is determined
by the issue at hand. Issues are defined as problems that receive recognition on the
political agenda. Topf pitches them against business as usual routines of public ac-
tion.8 Issues either implicate an existing routine, a dysfunctional one, or one that
has yet to be defined. In the case of an existing routine, government has already
put forward a problem diagnosis prior to the current term in office, either from the
position of a contender or an incumbent. The problem diagnosis has consequently
been validated by the election. Nevertheless, expert knowledge is not superfluous
as the incumbent is in a situation of having to devise authoritative indicators that
account how successful the government’s action is in achieving the declared ob-
jective. As policy failure invites adjustment rather than the redefinition of policy
objectives, there is no particular value goal implicated in agenda setting that might
interfere with rational scrutiny of problem and solution. Topf thinks that in such an
instance, government first turns to its own bureaucracy for expert advice, especially
when matters are urgent – as might be the case in an epidemic. However, in the ab-
sence of such urgency, as well as when the government’s expertise is contested by
the relevant professional community, a study commission might be set up. Setting
up a commission will then provide an authoritative basis for future policy while
taking the issue off the agenda. Finally, when the state claims responsibility for a
8This seems identical to the distinction made between subsystem and macro politics by the punc-
tuated equilibrium framework (cf. True et al., 2007). While issues do not necessarily belong to an
existing domain of public action, the public visibility bestowed upon them by the media is what sep-
arates them from other public action such as policy implementation, which may go largely unnoticed
by the larger public.
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new issue, Topf thinks that government would go about mandating research (e.g.
launch of a directed research program).
Building on her empirical investigation of the use of migration research in Ger-
many, the UK and the European Commission, Boswell (2009) proposes a theory of
knowledge utilization that aims to explain variation in terms of policy areas. Her
first argument is that research use behavior is conditional on how organizations
derive legitimacy. Organizations may do so through output or through symbolic
adjustment to rhetoric or formal structure.9 Instrumental utilization prevails in the
former, while the latter is marked by symbolic utilization. For output-oriented le-
gitimacy, outcomes of a policy initiative must achieve visibility; that is, they must
be identifiable through some measure which then is picked up through the mass
media, and the responsibility for this actionmust be attributed to the organization.10
Themode of securing legitimacy changes to symbolic adjustment (making a speech,
promising the elaboration of a plan of action, setting up a task force etc.) when at-
tribution is high, but visibility of the effect is low. When neither characteristic is
present, legitimacy-seeking is absent. Such modes of legitimacy seeking are not in-
trinsic to a particular policy area, but are the result of political dynamics. Boswell
argues that symbolic utilization prevails in areas where the policy community val-
ues expert opinion as more authoritative than arguments advanced by laypersons
or interest-based groups. She terms this a ‘technocratic’ as opposed to a ‘demo-
cratic’ mode of settlement. Instrumental use is ultimately a consequence of a poli-
cymaker’s belief that drawing on expert knowledge can actually make a difference
in terms of policy output.
Patzwaldt (2008) offers an analysis of scientific advice in German labor market
policy under the Schröder government. She suggests that scientific expertise is a re-
source for enhancing the legitimacy of political decisions (with participation being
another legitimatory resource). However, this legitimacy enhancing effect is condi-
tional on the recognition of experts as legitimate participants in that policy area by
other subsystem participants, as well as by the interested public at large. Her con-
tention is that government cannot derive legitimacy for its decisions by unilaterally
9The latter captures the notion of ‘procedural legitimacy’ (cf. Bekkers and Edwards, 2007: 38).
10Attribution, it appears, is not necessarily performed by the media, otherwise the combination of
low visibility and high attribution would be logically impossible.
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mobilizing scientific expertise. Instead, the organization of the production and con-
sultation process of scientific expertise needs to take into account the expectations
of other powerful actors. The empirical analysis focuses on the question of how
such expectations influence governmental actors in their decision to organize scien-
tific advice, either under a regime of dependency (ad hoc structures, with advisers
subordinated under a hierarchical control and command structure) or of voluntary
cooperation (the desire to be relevant and to exert influence motivates independent
and institutionalized advisory bodies to identify with the principal’s objectives).
Patzwaldt’s empirical analysis shows that governmental actors used scientific ex-
pertise very strategically in order to garner support for their political vision. Their
general expectation of advice was that it should be congruent with their political
agenda. This wasmademanifest in the creation of a number of ad hoc advisory bod-
ies whose general thrust wasmore easilymalleable than the positions of preexisting
institutionalized advisory organizations. Where opportunities for the political con-
trol of advice were not given, the selective use or ignorance of arguments as well
as attempts to silence unwelcome advice were deployed as a containment strategy.
Moreover, once a temporary committee outlived the government’s strategic interest,
it was suddenly left without the political support it previously received. Political
actors only showed themselves receptive to advisory arguments when they lacked
their own analytical resources, when they had not yet formed their own position,
or when the latter was supported by the expertise. Patzwaldt also shows that advi-
sory actors were not in a position to defend an independent argument in the policy
arena. Instead, their arguments could only penetrate that space when they were
brought in by a legitimate political actor that supported them.
Advisory systems
Studies comparing the functioning of scientific expertise across countries are sparse.
Individual case studies focusing on one country or even on a single aspect of a na-
tional advisory system dominate the literature.11 While it is thus possible to form
11See the following edited volumes for examples: Barker and Peters (1993), Benz (2012), Bröchler
and Schützeichel (2008), Lentsch and Weingart (2009b), Lentsch and Weingart (2011c), Peters and
Barker (1993), and Weiss et al. (1991).
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an image of a particular national context,12 these contributions mostly lack system-
atic reflection on how advisory arrangements relate to the political systems they are
part of.
A recent effort, spearheaded by Justus Lentsch and Peter Weingart, aims for
more systematization, but only focuses on the supply of advisory science. Start-
ing out from the premise that successful advisory organizations must produce ex-
pertise that is at once epistemically and politically robust, they evaluated German
advisory institutions (Weingart and Lentsch, 2008) and compiled two volumes of
case studies on different countries (Lentsch and Weingart, 2009b, 2011c). But this
enterprise lacks a genuine comparative heuristic, as Lentsch and Weingart them-
selves acknowledge (Lentsch and Weingart, 2009a).
Equally supply focused is work in a policy analytical tradition on advisory sys-
tems. Such work is not focused specifically on scientific expertise, but aims to un-
derstand the organization of all sources of advice within a political system. Craft
and Howlett (2012), for instance, develop and present a model that aims to classify
advice regarding its content. They distinguish between a substantive/procedural
dimension (content vs. strategy focus of advice) and a time horizon (reactive vs. an-
ticipatory). While such a typology certainly constitutes a clear heuristic amenable
to comparisons, it, too, lacks integration with the institutional and cultural factors
of a political system.
There are, however, comparative models, which conceive of systems of exper-
tise as embedded in particular national political cultures. Renn (Renn 1995 cited
in Heinrichs 2002: 50), for instance, distinguishes between adversarial, fiduciary,
consensual, and corporatist models to describe the role of scientific expertise in a
particular cultural context. An adversarial culture of expertise, typically the case
of the US, revolves around the publicly visible validation of competing empirical
claims. In the fiduciary system, which Renn attributes to Southern Europe, experts,
based on personal connections, provide background knowledge and advice to po-
litical leaders, who take it upon themselves to define what constitutes the common
good. The consensual model, prevalent in Japan, and the Northern European cor-
12The organization of scientific advice in the US, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, and France is
relatively well documented.
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poratist model have in common that experts are involved alongside interest group
representatives in policy negotiations. Such negotiations are less formalized and
not publicly visible in the consensus model, whereas interests, including those of
experts, are more clearly and transparently articulated in the corporatist model.
Jasanoff’s concept of civic epistemology (Jasanoff, 2005a), joins Renn’s earlier iden-
tification of expertise cultures. Civic epistemologies are politico-scientific cultures13
which condition national responses to biotechnological issues such as stem cell re-
search, abortion, genetically modified organisms, etc. By employing this concept,
Jasanoff shows that responses to these issues have been significantly different in
the US, Britain, and Germany, but that the type of response has remained consid-
erably consistent across issues within a given polity. Of special relevance regard-
ing national cultures of expertise are her discussions of the basis of trust in expert
knowledge claims; the foundation on which somebody is recognized as an expert;
and the visibility of expertise bodies. In the adversarial US context, settlement of
competing claims of expertise works through litigation. In Britain, trust is based on
the expert’s persona as a servant in the public’s interest. And in Germany trust is
largely role-based, meaning that a particular person comes to be trusted as an expert
because of his or her affiliation, rather than personal virtue. This dimension is not
entirely disconnected from what makes somebody an expert. In the US it is profes-
sional qualification and merit, while personal experience is valued in Britain, and
German political culture conceives experts almost as ambassadors of a particular
field of knowledge. Lastly, there are also differences in the transparency require-
ments of advisory councils, which are most far-reaching in the US, with Britain in
the middle, and Germany at the tail.
While not explicitly designed as a cross-country comparison heuristic, theDutch
concept of boundary arrangement also proposes concepts for capturing the organi-
zation of advisory systems. Its proponents argue that science advice consists of
both demarcation between science and politics, as well as coordination between these
realms (Bijker et al., 2009; Halffman, 2003; Hoppe, 2005). Demarcation and coor-
13 Jasanoff (2005a: 259) discriminates among six dimensions of civic epistemologies: 1) styles of
public knowledge-making; 2) public accountability and the basis of trust in expertise; 3) demonstra-
tion practices of the effects of technoscience; 4) the registers of objectivity; 5) the foundations of ex-
pertise; 6) the visibility of expertise bodies.
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dination are seen as two faces of the same coin. Boundary work (demarcation) is
necessary for expertise production in order to delimit the participants in the trans-
action and prescribe their roles. Boundary work constitutes the precondition for
cross-boundary coordination to occur. Coordination implies the mutual stabiliza-
tion of expectations about what constitutes acceptable roles and practices in cross-
boundary interactions. In Hoppe’s words:
“the simultaneous practices of demarcation and coordination together form boundary
arrangements. They are systematized versions of how actors conceive of the division of
labor between science and politics, conceptions or discourses that can be mobilized in
boundary work (in more or less consistent ways)” (Hoppe, 2005: 206).
Boundary arrangements are enacted through discursive practices and thereby
structure advisory work within organizations or entire policy fields. Hoppe (2005)
argues that there is a plurality of possible boundary arrangements, which are de-
fined by the terms of the science–politics division of labor. Such terms take into
account the primacy of science or politics in issue definition and whether problem
solving is pursued in cooperative or antagonistic terms. This context specific under-
standing of the division of labor is made explicit in boundary work discourses. An
empirical validation of this proposition confirms the postulated diversity of bound-
ary discourses and the self-ascribed roles of actors involved in science–politics trans-
actions (Hoppe, 2009).
Not only is there great variety in the perceived roles enacted by boundary work-
ers, there is also variability across time. Scholten (2009) analyzes the production of
migration research by the Dutch scientific council for government policy. His anal-
ysis shows that there are variations in boundary arrangements over time that have
been actively shaped by the council. Boundary organizations are thus not passive
boundary stabilizers but engage actively in boundary work. Similarly, Scholten and
Timmermans (2010) ask whether there is a link between the observed boundary
arrangement and the prevailing policy image in migration policy. In a paper com-
paring theNetherlands, theUnitedKingdomand France, they show just that. While
policy punctuation follows country-specific institutional logics, the authors find
that a multiculturalist policy image coincided with a technocratic mode of science–
politics coordination. The latter accords issue control to science while the science–
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politics boundary is relatively diffuse. The emergence of a universalist policy image
also displays connections to a mode of coordination that accords more primacy to
politics and tends to draw a sharper boundary between politics and science (en-
lightenment). Finally, an assimilationist image emerged, yet again connected to a
different coordination mode of engineering. The latter denotes political primacy
with a relatively diffuse boundary.
In conclusion, typologies of expertise organization, the concept of civic episte-
mology, and that of boundary arrangement constitute tools that enable comparative
thinking, even though truly comparative empirical studies remain scarce.14
2.6 Taking stock
In this chapter I have discussed literature pertaining to three broad aspects of sci-
entific expertise. Firstly, I introduced normative principles that govern societal ex-
pectations regarding the legitimate place of science in policy. Secondly, I turned
to the cognitive dimensions of scientific expertise. This implied the presentation
of different conceptions of expertise, the political appraisal thereof, and the social
processes by which scientific truth claims acquire credibility. Lastly, I devoted sub-
stantial attention to exploring the dynamics of expertise mobilization. On the one
hand this involved a close look at the concept of knowledge utilization and its em-
pirical determinants at the individual level. Understanding expertise mobilization
as a product of collective action, on the other hand, involved examination of public
policy theories about expertise.
Arriving at the end of the review, it is time to take stock. The review itself was
inductively structured according to the common denominators of a particular clus-
ter of literature. This final assessment, however, should be carried out through the
lens of the research as awhole in order to bemade useful. To beginwith, this assess-
ment should yield insights into the ontology of scientific expertise. Then, it should
provide answers to the two research questions about the determinants of expertise
mobilization, and the consequence(s) of the latter on the policy process.
14 Jasanoff (2005a) offers the most accomplished study in that regard. Boswell (2009) and Scholten
(2011) contain comparative elements, which are, however, not as clearly specified as in Jasanoff (2005a).
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The ontology of scientific expertise
Concisely stated, the ontology of scientific expertise may be summarized by two
statements: it is more than information; and it is a geniunely social phenomenon.
To beginwith the first, scientific authority constitutes a symbolic resource and is de-
ployed as such in the policy process. Like scientific propositions, policy proposals
must also win credibility in order to gain the support of a majority. Early modern
science developed social technologies of credibility that have been extremely suc-
cessful inmediating trust through institutions. These technologies have also proven
very influential in the design of representative democracies. Because of this, science
has acquired a significant cultural authority in Western societies (Ezrahi, 1990; La-
tour, 1993; Shapin and Schaffer, 1985). When policymakers draw on science, it is not
just to informpolicies, but also to bestow their proposalswith the symbolic values of
rationality and objectivity that science stands for (Albaek, 1995; Boswell, 2009; Feld-
man andMarch, 1981). Examples of such performances include President Obama’s
first inaugural address, in which he promised to ‘restore science to its rightful place’
(Obama, 2009), as well as the UK’s labor government under Tony Blair with its pro-
gram of evidence-based policy-making (cf. Parsons, 2002). Positivistically inclined
researchers employing the utilization concept tend to distinguish between proper
and improper use of expertise. Only when there is ‘instrumental’ or ‘conceptual’
(i.e. policy learning) utilization does the latter have an effect, while any other use is
just beating around the bush (cf. James and Jorgensen, 2009). This is a very narrow
vision and has led to a neglect of the effects of science in policy other than ‘dis-
cursive’ ones, which leave traces in policy proposals and decisions. However, the
reviewed literature offers several examples that warrant a serious examination of
what one might call scientific expertise’s ‘unintended’ consequences in policy.
Regarding the social nature of scientific expertise, it is more appropriate to char-
acterized it as a process of knowledge creation rather than the aggregation and com-
munication of pre-existing knowledge. Much thinking about scientific expertise is
based on an asocial model of science which conceives of knowledge production as
free from any social influence. Consequently, scientific expertise is construed as
something established and given prior to being engaged with in a policy context, in
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which it is presented in a purified form, devoid of any social attachments.15 Such a
notion of expertise does not only black-box the social, it also suggests a linear pro-
cess from knowledge to action (cf. Sarewitz, 2004). But this conception of scientific
expertise is flawed (Böcher, 2007). Scholarship in the tradition of social studies of
science consistently shows that scientific propositions win credibility as part of a
negotiated social process and that controversies are settled by social agreement, not
by facts alone (cf. Yearley, 2005: 29).16 In the case of scientific expertise, agreement
about what constitutes the relevant knowledge base is part of the advisory process
itself. Thus, knowledge production stretches well into policy negotiations them-
selves (Jasanoff, 1990). In fact, it may well be possible, as was the case for the Mon-
treal Protocol on ozone depletion, that political action precedes scientific consensus
– despite the fact that the Montreal Protocol is a celebrated case of science-based
policy (Pielke Jr., 2010).
What explains expertise mobilization
The KU and policy process literatures form a basis for deriving insights into the
causes of expertise mobilization. The presentation of the KU concept revealed that
research use takes on different forms, often described as instrumental, conceptual
(or enlightenment), symbolic, and strategical uses. To be clear, KU is fundamentally
a behavioral concept. It has been consistently applied to the study of research uti-
lization by individuals, using survey methods. Consequently, and to reiterate the
verdict of Nutley et al. (2007: 302) quoted earlier (section 2.4), “[m]uch of what we
do know about the use of research . . . concerns individual-level processes alone.”
Given the collective action nature of public policy processes, behavioral stud-
ies of research utilization are thus of limited value. This is where political science
scholarship comes in. While the latter takes collective action seriously (as does
STS), some contemporary political science scholarship on scientific expertise (e.g.
Boswell, 2009; Schrefler, 2010; Weible, 2008; Weible and Sabatier, 2009) has unques-
tioningly adopted the knowledge utilization concept. Somewhere along the road,
15On the notion of purification and its importance for modern science, see Callon et al. (2009).
16This is not to say that scientific facts lack a realistic foundation and that political relativism is
justified. However, the quote ‘everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not his own facts’, attributed
to Daniel Patrick Moynihan, falls short because facts don’t speak for themselves, but require social
arrangements in order to acquire credibility.
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the knowledge utilization concept has simply been scaled up from individual be-
havior to the description of interactions between collective actors.
Nonetheless, conflict theories (section 2.5), in particular, demonstrate that scien-
tific expertise may play different roles in public policy, depending on the dynamics
of policy politics. Scientific expertise may be deployed in an engineering-like ca-
pacity when goal conflicts and knowledge controversies are absent. It may equally
contribute to ‘puzzling’17 when goals are agreed on, but knowledge is uncertain.
However, when knowledge is certain but goals are contested, then scientific exper-
tise can at best play a mediating role. Finally, when knowledge and goals are con-
tested, there is little space for expertise, other than in clarifying what is at stake.
The legitimacy theories (cf. section 2.5) nicely underscore to what extent the mobi-
lization of scientific expertise is a means for achieving political currency (i.e. legiti-
macy), which is quite the opposite from the scientistic conception of speaking truth
to power.
While the conflict theories lay a foundation for comparative work across differ-
ent policy subsystems, the review could not find much literature on cross-national
comparison. There are different national cultures of science in politics, as a result of
different national historical experiences (Jasanoff, 2005a). But there is little empir-
ical evidence for the conclusion either that every country is a unique case, or that
there are countries that share substantive features in their advisory regimes.
At this point, theoretical contributions still outweigh empirical scholarship. In
many cases, this yields clean-looking typologies that sometimesmake us forget that
empirical policy processes cannot readily be tamed to fit squarely into a single cat-
egory.
Outcomes of expertise mobilization
What are the outcomes of experts and expertise becoming part of the policy pro-
cess? The longstanding answer has been that the cognitive product of expertise
informs solutions to political problems. Over time, however, this assertion has be-
come somewhatmore nuanced, as the tagline “from speaking truth tomaking sense
17Hugh Heclo (1974: 305) wrote that “[p]olicy-making is a form of collective puzzlement on soci-
ety’s behalf; it entails both deciding and knowing” (cited in Owens, 2011: 74).
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together” (Hoppe, 1999) aptly describes. Initially framed as direct and unmediated
impact on policy solutions, the knowledge utilization literature was quick to real-
ize that expertise rarely produces such effects. Instead, the trickle-down image of
‘conceptual’ or enlightenment use (i.e. learning) has taken hold (cf. Weiss, 1977).
It essentially means that we know that the involvement of expertise in matters of
policy does produce consequences over time, but that the mechanisms at work are
often poorly visible and hard to identify (see also Owens, 2011).
But in the light of the two ontological lessons that scientific expertise is at once
more than information and a social process, it is important to look for effects of
expertise beyond thought and talk. The KU concept falls clearly short here. It is
naive regarding agency, as it mingles (individual) action intentions with their con-
sequences (the force of deliberate intention frequently gets lost between arguing
strategically with science today, and learning together in a few years’ time). More-
over, the cognitive orientation remains present even in ‘symbolic’ utilization, as it is
framed as pretending to do the real thing instead of doing it, and not as something
different altogether. We are left asking, then: what alternative consequences may
the mobilization of expertise engender?
To begin with, the mobilization of expertise does not only produce agreement
and consensus; it may also be a driver of conflict. It is suggested that science fuels
rather than appeases value conflicts in policy and becomes politicized in the process
(Montpetit, 2011; Sarewitz, 2004). When the importance of science as a resource for
policymakers in a controversy increases, it is likely that all involved actors look for
scientific arguments that they can mobilize to support their own claims (cf. Weible
2008; Nutley et al. 2007: 51ff.). Science becomes politicized in the process because
this dynamic drags intra-scientific antagonism – necessary and normal within sci-
ence – into a context where science is expected to defend a consensual opinion if it is
to speak in the name of truth (Weingart, 1999). Hence, the mobilization of science
has an impact on politics.
Moreover, social arrangements that proffer scientific expertise may engender
structural effects in addition to cognitive ones. Discussing think tanks, Stone (1996:
218ff.) argues for considering the tangible influence they exert through member-
ship in policy networks (see also Medvetz, 2012). Guston (1999: 91) points in the
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same direction when he defines the success of ‘boundary organizations’18 in terms
of the capacity to stabilize the science–politics boundary through the internaliza-
tion of boundary negotiations. Lentsch and Weingart (2011b) similarly talk about
the need for advisory organizations to reconcile the sometimes conflicting demands
of epistemic and political robustness in their advisory production. Moreover, as
Greenberg and Mandell (1991) showed, an evidence gathering operation such as a
social experiment puts in place a social infrastructure that serves as a foundation
for an issue’s survival, even in the absence of political attention. Such a contain-
ment function is also served by expert committees that are established to insulate
conflicting issues from the political agenda (Timmermans and Scholten, 2006).
When drawing these insights together, an important lesson emerges: the mo-
bilization of scientific expertise has consequences beyond cognitive effects, such as
informing policy design and learning. The presence of scientific expertise may act
as regulator of conflict, either providing a venue for depoliticization or by fueling it.
This establishes a circular relationship between policy politics and scientific exper-
tise. On the one hand political dynamics are thought to shape the role that expertise
may play in the policy arena. On the other, expertise may fuel or appease conflict.
Scientific expertise may therefore have consequences on policy (content) and poli-
tics (interaction).
This concludes the review of the literature. The next chapter takes up the lessons
articulated here in order to build a theory of expertise mobilization and its conse-
quences.
18Boundary organization (Guston, 1999, 2000, 2001) is the conceptual label for organizations whose
purpose is to mediate between the scientific and political domain in society. They internalize and
thereby stabilize the contested and contingent nature of the science–politics boundary. Internalization
does not eliminate boundary conflicts, but contains themwithin amanageable space. Thus, managing
boundary conflicts becomes part of the organization’s activity. Boundary organizations may be en-
countered in areas such as technology transfer, management of research productivity, environmental
and technology assessment, as well as science advice.

Three
Theory
3.1 Introduction
The literature review has provided us with an ontological description of scientific
expertise, a set of assumptions about the connection between political conflict and
expertise mobilization in the policy arena, and the insight that scientific expertise in
policy deliberation may contribute to the substantive content of policy, but also to
themitigation or expansion of conflict in the policy process. However, reviewing the
literature has not produced a comprehensive account of how institutions and prac-
tices of scientific advice relate to the political system they are part of. Nonetheless,
it is suggested that country-specific epistemic cultures are relevant in that regard.
In this chapter I will develop a theoretical framework that addresses the two
fundamental questions of this research: in what situations do participants in pol-
icy formulation draw on scientific expertise, and what are its consequence(s) for
policy politics and design? While building on the lessons of the literature review,
this theory building expands beyond the existing knowledge base in one crucial re-
gard: it aims to offer an account not just of how political interaction dynamics affect
scientific expertise, but also of how institutions and the policy process shape the
availability of expertise and the arena of its deployment.
This requires several stages of argument. In a first step, the chapter briefly
presents the neo-institutionalist framework that informs the theory’s basic ontology.
It then proceeds with a theoretical analysis of how institutions distribute access to
scientific expertise, and how they shape regulative norms about due process in deal-
ingwith scientific expertise. A further section on action situations comprehensively
elaborates the circumstances in which policymakers are likely to value scientific ex-
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pertise as an action resource. It takes into consideration the institutional as well as
the issue-specific elements that jointly make up action situations. Following this
discussion of the conditions of expertise mobilization, the subsequent section looks
at the latter’s consequences on the policy formulation process. A concluding sec-
tion draws these elements together and outlines a number of empirically verifiable
propositions.
3.2 A neo-institutionalist tool kit
This theory’s conceptual building blocks derive from a neo-institutionalist toolbox
widely drawn upon by students of public policy. It has also been applied in two
previous studies on scientific expertise (Boswell, 2009; Patzwaldt, 2008), both of
which investigated the mobilization of social scientific expertise from a political sci-
ence perspective. In her study on scientific advice on the German labor market
reform under the Schröder government, Patzwaldt (2008) draws on actor-centered
institutionalism, a type of neo-institutionalist theory developed by Renate Mayntz
and Fritz Scharpf to study governance arrangements at the intersection of the state
and civil society (Mayntz and Scharpf, 1995). The present study similarly draws on
this conceptual toolkit.
Actor-centered institutionalism1 offers a relatively narrow definition of institu-
tions as a rule system that stabilizes expectations about mutual interaction. Insti-
tutions do so by offering rules and norms regarding appropriate behavior and due
process; they also regulate which actor gets access to which resource, structure re-
lationships between actors, and constitute corporate actors (e.g. the Constitution
installs Parliament, bylaws establish an association).
Actor-centered institutionalism aims to explain the behavior of ‘composite ac-
tors’ (e.g. coalitions and organizations) because it is they, not individuals, that are
the dominant participants in policy politics (Scharpf, 1997: 54). Composite actors
are aggregates of individuals who show a significant degree of coordination in the
pursuit of an intentional and shared goal. While themodalities of organization vary
among composite actors, their individualmembers do not enact their personal pref-
1The following elaboration summarizes the original propositions of Mayntz and Scharpf (1995).
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erences, but conform their behavior to the latter’s action orientation. Action orienta-
tions are the equivalent of notions of ‘role’ or ‘habitus’, but for a composite actor.
They are a necessary conceptual construct for explaining the rather large scope of
action this lean definition of an institution affords. Action orientations are latent
predispositions for meaningful action in a particular situation. What meaningful
action consists of depends on a particular actor’s perception of a concrete situation
(the ‘cognitive’ element). Moreover, it depends on the norms a corporate actor ad-
heres to, its (survival) interests, and its identity. These ‘motivational’ elements of an
action orientation stem from the institutional rules that instituted an actor and may
have experienced idiosyncratic adaptation and reinterpretation through the course
of an actor’s history. For instance, an environmental protection agency’s identity
is constituted by its legal mission to reduce environmental pollution. It has an in-
terest in doing this because its legitimacy depends on a perception of it as effective
in carrying out this mission. Its concrete action might be guided by a normative
paradigm of sustainability that portrays environmental protection and economic
development as compatible.
Actors are sensitive to the actions of others in formulating their own strate-
gies. They develop interaction orientations, which may be described as anticipa-
tion heuristics of social interaction patterns within a particular situation. The cru-
cial point about interaction orientations is that they are not hardwired to particular
problems (Scharpf, 1997: Chap. 4). Problems of social coordination, of free rid-
ing, and of redistribution may engender particular actor constellation (i.e. game
matrices). However, actors do not only consider their own benefits and costs in a
problematic situation, but also care about how other actors are affected by it. This
can greatly affect policy politics.
It is thus particular action situations, also called arenas,2 that selectively activate
action orientations. They induce problem pressure or provide positive incentives
for action. They also provide specific action alternatives and grant access to par-
ticular resources. A well defined action situation affords a certain amount of pre-
dictability, and the crafting of anticipatory strategies, because an actor can anticipate
2I use the terms arena and action situation interchangeably, but do not use arena to describe action
situations that do not comprise interaction.
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with whom s/he will interact, what form that interaction is likely to take, and what
the rules of the game are.
Arena has become the established term in policy analysis for describing inter-
action situations, especially in the analysis of governance regimes. But the concept
is also used by researchers in the symbolic interactionism tradition, such as Clarke
(2003, 2005). Knoepfel et al. (2007: 46) characterize a policy arena as a relatively
structured and formally defined area in which public and private actors interact.
In addition, Benz (2007: 5) emphasizes the functional bounding of arenas, meaning
that an arena is constituted through a particular issue. Thus, an arena has much in
common with the notion of policy subsystem (e.g. Sabatier and Weible, 2007; True
et al., 2007), but does not a priori confine interaction to a group of specialists, butmay
also engage the public at large. While an arena is structured by institutional rules
and norms (codified or not), it cannot be reduced to that. Unlike a venue, which
designates an institutional site, it comes into being through a substantive issue.
In the spirit of Max Weber’s interpretive sociology, Mayntz and Scharpf (1995:
59ff.) stress that the perception of a situation is crucial for explainingwhich aspect of
an action orientation is activated. However, whether a particular action strategy is
successful depends on the interplay of all the elements and thus acquires a subject-
independent quality.
With the basic notions of institution, (inter)action orientation, and action situa-
tion now in place, the following sectionsmake use of these conceptual tools in order
to craft theoretical propositions about how their substantive features condition the
presence or absence of scientific expertise in a given action situation.
3.3 Institutions
In order for scientific expertise to be enrolled into public policy formulation, it is
necessary that a supply of relevant and usable expertise exists, or may be created,
within a (politically) meaningful timeframe, and that there is either demand for it
or a potentially receptive audience. Demand for and supply of expertise evokes
a market metaphor (cf. Guston et al., 1997; Sarewitz and Pielke Jr., 2007), as well
as the question of how to reconcile the different expectations of science and poli-
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tics regarding ‘usable’ knowledge (cf. Caplan, 1979; Lentsch and Weingart, 2011b).
This section does not treat the reconciliation of demand and offer, which, as some
scholars have argued, are co-constitutive over themedium term (e.g. Jasanoff, 2004;
Scholten, 2011; Wynne and Shackley, 1995). Instead, it focuses on political demand
for expertise and how institutions regulate which actors have the capacity to access
andmobilize it. Doing so requires specifying what ‘good’ scientific expertise repre-
sents for its users, how institutions allocate it, and how norms prescribe due process
in its provision and ‘consumption’.
Expertise as a resource
Scientific expertise is a resource for participants in policy formulation which they
may use to achieve their policy-related commitments (Weible, 2008: 619). Because
the consultation of expertise serves a purpose rather than constituting an end in
itself, users have an inherently instrumental relationship to it. This limits the mo-
bilization of scientific expertise to situations where it supports the goal of its user
(a policymaker never mobilizes scientific expertise to argue that ‘available evidence
contradicts my plans, but I nevertheless pursue them’).
As an instrumental resource, scientific expertise has two properties: its users
value it as both information and symbol (Albaek, 1995; Boswell, 2009; Feldman
and March, 1981; Shulock, 1999). Information reduces uncertainty about problem-
atic issues by exposing their causal drivers and affording a certain power to project
the effects of policy instruments into the future. In that way, information is an im-
portant action resource because knowing about the world enhances the ability to
shape it according to normative preferences. As a symbol, scientific expertise sig-
nals competence, rational action, and a commitment to the common good rather
than particular interests. The symbolic quality is bestowed by the cognitive author-
ity that science enjoys in the Western world, which is a fundamental component
of political culture (cf. Jasanoff, 2005a). The symbolic quality is conditional on ex-
pertise acquiring credibility (cf. section 2.3), for which respect of procedural norms
of expert consultation is important. Participants in policy formulation are aware of
these symbolic qualities. They enroll scientific experts and their opinions in order to
win credibility for their own positions. Building majorities through persuasion and
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the production of shared meaning is crucial, particularly when coercive or legally
binding resources are absent (e.g. no unilateral decision-making power).3
Thus, scientific expertise is simultaneously information and symbol. While one
or other property may be more or less visible depending on the situation of exper-
tise mobilization, both are always present as intrinsic and inseparable features. Po-
litical science scholarship that has adopted the knowledge utilization concept (e.g.
Boswell, 2009; Schrefler, 2010; Weible, 2008) thus errs in arguing that a certain style
of using expertise produces these properties. However, the symbolic quality de-
pends on how and by whom expertise is produced. Policymakers, for instance, are
quite cognizant that, given capacity, theymay themselves produce some of the anal-
ysis forwhich they rely on external experts, but that such analysiswould never carry
the same symbolicweight if not delegated to reputed experts. This explainswhy de-
mand for external expertise frequently exceeds purely informational requirements
(cf. Shulock, 1999).
Distribution of access
As with any resource for political action, the political system unequally distributes
access to scientific expertise. To begin with, scientific expertise constitutes a re-
source that itself requires resources. Funding is necessary to organize academic
experts into committees and to pay for their operational expenses as they engage
in identifying, aggregating, adjudicating, and communicating available evidence.
Moreover, identifying competent and authoritative experts requires cognitive re-
sources. Users must also be in a position to offer an incentive, not necessarily mon-
etary, to producers to engage in such a relationship, such as prestige (Patzwaldt,
2008: 17).
Only a few participants in policy formulation and negotiation are endowedwith
such resources while being simultaneously in a position to offer immaterial re-
wards. There is first a divide between the haves and have-nots in terms of public
and private actors. While the state may readily be able to wield such resources,
civil society actors such as interest groups and political parties may not. The num-
3For instance, Sabatier and Weible (2007: 152, 203) argue that expertise is a resource for securing
the internal coherence of a coalition of actors, for discrediting an opponents view, and for enlisting
public support.
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ber of civil society actors with the capacity tomobilize scientific expertise is likely to
depend on how well political parties and interest groups are financed. In wealthy
Western stateswith a large population, privatemeans to support particular interests
may be aggregated in order to enable economies of scale. This establishes a capacity
for privately mandated expertise and privately funded research institutions (such
as think tanks). Alternatively, the state may sponsor political parties, thus subsi-
dizing their access to expertise. While the latter scenario may apply in some small
states, they nonetheless lack the possibility of economies of scale. Economy of scale
is not only a question of pooling demand, but also supply. Small countries simply
have fewer scientists than large ones; but the number of policy issues they have to
deal with does not fall in proportion to population size. Thus, the ratio of scien-
tific experts per issue (not per capita!) is smaller in small countries than in more
populous ones, assuming equal per capita spending levels on higher education. If,
for a moment, we ignore governance arrangements and cultural norms, and stick to
the metaphor of an unregulated advisory market, we may conclude that more civil
society actors can mobilize scientific expertise in large than in small nations, given
a more abundant supply and better economies of scale. This would be conducive
to more competing expert claims in public in large than in small countries.
However, even in the presence of economies of scale that enhance access to ex-
pertise by civil society actors, it is reasonable to assume that access to scientific
expertise is biased in favor of public institutions, regardless of the political sys-
tem. Public institutions, in turn, form an aggregate of composite actors amongst
whom resources are similarly unequally distributed. For instance, it is unlikely that
the legislative and executive branches of government are endowed with the same
technical and administrative capacity, or have equal resources to appropriate them.
How such resources are allocated most likely depends on the organization of the
decision-making process.
The unequal distribution of the capacity to mandate scientific expertise is not
the whole story. Public institutions as consumers of scientific expertise do not only
control demand through the disposal of the necessary financial, cognitive, and rep-
utational capitals. They may also keep out unsolicited expert advice, given they
are in a position of power vis-à-vis experts. The latter are neither in an institutional
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position of power, nor can use the threat of mobilization (as unions might call for a
strike) if their opinion is ignored: they lack a constituency of human actors whose
interests they may legitimately represent. Instead, scientific engagement in pub-
lic policy is premised on the expectation that scientists provide disinterested and
objective advice (Yearley, 2005: 160–1). Scientists may voice their opinion freely
in public, thereby attracting attention to issues, but they cannot access the more
closed venues of policy formulation on their own terms and initiative (cf. Camp-
bell Keller, 2009; Hoppe et al., 2013). Instead, scientific experts require a sponsor
(i.e. a governmental agency) who is a legitimate participant in policy formulation
in their own right (Patzwaldt, 2008). This dependency on a sponsor curtails the
scope of their engagement in the political arena. Strongly contradicting a sponsor
will likely lead to expulsion from venues of policy formulation. Loss of access to
power by exiting the policy forum is dangerous as the use of other influence chan-
nels (e.g. addressing the public through the media) may be fraught with obstacles,
such as confidentiality agreements and the financial requirements of going public.
But not every producer of scientific expertise is quite so dependent on a (politi-
cal) sponsor. Organizational factors may afford varying degrees of autonomy. Con-
sultancy firms, for instance, generate their revenue based on mandates with clear
contractual obligations. University-based providers may subscribe to the same con-
tracts, but they enjoy more financial freedom as their income is not solely reliant
on consultancy work. For academics, defection may engender a loss of access to
power and of future consultancy opportunities, but it does not directly threaten
their professional reputation or livelihood. The capacity to become emancipated
from a political sponsor is further enhanced when a provider of expertise has a
project-independent legal mandate and caters to multiple principals. As a rule of
thumb we may say that the more focused on a single policy domain a provider of
scientific expertise is, and the more its organizational survival is dependent on a
project-by-project basis, the higher the pressure to be relevant for its client(s). Con-
versely, there are also limits for independence. Too much distance endangers rele-
vance (Weingart and Lentsch, 2008: 19ff.).
In conclusion, the institutional distribution of financial resources in the politi-
cal system, combined with the institutionally secured right to participate in policy
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formulation, gives governmental agencies significant discretionary power concern-
ing decisions about actively seeking or considering proffered advice. Such power is
further compounded by the fact that there are hardly any formal statutes dictating
when experts have to be consulted.4 However, the power of institutional gatekeep-
ers is offset by the organization of expertise providers. The less dependent finan-
cially they are on a specific project, and the more institutional autonomy they have,
the larger their independence. Too much independence, however, comes at the cost
of diminished relevance.
Norms
Gatekeepers and other sponsors of scientific expertise have considerable influence
over the decision to mandate expertise. But they cannot deal with expertise en-
tirely at will. Scientific expertise derives its value from the cognitive authority of
science. This authority can only be successfully instrumentalized for political ends
if, at least on the face of it, its provision and mobilization obey societal norms (cf.
section 2.2). Such norms originate from at least two sources. Firstly, any regular
and repeated social interaction is conducive to the stabilization and institutional-
ization of expectations (March and Olsen, 1984). The growth of the public sector
and the increasingly complex nature of policy problems in fields as diverse as the
environment and social welfare have multiplied contacts between government and
science in these areas. While this has engendered a dialectical development of the
‘scientification of politics’ and the ‘politicization of science’, with sometimes unwel-
come effects for scientific credibility (Weingart, 1999), it has also engendered a set
of practices and routines of due process regarding the interaction between scien-
tific experts and policymakers. On a macro-scale, this repeated interaction has also
brought about an advisory market with diversified offerings from university, civil
society, and private sector providers.
Secondly, and in contrast to more bottom-up foundation of norms through rou-
4It is important to distinguish here between policy formulation and implementation, for many
laws prescribe a role of science in their implementation through the provision of measurements, def-
inition of standards, or evaluation. But for policy formulation, such provisions are rare. Regulatory
impact assessment may constitute an exception, but its spread and institutionalization is a recent phe-
nomenon (Dunlop et al., 2012). The Netherlands is an exceptional case in itself, for tradition and legal
norms require a governmental response to official advisory reports (cf. den Butter, 2011).
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tinization, national civic epistemologies (Jasanoff, 2005a) encode norms pertaining
to how processes of scientific expertise ought to be organized in society. Research
on boundary work (Gieryn, 1999; Jasanoff, 1990), in particular, has aptly demon-
strated that public commitment to such norms is imperative for the credibility of
science in a regulatory context. These informal norms are made explicit through
formal legislation in some jurisdictions. The US Federal Advisory Committee Act
(Brown, 2009: Chap. 4) is a good example of transparency enforcing legislation.
In other countries norms are less codified. Nevertheless, the scientific community
has recognized the need for more transparency and strives for the codification of
best-practice norms regarding scientific advice.5
To sumup this discussion, formal rules, routinization andpolitical culture shape
a normative framework that conditions expectations of how the production and con-
sultation of scientific expertise ought to be organized in order to be legitimate. How-
ever, if and when scientific expertise is to be consulted depends on how a political
system allocates financial, cognitive, and reputational resources for mandating sci-
entific experts, on whether or not the population of a country enables economies
of scale in pooling private resources for appropriating scientific expertise, and on
the effective capacity of expertise providers to be autonomous vis-à-vis their spon-
sors. The intersection of these factors may produce different configurations for the
control of expertise.
3.4 Action situations
Political life revolves around substantive issues. Issues are ‘socio-ontological’ (Mar-
res, 2007) in that they bring people together around specific concerns. They are the
necessary ingredients of any enterprise of collective action. Issues turn individu-
als and social groups into stakeholders, interested parties, and target publics. Once
on the political agenda, issues become the object of institutionalized problem solv-
5In the US, this effort is spearheaded by the National Academy of Sciences (cf. Committee on
the Institutional Means for Assessment of Risks to Public Health et al., 1983; Committee on Risk As-
sessment of Hazardous Air Pollutants et al., 1994; Committee on Risk Characterization et al., 1996;
Committee on the Use of Social Science Knowledge in Public Policy, 2012). On the EU-level there is
the Taking European Knowledge Society Seriously report (Wynne and Felt, 2007). For Germany, see the
guidelines developed by the Brandenburg Academy (cf. Weingart and Lentsch, 2006). Also the Swiss
Academies developed their own guidelines (Akademien der Wissenschaften Schweiz, 2011).
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ing routines. Political scientists have long sought to understand whether the nature
of an issue exerts an influence on the politics of its resolution. Moreover, some of
the scholarship on scientific expertise discussed earlier (Boswell, 2009; Braun, 1998;
Schrefler, 2010; Topf, 1993) addresses the same question regarding the dynamics of
expertise mobilization and their link to the policy issue at hand.
In this section I propose an approach that links issues to expertise mobiliza-
tion. This blends elements from a problem governance perspective (Hoppe, 2010)
with ideas taken from discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2000, 2008) in order to
fashion an ‘expertise valuation heuristic’. The contention is that the anticipation
of different kinds of policy politics by policymakers leads to different evaluations
of whether the mobilization of scientific expertise may prove instrumentally effec-
tive in the realization of one’s action orientation. This approach therefore requires
the elaboration of an issue classification heuristic, the connection of this to differ-
ent dynamics of policy politics and the roles of scientific expertise therein, and an
explanation of how such dynamics are sustained in different regimes of power dis-
tribution.
Problems
Discriminating between different types of policies is a notoriously slippery busi-
ness (Smith, 2002). Lowi’s (1964; 1972) arenas of political choice is the best-known
and most popular enterprise of policy issue classification. By linking policy de-
sign to policy politics, Lowi contends that ‘policy makes politics’. He distinguishes
between distributive, redistributive, regulative, and constitutive policies. But his
typology is not exhaustive: it fails, for instance, to account for non design-related
characteristics of political issues. A case in point is so-called morality politics (cf.
Knill, 2013) – value-laden issues around birth, sex, addiction, and death. While
such issues share a substantive core, their politics varies substantially according to
national political context (e.g. Engeli et al., 2013).
Regardless of the (analytical) system of classification in use, issues only matter
in terms of how they are perceived in situ. It is through framing that reality is made
sense of, and, to follow the tenets of argumentative policy analysis (cf. Fischer and
Forester, 2002), power is about persuading others to adopt one’s frame (e.g. Hajer,
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1995). But framing is more than representing a single (social) reality in possibly
different ways; it is a tool of world-making, because it crafts a particular reality.
The work of Robert Hoppe (2010), in particular that on problem governance with
its “typology of the socio-cognitive status of problems for policy makers in political
task environments” (Hoppe, 2010: 72), provides conceptual guidance in making
sense of issue classification.6
Problems arise from valuations that compare an is and ought state of the world.
This is ultimately a private and subjective process. In a political environment, how-
ever, problems are necessarily externalized through the claims of a particular group.
They “are always claims of groups of people about the way they experience a situ-
ation” (Hoppe, 2010: 67). It is politicians who then cast such claims into broader
narratives capable ofmobilizing people beyond thosewho originally articulated the
claim. In addition to this normative core, problems also contain a factual/empirical
component in the shape of the is and could be assessments which always underlie
claims. Factual assertions require justifications, which, in turn, have to be approved
by groups endowed with epistemic authority. At their core problems are therefore
constructs that link ‘norms’ and ‘facts’ through comparisons (Hoppe, 2010: 69).
We find a fact–value separation embedded in many public institutions and pro-
cesses (Hoppe, 2010: 68–9). The bureaucracy, for instance, stands for technical and
depoliticized competency, whilst being under the control of government – that is,
the designated space of valuation. Another example is the distinction between risk
assessment and risk management in US regulatory policy (Jasanoff, 1990). But the
boundary between values and facts is not given, but constantly negotiated (as schol-
arship on boundary work demonstrates; cf. section 2.3).
Hoppe argues that the classification of public problems around the value–fact
dichotomy is in fact a socio-cognitive complexity reduction heuristic of the political
task environment (Hoppe, 2010: 70ff.). Political decision makers – endowed with
bounded rationality that leads to analysis necessarily being supplemented by in-
tuition – face two constraints: they cannot ignore the resistance of the world (not,
primarily, the natural world in this case, but rather the socially constructed task en-
6The following discussion is based on Hoppe (2010) if not indicated otherwise. The same ideas
are also developed in Hisschemöller and Hoppe (2001) and Hoppe and Wesselink (2011).
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Figure 3.1: Four types of problem structures. Source: Hoppe (2010: 73).
vironment), for they always act in concrete situations, and they seek the approval
of those to whom they are accountable. It is these constraints that prevent prob-
lem framing being the purely opportunistic exercise of some small group. Rather,
problem construction is only successful if it is sensitive to the distributions of power
and agreement in different fora – such as politics, administration, media and pub-
lic opinion, and science – regarding three points: the degree of agreement on fact
constructions; the degree of agreement on values; and the degree of agreement on
the problem definition itself.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the resulting problem typology.7 The perceived agreement
or disagreement on values and on relevant knowledge at stake creates four types of
problematic situations. Hoppe (2010: 72) likens structured problems (where there is
agreement on values and relevant knowledge) to puzzle solving because they are
conducive to routinized problem solving. Road construction, for instance, can fall
into this category. At the other end of the scale are unstructured problems. These
are characterized by policymakers perceiving a high problem pressure, persistent
uncertainty regarding the relevant knowledge at stake, and either very unstable or
highly divided elite and popular opinion. Unstructured problems often break out
of their subsystems to become part of high politics. Dealing with them is difficult
as trying to make them more structured often sparks other problems. Many issues
7This is in fact the same typology as depicted in Table 2.1.
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related to recent biotechnological inventions, or to controversies around technical
risks, may fit this description. In the middle there are two types of moderately
structured problems, where there is perceived disagreement on one dimension (ei-
ther values or knowledge), but not on the other. Moderately structured problems
with consensus on goals still bear much uncertainty in their concretization, which
can result in disputes about costs and political risk. Conversely, when the means
are agreed on, but goals disputed (as is the case in many morality policies), there
is not much debate about relevant knowledge. Instead, the debate focuses, often in
black and white terms, on ethics.
This typology is of ideal-typical nature. Real world policy processes may fall in
between cases, or even display traits of different problems because they harbormore
than a single issue. Moreover, issue structures are not necessarily stable. Punctua-
tion dynamics may suddenly and radically affect issue structure (think of nuclear
power before and after the accidents at Chernobyl and Fukushima), and policymak-
ersmay also try to reframe issues throughmeta governance (Hoppe, 2010; Rein and
Schön, 2002).
Policy politics and the valuation of expertise
Having elaborated the socio-cognitive underpinning of problem structuration, we
can proceed with a discussion of how problems relate to the mobilization of sci-
entific expertise. Hoppe (2010: Chap. 5) contends that different kinds of prob-
lem create their own policy politics, which in turn reinforces problem structures.8
Each problem type is thought to be conducive to a particular network structure (cf.
Hoppe, 2010: 132). The more structured a problem is, the more institutionalized
policy participation, resulting in a closed network with a single belief system. Con-
versely, unstructured problems engender open networks with unpredictable partic-
ipation. Semi-structured problems with agreement on goals give rise to advocacy
coalitions with oligopolistic participation. Finally, value conflicts in the absence of
knowledge controversies engender the design of ad hoc networks for depoliticization
and accommodation.
8The recursive influence of problem and politics sets Hoppe apart from Lowi (1972), who es-
tablishes a linear causal relationship between policy design and politics (hence ‘policy determines
politics’).
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It is this understanding of network structures that provides a model for expert
involvement (cf. Hisschemöller and Hoppe, 2001; Hoppe, 2010; Hoppe and Wes-
selink, 2011), which, incidentally, reflects Fung’s (2006) juxtaposition of experts and
the public sphere as two opposed extremes on a continuum of political inclusion.
The more closed a network is, the more it is dominated by experts and techno-
cratic rule-making. Conversely, in entirely open networks experts lose their author-
itative position to judge about is or could be states and become just one of many
(knowing) participants, though they may maintain a role as problem namers. In
medium-structured problems with consensus around goals, experts may act as an-
alysts or advocates, becoming enrolled into different advocacy coalitions. Finally,
in medium-structured problems with goal conflicts, experts may become part of
accommodation strategies in which they act as mediators. It is important to note
that the notion of expert is used in this context to denote professional competence,
which could include scientific experts external to government, but may also refer to
the administration’s internal technical competencies.
These are roles experts may enact should they become implicated in the policy
process. But this is not yet the end of the road: further conditions require con-
sideration prior to formulating concrete expectations. Firstly, we should not for-
get that the participation of scientific experts is conditional on their willingness to
engage with policy, on their effective access to policy formulation through institu-
tional prerogatives, mandates, or coalition membership, and on the availability of
the necessary financial resources to enable participation. Secondly, it is important
to keep in mind the situated perspective of problem perception. This is an intrinsi-
cally forward-looking perspective which faces uncertainty about outcomes of social
interaction. Actor-specific problem perceptions and group claims may or may not
stabilize into a broadly shared perspective. When issues arrive for the first time
on the agenda of a jurisdiction, or when an external shock event brings in new ac-
tors and reshuﬄes resource distribution (cf. Sabatier and Weible, 2007), problem
perception may be quite local. Moreover, Hoppe (2010: 75) argues that policymak-
ers are biased in their problem perception because they prefer structured problems
that can be resolved. In their (not necessarily conscious) avoidance of unstructured
problems, policymakers may go as far as deliberately screening out information in
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order to keep it simple and manageable.9 It is important to reaffirm the situated
perspective, because in making the jump from socio-cognitive problem perception
to network politics, that indeterminacy tends to get lost as the gaze shifts from an
internal to an external account. No longer are problems just perceptions and com-
plexity reduction heuristics, they have been translated into the (singular) reality of
interaction structures. This shift nicely illustrates Berger and Luckmann’s account
of the construction of social reality through an externalization of internal experi-
ences (Berger and Luckmann, 1966); but we have to remain conscious that such
construction processes always proceed in parallel to and in interaction with already
established structures, and that expertise mobilization decisions are invariably mo-
tivated on the basis of a subjectively construed reality, rather than an objective one.
Thirdly, not every issue has the same likelihood of becoming the subject of formal
law making procedures. Very structured issues establish policy monopolies that
resist punctuation (Hoppe, 2010: 132). Consequently, while entirely structured
problems may establish a prominent intervention context for scientific expertise –
Ezrahi (1980) illustrates this with the Manhattan and Apollo projects – they may
not be very common objects of policy formulation. When also taking into consider-
ation the above-mentioned pro-structure perception bias of problems, it is plausible
that policymakers tend to be confronted more often with problems they perceive as
semi-structured.
With these clarifications in hand, it becomes possible to formulate more accu-
rate expectations regarding the relationship between perceived problem types and
expertise mobilization. To begin with, it is unlikely that extramural scientific ex-
pertise is called upon to resolve highly structured and routinized issues (cf. Braun,
1998; Weible, 2008). Such issues neither induce much uncertainty about the policy
process (who are the other actors, what are their intentions?) nor require support
by scientific arguments to enhance a proposal’s credibility. If external experts are
mobilized, they likely keep a low profile within the confines of the administration,
where they complement existing technical capacity.
Moderately structured issues where value questions prove highly divisive may
9See for instanceHoppe et al. (2013)who contend that theUNFCCCerred in assuming that climate
change constitutes a structured problem.
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contribute to action situations in which scientific expertise is not valued much, be-
cause there is little disagreement on the relevant andusable knowledge at stake. The
priority is to contain conflicts and make problems amenable to resolution through,
for instance, reframing (Rein and Schön, 2002), insulation from the political agenda
by forming an expert committee for deliberation (cf. Timmermans and Scholten,
2006; Topf, 1993), or adopting procedural policy designs (Engeli and Varone, 2011).
Trusted experts may assume the role of an arbiter between conflicting parties. But
this is ameta-governance role and contributions to policy design are rather unlikely.
Conversely, actors capable of mobilizing scientific expertise are likely to value it
when they perceive an issue as moderately structured with either a clear value con-
sensus, or somewhat diffuse and inarticulate value incongruence. This reimagines
what Braun (1998) calls a situation of ‘puzzling’ – value consensus enables rational-
ization of solution finding – as well as policy subsystems with moderate levels of
conflict among advocacy coalitions (cf. section 2.5). The symbolic aspect of scien-
tific expertise is of particular value in the latter situation as it constitutes a resource
for winning credibility through persuasion.
But what happens in truly unstructured issues or issues that are ill-defined be-
cause they are emergent? Given the high uncertainty about the relevant knowledge
at stake, and possibly the presence of crisis, it is far from certain whether the policy-
maker is in a position to clearly articulate his or her advisory needs and to identify
potential experts (cf. Topf, 1993). It may also be the case that advisory capacity
must first be created. There might be scientific research on the topic, but any such
evidence still requires translation in order to become accessible. Moreover, policy-
makers in such a situation are ignorant about other actors, for an issue public has
either not yet been constituted, or its composition fluctuates unpredictably. Insti-
tutional policymakers, the only default participants in such a situation, are there-
fore forced to refer to their own identities for cues about possible action strategies
(cf. Patzwaldt, 2008: 64). In the context of public policy, such a situation is never
pure, as some inference about political consequences is always possible due to the
institutionally given structure of decision-making processes. The mobilization of
expertise for conflict containment, akin to semi-structured value problems, would
likely be ineffective because of ambiguity regarding the interlocutors. The open na-
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ture of participation, however, would not preclude self-authorized experts entering
the scene. Nevertheless, should institutional policymakers mobilize expertise, the
latter would have a rather low public profile.
Expertise and legitimation
The preceding exploration of problems as the socio-ontological origin of interaction
situations implicitly focused on policy formulation within the confines of the policy
subsystem, where strategizing and anticipation of interaction patterns takes place
with the policy community as audience. Yet the policy community is not the only
relevant audience to witness (and participate in) policy formulation and decision-
making. Arriving at collectively binding decisions in a democracy requires support
not just from thosemost directly concerned (that is, input legitimacy), but also from
the public at large. The latter is the ultimate judge on the orientation towards the
common good and compliance with norms of distributive justice of policies (out-
put legitimacy) (cf. Scharpf, 1997: 153). Governments are ultimately accountable
to their electorate, which ensures that elections serve as a mechanism for enforcing
congruence between expectations regarding policies and the effects thereof. Scien-
tific expertise is not absent from the public arena. Yet we cannot describe mobi-
lization dynamics in this arena by simply extrapolating from problem structuring
dynamics. Policy communities and the public have different origins, with the first
being established through issues, and the latter through the institutions of repre-
sentative democracy. Issues come and go, but the public at large exists as long as
the jurisdiction perdures of which it is part of. Hence, in order to accommodate the
public arena as a venue for expertise mobilization, the theory as thus far elaborated
requires extension.
This is where a conceptualization of the policy subsystem and the public as two
distinct arenas – as proposed by discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2000, 2008) – be-
comes a valuable theoretical resource. Underlying discursive institutionalism is the
assumption that the policy subsystem and the public arena differ in the way that ac-
tors mobilize existing discourses (i.e. policy images) for legitimating their positions
in policy formulation.10 Policy discourses – one could also call them paradigms
10 Schmidt (2000, 2008) developed the notion of legitimation discourse for her ‘discursive’ blend
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– provide a shared language and a common vision that actors may draw on as a
strategic resource. In arenas of policy coordination between different public and
private actors, the recourse to an established discourse may be crucial in overcom-
ing disagreement. This coordinative function of discourse is especially prevalent in
political system where power is diffused among multiple veto players, examples of
which being Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland. In those coun-
tries extensive coordination is necessary in order to achieve agreement. In coun-
tries with a stronger power concentration, such as the UK or France, coordination
in order to craft majorities is not as important, because the inclusion imperative is
lower. However, policies require justification in the wider public. Governments do
so in white papers, party programs, coalition treaties, and public as well as media
appearances. And they do so by drawing on prevailing discourses. Schmidt (2000:
286) calls this the communicative function of discourse. While the two discourses are
not mutually exclusive, the communicative function of discourse is more important
in political systems with multiple veto players.
Because scientific expertise is an important component of policy images that
underlie legitimation discourses (cf. Ingram et al. 2007: 109, Scholten and Timmer-
mans 2010), it is plausible that dynamics of expertise mobilization roughly follow
the mobilization of legitimation discourses. This yields two basic scenarios where
expertise mobilization follows either the coordinative or communicative discourse,
depending on which is dominant. In the first scenario, with a predominant co-
ordinative discourse, we can largely fall back onto problem structuring dynamics
as elaborated in earlier sections, because who gets to participate in policy coordi-
nation, and how they do so, is strongly influenced by the structure of problems.
While less important, a communicative discourse still exists in that scenario. But
once an agreement has been reached within such a political system, we would ex-
pect that a decision obtains legitimacy because of the (subsystem) actors that have
lent support to it. This may especially be the case of semi-structured problems with
of neo-institutionalism. Drawing on work from the cognitive and argumentative turn in political
analysis, she argues that discourses – understood as sector-specific policy ideas with a paradigmatic
status (e.g. Keynesianism in economic policy) – provide an explanation for why a particular welfare
state reform agenda has proven successful, while it failed in another. She contends (e.g. Schmidt,
2002) that the presence of a coherent legitimation discourse – combining substantive elements about
problem definition and policy response, as well as normative arguments – may explain successful
instances of change.
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goal conflicts, where experts, at best, act in a mediating capacity. Either extremely
structured or unstructured problemsmay constitute exceptions. Substantive expert
involvement in solving structured problems is largely uncontested and delegation
to specialized agencies not uncommon (see also Scharpf, 1997: 153). Conversely,
when problems are extremely unstructured, the boundary between the subsystem
and the public arena erodes, making a distinction superfluous. It is quite conceiv-
able that scientists acting in a self-authorized capacity gain a voice in that case.
For political systems with strong power concentration and a predominant com-
municative discourse, such a fall-back onto problem structure dynamics is not pos-
sible. Because decisions can be taken by a very small policy elite, there is less need
for coordination, which also reduces the appeal of scientific expertise as a symbolic
resource. This is not to say that governments in such regimes rely less on scientific
expertise. Instead, recourse to expertise, should it occur, takes on a dyadic relation-
ship between principal (government) and agent (expert), rather than a triadic one
where a government aims at persuading a third party with reference to expertise,
for the third party does not exist to the same extent that it does in systems with
more diffuse power. Thus, expertise is likely to be at work under the radar, without
seeping into the coordinative discourse.
Expertise may matter for the communicative discourse, however. While gov-
ernments are authorized through elections, and gain legitimation based on their
promised agenda and (anticipated) performance, performance claims require vali-
dation through indicators, and the credibility of these benefits from scientific and
evidential rhetoric (Topf, 1993). Further, systems of limited political participation
have to substitute a legitimacy deficit on the input side. Elections and authoritative
performance claims are important, but not always sufficient. Here, the mobiliza-
tion of scientific expertise in public discoursemay be construed as such a substitute.
As current debate about public participation in science (e.g. Bucchi, 2009; Callon
et al., 2009), and historical research on the relationship between liberal democracies
and modern science (Ezrahi, 1990), suggest, science is instrumental in justifying
a regime of limited participation (i.e. representative democracy) in and of itself.
Evoking science in political discourse, and therefore portraying one’s programs and
actions as rationally grounded, functions as a rhetorical device to assert that politi-
Action situations| 73
cal action serves the common good, and is not arbitrary. The evidence-based policy
movement of the Blair labour government in the UK is a prime example of such
rhetoric (Boswell, 2009: 248).
As it stands, the consideration of political systems with strong power concen-
tration is not exhaustive and would require more clarification in order to be made
useful for research purposes.11 This is of lesser relevance for the present research.
Its empirical focus is on Switzerland, which is a known case of a country with many
veto players in the policy process. Consequently, theory building focuses on cases
with dispersed power. Nevertheless, the present expansion of the theory beyond
the policy subsystem is relevant. Even political systems with dispersed power have
a communicative discourse, which raises the question about the public role of sci-
entific experts and expertise. Moreover, by arguing that systems with strong power
concentration display different dynamics of expertise mobilization, clear limits to
the theory’s scope can be identified. This becomes relevant when discussing the
generalizability of the empirical findings.
Three clarifications
The combination of issue dynamics and the institutional distribution of power af-
fords the construction of a contextual theory of expertise mobilization. For the sake
of coherence, the foregoing sections have elaborated the individual steps of this the-
ory by narrowly attending to elements that are endogenous to its dynamics alone.
Exogenous elements and objections must now be considered. These concern sci-
ence policy as a particular context, power politics as antithesis to cogitation, and
ideology as substitute for scientific expertise.
Scientific exceptionalism
There is always an odd case that refuses to fit neatly designed typologies. In our
case the domain of science policy is one of them. As with any other issue, science
policies are not endowedwith an intrinsic problem structure. For instance, research
funding and the regulation of risks associated with genetically modified organisms
11 Boswell (2009) and Topf (1993), both discussed in section 2.5, build on the UK case and constitute
therefore possible avenues for reflection.
74| Theory
as issues of governance are utterly different beasts, with very different policy poli-
tics. The exceptionalism comes about because in policy subsystems that deal with
science governance issues, scientists are de facto members because they constitute
the target group. Scientists as a target group generally benefit from a positive and
powerful framing (cf. Ingram et al., 2007), which empowers them as policy partic-
ipants. Moreover, scientists are dominant participants in science policy decision-
making because there is a strong self-regulatory tradition in the governance of sci-
ence (Braun, 2006; Wilholt and Glimell, 2011).
However, participating in policy formulation as a stakeholder is different to
proffering advice from a disinterested position. Scientists may well provide advice
in the form of informed accounts of academic practice, but such advice is grounded
in experience and not analysis. The scientist’s role is therefore more similar to that
of a banking CEO whose counsel is solicited in the case of financial market reg-
ulation reform. This is not to say that there is no scientific expertise about sci-
ence that is grounded in the systematic analysis of science. Science studies and
its subfields clearly constitute a source of such expertise. Moreover, science gover-
nance instruments such as technology assessment aim to produce systematic rather
than experience-based evidence. Theoretical reasoning may lead to the conclusion
that the valuation and mobilization of such analysis-based expertise follows nor-
mal problem-related dynamics, as discussed above. In practice, however, this is
highly doubtful, given that the roles of stakeholder and (meta) expert readily be-
come muddled. Other policy participants are unlikely to distinguish consistently
between these two roles. Moreover, scientists sometimes forget that practicing sci-
entific inquiry does not make them an expert in all things scientific.
Puzzling and powering
The preceding discussion of problem perception and expertise mobilization did not
identify an interaction constellation in which policy politics is focused exclusively
on coercion and power. Here is why. Policy formulation may be construed through
two seemingly antagonistic modes of interaction. There is the search for the better
solution through reasoning and deliberation, also described as cogitation or puz-
zling. Opposed to this is problem solving through the mobilization of support by
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means of coercion and incentives. This has been described as interaction or pow-
ering. In communicative terms, these two modes carry the labels of arguing and
bargaining, respectively (Holzinger, 2010; Saretzki, 1996). While the association
between arguing and scientific expertise is intuitive – after all, both seem to ratio-
nalize problem solving – bargaining and negotiation seem at odds with a rational-
ization finality. As a consequence, there seems to be little use for scientific exper-
tise when policymaking mainly revolves around bargaining and deal making (e.g.
Braun, 1998). Yet cogitation and interaction are not mutually exclusive. This may
only seem to be the case in Lowi (1972) and his coupling of redistributive policy
with negotiation, bargaining and log rolling politics. There, a particular way that
interests become affected is coupled, in a more or less deterministic fashion, to a set
behavioral response. Yet the earlier definition of the concept of interaction orienta-
tion (cf. section 3.2) clearly refutes a deterministic linkage by effectively decoupling
actor constellations and modes of interactions. Actors caught in the zero sum game
typical of redistributive politics have a choice in how to respond to it. Depending
on whether they care about how other actors fare, such a game may well be played
in an antagonistic or cooperative fashion (Scharpf, 1997: 72ff.). It is exactly this
observation that Braun (1998, 2009) leverages when he argues that, when problems
of redistribution are approached in a cooperative spirit, bargaining and negotiation
may be substituted by ‘puzzling’ as a mode of interaction. Consequently, there are
reasons to argue that problems are not deterministically paired with a set mode of
interaction. While there is a decoupling of problems from modes of interaction be-
cause the latter are mediated by (inter)actor orientations, puzzling and powering
as modes of interaction are actually mutually dependent on each other in policy
problem solving. Hoppe (2010: 258) writes:
"No policy comes about without reason and deliberation on the one hand, and insti-
gation or power on the other; but the nature of their being necessary is very different.
For their adoption and implementation, even high-quality policy designs remain vitally
dependent on successful instigation and decision making. Nevertheless, designs soon
hit upon insuperable limits to rationality, irrespective of whether they were reasoned
out with or without much sophistication, and with or without extensive deliberation
processes. On the way to collective action, these limits can only be overcome by falling
back on instigations and decisions."
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Thus, it is unreasonable to assume that a given policy problem should induce
a single and deterministic mode of resolution. It is rather to be expected that as
problem processing goes on, alterations of puzzling and powering take place. Sci-
entific expertise is not a prerequisite for puzzling, which may just as well draw on
citizen deliberation. But as Manin (1987) noted, even deliberation needs to end in a
decision, for which a majority decision is inevitable.
On ideology as alternative to scientific expertise
Theprecedingdiscussion on issue classificationwas based on the premise that prob-
lem framing is an activity that is always grounded in a particular perspective, but it
did not address whether different actors are predisposed to different perspectives.
In otherwords, canwe treat a civil servant in the sameway thatwe treat amember of
a political party elected to Parliament? This question raises the question of whether
some actors, e.g. politicians, may be predisposed to draw on ideology rather than
science in the production of authoritative statements regarding is or could be ques-
tions.
The contention that ideology may serve as a substitute for science for politi-
cians must be addressed by considering scientific expertise in its two capacities,
as information and as symbol. If scientific expertise were reducible to its informa-
tional content alone, then its purpose would be to diminish uncertainty regarding
the causes and consequences of perceived policy problems. But such informational
uncertainty can also be reduced through alternatives such as experience-based intu-
ition (cf. Lindblom and Cohen, 1979), frames (cf. Rein and Schön, 2002), and politi-
cal ideology. Ideology and common sense are, arguably, the least costly uncertainty
absorption heuristics, with professional experience and scientific expertise being on
the costly end of the spectrum. Hence, which of these heuristics an actor prefers is
a function of his or her available cognitive and organizational resources.
But the problem is more complex than this assessment might suggest. As es-
tablished, individuals primarily participate in policy formulation in a professional,
not private, capacity (Scharpf 1997: Chap. 3; see also Fischer 2012: 55-7). As part of
a composite actor, their action orientation reflects the values and perceptions of the
social collective they are a member of. This is not only relevant in terms of action
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but for cognition, too. Information processing is carried out collectively, possibly
involving a division of labor. Pooling information processing capacity in such a
way affords the possibility of accessing more costly and sophisticated uncertainty
absorption heuristics, which are not available to isolated individuals.
Further, is claims require justification. Science, experience, common sense and
ideology are different registers of justifying empirical beliefs. Justification requires
reference to a third party in front of an audience (Saretzki, 1996). This makes the
choice of register of justification dependent on the audience’s preference. In West-
ern countries the general public is receptive to scientific arguments as a register of
justification. But this does not make science the default mode of justification. Par-
ticular groups may be distrustful of science because of misconduct, collusion with
the ruling elite, or because scientific pronouncements run counter to personal ex-
perience. It is thus conceivable that a politician addressing a populist movement
appeals to common sense and ideology, rather than to science. However, in order
to reach a broader audience and make claims about the common good, science has
to be reckoned with. The anthropogenic cause of climate change, for instance, is
not simply denied on the basis of ideology and experience; rather, such denial re-
quires the undermining of the credibility of scientific truth claims (cf. Oreskes and
Conway, 2010).
When drawing together the individual cost of an uncertainty reduction heuris-
tic, the fact that cognition and information processing are collective processes in
policy formulation, and the need of affirmation of a truth claim by an audience, the
attribution of science or ideology as a default tool for uncertainty reduction and jus-
tification of claims to a particular group of actors appears problematic. A politician
may well mobilize ideological beliefs when talking at a party convention, where
participants subscribe to the same values. But when trying to reach an audience
wider than members of that political party, he or she is likely to appeal to values
that are shared by the wider community. Mobilizing scientific arguments could be
exactly the right instrument for such a task.
In connection with the problem structure typology, it is plausible that unstruc-
tured problems engender situations where ideology is likely to substitute science
as the dominant justification heuristic. Not only are epistemic claims contested in
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such a context, there is also a lack of a stable audience that could witness and attest
claims made in the name of science.
3.5 Effects of scientific expertise
Having established a model of expertise mobilization in response to the question of
which situations will cause participants in policy formulation to draw on scientific
expertise, we can now turn our attention to the second research question: what con-
sequences does scientific expertise engenderwhen it becomes part of the policy pro-
cess? The literature review has established two kinds of effects of scientific expertise
(cf. section 2.6). Firstly, scientific expertise may have cognitive consequences in in-
forming policy design or shaping how policy participants conceive of a problem.
Secondly, there are social consequences. Expertise mobilization may have effects
on social interaction (i.e. policy politics) by enabling social coordination through
procedures of conflict containment, or by exacerbating conflict when political con-
flict is mirrored by public scientific disagreement. In addition, social arrangements
for evidence production may effectively institutionalize a problem definition, even
if the problem fails to become part of the political agenda.
Political interaction dynamics engendered by problem structures, as explored
earlier, may not only account for expertise mobilization dynamics. In fact, such pol-
icy politics dynamics may also account for what kind of consequences (i.e. cogni-
tive or social) expertise may engender. However, there are a number of issues to be
considered before this argument can be laid out. Firstly, dynamics of expertise mo-
bilization and the consequences thereof are not independent of each other. Without
the mobilization of expertise, the latter cannot engender consequences. Moreover,
consequences may feed back – or rather feed forward – into mobilization dynam-
ics, as themobilization of expertise potentially transforms conflict structures, which
in turn may shape political dynamics in the future, which themselves become sus-
ceptible to expertise mobilization. Secondly, expertise mobilization decisions are
motivated by the perception and anticipation of a particular issue structure. There
is the possibility that such perceptions will prove mistaken at a later point. How-
ever, by the time such a ‘reality check’ becomes possible, experts have long been
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mandated or ignored. Consequently, it is not the objective reality of a situation, but
its subjective construction, that matters for mobilization decisions. But the real and
not the subjectively construed situationmatters for the consequences thatmobilized
expertise engenders in the policy process, as expertise begins to interact with other
participants in policy formulation. This is akin to the observation that, while the
perception of situations activates action orientations, the real situation influences
whether the anticipated action will be successful (Mayntz and Scharpf, 1995: 60).
This is congruent with the third point: unlike a decision to mobilize expertise, the
consequence of such a decision is not necessarily the product of intended and con-
trollable agency. There might be consequences that are unintended or of which
policy participants are unaware. The reason for this is that expertise acts in concert
with other factors (cf. Owens, 2011; Radaelli, 1995). The social context of policy
formulation is always already impregnated with formal and informal institutional
rules and practices, which mediate the political dynamics caused by problem struc-
tures. These institutional rules favor inertia in information processing (cf. Jones
and Baumgartner, 1991; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; True et al., 2007), which may
engender a discrepancy between a situation perception and the social structures
in place (that is, path dependency). If we add up the potentially circular causal-
ity between conditions of expertise mobilization and its consequences, and of the
mediating effects of already existing structures, then the consequences of expertise
mobilization are probably best characterized as a web of entanglements wherein
expertise is always a necessary but never a sufficient component. Thus, the con-
sequences of expertise mobilization are not steerable by deliberate and intentional
agency on the part of any single actor. With these qualifications about causality and
agency in place, we may now turn to the link between problem structures and the
consequences of expertise mobilization. This link consists of the regulating effect of
problem structures on participation in policy formulation; wemust not forget, then,
that path-dependent institutional factors interact with such dynamics. (Any cause
and effect statement therefore depends on an ‘all things being equal’ assumption.)
Structured problems have limited participation. This reduces the need for ma-
jority building through persuasion. It also entails that there is a single principal for
expertise mobilization. The consequence of this is that the principal and addressee
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of expertise are identical. Because expertise mobilization is costly – for actors who
wield the necessary resources as much as others – it has to result in something that
the principal desires. Given that the principal also constitutes the audience, there
is no need to deploy expertise for coordinative purposes unless the actor that mobi-
lizes it consists of a large number of coalition members. Thus, the primary purpose
of expertisemobilizationmay be policy design oriented information and advice. Be-
cause very structured problems are by definition not contested, there is little reason
to assume that policies addressing such problems acquire widespread visibility on
the political agenda. Therefore, the need for an elaborate communicative discourse
is low, which simultaneously reduces the need to draw on science’s epistemic au-
thority. Unstructured problems, in contrast, engender unrestricted participation,
which may completely erode the subsystem/public arena distinction. In this un-
fettered pluralism, a scientific expert who dares to join the turmoil is just another
participant. Such an expertwillmostly be a losing voice in the competitionwith ide-
ology, for she lacks a political constituency, and no stable coalition exists to serve as
an interlocutor/audience. Direct and unmediated material contribution to a policy
solution are unlikely effects of such expert participation. As in a game of chance,
expert arguments may or may not find an interested ear. But being picked up by a
principal with an agenda is still a far cry from exerting a mediating effect on poli-
tics. Besides, what academic expert wants to become enrolled in an openly partisan
argument?
Regarding semi-structured problems, we established earlier that a trusted ex-
pert may act in a mediating role in situations of conflicting goals and values. Such
mediation, should it occur, takes place between subsystem participants and pro-
duces social coordination. But an expert-cum-mediator is not a public role, for set-
tlements of value controversies have to be legitimated by democratic procedural
norms. Semi-structured problems with disagreement about the relevant knowl-
edge produce the largest array of expert roles and consequences. Depending on
the dynamics between the oligopolistic coalitions, experts may either assume the
position of an analyst or, when conflict increases, of an advocate. Within the sub-
system, this may engender effects on policy (design input/learning), but also on
politics. Because experts mirror (and sometimes animate) political dynamics, their
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participation may exacerbate or reduce conflicts. Expertise that becomes part of the
public arena likely assumes an advocacy role, which, given public visibility, has an
expansive effect on conflict.
Having established these basic dynamics between expertise mobilization and
its consequences, a final issue can also be addressed. The participation of experts
in policy formulation is sometimes construed as limiting the participation of (lay)
stakeholders who lack technical expertise. Nothing in the discussion so far con-
tradicts the assumption that not commanding such capabilities is a disadvantage
in staking one’s claim. Indeed, I have argued that the resources necessary for ex-
pertise mobilization are unequally distributed. Yet we also need to consider that
what drives expertise mobilization and the roles that experts can enact in policy
and politics are the result of problem structures that also engender more general
opportunity structures for participation. Experts do not, and in fact cannot, eject
others from the policy arena. Yet their advice seems to be most treasured in cases
where participation is most limited.
3.6 Some propositions
By drawing on actor-centered institutionalism, problem governance theory, and
discursive institutionalism, this chapter has established a conceptual and theoreti-
cal foundation for explaining expertise mobilization and the consequences thereof
within policy formulation. I will now concisely restate the ontological assumptions
that underly the theoreticalmodel, before detailing the empirically verifiable propo-
sitions this model affords.
The ontological assumptions form – to borrow from Imre Lakatos’ terminology
(Lakatos, 1970) – the hard core of the theory, which it critically depends on, butwhich
are outside the scope of empirical substantiation. The first and most central as-
sumption is that policymakers construe scientific expertise as a resource that they
can mobilize in the actualization of their idiosyncratic action orientations. Action
situations offer constraints and opportunities, and therefore determinewhether sci-
entific expertise is perceived to constitute a useful resource. This is followed by a
second assumption, according to which access to scientific expertise requires or-
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ganizational, financial, and cognitive resources. The third assumption states that
scientific expertise has the two intrinsic and non-alienable properties of having an
informational core, and of symbolizing the trust society places in the social arrange-
ments that have produced it. It is both plausible and very likely that particular sit-
uations give prominence to only one of these attributes, with the other being latent,
but not absent. It is interactional dynamics – not the intention of a single actor! –
that modulates which aspect attains prominence.
With these assumptions in place, we may proceed with the synthetic presenta-
tion of the empirically verifiable propositions. In accordance with the assumption
that expertise requires resources for it to be mobilized, theory development sup-
poses that such resources are unequally distributed in a political system, with a
strong bias toward the state. The population size of a country may reduce this bias
by affecting the supply and demand of expertise. Concerning supply, the larger a
country, the more numerous the supply of potential experts, assuming the percent-
age of the population with academic training to be fixed. Because of economies of
scale, the number of policy problems does not grow with population size through
a linear relationship, increasing the pool of potential experts per issue. Popula-
tion size affects expertise demand through the possibility of pooling the resources
necessary to acquire expertise. For instance, an environmental interest group with
1 million members has more financial capacity than one with only 50 thousand.
Hence, the propensity of expertise pluralism increases with population size. In
small countries, the smaller domestic expert pool per issue can only be mitigated
through expertise from abroad, which might not always be suitable, or by substi-
tuting scientific expertise for less costly uncertainty absorption heuristics, such as
experience. However, the demand structure can be influenced. The state can sub-
sidize select groups (e.g. public financing of political parties) and thereby increase
their resource potential. Moreover, it can empower producers of expertise by grant-
ing non-earmarked funding and providing a constitutionally secured access to the
political system (i.e. the Dutch solution).
Resource distribution is not sufficient to characterize an advisory system. Sci-
entific expertise is valued above experience, common sense and ideology because
Western societies have come to trust members of the scientific community, its in-
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stitutions, and methods as enabling disinterested and objective representations of
the world. Suggesting that one’s argument is grounded in scientific evidence is an
attempt to convert trust in science into society trusting oneself. Yet science–society
trust relations are not generic, since they are the product of idiosyncratic national
historical trajectories. Consequently, a national system of expertise does not only
depend on who commands expertise, but also on procedures of deployment that
are culturally recognized as legitimate.
Expertise control and epistemic culture jointly provide a model of whomay mo-
bilize expertise, under observance of which procedural constraints, but they do not
provide insight into in which kinds of situations expertise is perceived as valuable
and as instrumentally effective in the realization of action orientations. The latter
may be explained by looking at action situations. As a brief reminder, action situ-
ations are modeled around issues and audiences. Issues have a normative and an
epistemic core, and agreement anddisagreement about these engenders different is-
sue structures. Political decision-makers are confrontedwith the subsystem and the
public as two audiences, before whom policies must attain legitimacy. While every
political system has both of these audiences, the public becomes the key audience
for seeking legitimacy in political systems which enable a small number of actors to
take decisions due to power concentration. Conversely, when power is dispersed,
gaining the approval of other policy subsystem participants becomes necessary in
order to build majorities. Political agreement in the subsystem then becomes the
basis of legitimation in the public arena.
The perception of different types of problems engenders different valuations of
scientific expertise as an action resource, but it is in interaction with different net-
work structures resulting from a given problem structure that mobilized expertise
engenders consequences (cf. Table 3.1). This theoretical development yields several
propositions:
1. Highly structured issues are firmly rootedwithin a policy subsystem, which is
dominated by a single coalition. Expertise mobilization occurs only when the
administration lacks the required technical capacity. The mandating agency
and the audience are thus one and the same. Mandated experts operate in
the shadow of public attention and do not appear in the communicative dis-
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course. Such expertise mobilization affects policy design by producing con-
crete instruments and concepts.
2. Semi-structured problems with uncertain knowledge are conducive to exper-
tise mobilization. Experts become enrolled in advocacy coalitions, and, de-
pending on the interactional dynamics, theymay either contribute to problem
solving as analysts or replicate and reinforce political conflict as advocates.
The two are not mutually exclusive, but, when carried into the public realm,
the advocacy role is likely to dominate.
3. Moderately structured issues with disagreement about values are not con-
ducive to expertise mobilization, but a highly trusted expert or venues of ad-
vice production may be enlisted as part of a conflict containment and media-
tion strategy. Possible consequences from such (rare) expert involvement are
entirely of an interactional nature, by brokering an agreement. Such expert in-
volvement is likely confined to the subsystem, as it exactly serves the purpose
of removing an issue from the public spotlight. A policy decision obtained un-
der such conditions is likely legitimated in public by reference to the support
it obtained from contesting political parties.
4. Unstructured issues obliterate the subsystem/public distinction. With no sta-
ble adversary to persuade, and no prospects of finding a shared goal, scien-
tific expertise is of little instrumental value. But the absence of entry barri-
ers makes it possible for self-authorized experts or institutionalized advisory
bodies with a foresight mission to join the fray. But this makes them one of
many participants, without an a priori higher epistemic authority. They may
name problems, and thereby give structure to the debate, but neither con-
flict mitigation nor substantial policy design are likely to be immediate con-
sequences of this.
These propositions mark the end of this chapter. The next chapter turns to
methodology in order to elaborate how these propositions may be empirically sub-
stantiated.
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Empirical Approach
4.1 Introduction
Assumptions made about a phenomenon’s ontology substantially shape inquiry
design and the methods to be deployed. Researchers working within an interpre-
tive paradigm have therefore called for theory–method congruence. Clarke and
Leigh Star (2008) speak of a theory–methods package to describe the interconnection
between ontology and methodology, even though, for them, this is about ‘ground-
ing’ theory in the data through the use of methods, and not about ‘causal inference’.
Determining which methodology to adopt is thus not simply a ‘pick and mix’ op-
eration based on the preferences, affinities, and skills of the researcher.
Ontologically, this research assumes that scientific expertise is constituted by
deliberate social action, and that such action is itself the product of situations. The
latter are composed of both material and immaterial elements (resources, actors,
rules) and the subjective meaning that actors attribute to them. These assumptions
follow in part from the literature review, as well as from the actor-centered insti-
tutionalism framework adopted as the basic ontological infrastructure for theory
building. In order to make them operational for empirical analysis, I pursue a dou-
ble strategy. In a first step, I develop a descriptive account of the institutional di-
mensions of scientific expertise within the Swiss federal decision-making process.
In accordance with the theoretical propositions already developed, the aim is to
clarify the organizational structure of expertise production, the distribution of ac-
cess to it, and the extent to which a coordinative rather than communicative dis-
course prevails in decision-making. These elements constitute the backbone of a
tentative advisory system typology which reaches well beyond the classification of
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organizational traits of institutionalized producers of scientific expertise. In a sec-
ond analytical step I take the opposite perspective. Having clarified the ‘objective’
distribution of expertise, it is now necessary to consider how the subjectively con-
strued realities of political action situations condition the mobilization of scientific
expertise and the consequences thereof. For that purpose I analyze policy formula-
tion and expertise mobilization in three different decision-making processes. These
are selected such that each matches a different type within the policy issue classifi-
cation elaborated in the preceding chapter. Contrasting these cases not only allows
for verification of whether observed patterns of expertise mobilization and its con-
sequences conform to the theoretical expectations postulated for each policy type,
but also allows for discrimination between effects induced by the political system
and those by policy issue dynamics. Analytically, this latter task entails the recon-
struction of the selected decision-making processes. In order to causally connect
context to action, this reconstruction focuses on the perspectives of those actorswho
mobilized scientific expertise. Here I draw on the situational analysis framework de-
veloped by Adele Clarke (2003, 2005), which offers a set of ontological assumptions
as well as analytical techniques for ‘opening up’ a dataset. With roots in grounded
theory and symbolic interactionism, situational analysis is a relatively open analyt-
ical framework for analyzing interactions between collective actors in shared are-
nas.1 While explicit about its sociological assumptions, its analytical techniques are
exactly geared to capturing the interpretive flexibility with which social actors ap-
proach a given action situation.
The remainder of this chapter elaborates the research design of this study and
describes data collection. It ends with an explanation of the analytical strategy, in-
cluding an analytical hierarchy that ranges from data processing to interpretation.
4.2 Research design
This study employs a case study design (George and Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2007;
Yin, 2009). Such a research design aims at in-depth analysis of a single or very
1While its theoretical roots differ from those of actor-centered institutionalism, situational analysis
is quite compatible with the latter as far as the analytical level of action situations is concerned. I will
argue this point further below.
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Context: The Swiss
federal policy process
Case 1: Stem cell
research regulation
Case 2: CO2-
emission tax
Case 3: Fiscal equal-
ization reform
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Figure 4.1: The research design. Source: author’s illustration.
limited number of occurrences of the phenomenon of interest. It is an appropriate
design choice for investigating how and why questions about relatively contempo-
rary events over which the investigator has no control (Yin, 2009: 8ff.). Moreover,
it allows for context sensitivity in the analysis, enables a focus on social processes
whose sequences may not be captured by standardized measures, and permits the
necessary flexibility for alternating between theory and data in the analysis process.
To be precise, I adopt an ‘embedded multiple case design’ (Yin, 2009: 46ff.).
This means that I analyze several cases (decision-making processes) that share a
common context (the Swiss political system, 1990–2005), which jointly exercise an
influence on sub-units embeddedwithin a single case (the mobilization of scientific
expertise). This study defines the case unit as a decision-making process, which
comprises a substantive issue and a set of (in)formal rules that govern where, how
and who deals with it. Furthermore, the study takes expertise mobilization events
to constitute the embedded sub-units. A hierarchical ordering of the research de-
sign is important because I explicitly study policy advice in the context of policy-
making. This implies a clear dependency between case and sub-unit, because the
former brings the latter into being and not the other way around. Case selection has
to operate based on the characteristics of the decision-making process, and not on
the instances of policy advice embedded therein.
The research design (Figure 4.1) has three layers. The outer layer is the institu-
tional configuration of the political system at a given historical moment. This in-
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fluences the organization of policy-making (Papadopoulos, 1997: Chap. 8). It may
also have a direct influence on the occurrence and organization of policy advice.
Embedded within this context are the cases, which are the second layer in the de-
sign – the discrete policy-making processes. Aswith the political system as awhole,
they also exert a possible influence upon the occurrence and structure of individual
instances of policy advice. At the core of each case are particular instances of pol-
icy advice. These are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for policy-making,
which may well take place without advice. Therefore, where and how often they
occur is a priori unknown.
Cases and unit of analysis
The definition of cases requires justification (Gläser and Laudel, 2010: 96). In public
policy research policy-making processes are frequently defined as the case unit.
Such a practice is appropriate for this study, too. A policy-making process provides
a coherent delimitation of purposeful social action. It is an empirical rather than
conceptual category for it is generated in situ and its structure is meaningful to its
participants. These participants shape their actions in reference to events and other
participants inside the decision-making process. This leads to the emergence of an
action systemwhich is clearly distinguishable from public action in relation to other
policy issues. Thus, a decision-making process is an ‘organic’ unit and the fact that
it is structured by institutional rules and norms ensures a certain unit homogeneity.
Thus, while one process might considerably differ from another one, it still shares
enough similarity to provide comparable social action contexts.
The cases are also bounded in time. For the purpose of this research, they end
with a parliamentary decision or a popular vote. Such decisions not only mark
the potential beginning of policy implementation, which is a different context from
policy formulation, but are also important points of reference for the participant
actors who develop their strategies in reference to them. The exact beginning of
a case is more fuzzy. A rough definition of a case’s inception is the emergence of
sustained institutionalized attention to an issue. Every issue has a prehistory and
nonematerializes out of thin air. The extreme historical boundary of a case overlaps
with the temporal scope of collective awareness at the moment of the first official
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act in relation to a specific policy issue. This case definitionmakes also clear that the
level of analysis is situated at themeso-level of social interaction in an organizational
setting. It encompasses all the directly relevant social interactions concerned with
policy advice.
While adopting a policy-making process as a case unit is a tried and tested ana-
lytical strategy, no such thing can be said about policy advice – the embedded units
in the research design. Different instances of policy advice might display impor-
tant organizational variations, but they have several elements in common which
enable their clear identification and bounding. Firstly, science-based policy advice
involves people who produce and disseminate advice (advisory organizations, in-
dividual experts). Moreover, it necessarily contains a cognitive object (e.g. an idea, a
fact, a theory, etc.) encoded in amaterial object (advisory report, leaflet, powerpoint
presentation, etc.). Often, but not necessarily so, advice is given in face-to-face inter-
actions (an event, a hearing, a press conference), to which reference might be made
in subsequent policy deliberation. Secondly, the production of advice requires pur-
poseful and deliberate social action. Actors producing, giving and receiving ad-
vice deliberately do so and are thus aware of the procedural steps and symbolic
dimension associated to it. Hence, delimitation of an instance of science-based pol-
icy advice is possible through tying a cognitive object to the actors and interactional
situations implicated in its production, negotiation, and consumption.
Comparative logic
Comparing different cases allows for testing whether or not the case level exerts no
influence at all, mediates institutional effects of the political system in a particular
way, or engenders purely case-specific dynamics. Clear differences in themanifesta-
tion and consequences of scientific expertise would suggest that a particular policy
issue engenders either an independent effect or mediates a system-level effect in a
particular way. However, should the analysis reveal consistent similarities across
the different cases, it would be likely that the context – the political system and its
culture – exerts a direct influence rather than the specific case itself.
In order to allow for comparability of the different cases, some factors must
be held constant. For the context, only cases embedded within the Swiss federal
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decision-making process are considered. More tricky is the bounding of the tem-
poral context (Pierson, 2004: 169ff.). For this study, it requires consideration of
the political as well as the scientific system. Political and scientific systems are not
frozen, they change with time, even though some do so at a very slow pace. Given
that we have entered a new configuration of the science–politics relationship since
the 1980s (Guston, 2000), there are empirical reasons for looking at post–1980 cases.
Moreover, it also places the cases within the temporal scope of the case study frame-
work (Yin, 2009: 8). A case as defined in section 4.2must have come to a close before
being analyzed. Only an accomplished process can be reconstructed in its entirety.
Thus, selecting cases prior to 2005 is a sensible choice.
Case selection
This research treats a law-making process as a case. Case selection consequently en-
tails determining which law-making processes to analyze: this is a methodological
choice, and must reflect ontological assumptions stipulated by theory. A decision-
making process revolves around a substantive issue, which is affected by a partic-
ular conflict structure. The latter in turn establishes a particular action situation, to
which policymakers are sensitive in their action strategies. Following this logical
deduction means treating action situations as cases if, and only if, one condition is
met: an issue structure must remain stable throughout a decision-making process.
It is possible that issue structures change over time, which may occur at a very slow
pace or in the form of a shock event. But it is equally conceivable that – in analogy
to policy subsystems (cf. Sabatier andWeible, 2007) – issue structures remain fairly
stable over a decade or so. Proving stability is ultimately an empirical task. Should
changes in issue structure emerge, then a single decision-making process has to be
treated as more than a single case.
Wemay therefore proceedwith case selection bymappingdecision-making onto
the issue structure typology. Again, clarification is needed. Issue structures are
subjectively construed, which allows for the possibility that different actors develop
different perceptions of a situation. But because policymakers are sensitive to how
other actors perceive a situation, it is likely that different perspectives converge and
become congruent (cf. section 3.4). This bridge between the subjectively perceived
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world and the emergence of a intersubjective social reality also helps to span the gap
between the situated perspective of the agents in situ and the outsider perspective of
the researcher (with case selection ultimately driven by the latter). As case selection
takes place before conclusive knowledge about the issue structure of each selected
decision-making process can be obtained, I relied on a brief analysis of each case’s
inception and the federal government’s initial strategic response. The case study
results later corroborated these initial assessments.
An assumption of the stability of issue structures and their intersubjective na-
ture consequently allows for case selection according to variability in issue struc-
ture. In order to ensure that the variation between issue structures accounts for the
expected differences in expertise mobilization, the cases must be independent from
one another. They have to reflect substantially different issues, implicating different
policy subsystems and potentially mobilizing different kinds of substantive exper-
tise (the latter point is of particular interest, as the academic literature tends to study
either natural or social scientific expertise, but seldom contrasting them). Moreover,
path dependency effects should be minimized by selecting cases without a direct
substantive predecessor (i.e. the revision of an existing law).
The three cases selected – stem cell research regulation, carbon dioxide emis-
sion taxation, and fiscal equalization reform – satisfy these criteria of independence.
Each concerns a substantively different problem and brought together a different
cast of participants in policy formulation, who, for the most part, called on produc-
ers of expertise not involved in the other cases.
These cases represent a relatively unstructured issue (stem cell research regu-
lation), a semi-structured issue with epistemic consensus (CO2 emission taxation),
and a semi-structured issue with value consensus (fiscal equalization reform). A
purely structured case is not included, because it is less likely that such an issue
becomes the subject of a decision-making process with substantial intervention of
external experts. The unstructured nature of the stem cell case is relatively straight-
forward as it involves a divisive value question, given the necessary destruction
of a human embryo in order to extract stem cells from it. Moreover, at the time
of the issue there was substantial debate, within scientific and lay communities
(cf. Vogel, 2001), as to whether equivalent insights could not be gained from us-
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ing other kinds of stem cells. The identification of the CO2 emission reduction case
as a semi-structured issue, incorporating disagreements about values, is grounded
in the government’s perception of the feasibility of legislation, based on a policy
brief dating from summer 1990. It explicitly mentions a major international confer-
ence on climate change, which would take place in the fall of the same year, while
simultaneously anticipating the ecology/economy goal conflict anymeasurewould
entail. Finally, the classification of the fiscal equalization reform as semi-structured,
with conflicts around knowledge, is justified by the analysis of Braun (2009), who
demonstrates the importance of how actors dealt with uncertainty for the reform’s
successful accomplishment.
4.3 Data collection
The aim of data collection is to establish an exhaustive account of the organization
of scientific expertise in the Swiss decision-making process, as well as of the three
decision-making processes further examined in detail. Hence, data collection does
not pursue the goal of providingmeasurements for a few conceptualized indicators.
Rather, it strives for a ‘thick’ account of events and processes in order to test the
theoretical propositions.
The data consists of 42 semi-structured interviews and several thousand pages
of documentary records. It allows a general characterization of the Swiss advisory
system and for detailed reconstruction of the three decision-making processes un-
der study. Moreover, the fact that this study employs interview testimony as orig-
inal data in connection with archival records affords a comprehensive triangula-
tion of sources. As scientific expertise is enacted in a professional context, we may
construe it as a routinized activity whose organization is neither arbitrary nor acci-
dental. The interviewees were selected because of they have executed or witnessed
such routines themselves. The interviews were then designed to capture the par-
ticipants’ knowledge of such organizational routines and particular events. Inter-
view testimony can be cross-validated for consistency and may be aggregated into
a multi-perspective account. Precisely because policy formulation and scientific ex-
pertise are formal and professional processes, they produce an extensive paper trail
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(Freeman andMaybin, 2011). I was able to access and analyzemuch of thismaterial.
Beyond its own informational value, it played a significant role in the preparation
and validation of interviews. It was through this documentation that I gained the
necessary background knowledge to select appropriate interviewees, formulate rel-
evant questions and further probe tacit answers. Documentary sources also enabled
me to judge the plausibility of an account and to detect memory bias. Conversely,
interviews complement documents. Despite the importance of meeting minutes
and reports for organizational life, not everything is recorded or accessible. This es-
pecially concerns informal meetings and tacit knowledge. Interviews were helpful
in reconstructing informal action and in providing insights were written documen-
tation was off-limits.
Documents
This study exploits four different kinds of documentary sources. The first kind con-
sist in documents that articulate ideas in connection with policy formulation such
as draft policy proposals, white papers and advisory reports. Drafting such doc-
uments is the core task of policy work. The second kind encompasses documents
whose aim is to coordinate strategy and policy work. Typical exemplars arememos,
meeting minutes, letters, guidelines, and polls concerning stakeholder and public
opinion preferences. These first two kinds are usually produced or mandated by
government. The third kind, however, is composed of documents that reflect an
outside perspective on the policy issue and its process. Newspaper articles are the
most important item in this category. They do more than report about issues and
events. Newspaper accounts shape a perspective that may engender a reaction by
the policymakers who read them. A newspaper is a platform where certain aspects
of the policy process may be rendered visible to a wider public, and where support
and criticism to a policy initiative may be voiced. The final kind of documents are
non-recursive accounts of the policy process. Unlike newspaper reports, publica-
tions such as scientific journal articles are addressed at publics who are not affected
by the policy issue. Moreover, such accounts usually have a greater temporal dis-
tance to the events they report on than have newspaper articles.
Because the documentary evidence is heterogeneous and accessmodalitieswere
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variable, the collection principle I employed was exhaustiveness, arbitrated by the
available resources to conduct data collection. The harvesting of newspaper articles
constitutes an exception to this rule. I systematically queried a French as well as a
German daily newspaper, which are widely read by the political elite (Neue Zürcher
Zeitung (NZZ) and le temps). The following paragraphs provide more information
about the data collection process and offer a description of some of the sources.
Most expert reports and position papers by organizations have been easily acces-
sible. Major reports are oftentimes published, either electronically on the website
of the administration2 or in print (for older reports). Such reports are not a ho-
mogeneous type of document. Unlike written documents created by government
agencies, the life histories of advisory reports and position papers are very unstan-
dardized. This starts with their inception. Some have been commissioned, others
have been created on the sole initiative of their author. There might be a clearly
identifiable individual author, multiple authors, or institutional authorship where
the names of the contributors are sometimes not even printed in the report. Advi-
sory reports also lack a clearly predefined structure and style, leaving much open
to the experience of their authors.3
As for Parliament, most of its records are publicly accessible on its website.4
This comprehensive website informs about present and past legislative issues. Par-
liamentary floor debates are fully transcribed and publicly accessible. However,
since the meetings of parliamentary committees are confidential, their minutes are
not freely accessible. Nevertheless, all my written requests for access were granted,
on condition that I preserve the confidentiality of the meeting participants and did
not use verbatim quotes.5
Each branch of the federal administration has its own access policy for mate-
rial authored prior to the 2006 enactment of the Federal Act on Transparency in the
Public Administration. Moreover, it also depends on a particular agency how long it
keeps the documentation about a certain legislative act in its office prior before com-
2http://www.admin.ch
3Interviewed experts said that they aim to mimic the communication style of leading newspapers
like the NZZ or of the dispatch (in which the Federal Council communicates policy proposals) with
their advisory reports.
4http://www.parlament.ch
5These minutes are verbatim transcripts created by professional staff. They are revised for read-
ability and random utterances common in spoken language are eliminated.
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mitting it to the federal archives. The federal archives impose a 30 year embargo,
duringwhich the filing agency has full control over who gets access andwithwhich
provisions. This state of affairwas notwithout consequences for this research. Some
branches of the federal administration were more generous than others. The Fed-
eral Office for the Environment (FOEN) allowed me to digitize its internal archive
on carbon emission taxation and provided me with the necessary infrastructure to
do so. For material pertaining to the fiscal equalization case study, consulting the
federal archives was necessary. While the Federal Office of Justice (FOJ) granted
virtually unrestricted access to the material it filed on this case (digitization, no re-
strictions on quoting), the Federal Finance Administration (FFA) restricted access
to its archived files to an ‘eyes only’ level (no quoting, no digitization, on location
notes only). The fact that much of the material archived by FOJ was identical to
what FFA filed, made these access policies a bit paradoxical. For the case study on
stem cell research, I was unable to access records outside the public domain for the
Federal Office of Public Health had not committed its case records yet to the Federal
Archives and I lacked the appropriate connections to staff working at the office in
question. Nevertheless, the amount of publicly available information and excellent
interview data enabled a comprehensive analysis of the case.
Interviews
This studyuses interviews as an indirectmethod of observation of themanifestation
of scientific expertise and of policy work. The latter constitute the units of analysis
(cf. section 4.2), not the interviewees. Thus, there is a clear ontological difference
between the phenomenon of interest and an interviewee (Spencer et al., 2003: 202).
This clarification is important as it influences the interview protocol’s design and
the analysis of the data thus generated.
The methodological framework I employ for the interviews is called ‘expert in-
terviews’ and has been theorized by mostly German speaking social scientists (cf.
Bogner et al., 2009). Such expert interviews are semi-structured and aim at eluci-
dating a functional elite’s interpretative and procedural knowledge about an orga-
nizational context of interest (Littig, 2009). Interviewees are construed as experts
for the analysis because they possess experience-based knowledge about the phe-
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nomenon (e.g. organizational routines) the interviewer is interested in. This is not
to be confused with members of the functional elite being referred to as experts
in the context of the phenomenon. This may cause confusion particularly for this
research as I use the ‘expert interview’ framework to interview people who acted
as scientific experts in the policy processes I study. Nevertheless, I am interested
in what people know about a process through first hand experience (cf. Meuser
and Nagel, 2005: 75), not about what they know about fiscal federalism, biomedical
ethics, or atmospheric physics.
Topic guide
Expert interviews followa semi-structured topic guide. The topic guide is amethod-
ologically reflected document that is consistently used across all interviews. The
aim is to let the interviewee provide an account that is as little predetermined by
the interviewer as possible, while still retaining enough control to steer the conver-
sation when it gets off-topic, or to offer encouragement to explicitly verbalize the
many tacit aspects of organizational life. The latter requires prompting of particu-
lar points, especially once the mostly spontaneous initial reply has come to a close.
The topics addressed during an interview concern an interviewee’s experiences
and judgements in regards to the empirical context of the phenomenon. They should
be intuitively comprehensible, clearly relate to the interviewee’s experience, and
should eschew concept-laden language (Gläser and Laudel, 2010: 112ff.).
Apart fromwhat topics an interview addresses, the interview guide also defines
how and when they are talked about. The interviewer’s aim is to establish a coop-
erative atmosphere that is conducive to trust building. In addition to strategies dis-
cussed in section B.2, this can be significantly influenced by the topic guide’s struc-
ture (Arthur and Nazroo, 2003: 114). As trust builds over time of the interaction,
the most important design principle is to start the interview with non-contentious
topics that are immediately accessible without much reflection and to address more
narrow or more delicate issues later on.
Table 4.1 represents an abridged version of this study’s topic guide. While fol-
lowing the enunciated design principles, the topic guide reflects the diversity of
perspectives the interviewees bring to the task. Thus, some topics are only intelligi-
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Table 4.1: Interview topic guide (abridged version).
Topics P A E
Introduction: presentation of interviewer and interview schedule × × ×
Professional background and role of interviewee in the decision-making process × × ×
Personal and collective preparation process of policy deliberation in Parliament ×
Organization of policy work during the pre-parliamentary phase ×
Mobilization and organization of expertise during the pre-parliamentary phase × ×
Rationales for and organization of expert hearings in parliamentary committees × × ×
Deliberation and the role of the administration in parliamentary committees × ×
The production process of advisory reports ×
Organization and governance of advisory bodies × ×
Reception and perception of expert advice in the policy process × × ×
Synthesis of key points and conclusion × × ×
ble for persons interviewed in their capacity as members of Parliament [P], others
apply only to civil servants and members of government [A], and some issues were
only relevant to the academic experts [E] I talked to. The relevance of a particular
topic to for each of these groups is indicated in the last three columns of the table.
Interviewee selection
The choice of interview sampling is directly linked to the research design and the
status of interview data therein. As interview data serves the purpose of recon-
structing events of interest in this research and, accordingly, the interviewee does
not constitute the unit of analysis, interviewee selection does not strive for represen-
tativeness of a particular social group. Rather, the sample design aims at identifying
the individuals who have acquired detailed and experience-based knowledge of the
events in question by having participated in some of them. Thus, interviewee selec-
tion follows the logic of data saturation, which is also influenced by how detailed a
reconstruction is possible from archival records alone.
The studied decision- and advisory processes bring together the three distinct,
and at times overlapping, perspectives of the executive and legislative branches of
government, as well as the one of advisory institutions. The most important princi-
ple of interviewee recruitment was to adequately reflect these different perspectives
in order to ‘have eyes’ on as many events and processes as possible, and where pos-
sible, to havemultiple witnesses to the same situation. Thus, maximal coverage and
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data saturation dictated howmany persons I interviewed from each viewpoint. The
sample design also took into consideration that the parliamentary perspective con-
tains multiple sub-perspectives that reflect the different political parties with their
independent opinion formation processes.
Naming of people in documents, the comprehensive recording of attendance in
the minutes of parliamentary committee meetings, and referrals from other inter-
viewees constitute the data from which to select interview participants. For MPs
this process was straightforward. As the committee meeting minutes are verbatim
transcripts with clearly identifiable speech turns, counting and plotting the number
of interventions per meeting participant was possible. I then contacted themost vo-
cal MPs of each party, based on the assumptions that those who contribute the most
to the debate are likely to be the opinion leader of their respective party, have in-
vested more effort in personal preparation, and are more likely than others to recall
events. In conjunction with referrals, the attendance record contained in the parlia-
mentary committee meeting minutes also enabled to identify the civil servants and
members of governmentwho drafted the policy proposal andwere in charge of that
process. Since that is a fairly small group, no particular sampling strategy was nec-
essary. Identifying the individuals and organizations having played an advisory
role was less straight forward for lack of a systematic record. Yet, the list of par-
ticipants in parliamentary hearings, references to advisory reports in governmental
records obtained through archival searches, or information obtained through inter-
views with civil servants managed to produce a coherent picture in the end.
Table 4.2 provides a picture of the final interview sample. A total of 14 persons
were interviewedwho during the respective policy process were either members of
the federal or cantonal executive, or held positions in the federal or (inter)cantonal
administration. In the parliamentary venue, 16 interviews were conducted with
MPs and one with two secretaries of parliamentary committees. Finally, ten inter-
views were arranged with academic advisers and staff of advisory organizations.
Out of the 43 persons I spoke with during these 41 interviews, 11 were women and
three were French speaking. With the exception of two occasions, interviews were
with one persona at a time. Only in three instances did an interviewee actively
participate in more than one of the processes this study is about. As interviews
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were scheduled on a rolling basis, this was neither anticipated nor controlled for. It
means, however, that the sample spreads well across different fields of experience
and that possible convergence of interview testimony between the different case
studies is not an artifact of sample selection.
Table 4.2: Interview attributes.
Number of interviews∗ 41
By venue:
Government and administration 14
Parliament 17
Experts and advisory organizations 10
Number of group interviews 2
Number of interviewees 43
Number of French speakers 3
Number of women 11
∗A phone inquiry was not counted as an interview.
4.4 Analytical strategy
As I have previously outlined (cf. section 4.1), the empirical analysis consists of
an analytic-descriptive account of what I have termed the institutional dimension
of scientific expertise in Switzerland, followed by three case studies that examine
scientific expertise in action. The use of situational analysis, further detailed be-
low, presupposes an analytical strategy that works from the ground up and finds
integration with theoretical presuppositions in form of sensitizing concepts. This
is a generic template that many qualitative and interpretive methodologies share.
Spencer et al. (2003: 212ff.) call it an ‘analytical hierarchy’. It is a ladder of progres-
sive abstraction that links the raw data across several methodologically controlled
steps to a theoretically informed interpretation.
Figure 4.2 illustrates this analytical hierarchy. The first step is datamanagement,
which implies several operations. The raw data has to be organized in a structured
and easily accessible fashion. This includes operations such as transcribing inter-
views, digitizing paper records, and tagging all the items with metadata. The sec-
ond step consists in data reduction, in order for any meaningful analysis to be pos-
sible. This reduction process goes hand in hand with an initial sorting process of
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the data according to its content. Once this step has been accomplished, the data is
structured and labeled in such a way that all evidence relating to a particular situ-
ation of action can easily be grouped together for further analysis. The third step
consists in the elaboration of a descriptive account concerning each action situation.
It is the core of the analytical enterprise. The final step is to write the case narratives
and to compare their findings in light of the Swiss institutional context. This analyt-
ical hierarchy enables the researcher to move across different levels of abstraction.
As new insights inevitably develop during the analysis process, the researcher can
move back into the raw data. Also, the analytical hierarchy affords a transparent
analytical process with a precise documentation of each step. This also allows for a
clear chain of evidence (Yin, 2009: 122).
In what follows, the analytical process is detailed. Beginning with data man-
agement and reduction operation, I elucidate the necessary procedure for interview
and documentary evidence. The chapter then elaborates on data interpretation and
the role of situational analysis therein. It concludes with a list of sensitizing con-
cepts used for interpretation.
Data management and reduction
Data management encompasses the digitization and storage of data, tagging of that
data with metadata, and organizing it in a chronological order. A clear storage sys-
tem is crucial for enabling a clear chain of evidence (Yin, 2009: 122). In order to facil-
itate this task, I developed a relational database using FileMaker Pro. This database
serves also for storing structured information about events and actors relevant to
each case.
Interviews and documents are subject to different procedures of data reduction.
For the interviews, I draw on an approach developed by Meuser and Nagel (1991,
2005, 2009). This approach offers a number of methodologically controlled steps for
the analysis of expert interviews within the framework of a reconstructive analysis.
Like other interpretative analytical strategies, it presupposes a ladder of abstraction
connecting the raw data on one end with a theoretically informed interpretation
of empirically grounded types on the other.6 The three broad sequences of recon-
6See Spencer et al. (2003) and also Kelle and Kluge (2010) for a similar approach.
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Data
management
Data
processing
Interviews:
a) transcription;
b) paraphrasing;
c) labeling;
d) grouping;
Synthesizing
documents Information
Agency
Data inter-
pretation
Deployment of
sensitizing concepts
Mapping of:
a) action situations;
b) perspectives;
c) discourses;
Memo writing
Report
writing Case narratives
Case comparison
Figure 4.2: Analytical hierarchy. Source: author’s illustration.
structive qualitative analysis of data management, the development of a descriptive
account, and the development of an explanatory account are broken down into six
individual steps. They lead the analyst from interview transcription (1), to data
reduction through paraphrasing and regrouping of similar passage within one in-
terview (2–3), to the development of a descriptive account by comparing accounts
of similar topics across interviews (4), to the theoretically informed interpretation
of this reconstruction (5–6). These steps enable the analyst not only to move to-
ward abstraction, but also to make recursive moves in order to verify the empirical
grounding of analytical categories (Meuser and Nagel, 2005: 90ff.). This approach
is not only fully compatible with the expert interview framework used for data gen-
eration – both treat the interviewee as an informant and not as the unit of analysis
– it also works well as a substitute to grounded theory data coding techniques oth-
erwise used as precursor step to situational analysis. In this study, the interpretive
steps (5–6) are replaced by situational analysis.
Documents are simultaneously information containers as well as artifacts. Both
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aspects provide important cues for reconstructing social processes and require proper
attention when collecting and analyzing documents. Concerning the informational
dimension of documents, economy and feasibility dictated a gradual approach. I
read through all the documents and highlighted relevant passages. However, I only
summarized and selectively paraphrased those I deemed especially important in the
context of the analysis (which was still a lot).
In this study, it is important to recognize that documents have some kind of
agency, or ‘performativity’ (Freeman andMaybin, 2011: 156) in order to to treat this
data source adequately. While they do not act on their own – they are still indifferent
kinds and rely on human actors’ agency for coming into being and into circulation
– they shape social action around them by how people collaborate in their crafting
and how they react to a document’s existence and content. Documents shape social
action indirectly by coordinating collaborative processes around them. This means
that documents, not only in their finalized state but also in their process of creation,
may constitute boundary objects (Leigh Star and Griesemer, 1989). Documents can
also teach usmuch about how its authors think. This is especially salient in an orga-
nizational context where writing is indispensable to collective thinking and prob-
lem solving. Crafting a report is part of a creative process in which ideas are formed
rather than just represented. Looking at the history of a document might therefore
reveal much about authors’ thought process and strategy. Thus, I also captured this
performativity in a memo for documents central to the social processes of interest.
Situational analysis
Clarke (2005) conceives situational analysis as an enlargement of grounded theory7
which updates and complements its underlying social ontology and offers a new
set of analytical tools rendered necessary by these modifications.8 As a former stu-
dent of grounded theory co-founder Anselm Strauss, Clarke pursues this project
along the lines of Strauss’ sociological work in the symbolic interactionist tradition.
What she takes from him and other interactionists are the ontological ‘root images’
7For an overview of grounded theory and its intellectual history, see Charmaz (2006).
8In her book, Clarke (2005) leaves out any treatment of traditional grounded theory data analysis
techniques, which she deems useful for data pre-processing. My use of situational analysis dispenses
with these grounded theory methods and uses other analytical techniques instead (cf. chapter 4).
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Table 4.3: Concept translation
Actor-centered institutionalism Symbolic interactionism
Composite actor Social world
Action orientation Commitment/perspective
Arena Arena/action situation
of social world, commitment, and arena (Clarke, 2005: 45ff.). Social worlds are shared
cognitive perspectives that form ‘social wholes’ akin to the public policy concepts of
advocacy, respectively discourse coalitions (Sabatier andWeible, 2007; Hajer, 1995)
(Table 4.3 illustrates how these concepts map onto each other). The notion of com-
mitmentmuch resembles the action orientations discussed earlier, for it is framed as
identity constructions and action predispositions. Further, social worlds only know
temporary stability. They are bounded by distinctive discourses, which are not nec-
essarily coherent. Here, Clarke draws at once on the interactionist understanding
of social worlds as ‘universes of discourse’, as well as Foucault’s notion of discourse
as disciplining and constitutive of identities and social collectivities (Clarke, 2005:
54ff.). This highlights the coproductionist relationship between discourse and social
worlds: social worlds articulate and reproduce discourses, which in turn establish
boundaries between social worlds and provide meaning to a world’s participants.
Clarke’s most original move is to construe of an action situation as the unit of
analysis. She dismisses the notion of context and argues that in the empirical action
situation there are only elements that are felt as consequential for the participating
actors. Conditions are not outside a situation, they are constitutive of it and are
therefore an intrinsic part. This is an empirical contention and Clarke does not reject
theoretical assumptions about structuring effects from more stable social entities.
However, they require empirical substantiation.
"I am arguing in favor of focusing empirically on the situation as a whole and on ex-
amining distinctions made there from the perspectives of different actors, rather than
a priori, categorically, and solely from the perspective of the researcher." (Clarke, 2005:
66)
This is where the methodological part of situational analysis takes over with
situational maps (cf. Clarke, 2005: Chap. 3). They offer three foci on an action
situation by asking
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1. what human and non-human elements are constitutive of an action situation
and how do they relate with each other?
2. what social worlds (i.e. collective actors) are there, what are their perspec-
tives? what kind of resources do they dispose of? how do they engage with
each other in negotiations?
3. what are the salient issues in an action situation? what are the positions taken
and not taken regarding them?
Clark translates these foci into visual mapping strategies, which, in conjunc-
tion with sensitizing concepts, form canvasses for interpretation and memo writ-
ing. While some maps may serve as the basis for a later visual illustration, they are
not analytical end products (Clarke, 2005: 137). Rather, they are works in progress.
As new insights emerge, elements are added or removed. A map is done when
‘saturation’ has been achieved (Clarke, 2005: 108).
While I adhere to Clarke’s conceptual toolbox and the three foci to interrogate
the data, my use of mapping techniques was not systematic. Policy formulation
is a highly organized enterprise (also in terms of the participating actors), which
somewhat reduces the exploratory value of mapping. Nonetheless, drawing maps
was useful at times, but mostly I inquired action situations through memo writing.
Clarke (2005: 77) uses ‘sensitizing concepts’ – originally proposed by Blumer
(1954, 1969) – as ‘directions along which to look’, as opposed to closed concepts
that prescribe ‘what to see’. In addition to structuring the analysis into two steps –
establishment of the institutional context followed by case studies –, the use of sen-
sitizing concepts is a firm part of how this research strives for empirical grounding
of its theoretical propositions.
Since sensitizing concepts require empirical substantiation, their identification
and operationalization is not spelled out to the same extent as amore deductive and
theory testing approach would command. Table 4.4 lists the most salient concepts
for this research (first column) and offers some empirical traits for each concept
(second column). Where applicable, the table refers to other sections of the text that
discuss certain concepts. Further clarifications and a description of the analysis
protocol may be found in the appendix (section B.3).
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Table 4.4: Sensitizing concepts
Concept Empirical Traits
Scientific expertise
(ontological)
Section "A working definition of scientific expertise" (p. 10) separates
it from other policy-relevant kinds of knowledge. See also section "The
epistemic dimension of scientific expertise" (p. 20).
Scientific expertise
(empirical)
The issue (what is it about?);
The producer (who is the producer and why?);
The medium and sites of interaction (e.g. a written report; face-to-face
hearing; news media diffusion through press release or conference, or
live expert appearances).
The principal (is advice directly or indirectly mandated by government,
another sponsor, or the autonomous initiative of an advice producer?)
The audience (is it well defined or diffuse)?
Institutions
(ontological)
See section "A neo-institutionalist tool kit" (p. 54).
Resource distribution The principal (which public and private actor dispose of financial, orga-
nizational, and symbolic capital to sponsor scientific expertise?)
Independence (budgetary envelope vs. project-based financing of exper-
tise.)
Action situation/Arena Is action self-referential, oriented at subsystem participants, or directed
at the larger public? Section "Action situations" (p. 62) provides a more
exhaustive list.
Social world/actor
Commitment/
action orientation
See the elements listed in section "Situational analysis" (p. 104).
Effects of expertise
mobilization
See discussion in section "Effects of scientific expertise" (p. 78).
This list of sensitizing concepts concludes the theoretical and methodological
part of this study. The following chapters will provide an empirical investigation
into scientific expertise and the Swiss decision-making process.

Five
The Swiss Advisory System
5.1 Introduction
Scientific expertise is an important enough component of modern democracies that
it can be regarded as an institutionalized phenomenon. Jasanoff (1990) went so far
as to call it ‘the fifth branch’ of government so to underscore the power that exper-
tise wields in regulatory governance. But the label ‘institutionalized’ should not
trick us into thinking that the phenomenon manifests itself in the form of a neat,
science court-like institution that presides over contentious questions of a factual
nature. Instead there are a heterogeneous assemblage of organizations proffering
expertise, a certain demand structure, and rules and expectations governing the in-
terplay between these. This chapter will describe and characterize the individual
parts which form the Swiss advisory system, given that a comprehensive and up to
date survey does not currently exist.1 But identifying and describing the individual
elements of that system is ameans rather than an end in itself. The key question it is
designed to answer is how the system relates to the Swiss decision-making process.
The lesson from the literature review (cf. section 2.5) has been that there is no
unified way to identify and analyse an advisory system and its links to decision-
making. However, in the conceptualization of expertise mobilization outlined ear-
lier (cf. chapter 3) I suggested that several elements might be relevant: the distribu-
tion of access to expertise, regulative norms of both a formal and informal nature,
and power concentration within the political system. Treating these elements as
sensitizing concepts, I will proceed as follows. In the first section I look at the main
1At times, no such overview exists in English. For a comprehensive overview in German of pol-
icy advice, see Sager and Stadelmann-Steffen (2008). On Swiss science, technology and educational
policy, Braun and Leresche (2007) offer a comprehensive overview in English.
109
110| The Swiss Advisory System
pillars of the Swiss political system, and the distribution of power and resources
to mobilize expertise therein. In the second section, I advance the argument that
science as an institution does not constitute a pillar of political legitimacy in Swiss
political culture, which, however, does not prevent political argumentation in refer-
ence to science. In the third section I propose a classification of the different sources
of policy-relevant research which distinguishes between three organizational mod-
els (networks, contracts, and delegation). Drawing it all together, the concluding
section offers a picture of the Swiss advisory system through contrasting stable and
changing elements.
5.2 Resource and power distribution in the political system
The Swiss political system is best known for its institutional idiosyncrasies, involv-
ing a collegial executive, instruments of direct democracy controlled by the people,
and federalism. This section describes them in order to determine the power distri-
bution that they afford, and the ways in which the necessary resources for mobiliz-
ing scientific expertise are distributed.
Federalism
Switzerland is a federal country composed of three tiers of government: communi-
ties, cantons (of which there are 26) and the federal state. Swiss federalism is the
historic coming together of individual member states called cantons. Between the
13th and 19th centuries, individual cantons joined the Swiss confederation. After
a very brief civil war – which opposed a liberal, urban majority against a conser-
vative and rural minority, and which ended with the victory of the former – the
constitutional settlement of 1848 became the foundation of modern Switzerland.
While being muchmore integrated than previous confederate forms of cooperation
between cantons, the modern state nevertheless retained federalism as a constitu-
tional principle, which was important to the protection of the Catholic minority,
who were concentrated in small rural cantons. The liberal majority also made fur-
ther concessions to this territorially anchored minority. Parliament’s design is ab-
solutely symmetrical and bicameral, such that every canton, small or large, receives
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two seats in the upper house (Council of States). The implication for the decision-
making process is that both houses need to reach an agreement. Moreover, any
constitutional amendment was to be ratified by a mandatory popular referendum,
which to this date requires a so-called ‘doublemajority’. Thus, not only is amajority
of the popular vote necessary for constitutional change, it has also to be accepted by
the popular vote in a majority of cantons. The small cantons are therefore in pos-
session of very strong veto powers, which have increased over time as population
disparities between large and small cantons have increased with urbanization.2
Braun (2003) argues that Switzerland uses a ‘decentralized’ form of federalism,
in which tendencies toward centralization might not entirely be absent, but where
such shifts require justification. The cantons have a very strong position in the Swiss
system, as all competences not constitutionally delegated to the central government
fall under their jurisdiction (Linder and Vatter, 2001: 95). The acquisition of new
competencies by the federal government therefore requires a constitutional amend-
ment, which necessarily involves a popular vote.
Cantons are integrated into the federal policy process through a host of for-
mal and informal channels, which – contrary to the intent of the 1848 constitu-
tion – evolved into a multilevel system of vertical cooperation (Linder and Vatter,
2001; Vatter, 2005). Many federal programs are implemented by the cantons, giving
them large discretionary powers, though they have little hard power in the fed-
eral decision-making process. Unlike the German Bundesrat, the Council of States
does not formally represent the cantonal governments. However, a minimum of
eight cantons may call for an optional referendum on a law voted through in Par-
liament. Cantonal representatives also participate in many policy formulation pro-
cesses through membership in advisory commissions; similarly, cantons are rou-
tinely consulted about federal legislative proposals.
Direct democracy
The advent of direct democracy followed a progressive evolution in Switzerland.
The mandatory referendum required for all constitutional amendments was intro-
2See Papadopoulos (2002) on how social transformations have distorted the conception of minor-
ity representation anchored in the 1848 constitution and left essentially unchanged until today.
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duced as part of the 1848 constitution. The optional referendum and the popular
initiative [proposition] followed suit as part of constitutional reform in 1874 and
1891, respectively.3
According to Papadopoulos (2001), it is not so much the fact that direct demo-
cratic instruments also exist at the federal level of government (unlike in the United
States, for instance) or the frequency of its use that sets Switzerland apart, but that
these instruments are entirely under the control of the population. Thus the elite
cannot make strategic use of direct democracy (for instance by decreeing that a ref-
erendumwill be held). The opposite is in fact the case: it is the governing elite who
have to adjust their strategies to pressure from below.
Papadopoulos (2001: 38) notes threeways inwhich the political system adjusted
to the substantial uncertainty introduced by direct democracy, in order to prevent
or steer its use. Firstly, the governing coalition was expanded to include the ma-
jor political parties that had successfully demonstrated their strategic use of direct
democratic instruments against the governing elite (cf. section 5.2). Secondly, stake-
holder groupswith the potential to launch a referendum are actively integrated into
the rather long policy-formulation process, through membership in advisory com-
missions and formal and informal consultations.4 Finally, in the case of a successful
launch of a popular initiative, the lattermay be diffused ormoderated bymeans of a
direct or indirect governmental counterproposal. In reaction to counter proposals,
sponsors of popular initiatives sometimes retract their proposition if they feel that
their demands have been met. A counter proposal may also weaken the chance of
an initiative at the ballot.
3Government-initiated constitutional amendments, and proposals of Swiss adherence to inter-
national organizations, are subject to a mandatory referendum, requiring a double majority of total
popular votes and cantons in order to pass. An optional referendum can be requested by 50’000 signa-
tures or 8 cantons, to be submitted in less than 100 days after the formal publication of a law adopted
by Parliament. A simple majority is sufficient. The popular initiative requires 100’000 signatures.
Initiatives can only lead to constitutional amendments and are thus also subject to the double major-
ity rule. A general initiative enabling the initiation of federal laws was introduced and then aborted
before being used, because it was deemed to complicated in practice.
4 Neidhart (1970) famously hypothesized that expert commissions and stakeholder consultation
procedures are an important complement to direct democracy, since they are presumed to be instru-
mental in integrating actors capable of launching a referendum.
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The system of government
The Swiss political system5 is of neither the parliamentary nor the presidential kind.
Its executive is composed of seven members and is called the Federal Council.6 As a
directorate, the Federal Council is a collective body, and each of its members repre-
sents the government as a whole in public. Federal Councillors thus do not defend
their own opinion but that of the collective, even if this should be against their per-
sonal preference. Federal Councillors simultaneously head the federal administra-
tion. Each of them presides over a single ministry – called a department in Switzer-
land – which is divided into offices, such as the ‘Federal Office of Public Health’ or
the ‘Federal Office for the Environment’. The federal offices form the core of the ad-
ministration and are led by a director. The administration has been composed of the
same seven departments since 1848, and public administration reform is extremely
difficult, often suffering important setbacks at the ballot (Varone, 2006).
Federal Councillors are elected by Parliament for a four year term. Unlike in
a parliamentary system, however, there is a strict separation of power, and nei-
ther government nor Parliament has the power to dissolve the other. As a result
of the political elite’s coping strategy with direct democracy (cf. supra) and the sta-
ble power distribution between the major political parties, the Federal Council is
de facto a multi-party government. Between 1959 and 2003, the same four political
parties each occupied the same number of seats in the Federal Council.7 Despite
this exceptional stability, it has to be noted that this system of concordance govern-
ment [Konkordanz] is not to be confused with a coalition government. Firstly, there
is no coalition agreement specifying binding goals for the legislature. Secondly,
party discipline is weak because the party system is vertically fragmented (with
there sometimes being considerable disagreement between cantonal sections and
the national party) and because of the missing governmental power to dissolve Par-
liament. Thus Linder (2007: 26) remarks that power-sharing in Switzerland is not
5For a comprehensive overview, see Kriesi and Trechsel (2008).
6One Federal Councillor is elected president of the confederation for a one year term by Parlia-
ment. There are no special prerogatives associated to the presidency other than ceremonial duties and
chairing the meetings of the Federal Council. This form of government is unique and is not directly
comparable to either a presidential or parliamentary system.
7Swiss People’s Party (SVP): 1 seat. Radical Party (FDP): 2 seats, down from full dominance of
the government in 1848. Christian Democratic Party (CVP): 2 seats. Social Democratic Party (SPS): 2
seats.
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induced by the political elite, but that it is an extant institutional configuration that
forces the latter into cooperation.
Parliament is of symmetrical bicameral design. Each legislative proposal has
to pass both the National Council (lower house, 200 seats) and the Council of States
(upper house, 46 seats). The cantons form the electoral districts. Proportional rep-
resentation for elections of the National Council was introduced in 1919, following
civil unrest, and led to the formation of a multi-party system of exceptional stabil-
ity. It was not until the 1990s that important power shifts appeared, with the right
wing Swiss People’s Party (SVP) rapidly gaining in electoral strength, mainly at the
expense of the Radical Party (FDP) and the Christian Democratic Party (CVP) (Lad-
ner, 2007: 328).
A dual system of representation
When considering the representation of particular interests in the Swiss context,
one has to consider the political parties aswell as interest groups. Political parties in
Switzerland are structurally weak. There is no public financing for political parties
in Switzerland, and, consequently, they have few financial resources and depend on
donations. This has direct repercussions on the degree of professionalization and
the analytical capacity that parties can acquire – such thatmanyparties, for instance,
rely heavily on volunteer labor even at the most senior levels. The party system
is also incredibly fragmented. Political parties have strong cantonal roots, but the
national organization of a political party is more of an umbrella organization, and
it is not uncommon for cantonal sections to deviate considerably from the national
party. Political parties are also horizontally fragmented: there are over a dozen
parties active at the national level (Ladner, 2007: 310ff.).
Interest groups – such as trade unions and employers’ associations – are also
highly decentralized. However, their umbrella organizations at the national level
tend to be much better organized, and have many more financial resources, than
the political parties. This translates into better analytical capacities. For instance,
Switzerland’s only major think tank, Avenir Suisse, is financed by the business com-
munity (Kriesi and Trechsel, 2008: 104). Interest groups have traditionally wielded
great influence in the pre-parliamentary phase of the decision-making process, be-
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cause they have been integrated into extra-parliamentary commissions and invited
to comment on policy proposals.
Flexible affordances of rigid institutions
The institutional foundation of the Swiss political system is rigid and accommo-
dates for diversity through federalism (and associated bicameralism), proportional
representation, a multiparty collegial executive, and instruments of direct democ-
racy controlled by the people. This has fostered the textbook image of Switzerland
as an exemplar of consensus democracy (Lijphart, 1999), with a well-articulated
coordinative discourse in the form of extensive stakeholder inclusion during pol-
icy formulation (the so-called pre-parliamentary phase, in Swiss political science
jargon). However, recent scholarship (Häusermann et al., 2004; Mach et al., 2003;
Papadopoulos, 2008; Sciarini, 2013) shows that the dominance of this coordinative
discourse is weakening, despite institutional rigidity. An indicator for this is that
the median ratio between the length of the pre-parliamentary and parliamentary
phase of decision-making has reduced from about 4:1 to 3:1, when the early 1970s
and late 1990s are compared (Sciarini, 2007: 475). Moreover, the density of elite net-
works has declined since the 1980s, which has affected cooperative venues of policy
coordination (e.g extra-parliamentary expert committees; cf. section 5.4).
The reason for these changes is that the once all-powerful interest groups are los-
ing influence. Internationalization (adoption of treaties or autonomous adaptation
to international changes) has reduced the role of domestic actors in policy-making,
because it requires swift political action, which is fundamentally incompatible with
the heavy, time-intensive procedures of maximum inclusion (Papadopoulos 1997:
78; Sciarini 2007: 474). This has empowered the executive relative to interest groups,
for a non-inclusive and technocratic style of decision-making tends to marginalize
the latter (Papadopoulos, 2008).8 Further, increased polarization of partisan compe-
tition (amplified by media scrutiny), and new conflict structures leading to less sta-
ble coalitions, has empowered the political parties represented in government at the
8The weakening of interest groups in not only a question of procedural efficiency. International
economic pressures are dividing interest groups into business associations oriented toward the in-
ternational market, and others with a domestic orientation, such as the farmers’ and small business
organizations (Kriesi and Trechsel, 2008: 100).
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expense of interest groups (Papadopoulos, 2008; Sciarini, 2013). The reinforcement
of the main political parties manifests itself in the increasing importance of Parlia-
ment as a venue for policy formulation. Parliament introduced permanent special-
ized committees in 1992, and has since then strengthened their competencies. As a
result, the number of legislative processes controlled by Parliament from start to fin-
ish have increased (Lüthi, 2009). The relative shortening of the pre-parliamentary
phase signifies the empowerment of the executive in internationalized policy do-
mains, and of Parliament in domestic ones. But in any case – and this is of partic-
ular importance to the present study – Switzerland can no longer be regarded as a
paradigmatic case for a dominant coordinative discourse, given that venues of cor-
poratist interest intermediation have lost their importance. This does not mean that
Switzerland has become an example of strong power concentrationwith a predomi-
nantly communicative discourse. But further analytical attention to communicative
discourse is certainly warranted.
5.3 Science and political institutions
Earlier in this chapter I described how internationalization and increased polariza-
tion of partisan competition have reinforced the power of Parliament and of the
major political parties at the expense of interest groups (cf. section 5.2). This rein-
forcement of Parliament as a venue of policy-makingdoes notmean that the political
system has changed completely; after all, the administration still controls substan-
tially more decision-making processes than Parliament. But because Parliament as
a venue is more accessible to media scrutiny than the executive, policy-making has
moved further into the public arena when compared to the 1970s and early 1980s.
This is equivalent to the strengthening of the communicative discourse relative to
the coordinative one, at least in domains like social policy. As established in the dis-
cussion of ideology as a potential substitute for science (cf. section 3.4), the register
of justification an actor draws upon is dependent on a witnessing public’s endorse-
ment of it. This warrants two questions. Firstly, what relationship does the Swiss
public have with science? Secondly, is Parliament a venue for the mobilization of
scientific expertise?
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To my knowledge, there is no direct research on how the Swiss public perceives
the engagement of scientific experts in matters of policy. We therefore do not know
whether politicians can effectively enhance their credibility bymaking a showof sci-
entific expertise in public, or whether the publicly visible role of experts in policy-
making has legitimatory power. Instead, we have to construct an account of this
by indirect means. Research in the ‘public understanding of science’ (PUS) tradi-
tion and drawing on Eurobarometer survey data andmedia analysis shows that the
Swiss public has a globally favorable attitude toward science. The evidence is quite
clear that this positive valuation of science is not connected to the generally high sci-
entific literacy present in Switzerland. For instance, while science related popular
initiatives stimulate scientific literacy through their public campaigns, better knowl-
edge about science does not lead to higher levels of trust in it (Bonfadelli et al., 2002).
Instead, trust in science appears to be mediated by trust in institutions. The picture
is somewhat differentiated: there is a negative linear relationship between trust in
science and trust in the church. Inversely, the more strongly somebody trusts in-
dustry and the press, the stronger his/her belief in science as an engine of progress.
Curiously, trust in political institutions such as the Federal Council is not related to
trust in science (Crettaz von Rotten et al., 2003). There is also a linguistic divide,
with each linguistic region mirroring the attitudes of the neighboring country that
shares the same language (Crettaz von Roten and Leresche, 2004).
The heuristic value of these findings is probably greatest for understanding po-
litical dynamics regarding science policy. But, and at the risk of over-stretching
interpretation, the absence of a relationship between trust in political institutions
and trust in science could be read as a counter to Ezrahi’s (1990) demonstration of
the co-construction of trust in representative institutions of liberal democracy and
trust in science. It is consequently not to be expected that politicians would draw
on expertise and scientific reason in communicative discourse to legitimate political
institutions. Given the Swiss People’s Party success, a populist agenda that contin-
uously affirms that ‘the people know best’ seems to be a far more effective means to
this. We also have to consider direct democracy in that respect – less with regard to
its indirect effect of forcing the integration and consultation of ‘referendum capable’
actors, than in terms of the communication between the elite and the people. Since
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elections are not the only mechanism of accountability within the political system,
but are supplemented by issue votes, MPs need to appeal to the popular will rather
than to expert arguments, as they are ultimately re-elected by the population. Pol-
icy decisions that have provoked a referendum or popular initiative furthermore
receive a great deal of media attention, which also works against dispassionate ar-
gument (Bussmann, 1997).
The tentative statement that science does not constitute a source of legitimacy
for political institutions may be further corroborated by looking at Parliament and
the organization of committee hearings therein. In fact, the opinion of a scientist in-
vited for a hearing is a priori not weighted any differently from the statement of an
interest group representative. As civil servants andMPs interviewed for the present
research consistently reported, hearing participants are recruited according to a cri-
teria of opinion pluralism. This is a quasi formal rule – except that it is not codified.
Experts, while not stakeholders, are treated like them, and it is taken for granted
that experts are not free from interests (which is not perceived as problematic, as
long as it is clear what the interests and biases are).
However, as Frey’s study of the use of policy evaluation evidence in policy re-
vision processes shows (Frey, 2010a: 242–5), such reports are not simply ignored
or openly supplanted by ideology in parliamentary debate. While congruence be-
tween evidence, ideology and interests were decisive in whether or not a MP was
convinced by systematic policy evaluation evidence, evidence claims were coun-
tered by opponents not with ideological statements, but through relying on the
same register of justification. Evidence claims were countered with attempts to dis-
credit them, either by advancing alternative evidence claims, or, if these were not
available, by calling for an ‘independent’ study. Frey describes the discrediting of
reports by casting doubt on their credibility as an argumentative routine. Interest-
ingly, she finds fewer arguments that give reference to evidence in cases of policy
proposalswith a firmgrounding in evidence, compared to thosewhere the evidence
is less certain. Moreover, even in cases where there was a solid scientific consensus,
value conflicts led to attacks on the credibility of evidence.
The cautionary lesson we can draw from this research is that scientific ratio-
nality does not constitute a pillar of institutional legitimacy, and that Parliament
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largely constitutes a venue of opinion pluralism, without qualifiers of ‘objective’ or
‘neutral’. Yet at the same time, arguments with reference to evidence are deployed,
and challenged within the same register of justification. Refusing science a special
place, but using it as a distinct rhetorical form in political argumentation, seems at
first sight to be paradoxical. But when we consider that policy reform projects that
are firmly grounded in solid evidence attract less rhetoric of this kind, it appears
that evidentiary arguments replicate underlying value conflicts.
5.4 Sources of scientific expertise
Science-based policy advice oriented interactions between the academic and polit-
ical sphere in Switzerland can be broken down into three broad domains. Firstly,
there aremultiple interpersonal linkages between academic and political elites. Sec-
ondly, thework of the federal administration generates a demand for policy-oriented
research, which is satisfied through contract research. Thirdly, the federal govern-
ment earmarks part of its research funding budget for National Research Programs
(NRP) which investigate politically defined strategic research priorities. In what
follows, these three intersections are explored in more detail.
Interpersonal networks
Several kinds of interpersonal connections link academia to the public administra-
tion and Parliament (cf. Koller, 1989). Most obviously, civil servants with an aca-
demic training bring a scientific background to their work. Some civil servants, in
turn, teach at universities as adjunct professors. On the other side, some univer-
sity professors serve on extra-parliamentary commissions (cf. below) or are elected
MPs. The structure of these personal linkages is strongly influenced by civic en-
gagement [Milizprinzip] and the concordance system of government. The former
is a fundamental organizational principle of public life in Switzerland. Based on a
strong republican tradition that demands public engagement of citizens in public
life, many public and civil society institutions are staffed not by professionals but
people who have other primary employment. Originating from the conception of
the military as a militia, in which all able-bodied male citizens defend the country,
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as opposed to a professional army, we find a number of offices subscribing to the
same system (Kley, 2009). This holds true for executive mandates at the commu-
nity level of government. It also applies to parliaments at all levels of government,
even though the mandate of members of the Federal Parliament has long since ex-
ceeded the boundary of this system in practice (cf. Pilotti et al., 2010). However,
recently the judiciary has been largely professionalized and citizen juries or lay ap-
peal commissions have given way to professional structures. We shall turn now to a
discussion of the ‘extra-parliamentary’ commission system, which is an important
pillar of expertise production.
Extra-parliamentary commissions
A large number of commissions complement the professional core of the Swiss fed-
eral administration. These commissions are composed of federal administrators,
representatives of the cantons and communes, expert advisors from universities
and the private sector and interest group representatives. Officially, these commis-
sions are called ‘extra-parliamentary’, and are described in the literature as themili-
tia, or non-professional, administration because amajority of commissionmembers
are not employed by the federal government (Germann, 1981). They are firmly an-
chored in the executive branch of government because the legislative is largely ex-
cluded from membership and because they are appointed by the Federal Council
and logistically supported by the administration.
Extra-parliamentary commissions are entrusted with a multitude of tasks, from
studying particular problems like energy security, preparing legislative texts (e.g.
regulation for enhancing the stability of the banking system), surveying a particular
policy domain such as biomedicine, guiding implementation of public policy, and
regulating markets (e.g. enforcement of antitrust regulation).9 Commissions are of
subsidiary nature to the administration. According to official guidelines – which
appeared for the first time in the 1970s – the establishment of a commission should
only be authorized when the administration lacks capacity or relevant know-how
and where the intramural acquisition of such knowledge would be too expensive
(Rebmann and Mach, 2013: 175).
9See Rebmann and Mach (2013: 171–173) for a precise description of the commissions’ tasks.
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Figure 5.1: Commissions in time. Source: Rebmann and Mach (2013: 175).
Organization of commission work The commission system was for a long time
rather opaque, with the actual number of commissions not known even by the gov-
ernment, and next to no formal governance before the 1970s. This situation has
changed. Two research projects10 have given clarity on the number and composi-
tion of the commissions over time. In addition, Parliament has led a sustained effort
to establish a governance framework through legislative initiatives and a govern-
ment oversight function. Successive decrees from 1970, 1974 and 1977 formalized
the power to establish a commission (placing it in the hands of the Federal Coun-
cil and the departments), limited membership duration to 16 years, and officially
recognized the role of interest representation within them. In 1978, commission
governance became part of the Government and Administration Organization Act
(GAOA). Following repeated findings by the Parliamentary Control of the Admin-
istration (PCA) – the body supporting Parliament in overseeing government – that
there are important transgressions of legal provisions in the practice of the commis-
sion system, a 1996 governmental decree further reduced commission membership
10 Germann (1981) produced a survey of the commissions and their membership during the 1970s
andmore recently Rebmann andMach (2013) have produced an in-depth examination of the commis-
sion system’s evolution as part of a larger research project on the Swiss elite during the 20th century.
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to 12 years. Finally, the Federal Council launched another initiative in 2005 to fur-
ther reduce the number of committees by postulating a strict subsidiarity rule and
thereby strengthening the governance of commissions and improving transparency.
Following these changes, the Federal Council alone is able to establish a new com-
mission (an explicit wish of Parliament), which requires an official justification, and
commissionmembers need to declare othermandates and conflicts of interest (Reb-
mann and Mach, 2013: 179–181).
Extra-parliamentary commissions are currently regulated on three different lev-
els. Articles 57a–57g GAOA regulate the enactment and review of a commission
(a–d). Commissions may be enacted for advisory or representative purposes while
still respecting a subsidiarity principle that forbids commission formation when
the corresponding task could be executed by the federal administration. Commis-
sion tenure is fixed at four years, at which point the need for it is re-assessed and, if
deemed of further use, its members re-elected by the Federal Council. Furthermore,
commission composition, mandatory declaration of conflicts of interests, and finan-
cial compensation is provided for by the law (e–g). The size of commissions is lim-
ited to 15members and its composition has to respect a balance of gender, language,
geographic region, age and interest groups. This legal provision is complemented
by the Government and Administration Organization Decree (GAOD), whose arti-
cles 8a–8i offer further clarification. Those who would also qualify for employment
in the federal administration are eligible for commission membership. Moreover,
commission-balancing criteria demand that at least 30 percent of either gender and
a minimum of one member per linguistic group be represented. Age limits have
been lifted, but tenure is limited to 12 or (under exceptional circumstances) 16 years.
Each member is required to declare mandates and functions for public and private
organizations. Failure to submit or update this declaration may result in expulsion.
Details of commission organization are regulated in the inaugural decree specified
by the Federal Council for each new commission (Art. 8e GAOD). Specifically, this
concerns the definition and justification of the remit of a commission, the actual
number of its members, its internal organization, rules for public communication,
financial compensation for members, and which administrative unit is financially
and logistically responsible (e.g. secretariat) for the commission.
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There is very little data on how commissions work in practice, and it can only be
guessed how the increasing formalization of commission appointment influences
that work. Somewhat more can be said about the role of scientists in commissions.
Based on extensive interviewing of commission members, Germann (1985, 1991)
concludes that, contrary to what a decisionist or technocratic mode of interaction
might suggest, the relationship between science andpolitics in the commission lacks
any clear hierarchy. Commissionmembers do not see themselves either as scientists
or as politicians, but instead give very heterogeneous self-assessments. Scientists in
the commissions also disagree about how often scientific knowledge is decisive in
the debate. Natural scientists tend to have a more positive assessment of the im-
portance of such knowledge than social scientists. This leads Germann to conclude
that the Habermasian pragmatic model of policy advice (cf. Habermas, 1976) best
describes the commission system.
The reduced significance of commissions The 1960s and 1970s were a time of
large scale planning (e.g. constitutional reform (Germann, 1975), general traffic
masterplan (Germann, 1981: 17), energy planning (Mironesco et al., 1986)), and
such exercises relied heavily on commissions. Many commissions on socio-economic
issues were created during the economically turbulent 1970s (Rebmann andMach,
2013: 176). Since the 1980s, however, the political importance of commissions has
been in decline – both in terms of numbers (cf. Figure 5.1) and political importance.
According to Papadopoulos (1997: 75–78) just over a third of decision-making pro-
cesses during the early 1970s involved a commission. These numbers are lower for
the period 1995 to 1997, when only about 10 percent (17 out of 162) of the federal
acts voted on by Parliament were elaborated in expert commissions (Biedermann,
2002: 23).
As one of the venues of corporatist interest intermediation, extra-parliamentary
commissions are directly affected by the decline of such procedures of conflict res-
olution (cf. section 5.2). Commissions have only a limited integrative capacity, as
only a minority of commission members belong to powerful civil society organi-
zations (the majority being scientists and administrative officials) (Germann, 1981;
Rebmann, 2011; Rebmann and Mach, 2013). Moreover, the commissions operate
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according to a majoritarian, rather than consensus, logic (Sciarini, 2007), and some-
times members publicly resign in protest (cf. Mironesco, 1993)
Mandated research
The work of the federal administration engenders a steady demand for policy ori-
ented research for policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation. Demand
for policy-oriented research that is executed or financed by the federal adminis-
tration – that is, agency research [Ressortforschung11] – emanates from the different
units of the federal administration and from obligations fixed in different sectoral
laws and international treaties, as well as from parliamentary requests submitted in
form of motions. Most of this research is conducted extramurally. Of the CHF 247
million spent in 2010 on agency research, only 35.5 percent was spent on intramural
research, which almost exclusively consisted of agricultural research (31.7 percent
of the total expenditure).12 These are only the direct research investments of the
federal administration and do not include indirect expenses through the funding
of the two federal institutes of technology (ETHZ and EPFL) as well as the four as-
sociated research institutions (PSI, EMPA, EAWAG, WSL). The intramural research
capacity of the federal administration is therefore rather limited.
Agency research is governed through constitutional provisions 64 and 170 and
detailed in the Federal Act on Research, which identifies the federal administra-
tion as a ‘research institution’. For a long time, agency research has been under
the firm control of the different federal offices, who control the respective budgets.
While an administrative centralization of the different research activities was never
achieved, a steering committee under the lead of the State Secretariat for Education,
Research and Innovation (SERI)13 has been in charge of coordination (since 1998)
and quality assurance (since 2002) (cf. Farago and Brunner, 2006). Represented
in this committee are the Swiss National Science Foundation, the Commission for
Technology and Innovation, the Federal Institutes of Technology and associated re-
search organizations, and the directors of the agencies conducting research. The
11For an assessment of agency research during the 1980s, see Germann (1991: 192ff.).
12cf. http://www.ressortforschung.admin.ch/html/dokumentation/zahlen_de.html (Accessed
Jan. 20, 2013).
13Known as the State Secretariat for Education and Research (SER) prior to 2013.
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database ARAMIS,14 which logs the federal R&D projects since 1999, constitutes an
additional policy instrument for assuring accountability and transparency of the
system.
Another category of demand for policy-oriented research are expert reportsman-
dated by the federal administration, a topic which the present study treats in-depth
during the subsequent chapters. A report by the Parliamentary Control of the Ad-
ministration (PCA) (Bättig et al., 2006) estimated that the federal administration
spent about CHF 144 million on policy-oriented advisory mandates in 2004.15
The main instrument for governing expert mandates is through financial con-
trol. As a service which the state procures on the market, it is subject to the World
Trade Organization’s procurement guidelines, which federal law specifies in the
Public Procurement Act and the corresponding executive decree. According to this
legal framework, mandates below a net value of CHF 50’000.- may be awarded di-
rectly to a selected client. A price quote from at least three parties is required for
service contracts amounting up to CHF 230’000.-, beyond which a public tender
must be held. As it has been criticized in the above-mentioned PCA report (ibid:
2006), the procurement of many expert reports has taken place without following
this legal framework, ormandates have been split up in order not to exceed the CHF
50’000 threshold. Parliament has demanded more transparency by calling for the
systematic publication of all expert reports, including full financial disclosure (Mo-
tion Swiss People’s Party, CuriaVista 04.3755). In fulfillment of these demands, as
well as of some of the recommendations by the parliamentary commission on gov-
ernment oversight, the Federal Council decided to establish a publicly accessible
database on public procurement, which is to include expert mandates.16 Indepen-
dently of this, but nonetheless of importance, was the enactment of the Federal Act
on Transparency in the Public Administration in 2006, which regulates public ac-
cess to information of the federal administration. Other than these provisions, there
are no other formal legal foundations governing expert advice. The Federal Coun-
14http://www.aramis.admin.ch
15In the political debate following the publication of this report, the expenditure for policy advice
was often confusedwith the estimated total expenditure formandated services (including IT contracts
etc.) of CHF 600 to 700 million (Bättig, 2008).
16This database is now online and covers expert reports from 2010 onwards. It is accessible at
http://www.admin.ch/dokumentation/studien/suche/index.html?lang=en (Accessed Jan. 21, 2013).
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cil, for instance, is not required to publicly comment on expert reports: it is only
forced to articulate an opinion for reports published by the parliamentary govern-
ment oversight commission, which are sometimes based on externally mandated
reports (Federal Act on Parliament, Art. 112).
Evaluation of the effectiveness of policy measures is another important source
for demand of policy-oriented research. With the general overhaul of the Federal
Constitution in 1999, a provision mandating Parliament to review the effectiveness
of federal law (Const. Art. 170) was introduced. Subsequently there has been a
growing demand for ex post (Balthasar, 2009; Bussmann, 1997; Frey, 2010b,a; Wid-
mer and Neuschwander, 2004) – and more recently also ex ante (Sager and Rissi,
2011) – policy appraisal.
As opposed to the federal administration, Parliament is only a minor actor in
supporting or commissioning external research, despite its standard setting role
for advisory governance. This is largely explained by the weakness of Parliament’s
own administration, the parliamentary services, whose development has been ham-
pered by public resistance against the professionalization of Parliament (cf. Kriesi,
2001). Within the parliamentary services, only the PCA commissions external eval-
uations, for which it disposes a tiny budget of between CHF 200 and 300 thousand
(Bättig, 2007). In addition to its oversight function, Parliament draws on external
expertise in committee hearings, which take place behind closed doors. However,
it is extremely rare that external experts are consulted for more than a single hear-
ing, as several MPs interviewed for the present research confirmed. The federal ad-
ministration, rather than external experts, is the main source of scientific advice for
Parliament. Finally, while the instrument of ad hoc parliamentary inquiry commis-
sions exists to investigate exceptional events, this is not the case for policy-oriented
study commissions comparable to theGerman enquete-commission (cf.Weingart and
Lentsch, 2008).17
17A parliamentary initiative by the green group aiming at the introduction of such an instrument
was rejected in the National Council in 2003 (CuriaVista 02.427).
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Research providers
The market for policy-oriented research in Switzerland is considerable. As we have
seen, the federal government alone spends roughly CHF 300 million p.a. on extra-
mural research and consulting (this corresponds to 0.48 percent of the total 2011
federal expenditures).18 One can only guess at howmuch this figure increases once
potential demand for external expertise by the 26 cantons and 2459 communes has
been added. Data from Bättig et al. (2006: 36ff.) and the agency research statis-
tics19 identify private firms, publicly funded institutions of higher education and
research, other non-profit organizations, and the federal administration itself as the
most important contractors for policy-oriented research. Private firms, which often
have close ties to academia (cf. Steffen and Linder, 2006), have a strong presence
in the market for individual research reports (about 56 percent of all mandates in
2004). They are somewhat less important for agency research, where they obtained
14.2 percent of funding allocated in 2010. These firms may even apply for research
funding under the ‘national research program’ initiative (cf. section 5.4). Their ex-
pertise is highly specialized and they sometimes have an effective sectoralmonopoly
due to this specialization and the small size of the country.20
Policy-oriented research not paid for by the federal government is sparse in
Switzerland. In the field of political economy, trade unions and employers’ asso-
ciations have traditionally provided policy advice that was well-regarded despite
its advocacy character. But other privately funded organizations are rare. The neo-
liberal and industry financed think tank Avenir suisse emerged only as late as 1999.
It was followed some years later by a much smaller and less well funded think tank
on the political left called Denknetz (Steffen and Linder, 2006).
18The calculation is based the estimated CHF 144 million of federal expenditure for external ex-
perts in 2004 (Bättig et al., 2006) and the expenditures for extramural agency research in 2010, pub-
lished on http://www.ressortforschung.admin.ch/html/dokumentation/zahlen_de.html (Accessed
Jan. 21, 2013).
19http://www.ressortforschung.admin.ch/html/dokumentation/zahlen_de.html (Accessed Jan.
21, 2013).
20Interviewed civil servants contended that they do not have a particular preference for working
either with university-based experts or with private consulting firms. According to them, the former
are cheaper (their R&D costs do not have to be covered by consultancy mandates), while the latter
have a better availability and are more dependable in delivering on time. These interviewees note,
however, that changes in the science system increased time constraints and diminished incentives for
professors to engage in policy-oriented research and consulting. This suggests that changes on the
supply side and not on the demand end are responsible for the growth of the private consultancy
market.
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Research funding
The third major interface between academic research and the state with relevance
for policy advice is clustered around the federal government’s research funding pro-
gram. Academic research is tied closely to higher education in Switzerland, linking
the policy domains of research, innovation and education (Braun and Leresche,
2007). The governance of this policy field is fairly complex, since education has
long been a prerogative of the cantons, which also fund ten universities. Moreover,
para-governmental organizations such as the Swiss National Science Foundation
(SNSF), established as a private law foundation in 1952, and the Swiss Academies
of Arts and Science (SAAS) are important partners in research policy implementa-
tion. A number of commissions with advisory and executive functions complement
this governance arrangement, most importantly the extra-parliamentary commis-
sion Swiss Science and Technology Council (SSTC).
Based on the Federal Act on Research of 1983 and a budgetary proposal to be
confirmed by Parliament on a quadrennial basis, public funding is allocated to a
number of institutions defined as either research funders (e.g. SNSF and SAAS) or
as non-commercial research institutions. The latter consist in the two federal insti-
tutes of technology and their four associated research centers (all funded by the fed-
eral government), the cantonal universities, and the universities of applied sciences
and arts (mainly funded by the cantons). Wewill now focus on the research funders,
especially the advisory functions performed by a host of organizations alongside
SAAS, and the directed research funding programs of SNSF.
The Academies of Arts and Sciences
The Swiss Academy of Arts and Sciences (SAAS) is an umbrella organization which
groups together the SwissAcademyof [natural] Sciences (SANS), the SwissAcademy
of Humanities and Social Sciences (SAHSS), the Swiss Academy of Medical Sci-
ences (SAMS), and the Swiss Academy of Engineering Sciences (SAES). Created rel-
atively recently, in 2006, SAAS replaced the earlier inter-academy conference which
had assumed a coordinative role since 1981. Tighter cooperation between the four
academies is the result of the requirement by international academies that their na-
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tional members represent the entire academic spectrum (Zürcher, 2009). However,
the idea to completely merge into a single organization encountered too much re-
sistance to be feasible (Interview V).
The academies have their origin in civil society and are rather heterogenous or-
ganizations. SANS dates back as far as the mid–19th century, SAHSS and SAMS
were founded afterWorldWar II, and SAES only in 1981. The individual academies
regroup the professional societies in their respective domain. Historically, the rela-
tionship between the academies – which are foundations under private law – and
the state has been close. SANS, for instance, has collaborated with the federal ad-
ministration since the early days of the modern Swiss state (established in 1848).
Pioneering work by SANS working groups on cartography and meteorology, soon
to be subsidized by the public purse, became the foundation on which respective
entities of the public administration were established (Kissling-Näf, 2009). Sim-
ilarly, an inter-academy expert group on biological safety that was founded as a
self-regulatory initiative for adapting the guidelines of the US National Institute of
Health (NiH) to the Swiss research context was later integrated into the state, and
became the Swiss Expert Committee for Biosafety (Interview I). A reverse transac-
tion took place in 2008 when the center for technology assessment TA-Swiss was
transferred from the SSTC and was placed under the umbrella of SAAS. Nowa-
days, the academies are mandated by the federal government to execute a num-
ber of tasks, for which they receive a lump-sum budget on a quadrennial basis.
This budget amounted to CHF 112 million for the contract period 2008–2011. These
tasks are broadly defined in the Federal Act on Research (Art. 9) and comprise the
fields of early detection of socially relevant topics in the area of education, research
and technology, research ethics and scientific social responsibility, and the science-
society relationship.
A number of inter and intra-academy expert groups and platforms are dedi-
cated to these tasks, which are often performed through the voluntary and unpaid
engagement of scientists. The fact that this work is sometimes carried out by al-
ready retired scientists, especially within SAES, prompted an interviewee to dub
the academies an ‘old boys’ club’ (Interview V). Examples of such working groups
are numerous. SANS, for instance, has an entire ‘platform science & policy’ that
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hosts topics as diverse as climate change,21 genetic research, biodiversity, and north-
south research cooperation. SAES is also prominently engaged in policy-relevant
topics, such as the transition of the energy system. While SAMS is more strongly
oriented toward the medical community, its Central Ethics Commission is a pow-
erful standard setter in self-regulation of the fast moving bio-medical community.
Its recommendations have para-legal status and carry great weight in law-making
on medically assisted reproduction and stem cell research (cf. next chapter). In the
science and innovation domain, the academies never managed to become an effec-
tive umbrella association that would represent the interests of the scientific commu-
nity in politics. This is not only due to the academies’ internal fragmentation, but
also because of the SSTC (set up in 1965 to advise the Federal Council), which par-
tially assumes this function. The academieswere also sidelined as research funders:
while they had been the driving force behind the initiative to establish the SNSF in
1952 (Benninghoff, 2004), the latter soon became the dominant body in this field.
How the academies’ policy-oriented work feeds back into the public sphere and
political system is not entirely clear, not even for the academies themselves. For
this reason, SAES mandated a research study on the impact of science on climate
policy (Lehmann and Rieder, 2002) in order to learnmore about its influence. Inter-
personal networks crosscutting the academies and politics are certainly important;
similarly, regular use is made of the possibility to comment on policy proposals
during formal consultations.
In conclusion, despite their civil society origins, the academies have maintained
a close relationship to the modern Swiss state. While still remaining very heteroge-
neous bodies, closer integration came as a result of international pressure. Working
groups of the academies now engage in a number of strategic foresight activities for
the state, and attend to the human and social dimension of science in society. Much
of this work relies on voluntary engagement and the decentralized organizational
structures supporting these tasks are very different to the tightly integrated and
professionalized organization of theNational Academy of Science in the United States
or the British Royal Society (cf. Blair, 2011; Collins, 2011).
21The climate change related committees ProClim and the consultative body on climate change, to
be discussed in a later chapter, is part of SANS’ science and policy platform (Niederberger, 2005).
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Directed research funding
We have already looked at policy-oriented research conducted under the helm of
the federal administration, which is, for the most part, contracted out either in the
formof agency research or as individual researchmandates. Moreover, we have also
discussed the performance agreement under which the academies receive funding
from the federal research budget in order to engage in foresight activities, such as
technology assessment. But the lion’s share of federal research support expendi-
tures not earmarked for higher education institutions is allocated to the SNSF. As
the country’s most important all-purpose research funding agency, SNSF allocates
some 20 percent of its expenditures to two programs that pursue politically de-
fined objectives (Braun and Leresche, 2007: 743). Instituted in 2000, the program
National Competence Centers in Research (NCCR) seeks to concentrate research
investments in order to create internationally competitive networks of excellence
around a select number of issues. However, I shall devote most attention to the Na-
tional Research Programs (NRP), the second and oldest directed research initiative,
because the NRPs primarily pursue a logic of social problem-solving rather than
one of scientific excellence and competition.
Directed research is a term requiring explanation, because the political definition
of a research objective is intrinsically linked to the Swiss political system. Firstly, we
need to note that SNSF is a foundation under private law, which was set up in 1952
with the mission to allocate funding for basic research. This funding is provided
under the quadrennial federal research support budget. SNSF enjoys operational
independence in allocating these funds, and neither the Federal Council nor Parlia-
ment may withhold funding from research deemed objectionable – they are limited
to deciding the global amount of research funding. G. W. Bush’s executive order of
August 2001 prohibiting the NiH from funding research on newly derived human
embryonic stem cells would, therefore, not have been possible in the Swiss context.
In terms of accountability, SNSF may be characterized as a ‘boundary organization’
(Guston, 2001) in that its oversight body, the foundational council, is composed of
representatives from the federal government and Parliament, the major Swiss in-
stitutions of higher education, the academies of science, and the economy. As one
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among many stakeholders the federal government lacks unilateral veto power.22
We need to add that such an institutional setup – known as para-governmental or
subsidiary policy implementation – is not uncommon in Switzerland, which has a
strong tradition of delegating policy implementation from the federal government
to the cantons or even to private actors (Kriesi and Trechsel, 2008: 124).
Secondly, the definition of topics to be investigated by NRPs is not a straightfor-
ward process, but reflects the negotiated character of policy formulation in Switzer-
land. After the 1960s (marked by much activism in science policy), the onset of the
1970s saw a crisis of public finances and amore skeptical attitude towards the utility
of scientific research. It was in this context that, in 1973, SNSF submitted a proposal
to the Federal Council suggesting earmarking ten percent of the federal research
budget for programs of social and political importance. SNSF hoped to secure its in-
stitutional legitimacy by demonstrating the social utility of research (Benninghoff,
2004; Freiburghaus and Zimmermann, 1985). Both the Federal Council and Parlia-
ment quickly embraced the proposal, and SNSFwas taskedwith its implementation
only a year later.
Within SNSF, research funding is allocated by the national research council,
which, as SNSF’s operational arm, is responsible for the scientific evaluation of the
funding proposals submitted by researchers affiliated with Swiss research institu-
tions. The review process is carried out in separate ‘divisions’ (division I: humani-
ties and social sciences, division II: exact sciences, division III: biomedical sciences).
For the implementation of the NRPs, a division IV was set up and started operat-
ing in 1976. While the role of SNSF as the program implementer was unquestioned,
there was competition between SNSF, SSTC, as well as the federal administration, to
define the topics of inquiry for the NRPs. The final solution adopted was that these
parties jointly perform this task under the auspices of the Federal Department of
HomeAffairs. After consultation with interested parties the Federal Council would
then make the final choice (Freiburghaus and Zimmermann, 1985: 128ff.). This ar-
22Representation of the federal government in the national research council, SNSF’s operational
arm, was abolished in a 2002 reform, along with the foundation council’s decision-making authority
for funding proposals exceeding half a million Swiss francs. It does, however, retain a say in funding
decisions of wider social and political importance. In the context of stem cell research regulation the
old regulationsmatter since SNSF’s decision to fund a research project on imported human embryonic
stem cells was taken in September 2001.
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rangement, however, did not lead to political capture of research priority setting,
which, according to Braun and Leresche (2007: 743), has largely been a bottom up
process. In practice, once the topic of a NRP has been defined by the Federal Coun-
cil, researchers can submit project proposals with a thematic fit. Upon successful
evaluation of the proposal, funding is provided for four years. An ad hoc expert
group is established by SNSF for each new NRP, which accompanies implementa-
tion. About 70 programs have been authorized to date, encompassing a very broad
thematic horizon.
NRPs have important effects within the scientific community as well as in the
context of application. Effects on the scientific community primarily result from the
coordination of different research areas into a single field, thanks to a common um-
brella and the training of young researchers. Effects on the context of application are
also important, both in regards to commercial applications as well as public action.
However, NRPs are confronted with multiple and concurrent expectations by dif-
ferent stakeholders, which Freiburghaus and Zimmermann (1985: 134) described as
‘expectation excess’. Amore recent evaluation report maintains that NRPs generate
impulses towards solutions rather than ready-made solutions to technological and
societal problems. Expectations in terms of policy advice should thus be directed
at other research instruments, such as agency research. However, this does not pre-
clude the relevance of NRPs for political problem solving, since they may engender
longterm effects (Staatssekretariat für Bildung und Forschung, 2007: 18ff.).
5.5 Continuity and change in the advisory system
This chapter has investigated the institutional foundations of the Swiss political sys-
tem, the public image of science in politics, and the organization of expertise sup-
ply. Keeping in mind that the evidentiary basis regarding processes and practices
is much sparser than that on institutions, this discussion nonetheless enables us
to create a synthesis of the Swiss advisory system. There is one key lesson from
this survey: the contemporary Swiss advisory system no longer corresponds to the
corporatist image derived from empirical research from the 1970s and 1980s (e.g.
Freiburghaus and Zimmermann, 1985; Germann, 1991). However, not everything
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has changed. By distinguishing between elements that have remained stable and
those that have changed, we can draw out some lessons.
Several aspects of the advisory system have remained stable. Firstly, Switzer-
land remains a small federal polity. The small population entails that the ratio be-
tween the number of scientific experts to the number of policy problems is much
smaller than in more populous countries, resulting in a smaller domestic expertise
pool. Moreover, the strong position of the cantons in Swiss federalism contributes
to the decentralization of expertise demand. There is a culture of organizational de-
centralization and fragmentation, which also applies to the university system and
epistemic authority (e.g. the academies of science have, under international pres-
sure, federated, but refused to merge); the small size of the country makes personal
contacts more direct and favors informality; and experience-based expertise from
industry and the public sector is valued. In fact, if advisory organizations have not
been mandated by the federal administration, they have to share the same access
channels to the political system as interest groups. The non-preferential treatment
of advisory organizations by the political system is also manifest in political cul-
ture, which does not make an association between trust in the state and trust in
science. This non-discrimination between experience and science-based expertise
is not counterintuitive, given the scarcity of the latter.
Secondly, the capacity to mobilize scientific expertise is still strongly concen-
trated in the hands of the federal administration. The state finances most producers
of scientific expertise, either through direct mandates or lump sum grants. Inde-
pendently financed research organizations, such as think tanks, are rare, and po-
litical parties largely lack the means to be regular sponsors of expertise production
(Freiburghaus and Zimmermann, 1985; Ladner, 2007: 84ff.). There is no evidence
that the reinforcement of Parliament and the major political parties has had reper-
cussions on this resource distribution.
Thirdly, while political polarization has increased, and shifts in partisan power
have translated into the modification of the seat allocation in the Federal Council,
the Swiss political system does not lend itself to power alternations such as those
that occur in parliamentary systems of government. Instead, majorities are issue
specific, and elections do not result in stop and go government. As some have
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argued (Bussmann 1989: 28-30; Koller 1989: 225; Sager and Rissi 2011: 158-160;
Freiburghaus and Zimmermann 1985: 84ff.), such a system is conducive neither to
expertise production organizations (i.e. think tanks) serving as platforms for ‘gov-
ernments in waiting’, nor to experts adjudicating between partisan platforms and
coalition treaties.
Amid these continuities, change in the political systemover the past twodecades
has also affected the advisory system. This particularly relates to the diminished
importance of political inclusion during the pre-parliamentary phase of decision-
making, and the reduced importance of extra-parliamentary commissions that has
gone hand in hand with that. Not only is the number of extra-parliamentary com-
missions in decline (as is the number of policy proposals drafted by them), their
members increasingly belong to a functional elite, with personal networks across
different commissions and sectors of society becoming increasingly rare (Rebmann
and Mach, 2013). This does not mean that the administration has stopped consult-
ing scientific experts, but it suggests that how it does so has changed. Policy work
has become more internalized, reducing the need for professors to contribute or to
preside over expert committees that draft legislation. Instead, experts work under
closer oversight, and with less public visibility. Although data is scant, such work
is increasingly done by private consulting firms. Interview testimony suggests that
their ascent has asmuch to dowith changes in the science system reducing the avail-
ability of academic scientists as policy consultants as it does with consulting firms’
reliability and professionalism. Their dominance, however, is limited to short term
mandates, and academics are still the preferred partners for medium and long term
research projects of the administration. The lesson from this is that Bussmann’s
(1989: 29ff.) analogy between academic engagement in government, and a public
school teacher assuming responsibilities in a community’s associational life after
work hours, is holding less and less true. Expertise has become professionalized.
Increasing normative codification of advisory practice and legal transparency
requirements are another changing variable in the advisory system. As elaborated,
WTO public procurement guidelines have been adopted in Switzerland, and ap-
ply to the recruitment of experts. Parliament has enforced the publication of expert
reports in a publicly accessible database. But many expertise mandates have a fi-
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nancial volume small enough to escape public procurement guidelines, and while
installing and staffing an advisory committee is now formalized, its sessions are
generally not open to the public. Such are the rules, but how they come to influence
advisory practice is yet to be seen.
Parliament and the political parties have not been endowed with further re-
sources to mobilize their own scientific expertise. From that point of view, the con-
trol of expertise remains firmly in the hands of the administration. The question
remains, though, if increased political polarization and media scrutiny is having
an effect on scientific expertise. While there is no clear answer at this point, this
discussion will be pursued in section 9.2.
In concluding this chapter I want to reiterate the assertion that the Swiss advi-
sory system has experienced transformation over the past 20 to 30 years, and that
these changes have moved it away from its former corporatist image through in-
creased transparency and professionalization. The federal administration remains
the dominant principal in expertise mobilization, and has likely further consoli-
dated this position through the decline of the political system’s informal core of
political inclusion. While increasing politicization of expertise in the public realm
is a possibility to be empirically confirmed, we have to keep inmind that policymak-
ing still predominantly takes place at the pre-parliamentary phase, where informal
cooperation remains strong (Sciarini, 2013). In addition, the transformations de-
scribed likely vary in magnitude between different policy domains. We can end
this discussion with the statement that Switzerland is and remains a political sys-
tem in which cooperative decision-making remains important, with most resources
necessary for mobilizing scientific expertise concentrated in the hands of the fed-
eral administration; but that we must keep an eye on whether, and how, political
polarization and media scrutiny affect the mobilization of scientific expertise.
Six
Regulating Stem Cell Research
6.1 Introduction
This chapter is about the making of stem cell research regulation by the Swiss fed-
eral government and the role of scientific expertise therein. It was the summer of
2001 that an imminent policy decision by the Swiss National Science Foundation
(SNSF) on stem cell research became engulfed in political controversy. In early 2000,
Marisa Jaconi and Karl-Heinz Krause from the University of Geneva’s ‘Laboratory
of Biology of Aging’ had submitted a funding proposal to SNSF for studying the dif-
ferentiation mechanisms of human embryonic stem cells (hESC). This proposal not
only prompted an extended review process at SNSF (scientific, legal, and ethical),
it also led SNF’s governing council to prepare a declaration of principle in support
of such research.
Human embryonic stem cells, first derived in 1998 at the University of Wiscon-
sin (Thomson et al., 1998), have two interesting properties. They have the ability to
replicate at a high rate through division without showing signs of aging, and they
have the potential to differentiate into any of the 200 or so known types of cells found
in the human body. The biomedical research community construed the (then still
experimental) ability to deliberately control the differentiation process of an embry-
onic stem cell into a cardiac or nerve cell, or the future possibility of engineering an
entire tissue, as the advent of a new medical paradigm – regenerative medicine –
out of which cures for conditions like Parkinsons might be developed. However, as
their name suggests, the researcher extracts human embryonic stem cells from an
approximately five days old embryo in the blastocyst stage, which is a fatal proce-
dure. There was no disagreement about the desirability of cures against degener-
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ative diseases like Parkinsons or Alzheimers. However, destroying embryos in the
name of science was prone to contention, not just in Switzerland. Parallel debates
took place at the same time around the world, notably in the US, the UK, Germany,
and France.
Controversy erupted in Switzerland after a MP – tipped off by an investiga-
tive journalist – introduced a moratorium bill in Parliament (later defeated), just
weeks before SNSF took its decision. The National Commission on Biomedical
Ethics (NACBE) also issued a statement pleading that SNSF ought to withhold a
decision until appropriate public debate on aims and means of stem cell research
had taken place (Nationale Ethikkommission im Bereich Humanmedizin, 2001a).
Nevertheless, SNSF followed through with its decision. It also called on the legisla-
ture to create an unambiguous legal basis for stem cell research. After a brief public
uproar against SNSF,1 the federal government set to work and presented a draft
‘embryo research law’ only a few months later for public comment, treating impor-
tation and domestic derivation of human embryonic stem cells. Parliament largely
followed the governmental draft and adopted the law with some modifications on
December 18, 2003. Subsequently a referendum was initiated and a popular vote
took place on November 27, 2004, in which Swiss citizens backed the law with a
two thirds majority.
It is important to acknowledge that this case study differs from the other two in
one important point: regulating stem cell research implicates elements of the scien-
tific community as target population of public policy. Moreover, regulatory policies
– whereby the state prescribes a certain conduct – aimed at the scientific commu-
nity are a rather rare infringement of science’s traditional self-regulatory autonomy.
Considering the role of scientific expertise in stem cell research policymaking nec-
essarily implicates scientists in the capacity of stakeholders and engages the debate
about the nature and adequacy of the state–science relationship. As this chapter
will show, these science-policy elements are present throughout the case as differ-
ent normative visions about science in society come to substitute the traditional
partisan left-right structure of political conflict.
1The green party demanded the resignation of SNSF research council president Heidi Diggel-
mann and Federal Councillor Ruth Dreifuss qualified SNSF’s decision as ‘based on reasonable reflec-
tion, but taken in a rush and lacking political tact’ (Masmejan and Vos, 2001).
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This chapter is structured as follows. The first part looks at constitutive ele-
ments of the overall action situation that exerted a strong structuring effect, but did
not originate in the situation itself. This includes the science of stem cell research,
the domestic biomedical policy subsystem, and the international policy response to
human embryonic stem cell research. The second part analyzes actors that mobi-
lized scientific expertise and explores their commitments in the policy arena. This
includes the Swiss National Science Foundation, the Federal Administration, the
National Advisory Council on Biomedical Ethics, the Center for TechnologyAssess-
ment TA-Swiss, and the political parties. The third part looks at sites where nego-
tiations involving expertise took place. This comprises the consultation procedure,
the parliamentary deliberation process, and the referendum campaign. Finally, I
draw conclusions. For this purpose I establish the nature of the policy issue as it
transpired from the analysis and then go on to identify the conditions of expertise
mobilization and the effects the latter produced.
6.2 Constituting elements of the action situation
The overall action context of stem cell research policy deliberation comprises a fair
share of elements that are not the product of concrete action situations within the
decision-making process, but originate elsewhere. They have nonetheless been a
strong structuring influence on decision-making about human embryonic stem cell
research. This notably concerns the science of stem cell research itself, which I dis-
cuss at first. Following this, I turn to the Swiss constitutional and legal framework
of biomedicine, against which policy-makers sought to articulate the political im-
plications of human embryonic stem cells. Finally, I characterize the influences that
the stem cell controversies in other countries – notably Germany – exerted on the
Swiss debate.
The science of stem cell research
When stem cell research became a political issue in the early 2000s, it was at a very
precocious stage and predictions about potential applications and timelines were
speculative. The political debate largely focused on stem cell research as such, rather
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than its potential medical applications. This stands in stark contrast to recombinant
DNA research where primarily the technological application – genetically modified
organisms – drew most attention. The goal of stem cell research to cure diseases
like Parkinson’s was largely welcome and only few persons leveled criticism at the
broader emerging paradigm of regenerative medicine.
The acquisition of basic notions of stem cell biology has proven to be inevitable
for the analyst; the advisory recommendations and political arguments deployed
could not have been made sense of otherwise. I briefly present them here, as an
illustration of the issue complexity politicians were confronted with, few of whom
had a background in biology.
In the human body we find three groups of stem cells: embryonic stem cells,
primordial germ stem cells, and adult (or somatic) stem cells. They are of different
origin and potentiality. The latter term describes the scope of possible differentiation
of a stem cell kind. A fertilized egg cell, for instance, is totipotent for it can develop
into a full individual. Embryonic stem cells are assumed to be pluripotent, meaning
that they can differentiate into any type of cell, but cannot form a complete individ-
ual.2 Adult stem cells are believed to have the ability to differentiate into a limited
subset of cells of the organ in which they have been found (multipotency). How-
ever, whether or not adult stem cells have the ability to transdifferentiate into a cell
type from another organ (cardiac stem cells forming liver cells, for instance), has
been the source of great controversy. Normal cells cannot change into another cell
type and this unipotency sets them apart from stem cells.
Stem cells can produce other kinds of cells, which is of great interest to medical
research, for they open up the possibility of a regenerative approach to medicine.
Human stem cell based therapy concepts have been discussed for diabetes mellitus,
pathologies of the central nervous system (Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, paralysis, etc.),
coronary heart diseases, and autoimmune diseases.
Stem cell research started in the early 1960s with the discovery of hematopoietic
stem cells in the bonemarrow of mice. Hematopoietic stem cells are cells capable of
2For ethical reasons it remains untestedwhether human embryonic stem cells are truly not totipo-
tent for such an experimental proof would require the implantation into a human uterus. However,
animal experiments suggest that individual germ cells are only totipotent until an 8 cell stage. Em-
bryonic stem cells are derived at a much later stage and have failed in animal experiments to develop
a placenta, indispensable for full development.
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differentiating into any type of blood cell and thereby regenerating damaged blood
cells. Stem cells with the same properties as hematopoietic stem cells have also been
found in other organs like the skin, in certain cavities of the digestive tract, the heart
and the brain. They are called ‘adult’ or somatic stem cells. They only exist in small
numbers and are capable of differentiating into several different cell types found in
their host organ.
In 1981, researchers managed to extract stem cells from mice embryo. They dis-
covered the extraordinary ability of these embryonic stem cells to be capable of dif-
ferentiating into any type of cell. By themid–1990s, this property has also been con-
firmed in embryonic stem cells of primates. Human embryonic stem cells (hESC)
have first been isolate in 1994. However, the big breakthrough came in 1998 when a
team of researchers not only managed to isolate hESC, but also to culture them and
derive a cell line. In the same year, another team of researchers succeeded in the
isolation and culturing of embryonic germ cells from aborted fetuses (Shamblott
et al., 1998). These cells are found to have similar properties like hESC in terms of
their ability to differentiate into any type of cell, but are less prolific than the latter
(Cohen, 2007: 12–14).
Human embryonic stem cells are derived from the inner cell mass of a 4–6 days
old embryo, called the blastocyst. The blastocyst is formed of about 200–250 outer
cells that surround 30–40 inner cells. It is these inner cells that are extracted for the
derivation of a human embryonic stem cell line. The extraction process damages
the embryo and kills it. The hESC are placed on a feeder medium and a growth
factor is applied. They continue to divide without differentiating into other cells
(Cohen, 2007: 21–22).
Embryos from different sources may be used for derivation. Stem cell lines are
mostly derived from embryoswhich have been created for in vitro fertilization treat-
ments (IVF) but have not been implanted for some reason. They are referred to as
‘spare’ or ‘supernumerary’ embryos, a discursive classification subject to criticism.
An embryo for hESC extraction may also be created specifically for that purpose,
even though such practice is only legal in a handful of countries, such as the UK
(Hüsing et al., 2002: Chap. 4).
More recently alternative methods of producing stem cells have been invented.
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For instance, genetic reprogramming has enabled the transformation of pancreatic
cells into insulin producing beta cells by forcing the expression of three critical genes
(National Institute of Health, 2010). Similarly, researchers managed to reprogram
cells into an embryonic stem cell-like state by forcing the expression of certain char-
acteristic genes and factors. This has been accomplished for mice cells in 2006 and
for human cells in 2007. Even though these ‘induced pluripotent stem cells’ (iPSC)
resemble hESC, it is not clear if they behave in the same way in a clinical setting.
However, iPSC solve the rejection problem since they can be produced from cells of
the receptor (National Institute of Health, 2009).
Affordances of the domestic biomedical policy subsystem
Because of the involvement of the human embryo, the stem cell research issue be-
came instantly entangled in the Swiss legacy of biomedical policy-making dating
back to the late 1980s. That legacy is composed of constitutional article 119 (hence-
forth Const. art. 119, cf. section A.1), which, during the relevant timeframe, was
the key provision on reproduction and genetic technology relating to the human.
It came into being as a governmental counter proposal to the popular initiative
Against the Abuse of Biotechnology and Assisted Reproductive Technology, launched by
a committee around the consumer advocacy news publication Der Beobachter [The
Observer].3 This committee retracted its proposition in favor of the more moder-
ate governmental proposal, which nonetheless made substantial concessions to the
initiative. The Swiss people accepted the counter proposal in 1992. Then, an inter-
agency working group (IDAGEN) was set up to elaborate legislative proposals that
would further detail the application of this constitutional provision in terms of spe-
cific laws.4 Amongst other things, this groupproposed the creation of a governmen-
tal ethics committee as an observer of the fast changing biotechnological landscape.
In themeantime, though, another popular initiative was launched that sought to re-
verse the 1992 constitutional amendment (‘Initiative for Procreation RespectingHu-
man Dignity’). This time, the government presented an indirect counter proposal in
3It was a journalist of the same publication that alerted a MP about SNSF’s impeding stem cell
research decision (Interview X).
4IDAGEN stands for ‘Interdepartementale Arbeitsgruppe Gentechnologie’. Its report was issued
in January 1993 (cf. Schweizerischer Bundesrat, 1996: 216).
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the form of the ‘Federal Act on Medically Assisted Reproduction’ (FAMAR) as one
concretization of Const. art. 119.5 FAMARwas accepted by Parliament in 1998, but
could not be enacted until the initiative was voted on the ballot in 2000, where it
failed (Rothmayer, 2006: 598–9).
Const. art. 119 and FAMAR turned out to be relevant for the stem cell decision-
making process in two distinct ways. Firstly, they articulated a legal framework
that (by omission) provided for the importation of hES cell lines and tied the debate
around the domestic derivation of hESC to medically assisted reproduction and in
vitro fertilization (IVF) by stipulating a ban on all forms of cloning as well as on
the use of IVF for research purposes. This legal framework further brought into
being the ‘supernumerary’ embryo as a contested, but possibly legal source for do-
mestically derived hESC. As we shall see, the work of constitutional expertise was
an important agent in articulating these factors for the debate. Secondly, this le-
gal framework established the National Advisory Committee on Biomedical Ethics
(NACBE) (FAMAR art. 28). Moreover, the making of these legal provisions brought
into being a biopolitical subsystem by constituting a number of ad hoc advisory bod-
ies and fora for policy formulation.6 Some of these actors became deeply engaged
in the stem cell case. Moreover, through the publication of a scholarly analysis of
Const. art. 119, Prof. Rainer J. Schweizer, whom we will meet later, established
himself as the dominant constitutional expert on biomedical issues. Knowing his
written interpretation of Const. art. 119 prompted the federal administration to
mandate him with a report on the legal foundation of stem cell research (Interview
IV, for the report see Schweizer 2002a).
The project of human subject research regulation also exerted a path depen-
dent effect. While at early project stage during the stem cell research controversy,
it would later lead to the creation of a dedicated constitutional article (Const. art.
118b)7 as well as the Federal Act on Research involving Human Beings (FARHB). In
1997 MP Rosmarie Dormann introduced a motion asking government to propose
5Since a popular initiative necessarily has to take on the form of a constitutional provision, a direct
counter proposal would have to do the same.
6The governmental dispatch detailing the legislative proposal on stem cell research provides a list
of these committees with their past findings (Schweizerischer Bundesrat, 2002).
7The need for such a constitutional provision was first articulated by the council of states’ com-
mittee on science, education, and culture, as it debated the stem cell research act.
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such a law, for she deemed FAMAR (still in gestation at that time) not sufficiently
detailed on research issues. After a procedural hiccup, the Federal Office of Public
Health (FOPH) was at last empowered to assemble a project team and begin work
in 2000.8 FOPH originally planned to address stem cells within the same bill. How-
ever, when the Federal Council later decided to make a dedicated law regulating
research with hESC, it could simply mobilize the personnel resources FOPH had
build up for the FARHB project.
Finally, the popular ‘Initiative for the Protection of Life andEnvironmentAgainst
Genetic Manipulation’, although rejected on the ballot in 1998 (Votation No. 440,
BBl 1998 4363), exerted a structuring and constitutive influence on the action situa-
tion of interest. If accepted, this initiative would have imposed a near-total ban on
transgenic research and technologies. It was a wakeup call for the scientific com-
munity and a reminder that scientific research is not a neutral economic produc-
tion factor (Interviews V and VI). Not only was the memory of this near science
policy catastrophe still vividly present among decision-makers at SNSF when the
stem cell research issue was deliberated, it also informed and provided the organi-
zational infrastructure for government’s strategy in dealing with stem cell research
legislation. This infrastructure consisted of the foundation Science et Cité – liter-
ally ‘Science and Society’ – which then Secretary of State for Science and Education
Charles Kleiber established in cooperation with public and private science policy
stakeholders (Wehrli, 1999). The intent behind the foundation was to prevent a
future clash between direct democracy and the scientific community by strength-
ening the Swiss citizens’ awareness about what science is and how it works. This
was to be accomplished through the organization of public dialogue events, such as
science and cafés and fairs (Interview V). When the federal government announced
its intention to prepare a special stem cell research bill, it also promised a public
dialogue initiative organized by Science et Cité (Bundesamt für Gesundheit, 2001).
8The motion first expired because it was not deliberated in time, but was renewed by physics
professor and member of the council of states Gian-Reto Platter (social democrat), upon which it
finally passed a parliamentary vote and was received by the government in December of 1999.
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Foreign policy deliberation as a resource
In addition to domestic path dependencies, international developments added their
share of structuring elements to the Swiss policy formulation process on stem cell
research. The international expansion of research employing human embryonic
stem cells after 1998 led to a series of national policy responses in countries like
the UK, the US, Germany, and France. These developments were publicly known
in Switzerland, for the news media began covering stem cells long before the issue
attained domestic saliency. Later, the federal administration, as well as the advi-
sory bodies TA-Swiss and NACBE, established summaries of international policy
developments (cf. Schweizerischer Bundesrat, 2002; Hüsing et al., 2003; Nationale
Ethikkommission im Bereich Humanmedizin, 2002).9
For the federal government and FOPH, knowing about different policy options
served as a compass for the value controversy at stake, which could potentially take
on different shapes in different linguistic areas of the country. Moreover, knowing
what other countries were up to allowed for an assessment of whether a stringent
policy optionwould be detrimental to the competitiveness of Switzerland’s research
and innovation sector (Interview III).
But more defining than a regulatory impact assessment was the availability of
information engendered by the international debate, especially the German one. In
its internal decision-making, SNSF consulted closely with the German DFG on the
general direction to pursue so as to prevent the position of one organization being
pitched against the other in the German and Swiss political debates (Interview I).
Moreover, because of the shared language and the slightly earlier start of the Ger-
man debate, Swiss politicians had access to a wide range of information on which
they could draw for a general understanding of the matter as well as for arguments.
For instance, Interviewees VI and X declare having relied on literature produced
for the German context in order to gain a fundamental understanding of the issue.
Further, the parliamentary group of the Green Party established adult stem cells as
a viable alternative to embryonic ones, even before SNSF announced its final deci-
9An entire chapter of the dispatch was dedicated to the international comparison, which FOPH
mandated from a University of Basel law school PhD candidate (Interview IV). A request for such a
comparison was also submitted in Parliament (cf. Question Gutzwiller, 01.3530).
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sion,10 and social democrats introduced other arguments drawn from the German
debate during parliamentary committee deliberation. Finally, the advisory report
by the technology assessment advisory body TA-Swiss (Hüsing et al., 2002, 2003),
to be discussed at a later point, drew on the German ethical discourse, as both its
lead author and the author of the ethics chapter are Germans employed by German
research organizations. Based on this evidence, it is doubtful whether Swiss politi-
cal actors would have had the resources to develop, on their own terms, the framing
of adult stem cells as viable alternative to their contested embryonic sibling.
6.3 Actors and commitments
The preceding section identified a set of elements constitutive of the stem cell re-
search policy arena that originated outside of it. This section now turns to the sci-
entific expertise mobilized in that context. It discusses the collective actors impli-
cated in policy formulation and themobilization of scientific expertise. These actors
are the Swiss National Science Foundation, the Federal Office of Public Health, the
National Advisory Commission on Biomedical Ethics, the Center for Technology
Assessment TA-Swiss, and themajor political parties. The analysis strives for a clar-
ification of each actor’s commitments in the stem cell research policy arena. This in-
cludes a reconstruction of the actors’ perspectives – their perception of the situation
– as well as the description of their self-assigned position regarding policy formula-
tion. This analytical work exploits these collective actors’ internal decision-making
processes regarding hESC research and draws on their organizational history.
A summary of mobilized expertise
Table 6.1 provides an overview of all instances of scientific expertise mobilized dur-
ing policy formulation. It is grouped by the producer of the different expert opin-
ions and provides indications about the addressed issues, the means of commu-
nication and diffusion, its sponsor, as well as the addressed publics. The table’s
substance will be discussed throughout the entire chapter and I consequently forgo
further discussion at this point.
10Menschliche Embryonen als Rohstoff für die Forschung? (CuriaVista 01.3436).
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Table 6.1: Scientific expertise produced within the stem cell research policy arena
Producer Issue Communication Principal Publics
National
Ethics
Commis-
sion
Construction of
hESC as pol. issue;
delimitation of
policy alternatives
2 reports; press releases,
media appearances; com-
mentary of gov. policy
proposal; information event
and policy brief for Parlia-
ment; participation in parl.
committee hearing
Self Biomedical
community,
Parliament
TA-Swiss Biomedical, ethical,
legal & economic
implications of
hESC
2 reports; press releases;
commentary of gov. policy
proposal; information event
and policy brief for Parlia-
ment; participation in parl.
committee hearing; public
engagement event
Self Stakeholders
& public at
large
Prof.
Rainer J.
Schweizer
Determination of
regulatory scope
under existing legal
framework; patent-
ing of hESC
Published report; 2 news-
paper commentaries; par-
ticipation in parl. commit-
tee hearing; written and
oral advice in parl. commit-
tee deliberation
FOPH; self;
Parl.
Gov. & Parl.;
stakeholder
debate
Prof.
Olivier
Guillod
Legal implications
of Jaconi/Krause
proposal
Report to SNSF SNSF SNSF
Various
stem cell
researchers
Stakeholder per-
spective
Hearings in parliamentary
groups and committees;
numerous public presenta-
tions
Self Parliament,
public at large
The Swiss National Science Foundation
The SwissNational Science Foundation (SNSF)was arguably the key actor in putting
human embryonic stem cell research on the policy agenda. As mentioned in the in-
troduction, it was through a specific funding proposal that SNSF took up the issue.
SNSF is a private law foundationwhich implements federal science funding pol-
icy. It operates under a delegation mandate that affords operational independence.
This mandate is periodically reviewed with the quadrennial research funding bud-
get. Overviewing SNSF’s operation is a foundation council with mixed representa-
tion from scientific, political, and private sector institutions. It meets twice a year
to discuss strategy and science policy. Moreover, it elects the presiding members of
the research council’s four operational divisions. The foundation council’s opera-
tional prerogatives, however, are slim and extended to the approval of extraordinary
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large grants (a prerogative now revoked), as well as deliberating funding decisions
of political importance.
The Jaconi/Krause project proposal was not ordinary business for SNSF, as the
research council’s unusual review process demonstrates. The division on biomed-
ical research positively evaluated the proposal’s scientific merit. Further, it sought
the ethical appraisal of the University of Geneva research ethics commission as well
as the Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences’ (SAMS) ethics body, the Central Ethics
Commission. Both ethics panels signaled compliance. SNSF’s biomedical division
also turned to University of Neuchâtel’s Prof. Olivier Guillod for counsel on the
legality of importing human embryonic stem cells, also yielding an affirmative an-
swer (Modoux, 2001).11 But the process did not end there. Instead, the research
council’s presidency, responsible for the approval of funding decisions, decided to
involve the foundation council due to the politically sensitive nature of the case.
In its meeting of June 2001, the foundation council discussed the matter (Inter-
view I), after which SNSF publicly declared its intention to postpone the funding
decision until late summer in order not to preempt the political discussion about the
ethical and legal aspects of stem cell research. It further announced its intention to
consultwith science policy decision-makers anddeclared the need for a comprehen-
sive funding policy (Marco Iten, 2001). Subsequently, the nine-member presidency
of the research council and representatives of the foundation council conducted a
number of consultations in the run up to the foundation council’s September meet-
ing, in which the written policy position paper was to be voted on. Amongst others,
the panel talked to the applicants (Marisa Jaconi and Karl-Heinz Krause), as well as
with Christoph Rehmann-Sutter, designated president of the freshly inaugurated
National Advisory Commission on Biomedical Ethics (Interviews I and II).12
There was growing resistance to SNSF’s timeline for voting on the policy state-
ment and approval of the Jaconi/Krause proposal. For Federal Councillor Ruth
Dreifuss, in charge of the research portfolio, there were no legal means to influence
11While there was no existing legal foundation to provide for stem cell derivation, importation,
as long as not qualified as a commercial transaction, was unproblematic. The law only prohibited
commerce with embryos, which stem cells are no longer regarded as once derived and cultured.
12In an interview with the French language daily Le Temps, published on August 22, 2001,
Rehmann-Sutter said that Heidi Diggelmann, president of the research council, was very interested
in NACBE’s opinion, but that neither SNSF nor Secretary of State for Science and Education Charles
Kleiber have officially solicited the commission’s advice (Masmejan and Vos, 2001).
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SNSF, for the latter is a private actor. But she could, and did, instruct her repre-
sentative in the foundation council to demand an additional three to six months of
time for public debate. In addition, MP Rosemarie Dormann introduced her mo-
tion in the national council demanding amoratorium on stem cell research until the
planned FARHBwould be completed (cf. section 6.2). Moreover, NACBE cautioned
SNSF decision-makers in private as well as in a public statement – the very first
statement of this new organization – that a decision taken before sustained political
debate would be prejudicial and detrimental to the legitimacy of scientific research
(Interview II, Nationale Ethikkommission im Bereich Humanmedizin 2001a). But
SNSF remained intransigent and voted on the issue on September 28, 2001.13 In-
side SNSF it was felt that it was both the right venue to make such a decision, given
that SNSF had been established as an independent organization (Interview I), and
that waiting for a governmental decision would imply delaying stem cell research
for several years given the slow pace of the Swiss decision-making process (cf. Hof-
mann, 2001c). Hence, provoking a public reactionwas perceived as necessary (Inter-
views I, III, IV andVI). The latter was especially Fritz Schiesser’s position. Schiesser,
both president of SNSF’s foundation council and MP in the Council of States, pub-
licly defended this stance during the parliamentary debate of the stem cell research
law.
"We were aware that we made a decision, which inevitably had to provoke political
reactions. When I look back now on what has happened since, then I have to say that
SNSF’s decision – which concerned a very small amount of funding compared to other
research projects – has engendered discussions and also public action by the state. I
am convinced that we would not be deliberating this issue today had SNSF not made
this decision and also demanded that the state should issue corresponding legislation."
(Fritz Schiesser, AB 2003 S 175; my translation)
The SNSF position paper (SNF Stiftungsrat, 2001) underscored the scientific
importance of human embryonic stem cell research and vowed to fund future pro-
posals, provided that theymeet a list of outlined scientific, ethical, and legal criteria.
Addressing the somewhat ambiguous legal situation, SNSF writes that
13During this boardmeeting the president of the biomedical section informed the foundation coun-
cil of the scientific aspects of the Jaconi/Krause proposal, followed by an elaboration of SNSF’s de-
cision making process by Heidi Diggelmann and Fritz Schiesser. The position paper was approved
with 29 yes, six abstentions and no opposing votes.
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"[our] position is of interim character. [SNSF] will adapt it when necessary to reflect
new insights and framework conditions. It is in this sense that SNSF invites the legisla-
tor to regulate research with human embryonic stem cells as swiftly as possible." (SNF
Stiftungsrat 2001, my translation).
Such legislation, it contended, should also provide for the domestic derivation
of human embryonic stem cells from supernumerary embryos.
Interviewee VI recalls this episode as a struggle about who pilots Swiss science
policy – SNSF or politics. Despite private and public criticism – the green party
went as far as demanding Diggelmann’s resignation (Hofmann, 2001b) – agitation
quickly dissipated. By October 3, 2001, Diggelmann met informally with a group
of MPs and government to discuss the decision and its political implications. SNSF,
however, was not involved in the governmental decision-making process beyond
that point (Interview I).
In conclusion, the course of events suggests that SNSF legitimated its actions
primarily through its independent status, while at the same time claiming credit
as initiator of the political debate. Thus, it appears that its institutional preroga-
tive – backed by half a century of science policy through delegation – and not the
legal scope to specifically fund research with imported hESC, served as dominant
rationale in how SNSF addressed the controversy.
The federal government
The federal government picked up the stem cell issue where SNSF quit the scene
as a somewhat contested proto-regulator of science policy. In the very short time
span of two months, it developed the outlines of a legislative response to stem cell
research in Switzerland. This strategy, backed by a Federal Council decision, was
made public in a November 21, 2001 press release (Bundesamt für Gesundheit,
2001). It encompassed the creation of a dedicated stem cell research law with the
purpose of subjecting the issue to institutionalized treatment, opening up the usual
avenues of contestation through the consultation procedure, parliamentary delib-
eration, and a potential referendum. Moreover, it announced a public engagement
initiative, to be carried out by the foundation Science et Cité. The press communiqué
reveals only indirectly that this strategy was rooted on substantial work of consti-
Actors and commitments| 151
tutional interpretation, which delineated a blind spot in the constitutional map re-
garding biomedical research. Throughmaintaining that this spot existed, it became
possible to argue for legislation that could eradicate it, without having to engage in
the lengthy business of constitution making.
Procedural commitment
Unlike its rigid overall structure (cf. chapter 5), the federal administration is a shape-
shifter when it comes to preparing legislative business. It forms project teams for
that purpose, possibly with members from different agencies, but led by a single
principal. Thus, who the federal administration is as an actor and what interests
this actor pursues is to some extent issue specific. Const. art. 119 and FAMAR, the
centerpieces of biomedical legislation at the time, had been crafted under the di-
rection of the Department of Justice’s Federal Office of Justice (FOJ). But the Federal
Department ofHomeAffairs’ FederalOffice of PublicHealth (FOPH)was ultimately
in charge of its implementation. This division of labor had proven unsatisfactory
and when work on FARHB commenced, it was decided that policy drafting and
implementation should no longer be construed separately. Thus, the biomedical
portfolio was shifted to FOPH, with FOJ maintaining a consultative voice (Inter-
view III). This meant that Federal Councillor Ruth Dreifuss, a social democrat, was
now spearheading biomedical policy.14 Thus, by the time the stem cell research con-
troversy materialized, the FARHB project had already brought into being an entire
organizational infrastructure.
The federal government was in a reactive position. Amongst others, stem cell
and embryo research were issues thought to be addressed in the FARHB project,
which in late 2001 was still in an exploration phase with a relatively open sched-
ule (Interview VI). Interviewee III declares that the Federal Council was not keen
to take a decision, but that it was required to articulate a position in response to
a series of petitions submitted in Parliament.15 Moreover, there was SNSF’s overt
14The State Secretariat for Education and Research (SER), then also part of the Department of In-
terior, contested FOPH’s leadership on research issues, arguing that such matter would fall within its
domain of responsibility. But just as SER lost out to FOPH in the case of regulating physician training,
as well as FARHB, its bid to lead the stem cell research act failed, too (Interview VI).
15For instance, parliamentary initiative Dormann (Curia Vista 01.441) called for a moratorium on
destructive embryo research until the enactment of FARHB, andMotion Schmied (Curia Vista 01.3531)
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call for enabling legislation. Federal Councillor Dreifuss accorded a high priority
to the project. Interviews III, IV, and VI portray her as ‘research friendly’ and as
‘not being a big fan’ of regulating scientific research. Interviewee III contrasts this
position with Pascal Couchepin’s more ambiguous stance,16 who succeeded Drei-
fuss as Federal Councillor and head of the Department of the Interior.17 Dreifuss,
however, was convinced that a new branch of research requires political legitimacy,
lest it would provide grounds for public fears (Interview VI). For that purpose she
perceived the need for public debate, which, in her opinion, was best engaged by
starting a decision-making process serving as a public engagement platform. In
fact, a similar procedural choice already informed the regulation of xenotransplan-
tation,18 which had been dealt with separately and ahead of a comprehensive bill
on transplantation medicine in order to enable political debate on this potentially
controversial medical technology. Thus, Dreifuss wanted a swift legal response,
without it being an urgent response. This distinction is important – it was repeat-
edly asserted during debate on the floor and in committees of Parliament – for an
urgency law cannot be challenged by a popular referendum.
After the decision had been taken to divorce the stem cell issue from the larger
human subject research context (with the possibility of later reunification), the re-
sources for FARHB at FOPHwere reallocated to the stem cell research initiative, de-
scribed as a fluid transition (Interview IV). A steering groupwas formed overseeing
the project, consisting of the directors of FOPH and SER, FOJ’s deputy director, and
a retired scientist from the University of Bern. Subordinate to this committee was
the actual policy team, which gradually grew as one person after another joined
the interdisciplinary team. Verena Schwander, a constitutional lawyer specializing
in the question of academic freedom, whom FOPH originally hired for FARHB, led
the four person team. Those external to the federal administration, such as legal ex-
pert Prof. Schweizer, were not part of the formal project organization. Henceforth,
demanded an urgent law banning the importation of human embryonic stem cells.
16Reportedly, his views became increasingly conservative during the enactment of the executive
ordinance detailing the implementation of the law, as well as during the elaboration of HSRA under
his direction.
17While Dreifuss was in charge of drafting the law, she retired by the time it was introduced to
Parliament and subsequently it was Couchepin who represented the Federal Council’s position in
Parliament.
18Amendment of the Federal Decree on the Control of Blood, Blood-derived Products and Trans-
plants (Curia Vista 98.035).
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each person contributed to the project according to her disciplinary specialization,
a process that took place under significant time constraints (Interview IV).
By the time FOPH made the Federal Council’s plans for a dedicated stem cell
research act public on November 21, 2001, the project had already taken a defin-
ing stance on important material issues which were to remain constant until the
legislative proposal was delivered to Parliament. On the same day, the Federal De-
partment of Home Affairs also delivered its official reply to several motions on the
issue submitted in Parliament.19
Policy formulation took place entirely behind closed doors. The finalized pro-
posal was only released to the public when the Federal Council decided to initiate
the habitual consultation procedure, beginning onMay 22, 2002. However, judging
from a press report in Le Temps, the general direction of the policy proposal could
be inferred from public comments made by Ruth Dreifuss and Charles Kleiber, as
well as the known limitations imposed by the existing legal framework (Masmejan,
2002).
Policy alternatives
When FOPH embarked on the stem cell project, all actors agreed on the fact that
importing and performing research on hESC in a non-commercial context was con-
stitutional. Nobody challenged this fact, which Prof. Olivier Guillod’s legal exper-
tise for SNSF had uncovered. However, opinions diverged over how to deal with it.
After all, it was more the product of a constitutional accident rather than the out-
come of deliberate design: isolated and in vitro cultivated human embryonic stem
cells simply did not exist when the Swiss biomedical regulatory framework was es-
tablished. Some wanted to close the constitutional gap history had opened, either
temporarily (e.g. National Councillor Rosemarie Dormann) or indefinitely (e.g. Na-
tional Councillor Walter Schmied). But even proponents like SNSF preferred an af-
firmative rather than passive legal foundation for research with human embryonic
stem cells. Leaving things as they were was unsatisfactory for, as elaborated in the
last section, it would have left a controversy unresolved. Moreover, importation
19Green parliamentary group interpellation 01.3436; Motion Schmied 01.3531; Question
Gutzwiller 01.3530
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Policy alternatives
A) Ban research
& importation Provide for research
B) With im-
ported cells only
Utilization of domes-
tic ’spare embryos’
C) For HESC
derivation only
D) For generic
embryo research
Figure 6.1: Alternatives of stem cell research regulation
created a double moral standard, because embryos had to be destroyed somewhere
for stem cell derivation. All major actors (e.g. Dreifuss, SNSF, NACBE, TA-Swiss)
acknowledged this ethical dilemma. This either left open exploring the legal ramifi-
cations of enabling domestic stem cell derivation, or taking the path toward banning
hESC research altogether.
Pondering an enabling strategy, FOPHwas quickly confronted with the embryo
as a legal subject. More specifically, it required the determination of whether hESC
research fell under existing legislation regulating medically assisted reproduction
or constituted a new case. Interviewee III recalls that only following such an ex-
amination could one really decide if regulatory options were available that did not
involve changing an existing law or even the constitution, for the latter would have
implied a timeframe of five years or more.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the policy options FOPH considered. OptionAwas to draft
legislation banning the importation of human embryonic stem cells. Should hESC
research be permitted, option B could further concretize an importation-only so-
lution, for instance in following the Germany policy design. Alternative C would
only provide for derivation of hESC froma blastocyst, but no other embryo research,
which would be allowed under possibilityD. With the possible exception of option
B, all scenarios would have required legislative action, but potential clashes with
existing legislation were most salient for scenarios C and D.
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The administration’s policymakers generally favored alternatives C or D, due
to the double moral standard problem of B. But as Interviewee IV recalls, a cer-
tain flexibility in terms of selecting a policy alternative was required. Ultimately, it
was more important to end up with a solution rather than being defeated in Par-
liament or through a possible popular referendum. Thus, it was decided to devise
an enabling but strict legislation. Importing, deriving, or doing research with hESC
should be subjected to conditions that would prevent abuse and ensure that such
acts are performed in pursuit of ethically desirable goals.
This strategy had been fully adopted by the time the draft law was submitted
to public consultation in May 2002, and was followed throughout the remaining
decision-making process. The draft Embryo Research Act FOPH presented to inter-
ested stakeholders provided for destructive research on supernumerary embryos.20
This includes hESC derived abroad or in Switzerland, provided that they originate
from supernumerary embryos only. Creating embryos for research purposes is pro-
hibited and other sources of hESC that do not fall under the unconditional ban of
cloning stipulated by the Constitution are to be regulated in the future FARHB, into
which the present law should be eventually integrated.
Allowing for research implying the destruction of supernumerary embryos is
justifiable, so the proposal, because such embryos have to be destroyed in compli-
ancewith FAMAR.However, the authorization of researchwith hESC is conditional
on pursuing an ethically high-ranking goal, which cannot be reached with alterna-
tive and less ethically problematic means. Hence, the embryo in vitro, even when
classified as supernumerary, has a right to the protection of its dignity; this, how-
ever, does not preclude weighing the value of such protection against the greater
value of healing a sick person. Because such research is prone to abuse – and here
we see the strategy of ‘regulate swiftly but strictly’ in order to preempt fears in the
population – hESC research is tied to an authorization to be delivered by FOPH.21
20The following description is based on Schweizerischer Bundesrat (2002: 1235–1241).
21The law stipulates a number of strict conditions for this authorization:
• Research on supernumerary embryos is only to be authorized when aiming at improving IVF
procedures or for gaining insights into human developmental biology. Such a research project
has to conform to standards of scientific quality and has to be ethically justifiable. Supernu-
merary embryos may only be used for such research when its goals cannot be reached by alter-
native means. Spare embryosmay not be commercialized, imported or exported, or developed
beyond 14 days. Written and informed consent by the donor couple is required and persons
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Interviewee IV explains that the law was drafted in the shape of a pyramid.
Should its most extensive provision, research on supernumerary embryos until 14
days (optionD), cause resistance, it could simply be eliminated from the draft with-
out endangering the coherence of the law itself. The same also applied to the do-
mestic derivation of hESC (optionC). Indeed, Parliament ultimately decided to limit
the bill’s scope to provide for importation and domestic derivation of hESC only, but
not for other kind of embryo research.
Articulating the supernumerary embryo
Let us return to FOPH’s dealing with the central question about what scope the
existing legal framework – namely Const. art. 119 and FAMAR – afforded for draft-
ing legislation in support of the previously identified policy alternatives C and D.
This is where FOPH turned to Prof. Rainer J. Schweizer, whom I have already
briefly mentioned in the description of the biomedical legislative framework that
preceded stem cell research policy-making. Schweizer was (and still is) a widely
recognized authority on Swiss constitutional law with significant experience as an
adviser to the federal administration and Parliament alike (Interviews IV and VIII).
FOPH was familiar with Prof. Schweizer’s writings, notably his commentary of
Const. art. 119.22 Because his co-author on that commentary, Peter Saladin, had
passed away, Schweizer was virtually the only legal authority on that matter. This
cognitivemonopoly has to be assessed in the special context of constitutional exper-
tise in Switzerland. In the opinion of Interviewee VII, constitutional commentaries
produced by scholars such as Prof. Schweizer have special authority in the Swiss
performing IVF may not simultaneously be engaged in hESC research. The research has to be
documented in a publicly accessible report.
• HESCmay only be derived for research purposes and not for commercial purposes. Derivation
is only authorized in conjunctionwith a research project, with an exception for future domestic
research projects that would make a demand obvious. hESC lines have to be shared with other
researchers in Switzerland who are in possession of an authorization. The rules of ethical
acceptability, scientific quality, non-commercialization, subsidiarity, and publication of results
equally apply to hESC research. Acceptable research objectives are defined as gaining insights
relative to the diagnosis, treatment and prevention of severe illnesses, and relative to enlarging
the understanding of human biological development.
• HESC but not embryosmay be imported, provided they are derived under the same conditions
also applicable for domestic derivation.
22Interviewee III describes the selection of experts based on the knowledge of their writing as
normal practice in the federal administration.
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political system, for the latter lacks either a constitutional court or a government-
independent legal oversight body. Schweizer’s cognitive monopoly was further re-
flected by the fact that he was also the author of the stem cell research technology
assessment report’s legal chapter, which we will come to discuss further below.23
There was relatively little chance for FOPH’s stem cell research policy team to
be surprised by Prof. Schweizer’s findings – elaborated within weeks (Interviews
IV and VII) –, for his publications enabled the general thrust of his argument to be
gauged in advance. Moreover, the team’s leader had obtained her PhD studying
the constitutionality of academic freedom in Switzerland and was therefore well
equipped to judge the legal situation. (She would later publish her own legal com-
mentary in the dailyNeue Zürcher Zeitung (Schwander, 2004a), as part of the media
coverage leading up to the referendum vote on November 28, 2004, as well as in
a professional journal (Schwander, 2004b).) Thus, Schweizer’s commentary was
more sought as an authoritative confirmation, rather than as an orientation in the
face of uncertainty. As Interviewee IV elaborates,
"In intractable questions – and I was aware from the start that this is an ethically and
legally delicate question – being in possession of an external expert opinion from some-
body with an academic affiliation, who roughly arrives at the same conclusion, facili-
tates the work of the administration." (my translation)
Two important conclusions emerged from Schweizer’s (2002a) analysis of the
existing domestic and international legal framework, which he exhaustively dis-
cussed with scholarly peers (Interview VII). First, the said legal framework was
neither comprehensive nor conclusive on the question of destructive research on
supernumerary embryos. Secondly, such supernumerary embryos have a special le-
gal status. Because they lack a parental project, and FAMAR art. 5.3 mandates their
destruction, they consequently do not enjoy a constitutionally protected right to life.
But nonetheless, they are more than a mere object. Schweizer argued that the use
of such supernumerary embryos for research purpose could be admissible under
condition of parental consent and an explicit legal foundation yet to be crafted. To
arrive at that conclusion, he established an analogy to organ donation and likened
23Interviewees III and VI identify a small expert pool as a generic problem in Switzerland. They do
not see hiring foreign experts as remedy for the latter generally lack the necessary contextual knowl-
edge about Switzerland.
158| Regulating Stem Cell Research
the supernumerary embryo to a brain dead donor: neither has a chance for sur-
vival, they are not objects, and consent for donation of bodily parts is required in
both instances. In essence, Schweizer suggested that destructive research, which in-
cludes the derivation of human embryonic stem cells, could be allowed in Switzer-
landwithoutmodifying existing legislation, but that a new law explicitly regulating
such research would be required.
FOPH and the Federal Council fully embraced Schweizer’s conclusion, and his
language is evident in several policy statements (although not his name).24 For in-
stance, an extract of the November 21, 2001 press detailing the Federal Council’s
position reads:
"The issue to be clarified by this is if and under which conditions supernumerary em-
bryos and embryonic stem cells derived thereof may be utilized for research purposes.
[. . . ] The elaboration of and parliamentary debate on the assisted reproduction act took
place before embryonic stem cell research had been moved into the spotlight of science.
So far, this field of research has been neither unambiguously nor conclusively regulated in
Switzerland." (Bundesamt für Gesundheit 2001, my translation and emphasis).
The trope ‘neither unambiguously nor conclusively’ [weder eindeutig noch ab-
schliessend] also figured prominently in the dispatch the Federal Council submitted
to Parliament.25 Moreover, the Federal Department of Homeland Affairs also used
it in its official answer to dispute claims made in Parliament that the existing legal
framework would not allow for legislation without first amending legislation.26
Key to FOPH and Schweizer’s legal interpretationwas the use of a historical and
contextual, rather than literal, reading of Const. art. 119 and FAMAR. This was in-
dispensable to refute the argument that FAMAR art. 5.3 had already banned hESC
derivation. It reads: “Extracting one or several cells from an embryo in vitro and
their analysis is forbidden.” (original emphasis). It was necessary to demonstrate
that when the legislator deliberated and voted Const. art 119 in 1992 and FAMAR
24Schweizer and FOPH would later disagree on the exact affordances of this position, with
Schweizer recommending the exclusion of policy alternative D from the bill.
25“Hingegen ist bisher die Frage der Verwendung überzähliger Embryonen zu
Forschungszwecken weder eindeutig noch abschliessend geregelt. Sowohl die Bundesverfas-
sung als auch das Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetz lassen es offen, ob überzählige Embryonen für die
Forschung, namentlich für die Gewinnung embryonaler Stammzellen, verwendet werden dürfen.”
(Schweizerischer Bundesrat, 2002: 1165).
26Motion 01.3531 (Walter Schmied) and interpellation 01.3436 (parliamentary group of the Green
Party).
Actors and commitments| 159
in 1998, it did so exclusively with human reproduction in mind. FAMAR art. 5.3
was meant to prohibit preimplantation diagnosis, a procedure clearly geared to-
ward reproduction, and not research.The only provision Const. art. 119 made that
could be extended unambiguously to a research context was a total ban on any form
of cloning. This meant that any domestic human embryonic stem cell derivation
project would need to use spare IVF embryos.
As previously discussed, it was the legal framework that brought these ‘super-
numerary embryos’ into being as an inevitable byproduct of IVF treatments. They
are embryos that for some reason cannot be implanted into the uterus and are there-
fore legally subjected to destruction because donation to another couple as well as
cryoconservation for later use are banned. This also concerned embryos already
frozen before FAMAR was enacted. These altrechtliche Embryonen [i.e. pre-FAMAR
embryos]were to be destroyed by the end of 2003. While the existence of these kinds
of embryos was generally recognized, there was little certainty about their number,
as well as about the usability of pre-FAMAR embryos for hESC derivation due to
their age. But this uncertainty only arose during parliamentary deliberation amidst
strong interest of the scientific community in gaining access to them. What to do
about them was not so much a question of disputing the principle of Schweizer’s
analogy to transplantationmedicine, but of differing value conceptions of themoral
status of the early embryo.
In conclusion, even though Schweizer’s work set the standard of constitutional
interpretation – only contested by two peers – and left substantial traces in FOPH’s
articulation of the issue, the federal government did not actively justify its scope
andmotive of action in reference to that work. Instead, it was more of an insurance,
which would protect the overall strategy of conflict settlement through legislation
against potential criticism.
The National Advisory Commission on Biomedical Ethics
TheNational Advisory Commission on Biomedical Ethics (NACBE) is another actor
whose commitment in the stem cell research policy arena is to be assessed here. It
advises the federal government on medical and biomedical issues. Officially inau-
gurated by the Federal Council in July 2001, NACBE was immediately confronted
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with SNSF’s impending funding decision about Switzerland’s first research project
with hESC. Even before NACBE held its very first workmeeting onAugust 31, 2001,
its designated presidentwas invited by SNSF’s governing board to an informal hear-
ing (Interviews I and II).
NACBE falls within the ‘extra-parliamentary’ class of advisory organizations
previously described in some depth (cf. section 5.4). This means that institutional
rules govern itsmembership and remit.27 The Federal Council designatedNACBE’s
21 founding members ad personam, based on nominations by the federal adminis-
tration. NACBEmembers have to have a background in either ethics, healthcare, or
the sciences, and should represent the entire range of ethical positions. According
to Interviewees II and XI, this value pluralism was genuinely present, especially in
the stem cell debate. NACBE’s legally defined remit (VNEK art. 1) encompasses
• monitoring of developments in human medicine and biotechnology,
• informing the public about the ethical implications of human medicine and
stimulating public debate,
• elaborating recommendations for medical practitioners,
• preparing and providing advice to the federal government, Parliament and
the cantons when requested.
Under its first chairman Christoph Rehmann-Sutter, NACBE conceived of itself
as a non-representative institution (Interview II). Rather than assisting the federal
government in the formulation of policy alternatives, it preferred the role of iden-
tifying fundamental normative questions. Especially in its exhaustive commen-
tary on stem cell research (Nationale Ethikkommission im Bereich Humanmedi-
zin, 2002: 61), to be discussed below, it drew a clear boundary between its advisory
activity and what it considered to be questions resolvable by democratic institu-
tions alone.28 This position was also evident in NACBE’s policy to seek internal
consensus, but to clearly communicate persisting minority opinions. It deliberately
refrained from disclosing vote counts or individual members’ positions, though.
Nevertheless, members were free to express themselves in public and the positions
27FAMAR art. 28, as well as executive ordinance VNEK (SR 810.113).
28NACBE explicitly stated that in a democracy, the legitimacy of a public regulation depends di-
rectly on the quality of public deliberation and the conformity with procedural norms.
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of the commission’s most prominent members were publicly known through nu-
merous media appearances (e.g. Baumann-Hölzle, 2002; Fischer, 2002; Rehmann-
Sutter, 2002). When the Parliamentary Committee on Science, Education, and Cul-
ture later convened hearings on stem cell research, it invited individual NACBE
members rather than soliciting NACBE’s opinion as a commission (Interview II).
Returning to the stem cell case, NACBE used its inaugural meeting to draft an
emergency statement, urging SNSF to hold off with its decision for the sake of al-
lowing an in-depth public debate. On September 19, 2001, NACBE released this
six-page statement to the press and simultaneously published it in the Swiss Med-
ical Weekly (Nationale Ethikkommission im Bereich Humanmedizin, 2001b). The
purpose of this statement, Interviewee II recalls, was to remind SNSF and the scien-
tific community that the moral status of the early embryo is a legal issue, not to be
decided by an interested party. The statement warned that a decision taken by an
interested party (SNSF and the scientific community) on a question spanning be-
yond science (the moral status of the embryo), based on a legal foundation in need
of clarification, would constitute a potentially irreversible precedent that could be
seen as an illegitimate act of power violating democratic procedural norms, with
ultimately damaging consequences for the public reputation of the scientific com-
munity.
As we know, this statement did not prevent an affirmative vote of SNSF’s foun-
dation council. But NACBE didn’t leave it at that. Instead, it started elaborating a
second, and more in-depth statement, which it published during the governmen-
tal consultation procedure on FOPH’s draft law. It also officially commented on
that draft. While NACBE is formally independent, it is administratively attached
to FOPH, which also hosts its secretariat.29 However, FOPH and NACBE pursued
two different goals in the stem cell case. To borrow Andy Stirling’s (2005) termi-
nology of ‘closing down’ vs. ‘opening up’, FOPH’s strategy was to find closure to
the controversy, while NACBE persisted with its efforts well beyond the Federal
Council’s decision to submit the draft law to Parliament.30 It also organized an in-
29Interviewee II sees this link as enabling for the communication between the organizations, which,
for instance, was not given when NACBE collaborated with FOJ, part of whose activities also concern
NACBE (e.g. euthanasia).
30The act of remitting the dispatch to Parliament is the ultimate closure of the executive’s stance
on a policy issue. After that point, the federal administration assumes an advisory function for Par-
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formation event for MPs (cf. Hofmann, 2003a) and prepared a leaflet containing
six discussion points for the parliamentary debate. Interviewee II recollects that
this persistent opening up irritated some people inside FOPH at first, as they im-
plicitly assimilated NACBE to be part of the administration. Clarifying discussions,
however, set the record straight.
The supernumerary embryowas the core subject of NACBE’s ethical assessment
published for the consultation procedure and later summarized for parliamentary
debate (cf. Nationale Ethikkommission im Bereich Humanmedizin, 2002). It con-
strued hESC research as intimately linked to IVF, but argued for distinct ethical
debates as hESC research and IVF treatment pursue different goals. Central to its
reflections – richly contextualized within the scientific and legal assessment of stem
cell research that NACBE borrowed from TA-Swiss – were three ethical models and
the affordances they make for dealing with the supernumerary embryo. This pro-
vided the foundation for a theoretical analysis of ethical principles at stake. It also
constituted the basis for NACBE’s deliberation as a committee which pronounced a
set of recommendations. It reiterated its earlier assertion that the protectionworthi-
ness of the early embryo can only be assessed through open and transparent demo-
cratic decision-making. Legal options for enabling hESC research in Switzerland,
NACBE maintained, would be i) the derivation of hESC from already existing and
cryoconserved or future supernumerary embryos, ii) research on imported hESC, or
iii) alternative derivationmethods such as parthenogenesis. Amajority of NACBE’s
members further recommended that supernumerary embryos up to the blastocyst
state should be used for hESC derivation, provided that the embryo in question is
genuinely supernumerary (created for IVF and not research; informed consent of
the parents after the possibility of reproductive use has become medically impossi-
ble) and that the scientific research is of excellent quality and cannot be conducted
with alternative methods. Furthermore, no patents should be awarded on organs,
cells or cell lines and commercialization of embryos or directly derived cells should
be banned. Finally, a clinical research ethics panel should verify a research project’s
compliance with these conditions. A majority also recommended allowing hESC
importation, although not of embryos or egg cells, provided they are derived fol-
liament and no longer exerts processual control over an issue.
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Figure 6.2: Organization of TA-Swiss. Source: author’s illustration.
lowing the same ethical standards applicable in Switzerland. A ‘cut-off date’ rule
– which was introduced in Germany and the USA at the time – was unanimously
rejected. With regards to alternative methods of hESC derivation, the commission
recommended holding off any regulation before more was known about their sci-
entific potential.
TA-Swiss
Unlike NACBE, whose first official act consisted in cautioning SNSF not to preempt
public deliberation on human embryonic stem cell research by taking a decision
about the Krause/Jaconi research proposal, the center for technology assessment
(TA-Swiss) had been closely watching the emerging field of hESC research since
Thomson’s first successful derivation of a cell line in 1998 (cf. Thomson et al., 1998).
By November 2000, TA-Swiss decided that the issue had gained sufficient societal
and political relevance to warrant an investigation into the state of the art, the med-
ical and economic potential, and the legal and ethical implications.31
31It appears that TA-Swiss was not aware of the Jaconi/Krause research proposal submitted to
SNSF when it prepared the outline of its own inquiry. Internal documentation (Nov. 2000) only lists
Swiss research projects employing fetal or adult stem cells.
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TA-Swiss is unlike any other advisory body in Switzerland.32 As Figure 6.2 il-
lustrates, it is more of an organizational infrastructure than a committee for advice
production. That infrastructure consists of a small staff (the secretariat),33 which
monitors scientific and technological developments with social and political impli-
cations and identifies potential topics for study. It recruits study authors by tender,
and assembles a stakeholder review panel that is deeply involved in monitoring the
study process. For the stem cell research assessment, a mixed German and Swiss
consortium of scientists around biologist Bärbel Hüsing34 won this tender.
The role TA-Swiss played in the stem cell controversy, as well as its more generic
organizational principles and procedures, suggest that the organization’s commit-
ments in the political arena may be likened to the goals pursued by a boundary
organization (cf. Guston, 1999, 2000, 2001). TA-Swiss sees itself as an advisory
body, whose job is not to score on impact but to sensitize people. “One has to be
careful not to make prescriptions for Parliament”, contends Interviewee VIII. Yet
despite this discourse of ‘non-impact-seeking’, internal documentation shows that
TA-Swiss keeps a close account of its interventions andmentions in politics and the
public sphere. Rather than a stakeholder in a more or less well delimited policy
subsystem – which could be said of NACBE – TA-Swiss is the product of the po-
litical system’s coping with ‘reflexive modernization’ (Beck, 1992).35 Not only do
its studies address a wide range of emerging technologies, touching upon multiple
policy domains, the organization also lacks unconditional support within the scien-
tific community. In fact, it must carefully balance its position in order to avoid either
32TA-Swiss is formally independent and executes the legal mandate of technology assessment
specified in the Federal Act on Research under a performance agreement between the State Secre-
tariat for Education and Research (SER) and its parent body. Until 2008, this parent body consisted in
the Swiss Science and Technology Council, an extra-parliamentary commission advising the Federal
Council on science policy. However, with the establishment of the Swiss Academies of Arts and Sci-
ences, the federal government decided that this body serves as a more suitable parent (Interviews V
and VIII).
33The secretariat operates under the supervision of a permanent stakeholder council, which meets
four times per year. It approves the study topics and the author recruitment process. TA-Swiss also
organizes participatory technology assessment events – the publiforum and its smaller-scale sibling
the publifocus – inspired by the consensus conference model developed in Denmark (Interview VIII,
see also Bellucci 2006).
34Previously, Hüsing and some of her co-authors on the stem cell study had been awarded a TA-
Swiss tender for a study on cellular xenotransplantation, which was published in 2001.
35Concerns about nuclear energy (Chernobyl) and a chemical accident (Schweizerhalle) form the
backdrop of parliamentary engagement for the establishment of technology assessment in Switzer-
land.
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being stamped by scientific and industrial interests as an ‘obstructor of technologi-
cal progress’, or, conversely, as the scientific community’s ‘mouthpiece’ (Interview
VIII). On that backdrop of institutional vulnerability it is comprehensible that TA-
Swiss jealously guards its organizational independence (Interviews V and VIII).
Because its presence in any policy field is transient, TA-Swiss lacks strong ties to
institutional political actors. This introduces a reliance on institutional state–society
interfaces such as the consultation procedure for communicating with decision-
makers. It is hoped that timing a study for publication during the consultation
procedure ensures that it is taken up within the governmental dispatch (Interview
VIII). As governmental agenda setting is hard to predict, this is notoriously difficult
and also futile to some degree, for – as Interviewees V and VI contend – a real possi-
bility of influence has mostly expired by that moment. Like NACBE (and probably
any well-organized interest group), TA-Swiss also organizes events while Parlia-
ment is in session, distributes study summaries, and makes study authors available
for parliamentary hearings. This script also applied to the stem cell study, although
the rapidly advancing political schedule required much agility given that work on
the study only began inAugust 2001.36 In an exceptionalmove, TA-Swiss decided to
release an intermediary report onApril 10, 2002 (Hüsing et al., 2002). The final pub-
lication followed on February 3, 2003 (Hüsing et al., 2003). In terms of TA-Swiss’
position, the two versions do not differ significantly. The following discussion is
based on the intermediary version, for it was politically more relevant in terms of
its timing.
TA-Swiss’ elaborate procedure, deployed for securing the ‘political and epis-
temic robustness’ (Weingart and Lentsch, 2008) of its studies, is an entirely different
endeavor and takes full advantage of the policy elite’s networks. Devices such as
the permanent stakeholder steering committee and the study-specific stakeholder
panel are meant to ensure impartiality, while an external study team denotes ex-
pertise. TA-Swiss selects members of the stakeholder review panel through infor-
mal consultations following a logic of interest representation and diversity of view-
36Soon after the study project was set up, external events begun disturbing its schedule and forced
a sustained acceleration of the project. These events include the SNSF funding decision (Sep. 2001),
followed by the Federal Council’s announcement to draft a bill (Nov. 2001), and – after only sixmonths
– the opening of the governmental consultation procedure on May 22, 2002.
166| Regulating Stem Cell Research
points. Besides industry and NGO representatives, medical practitioners and pa-
tient groups, researchers and other representatives from the scientific community,
TA-Swiss also attempts to include MPs, especially those that have submitted peti-
tions in the matter. The inclusion of civil servants and members of other advisory
panels is also important, since it enables direct communication and coordination
of activities in different organizations.37 Thus, the aim is to constitute the panel as
broadly as possible, but only to invite people who are willing to participate in a
dialogue (Interview VIII).
The study authors meet with the stakeholder panel on four occasions. Firstly,
in order to present their proposal and to provide an opportunity for the panel to
validate or criticize the framing of the study’s premises and questions. The initial
meeting is followed by the presentation of two intermediary reports, with the first
being centered on the technology itself while the second addresses the legal and
ethical implications. During a last encounter, the entire study and its recommen-
dations are discussed in detail, including the wording of contentious passages. It
is then the stakeholder panel who issues the recommendation for publication to
the steering committee. These meetings are private and, as Interviewee VIII recalls,
no media indiscretions have been known so far, despite at times controversial (yet
constructive) discussions.
The stem cell assessment was also split into three sub-projects, the first present-
ing the medical and scientific foundations (Beatrix Rubin), the second elaborating
the ethical aspects of human stem cell derivation and utilization (Eve-Marie En-
gels), and the third clarifying the legal framework (Rainer J. Schweizer)38. The re-
port Hüsing’s team presented may be summarized by the recommendation ‘rather
not, but if youmust. . . ’. This scientific and legal assessment also became the founda-
tion of NACBE’s work (cf. Nationale Ethikkommission im Bereich Humanmedizin,
2002), as well as of a brochure produced by Science et Cité. The study’s economic
37The 10 member stakeholder panel convened for the study was presided by Margrit Leuthold,
then secretary general of the Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences (SAMS). Its members were drawn
from academic ethics, clinical research, the health insurance and pharmaceutical industry, a GMO-
critical NGO, TA-Swiss’ own steering committee, its parent body SSTC, and FOPH. The latter was rep-
resented by Verena Schwander, later to be project leader on the stem cell research legislative project.
The complete member list is available in Hüsing et al. (2003: 325).
38Prof. Schweizer’s engagement for TA-Swiss and for FOPH were entirely separate. The legal
assessment, however, was identical in substance.
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assessment can be reduced to the acknowledgement that human embryonic stem
cell research was too young to be the subject of commercialization.
The report’s ethical assessment, by Eve-Marie Engels, ethics professor at theUni-
versity of Tübingen inGermany is, however, significant. LikeNACBE, she employed
a range of conceivable moral statuses of the embryo (i.e. object vs. person with in-
termediary gradations) as heuristic device. But she took a rather different stance on
‘supernumerarity’. If anything, she argued, supernumerarity is an artificial condi-
tion, and thus does not serve as an ethical argument, at least not under scenarios
regarding the embryo as closer to a person than a thing. Her conclusions are a clear
vote against the derivation of stem cells, even from supernumerary embryos. She
advances biological (tumor generation) and also societal (slippery slope) arguments
against the use of hESC for research in the first place and contends that there are
alternatives in the form of adult stem cells. Moreover, she distinguishes between
simply destroying an embryo and using it for research, due to instrumentalization.
It is this ethical appraisal that strongly informs the report’s overall conclusion. The
study authors clearly caution against hESC research, which should only be autho-
rized – either through a special law or the importation option – if it is felt that hESC
research is of great importance for Switzerland at this point. Instead, adult stem
cells should be favored at this time. However, should legislation be adopted, it
should contain a series of conditions under which importation or domestic deriva-
tion of hESC would be admissible.39
Political parties, a missing actor?
Themajor Swiss political parties constitute the final set of actorswhose commitment
and role in the stem cell controversy I discuss here. To begin with, Swiss political
parties are internally rather heterogeneous, especially in their vertical fragmenta-
tion across different levels of government (cf. Kriesi and Trechsel, 2008: Chap. 6).
Yet beyond this more systemic aspect of intra-partisan heterogeneity, the extent to
which any of them acted as a coordinated and coherent actor in the stem cell case
is disputable.
39SNSF, NACBE, as well as the Swiss Academy of Medical Science’s ethics panel all formulated
very similar conditions.
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The Green Party was the first to embrace the issue when, after a meeting of its
parliamentary group on September 8, 2001, it submitted a comprehensive list of
(suggested) questions in the National Council, to be answered by the Federal Coun-
cil (Sep. 18, 2001; Curia Vista 01.3436. See also Hofmann 2001a). They concerned
the presumed lack of a legal framework for destructive embryo and hESC research,
the need for a public debate, the potential of adult stem cells, and the suggestion of
a temporary ban on hESC importation. At the same time, the questions’ phrasing
suggests that they were not aimed at seeking information, but as a device to seek
confirmation for an established point of view. One such question reads:
"Does [the Federal Council] share the opinion that the meaning and intention of [Const.
art. 119.2c] prohibit the utilization of human embryos for destructive research and that
the importation of embryonic stem cells, too, contradicts the meaning and intention of
our Constitution?" (Curia Vista 01.3436; my translation).
Later, it was also the Green Party that demanded the resignation of SNSF re-
search council president Heidi Diggelmann (Hofmann, 2001b). The Radical Party,
albeit with a delay of a fewmonths, also devoted attention to the issue. It organized
a symposium on biotechnology in February, 2002, featuring Karl-Heinz Krause as
one of the invited scientists (Hofmann, 2002b). Early during the public consulta-
tion procedure, the party also released a position paper articulating its clear com-
mitment to the cause, citing economic motives (Hofmann, 2002a). Other parties,
however, lacked a coherent commitment. The Christian Democratic Party’s Rose-
marie Dormann may have been the first politician to articulate the issue through
her parliamentary initiative40 (Curia Vista 01.441; Interview X; Hofmann 2001a),
but the issue could not really gain traction with the wider party, notably because of
its perceived moral divisive nature and complexity (Interviews X and XI). To some
extent Dormann would remain a lonely warrior for her party in publicly defend-
ing a critical stance. Other party members only came to dedicate attention to the
40Her initiative called for a moratorium of destructive embryo research until the completion of
FARHB, while allowing hESC research on condition that they originate from already existing cell
lines abroad, that research pursues a clearly defined objective not attainable with alternative means,
and that the aim of the research would be the medium to long term use of adult stem cells. In the justi-
fication of the initiative, she argued that both the constitution and FAMAR contain provisions banning
destructive embryo research. Moreover, hinting at SNSF, she condemned “that extra-parliamentary
and non-political authorities foreclose decisions and possibly create prejudice concerning such a sen-
sitive field of research. . . ” (Curia Vista 01.441; my translation.) The initiative was rejected.
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issue through their institutional mandates as MPs. The only collective preparation
Interviewee XI recalls was the organization of a Christian Democrat parliamentary
group hearing inviting a professor of theology to elaborate on the issue. Although
not filing any petitions in Parliament at that early stage, the Social Democratic Party
established a special committee, with an expert hearing scheduled for early Octo-
ber, 2001 (Hofmann, 2001a), to which, according to Interview VI, researcherMarisa
Jaconi was invited.41 But the party was also divided, which ultimately left individ-
uals to fight for their cause. Finally, the Swiss People’s Party lacked any discernible
coherent public profile on the issue. Many of its MPs signed two completely con-
tradictory parliamentary motions, one in favor and one against human embryonic
stem cell research (Gerny, 2002).
Thus, in most political parties the portfolio was in the hands of a few specialists
who made the investment of acquiring the expertise necessary for fully compre-
hending the issue. This investment proved all the more important the less contact
a person had through his or her education and professional background with sci-
entific research and biomedical policy issues (Interviews IX–XII). This was also true
for Parliament, where only a small number of representatives in each political group
led the debate (Interviews IX and X). Little could be comprehended of the complex
matter from the purely lay perspective of the average MP, Interviewees IX, X and
XII judge. This assertion is well captured by MP Hermann Bürgi, who also deliber-
ated the legislative proposal in the science committee. During the Council of States’
floor debate, he explicitly drew attention to this complexity.
"As a preliminary remark, I would like to ascertain that the to-be-regulated issue con-
stitutes a real challenge for the legislator. To begin with, one is confronted with very de-
manding natural scientific background knowledge, maybe too demanding for a layper-
son without such the relevant background. [. . . ] In addition to this, we have a very
complex legal situation, combinedwith fundamental ethical questions." (AB 2003 S 167,
my translation)
This complexity seems to be characteristic of regulatory issues pertaining to sci-
entific research, a legislative domain that Interviewee V judges to be particularly
challenging for MPs. Interviewee X “[. . . ] was under the impression that the limits
41I could not confirm whether the two sources describe the same event.
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of the semi-professional Parliament were not breached in any domain but scientific
research” (my translation). Interviewees X and XII report their experience as be-
ing that, unlike political domains such as social policy, MPs simply lacked personal
experience to draw from.
Evidence suggests that the political parties and its MPs drew largely on their
own networks for expertise and that no consultation ofwhat could be approximated
to disinterested expertise took place. Moreover, this discussion also reveals the in-
adequacy of such information resources when it comes to complex questions like
stem cell research.
6.4 Sites of contestation
So far I have characterized the exogenous elements that constituted the action situ-
ation of interest, as well as a number of actor perspectives that in some way dealt
with decision-making and scientific expertise. The case study now turns to the ex-
amination of three institutionally structured sites where some of these actors came
to interact, either through meetings or through the proxy of written statements and
the media.
Consultation procedure
The first of these sites is the consultation procedure which the Federal Council
scheduled to take place between May, 22, 2002, and August 30, 2002. During such
a procedure, the Federal Council actively solicits feedback from a list of actors it
deems concerned by an issue. In principle, ‘uninvited’ feedback may also be sub-
mitted. Consultation on the stem cell proposal deviated from the normal routine
in that the Federal Council sponsored a campaign to breach the boundary of the
policy subsystem and to make stem cell research a topic of debate among the wider
public. It is at this point that it drew on Science et Cité, the public engagement foun-
dation presented earlier. Its task was to organize a public campaign that begun
with the consultation procedure and ended when the Federal Council transmitted
the dispatch to Parliament. Chairing the campaign was a stakeholder committee
composed of proponents and opponents, like those deployed in TA-Swiss’ study
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process, but with organizations as members (e.g. SNSF, the Academies, etc.). The
campaign consisted of a widely distributed information brochure detailing the dif-
ferent aspects of the issue (cf. Brauchbar Büchel Partner AG et al., 2002)42 and a se-
ries of panel discussions featuring researchers, politicians, ethicists and legal schol-
ars. Other organizations sponsored also similar debates. TA-Swiss, for instance,
conducted a scaled-down version (due to time constraints) of its citizen delibera-
tion forum, where several demographic groups discussed stem cell research in a
professionally moderated discussion (Rey, 2002).
There was media coverage of the public engagement process itself (e.g. Brauch-
bar, 2002; Hofmann, 2002c,d). Moreover, part of this rather academic legal and eth-
ical debate also took place within the media, where positions were articulated and
attacked. For instance, Rainer Schweizer (2002b) summarized his legal commen-
tary in a newspaper article and several other articles featured guest commentaries
by ethicists (e.g. Baumann-Hölzle, 2002; Fischer, 2002; Rehmann-Sutter, 2002; Seel-
mann, 2002). It was through this forum that a key difference between NACBE’s
majority position and the ethical position defended in the TA-Swiss report – both
published just before the advent of the consultation procedure – became apparent.
The TA-Swiss report maintained that an embryo, beginning with fertilization, has
the biological potential to become a human being and may therefore not be instru-
mentalized for research. Thiswould also apply to the supernumerary embryo, as its
condition is of legal and not of biological nature. The counterargument rejected that
position, with the contention that ethical qualifications cannot simply follow from
biological observation, but represent human judgement. It was further argued that
biocentric argumentation is especially misplaced in the context of IVF treatment,
where technology has come to play an important role in a hitherto natural process.
The articulation of these two fundamental positions afforded opponents (some
Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, the Green Party, pro-life groups) with an
argumentative anchor. Citing the TA-Swiss report (Hüsing et al., 2002) and the
legal interpretation therein, they argued that the legislative proposal was unconsti-
tutional, because the legislature was ‘silent’ on the matter of hESC when it voted
42The brochure was produced in collaboration with TA-Swiss and sent to the official addressees of
the consultation, all MPs, and many thousand members of the general public.
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Const. art. 119 in 1992 and FAMAR in 1998 (cf. Eidgenössisches Departement des
Innern, 2002: 5). It may appear rather paradoxical at this point that the evidence
(but not conclusions) provided by a single legal expert – Rainer J. Schweizer – were
used by the administration to solidify the claim of constitutional validity of the pro-
posal while it also provided the essential argument to the opponents.
There were further critical arguments, some of which also resonate with the
TA-Swiss report, though without clear reference to it. They included the above-
mentioned anti instrumentalization argument, backed up by the constitutional pro-
vision of human dignity; the slippery slope argument, which warned that human
cloning might one day be called for as a result of providing for stem cell research;
and the lack of sufficient proof for the necessity of hESC research (‘adult stem cells
are an alternative’) (Schweizerischer Bundesrat, 2002: 1226). Further points of crit-
icism, also shared by proponents, included the lack of a provision on patenting, the
call for limiting in vitro development to 7 instead of 14 days, and the use of ‘human
dignity’ as term to denote the limited protection worthyness of the supernumerary
embryo (Schweizerischer Bundesrat, 2002: 1229).43 Nonetheless, the proposal was
positively received and did not engender any modifications. However, the dispatch
addressed every single point of contention in detail and provided a justificationwhy
it was preferable to stay with the original version of the bill.
When comparing the consultation procedure with the subsequent parliamen-
tary debate, three things become apparent. Firstly, arguments developed during
the former were exactly reiterated in the latter. Some of these arguments (e.g. adult
stem cells as a viable alternative to hESC) even originate in the very beginning of
the discussion in summer of 2001. But compared to its first articulation, the consul-
tation procedure had sharpened the ‘hESC research is unconstitutional’ argument
by refocusing it on human dignity. Secondly, when comparing the list of people
who submitted comments to government or wrote a press commentary with the
list of hearing participants during parliamentary committee deliberation, the latter
is almost entirely represented in the former. Finally, commentators have noted that
43The government justified the absence of a patenting provision with the ongoing reform of the
patent code. The rationale for 14 days was given as compatibility with international standard. The
human dignity argument is a legal coherence argument, for the called-for term ‘dignity of human life’
was absent from Swiss law at the time, but used in European law.
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the process of engaging the public about stem cells fell short of the organizers’ ex-
pectations (e.g. Brauchbar, 2002). These efforts were also not used as arguments
during the parliamentary debate. But they seem to have provided a forum in which
experts from research, law, and ethics articulated lines of argument clear enough to
be associated to a pro or a contra position in parliamentary committee debate.
Deliberation in Parliament
Parliamentary deliberation of the legislative proposal constitutes the second site of
interaction. More precisely, deliberation in the parliamentary committees on sci-
ence, education, and culture (CSEC in short) of both houses that encompassed the
majority of interaction. Deliberation of the draft Embryo Research Act commenced
in January 2003 and was scheduled to be accomplished by year’s end. The sched-
ule was tight because the incumbent legislature was due to expire in December,
which also coincided with FAMAR’s ultimatum to destroy pre-FAMAR embryos.
The Council of States first discussed business in a committee,44 before bringing it to
a floor vote on March 12, 2003. The National Council’s committee took up the job
thereafter and the floor debate took place on September 17, 2003. It was referred
once more to the Council of States (December 4) for elimination of differences be-
fore both houses adopted it in a final vote on December 19, 2003.
Resources of expertise
Subcommittee deliberation usually commences with hearings, followed by an open
debate and ending in a discussion of individual provisions, given that the com-
mittee agrees to consider the governmental proposition in the first place. It was
the organization of hearings and – unusually – the presence of Prof. Schweizer
during most of committee deliberation in both houses that provided a venue for
the mobilization of and argumentation with positions articulated by the previously
discussed members of the ‘hESC advisory regime’.
The hearings were unusual in two regards. First, with one exception, only re-
searchers and academics were invited. Interviewee XII has observed such an exclu-
44CSEC-CSmet on January 20/21, February 17/18, and for elimination of differences onNovember
18, 2003. CSEC-NC meetings were held on April 10/11, May 15, and August 21, 2003.
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sively academic hearing occurred only in science policy issues such as genetic en-
gineering and human subject research legislation. Second, the committees of both
houses held equally intense hearings, giving voice to stem cell researchers, legal
scholars, and ethicists.45 Interviewee XI reports that by the time a proposal has been
debated in the first house, hearings either do not take place at all (because there are
meeting minutes of the original hearings), or on a limited scale if open questions
remain. However, each committee spent half a day hearing the presentations of
six (different) guests and asking them (the same) questions.46 Despite this excep-
tionalism, these hearings conformed to a generic routine: for each person in favor
of hESC research, there was another who opposed it (Interviews IX-XII).47 More-
over, the identification of hearing participants also followed established practice.
Some committee members made suggestions and the committee president solicited
FOPH’s input (Interview IV).48
Prof. Schweizer initially testifiedduring theCSEC-CShearing, but also remained
present and actively engaged during the actual committee deliberation of the same
committee. Further, despite of not having been invited to the CSEC-NC hearings,
his presence was later solicited as the committee started deliberation of the actual
proposal. All interviewees (IV, VII, X, XI and XII) who had first-hand knowledge
45Hearing participants included stem cell researcher Marisa Jaconi (co-author of the infamous
funding proposal), professor of anatomy Günther Rager, legal scholars Rainer Schweizer and Do-
minique Sprumont, and NACBE members Ruth Baumann-Hölze and Alex Mauron. Testifying in
CSEC-NC were legal scholar Kurt Seelmann, stem cell researchers Catherine Nissen-Druey and Yann
Barandon, TA-Swiss study lead author Bärbel Hüsing, NACBE president Christoph Rehmann-Sutter,
and NGO representative Martina Meier (NOGERETE). As Interviewee II explains, invitations were
ad personam. Thus, even though members of NACBE or authors of the TA-Swiss study testified, they
were invited because of their personal position and not specifically due to their institutional affilia-
tions. Seelmann and Rager were alsomembers of the Swiss catholic church’s bioethics working group
(Arbeitsgruppe Bioethik der Schweizer Bischoftskonferenz, 2003).
46Most hearing participants also submitted a written testimony.
47Interviewee IX describes disagreement among hearing participants as “the alpha and omega” of
a good hearing and it is casting the hearing participant recruitment net wide that affords this config-
uration. It facilitates the articulation of ones own position, especially in an unknown field (Interviews
X and XII), for which stem cells are a rather good example. Moreover, as Interivewee XII elaborates,
triangulation between different opinions is important because hearing testimonies necessarily con-
tain blind spots induced by individual world views and legitimate interests, of which also scientific
experts are not free of.
48A comparison of names appearing in the governmental report about the consultation procedure
and the persons invited to speak in the hearings reveals a very strong overlap. In nine out of 12 cases,
either the parent organization of an invited speaker or the person herself commented on the govern-
mental proposal (EidgenössischesDepartement des Innern, 2002). Moreover, several invited speakers
publicly communicated their points of views around the time of the governmental consultation pro-
cedure in guest articles appearing in the daily NZZ (Baumann-Hölzle, 2002; Rehmann-Sutter, 2002;
Seelmann, 2002).
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of the committee deliberation process describe this as highly unusual. The role
enacted by Schweizer closely resembles one usually assumed by a high-level civil
servant either from the Federal Department of Justice or the legal division of the
department in charge, an analytic observation shared by Interviewee VII based on
personal experience.
In addition to the expertise resources mobilized during committee deliberation,
it is noteworthy that NACBE organized a public information event addressed at
Parliament just prior to the beginning of these deliberations. TA-Swiss organized a
similar event, after the first committee finished deliberation, but before it moved to
the floor of the Council of States. This timing correlates with the observation that
while NACBE’s position was discussed throughout the CSEC-CS deliberation, no
mentions of TA-Swiss occured therein.
Mobilization and consequences of expertise
In parliamentary deliberation, face to face interaction with invited guests only takes
place in the committee’s private realm. This applies to the present case, although
references to expert testimony were also carried into the public floor debate of both
houses. An analysis of the interaction between the invited hearing participants and
committee members reveals that – despite the extraordinary intensity and the aca-
demics present – most discussed issues consisted in a reiteration of positions al-
ready publicly known since the consultation procedure. As aMP fittingly remarked
during committee deliberation, there was nothing new to be learned from them.49
But this does not discount the potential importance of redundancy in persuasion.
In the first committee (CSEC-CS), Prof. Schweizer and another legal scholar reit-
erated the already known constitutional interpretation. Theywere followed by Prof.
Jaconi, who detailed her study on hESC and argued for the need to conduct compar-
ative researchwith adult aswell as human and animal embryonic stem cells in order
to learn more about cell differentiation mechanisms. A professor of anatomy and
a professor of biomedical ethics argued whether it is admissible to derive ethical
conclusions from biological developments. The deployed arguments were not new
49I am not in a position to reveal the names of the MPs whose positions I described due to meeting
minute confidentiality. However, I breach this confidentiality in a case a person defended the same
argument also in a public context.
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and had been amply discussed during the consultation procedure. Finally, another
ethicist delivered a warning against the slippery slope towards cloning, should
hESC derivation from supernumerary embryos be allowed. In the second com-
mittee (CSEC-NC), a different cast of hearing participants repeated the same argu-
ments. This time, however, it was a professor of philosophy of law who used a bio-
ontological argument to justify his assertion that the constitutionally protected hu-
man dignity fully covers the supernumerary embryo. The second hearing was also
more contentious as different MPs actively engaged in argument by asking rhetor-
ical questions (e.g. “wouldn’t you agree that. . . ?”) and, in one instance, openly
challenging a participant’s scientific credentials. While Interviewee XII experienced
these hearings as ‘pivotal’, the meeting minutes of the ensuing debate is almost de-
void of references to or arguments drawn from these presentations. Nevertheless,
some hearing participants left (positive and negative) impressions that a number of
Interviewees vividly recall (e.g. IV, X and XI).
But there were also pre-articulated elements that – through reiteration – helped
to shape some consequential decisions. TheNACBE (prior to deliberation) and Prof.
Schweizer (during committee meetings) criticized the governmental proposal in
several regards. They argued, for ethical or constitutional reasons, that the pro-
posal should be narrowed to only allowing for domestic hESC derivation (instead
of generic embryo research), for the purpose of a concrete research project only, lim-
iting the cultivation of an in vitro embryo to 7 rather than 14 days.50 These points of
criticism, delivered by NACBE in a policy brief and in Schweizer’s hearing presen-
tation, were taken up by a group of CSEC-CS members who – during deliberations
in the presence of Schweizer – came up with exactly the same proposals, also sup-
ported by other CSEC-CS colleagues. This reshaped the proposal, which was duly
renamed from Embryo Research Act to Stem Cell Research Act. Moreover, these MPs
– all with advanced law degrees – suggested that a motion, separate from the stem
cell bill, should be voted mandating the government with the elaboration of an ex-
plicit constitutional foundation for human subject research. Schweizer expressed
50FOPH suggested the 14 days deadline in conformity with similar rulings in other countries; yet
the Swiss Constitution bans the development of embryos outside the womb. The problem is that em-
bryos for hESC harvesting have to be developed a few days longer beyond the duration at which they
would normally be destroyed if declared supernumerary. The 7 days rule was thus a compromise.
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support for this idea. As a result of this committee motion, which was accepted in
both houses, such a provision exists today.
The issue of patenting reveals the similar, if not even more important, role of
Prof. Schweizer. Ever since the consultation procedure, the governmental proposal
had been criticized for the lack of addressing the patenting of stem cells. It was
through Schweizer andNACBE that this concernwas carried into CSEC-CS. The ad-
ministration’s own Institute for Intellectual Property (IIP) did not express sympathy
for banning patents on stem cell lines and was even less inclined to see such a pro-
vision in the stem cell research act rather than in the soon-to-be overhauled patent
code. Committee members close to economic interests were eager to hear IIP’s tes-
timony and a representative was heard, but after the other hearings. The invited IIP
representative attacked NACBE’s stance on patenting as ‘undifferentiated’ and ‘un-
helpful’. Schweizer in turn scolded IIP for playing an inadmissible delay strategy
in the patent code reform process. Ultimately, FOPH’s director asked Schweizer
to elaborate a legislative proposal, to be discussed during the next meeting. This
suggestion was then integrated into the proposal and survived political challenge
to become part of the law. Although counterfactuals are notoriously problematic
when it comes to the influence of expert arguments, it is fair to say that a MPwould
have lacked the resources to challenge government’s stance on patenting the way
Schweizer did. Interviewee XII, having earned a doctorate in law, elaborates that s/
he experienced intellectual property law as quite inaccessible without appropriate
specialization.
Finally, where CSEC-CS, by proposing a future constitutional amendment, set-
tled the remaining doubts as to how to interpret the Constitution’s silence regard-
ing research on supernumerary embryos, such closure was not readily achieved in
CSEC-NC. Opponents of stem cell research who, since the beginning of the con-
troversy, argued that any legislation in the matter would be unconstitutional, con-
tinued to argue so. Pascal Couchepin, the Federal Councillor who had taken over
the portfolio after Dreifuss’ retirement, was somewhat surprised at this challenge,
arguing that Schweizer had proven constitutional compliance. Already during de-
liberation in CSEC-CS did Couchepin ask Schweizer to present the constitutional
argument, rather having a representative of the administration argue the point. The
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need for Schweizer’s interpretive authority of constitutional matters lead to an odd
moment during deliberation in CSEC-NC. Because Schweizer had not been invited,
a top-level civil servant, who declared him/herself to be a personal acquaintance
of his, saw him/herself forced to speak in Schweizer’s name and vouch for his ut-
most diligent prudence in arriving at his conclusion. For the following meetings,
Schweizer was invited back. But his presence did not appease critics. Some con-
tinued to argue that the constitutional foundation was not given, as if Schweizer
had not have delivered his unwavering interpretation just an instant ago. They did
not attack him; they even asked for suggestions of how to legally formulate their
counterproposals (which he dutifully gave). They simply pretended he had never
said anything on the matter. The following quote from the National Council’s floor
debate exemplifies this and takes it even further by enrolling Schweizer’s credibility
for its own purpose.
Rosemarie Dormann: "... In an expert opinion commissioned by the Federal Council,
the very same Professor Rainer J. Schweizer, who also drafted the legal opinion for TA-
Swiss, arrives at no conclusive answer. This is not surprising in the light of this expert’s
respectability known to all of us." (AB 2003 N 1351, my translation.)
This analysis shows that a constitutional expertwith a solid reputationmay be in
a position to significantly shape Parliament’s response to a governmental legislative
proposal. At the same time, it also shows that there are virtually no boundaries to
interpretative flexibility.
The referendum
A final site of interaction opened when an ad hoc committee of techno-critical and
pro-life movements (cf. Hofmann, 2003b) collected enough signatures to force a
ballot vote, executed on November 28, 2004. A solid two-thirds majority of voters
backed Parliament’s version of the bill.
Although the referendum turnover was on the low side with just 37 percent,
therewas amarked difference to the sites of contestation that preceded the final vote
in Parliament. The issue was now in the hands of clear advocacy committees, which
appealed to their constituencies. While scientists were engaged in the support cam-
paign, presenting their work and motivation to anyone interested (Interview I), the
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previously engaged academic experts almost disappeared from the media report-
ing leading up to the campaign. The professional discourses of ethics and lawmade
space for more overt ideological and religious views. This does not mean that scien-
tific and legal arguments disappeared entirely, but theywere no longer pronounced
bymembers of the ‘advisory regime’. For instance, it was the federal administration
which addressed the issue of constitutional compatibility in a newspaper article (cf.
Schwander, 2004a).
6.5 Discussion
This case study of the making of the stem cell research act and the role of academic
expertise within this has thus far accomplished three things: Firstly, it identified
the science of stem cell research, path dependencies from previous biotechnological
controversies, and the international political response to stem cell research as three
exogenous but strongly structuring factors of the overall action situation. Secondly,
it has shed light on the commitments of the most important actors to mobilize ex-
pertise and elaborated the production of that expertise. Thirdly, it has detailed three
institutionally structured venues of negotiation and contestation and provided an
analysis of how expertise was mobilized therein.
In this concluding section, I will reintroduce this thesis’ central concerns and
provide an interpretation of the case study through the theoretical lens outlined in
chapter 3. For this purpose I start with the characterization of the overall action con-
text, in order to determine inwhich sites experts and expertise have beenmobilized.
Next I consider the causes of expert mobilization, and examine to what extent they
are products of the action situation. Finally, I look at the consequences of expertise
mobilization and assess the conditions that enabled them.
Action context
From the inception of the controversy in summer 2001 to the referendum vote in
late 2004, opponents (and, to a more moderate degree, proponents) of stem cell re-
search deployed the same set of arguments. While these arguments primarily artic-
ulated values about the role of democracy in science and technology, as well as the
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moral status of the embryo, they were also linked to factual statements from aca-
demic experts about the constitutionality of the proposed legislative initiative, as
well as about the transdifferentiation potential of adult stem cells. However, these
epistemic claims were contested. Opponents refused to settle the constitutional-
ity question, despite repeated and consistent expert testimony. And while some
uncertainty about the potential of adult stem cells was admitted, opponents and
proponents drew very different conclusions. In short, the problem was unstruc-
tured, with co-constitutive disagreements about values and facts. These persistent
disagreements concerning the values and knowledge at stake illustrate the unstruc-
tured nature of the issue.
However, this assessment requires some revision if we consider the govern-
ment’s own perception of the situation. Government strategy was to diffuse the
value controversy by subjecting it to the institutional treatment of the policy pro-
cess, rather than attempting to obtain a consensus through inclusion. Stakeholders
had no access to policy formulation and critical questions – such as the potential-
ity of different kinds of stem cells – were delegated to policy implementation. The
government therefore treated the issue more as a semi-structured issue with dis-
agreement about values than an outrightly unstructured issue. Moreover, speaking
in retrospect, Interviewees IV and VI draw attention to the highly symbolic nature
of the controversy. Very few distributional consequences were attached to the bill,
whichwas to regulate a dozen research projects only. Rather, they suggest, it was an
instance of the wider struggle between morality and freedom of research. In com-
parison to Germany, however, Interviewee II judges the Swiss debate to have been
rather tame.
Each procedural step received consistent media coverage. Le temps and theNeue
Zürcher Zeitung provided ample coverage and analysis of the latest discoveriesmade
in connection with stem cell research, as well as the procedural steps the Swiss leg-
islative response was taking. All public statements by NACBE and TA-Swiss re-
ceived coverage, as did the public engagement campaign sponsored by the govern-
ment. This led to the high visibility of expert arguments during the consultation
procedure. Due to the referendum campaign, media coverage did not falter even
after Parliament had adopted the law. However, coverage then became significantly
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less focused on expert argumentation, instead privileging the more ideological reg-
ister of justification advanced by proponents and opponents of the bill.
Causes of expertise mobilization
This case study revealed the participation of two kinds of experts: mandated aca-
demics (Profs. Guillod and Schweizer), and advisory councils (NACBE and TA-
Swiss). In order to explain the solicitation of Schweizer’s expertise, it is necessary
to distinguish between four different sites in which his expertise was deployed. The
first consists of the FOPH report; the second is the mandate for TA-Swiss; the third
is Schweizer’s engagement in the public debate under his own initiative (personal
communication, July 3, 2012); and finally there is his extensive involvement in the
deliberation of parliamentary committees.
Let’s begin the examination with the FOPH report. The previous discussion has
already established that – while being confronted with the need for a constitutional
interpretation – Schweizer’s opinionwas sought as an insurance in the face of clearly
anticipated and plausible adversity to FOPH’s emerging commitment to close down
the controversy by seeking legitimacy for stem cell research through lawmaking,
thus allowing for some contestation within institutionally demarcated sites. But
there are additional elements that enabled such a decision. There was Schweizer’s
constitutional commentary, which authenticated him as themost authoritative legal
scholar on the issue, as well as his agreement to elaborating a commentary on very
short notice within an extremely tight deadline. Moreover, it was the absence of
an institution – a constitutional court – that afforded Schweizer’s profession with
special prerogatives. Hence, several structural conditions as well as Schweizer’s
cooperationwere necessary to enable FOPH’s decision to solicit such legal expertise.
Schweizer drafted the legal opinion for the TA-Swiss report because he was part
of a consortium that won a tender bid51 prior to the eruption of the controversy;
there is therefore no direct connection to FOPH’s hiring motive. However, the other
conditions couldn’t have applied to the FOPH contextwithout applying to TA-Swiss
as well, given that this does not exist in a parallel world with an army of reputable
51According to Interview VIII, Schweizer’s reputation was one of the reasons this particular teams
of authors won the tender bid.
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constitutional scholars specialized in medical biotechnology readily available. As
mentioned, Schweizer’s public appearances, notably his two contributions to the
Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Schweizer, 2002b, 2003), were self-motivated. However, by
that time he had already dedicated considerable time and energy to the production
of the legal opinions. The newspaper articles disclose this affiliation, which will
have further authorized him as an authoritative voice.
When considering Schweizer’s substantial and highly unusual involvement in
the parliamentary debate, there is no simple chain of causes that establishes pre-
vious engagements as the only causes. In light of standard hearing organization
and the fact that Schweizer was the administration’s expert, his participation in a
hearing was probably inevitable. But he defended a partially divergent opinion
from the administration’s, taking a strong stance against it on the matter of patent-
ing. However, his stance was not directly exploitable by opponents of the proposal.
Yet the administration, with permission of the parliamentary committee, sought to
keep him involved. There was certainly a substantial degree of self-motivation to
remain involved (Interview VII), which may account for Schweizer’s presence in
the first committee. But there was also Schweizer’s reputation among MPs, paired
with the documented perception of complexity and lack of orientation (cf. quote
Hermann Bürgi). In addition, Federal Councillor Couchepin was new to the port-
folio. He consequently lacked the in-depth knowledge of his predecessor Dreifuss
on the matter. This is a plausible reason why he repeatedly invited Schweizer to re-
iterate his assessment during committee deliberation. This became especially clear
when some CSEC-NC members refused to settle the constitutional question. Thus,
even if FOPH’s decision to involve Schweizer was a deliberate decision in reaction
to specific circumstances, multiple actors and specific institutional conditions were
necessary to make Schweizer’s engagement into the mediator role it became.
Let us now consider the two instances of the ‘institutionalized mode’ of exper-
tise mobilization. The analysis of NACBE and TA-Swiss reveals an unambiguous
institutional mandate to their actions which clearly preceded and was to continue
beyond their involvement within the stem cell case. But how they went about their
involvement with the stem cell controversy was the result of their own interpre-
tation of their legal mandate. For instance, NACBE’s internal working style and
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repeated affirmation of its role as supporting rather than deciding was significantly
shaped by its president52 and contributed to the commitment to actively advise all
institutional participants in the decision-making process. Both organizations op-
erated from outside of government, aiming their advice at the same state-society
interfaces – chiefly the consultation procedure and information events for Parlia-
ment – that interest groups would also target. But there is competition for the at-
tention of MPs. NACBE, unlike TA-Swiss, had proven skillful at inserting its ad-
vice at the very beginning of deliberation, where many committee members lacked
strong convictions. Parliament did not consult them as organizations, but heard indi-
vidual members and their personal opinions instead. Both organizations somewhat
compensated their outsider status through interpersonal networks (NACBE’s secre-
tariat located at FOPH and Verena Schwander of FOPH’s membership in TA-Swiss’
stakeholder council). While this kept them informed, it did not grant them access
to policy design work.
While these traits are more generic to the institutional position of such advisory
organizations, which is mediated by their self-projected identity, their work was
significantly influenced by the rapid and somewhat unpredictable pace of the policy
process. They had a game of constant catching up in order to remain relevant.
But relevant to what? That is where substantially different conceptions of sci-
ence governancewere expressed. Governmental policymakers construed TA-Swiss,
NACBE, and the mandate of Science et Cité to make the issue public as a means of
closing down the debate. Interviewee VI recalls having urged TA-Swiss to speed
up in order to deliver arguments to appease the debate. The activities of Science
et Cité were timed so as to expire when the proposal was submitted to Parliament.
Indeed, some policymakers were irritated that NACBE continued its activities be-
yond that point. Inspired by the Danish consensus conference model (Interview
VIII), TA-Swiss held a very different conception of technical democracy. The drive to
really open up the debatewas evenmoremarkedwithNACBE. Thus, while the self-
initiated activities of these advisory organizations followed a logic that was largely
independent of the issue at hand, wider conceptions about technical democracy
52Based on their distinct experiences with extra-parliamentary commissions, Interviewees II and
XXXIII report that it is mostly the commission president and a small minority of the members that
does most of the work.
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proper to science governance nonetheless came to inform advisory strategy.
Consequences of expertise mobilization
If we are to consider what consequences the mobilization of expertise engendered,
we need to temporarily step back from social and institutional aspects to examine
the cognitive arguments advanced. This perspective reveals the extent to which
values and factual considerations were intermixed. Discounting Kurt Seelmann’s
public criticism of NACBE (Seelmann, 2002) and his indirect criticism of Schweizer
during committee hearings, there was a single and coherent constitutional inter-
pretation, originating from Schweizer’s analysis. But this spread through different
channels. On the one hand, it went from the TA-Swiss report to NACBE, which
copied it from the former. From the TA report it also spread into the Science et Cité
brochure. On the other, its language was integrated into the governmental policy
proposal. This same coherence applies to the scientific assessment of stem cell re-
search, as it originated in the TA study. Even stem cell researchers not involved in
the study delivered accounts, in hearings, that were substantially congruent with it.
This assessment also ended up inNACBE’s report and the Science et Cité publication.
But despite a coherent legal and scientific assessment, NACBE and the TA-Swiss re-
port arrived at different conclusions and recommendations, with the former closer
to FOPH’s position than the latter. This difference can only be accounted for by the
divergent ethical stances taken by NACBE’s majority and by Hüsing and Engels,
which came to dominate the TA-Swiss report.
Let us now consider three cognitive and discursive consequences of expertise
mobilization. First, as I have demonstrated in some detail, the Federal Government
used Schweizer’s language to argue that a stem cell research bill would be consti-
tutional in public articulations of its policy position, right up to the publication of
the dispatch. However, the position itself is not connected to that assessment. Sec-
ond, in connection to NACBE’s discussion points for Parliament, Schweizer’s crit-
icism of the governmental proposal – including his material input to a patenting
clause – inspired CSEC-CS members who had been concerned, but did not earlier
express a strong opinion, to substantially alter the scope of the proposal. While
there is a causal link between FOPH’s mobilization and the first consequence, there
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are many contingent links between the conditions that produced Schweizer’s ex-
traordinary presence in the parliamentary committee and its consequence. Third,
while the fundamental arguments against stem cell research predate domestic ex-
pert pronouncements, and continued to resonate during the referendum campaign
(where such expert voices were largely missing), critics were quick to pick up on
the TA report’s more cautionary message as clear evidence for their stance. Thus,
expertise was enrolled into reasoning and argumentation in several different ways,
owing to a very disparate array of causes.
There is also a broader observation about the overall discourse of the debate,
which remained thoroughly ‘professional’ up to and including the final vote in Par-
liament. What I mean by this is that even value arguments were expressed in legal
and biomedical ethical terms. For instance, the parliamentary committees did not
hear religious leaders. Instead, a legal scholar and an anatomist were invited and
expressed the traditional stance of the Catholic Church in, respectively, medical and
legal terms. MPs also took pains to make a distinction between their general sup-
port for science and their disagreement on that particular issue. Nevertheless, they
argued for the supposed advantages of researching adult stem cells. This expertise-
laden discourse of legitimation was not evident during the referendum campaign.
Its emergence cannot be directly attributed to the mobilization of domestic exper-
tise. It is conceivable that the highly publicized consultation procedure provided a
platform for the higher visibility of such expertise. Moreover, the MPs interviewed
valued expert discourse as useful in the face of complexity. At the end of the day,
however, the issue was about the scientific community, which justified its actions
through appeals to its autonomy and societal utility. MPs might call the pharma-
ceutical industry evil, but they could not dare to question the integrity of Swiss stem
cell researchers.
In conclusion, we can maintain that the stem cell research regulation decision-
making process was of a relatively unstructured nature, but that the federal ad-
ministration conceived it more as a semi-structured issue with conflicting values,
attempting to depoliticize the issue through the procedural legitimacy of a policy
process and the launch of a public debate campaign. Expertise was mobilized by
the administration as an insurance for this strategy, and by advisory committees
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tasked with foresight missions in this policy domain. Through a complex and un-
foreseeable chain of events and structural conditions, some of this expertise took
a mediating role, with minor effects on policy design (Prof. Schweizer, NACBE),
while the more pronounced positions of TA-Swiss were enrolled into the argumen-
tation of the opposing minority.
Seven
Curbing Carbon Dioxide Emissions
7.1 Introduction
The year 1990 was full of promise for combatting climate change. After decades of
research and scientific agitation, the fact that our planet’s atmosphere is warming
because of an increasing concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2) had finally capti-
vated the political imagination and catapulted the issue onto the political agenda.
The still young Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCCC) was about
to officially present its first assessment report during a scientific conference of the
World Meteorological Organization (WMO), to be held in Geneva during fall of the
same year. It was in this context that the Federal Council authorized the Federal Of-
fice for the Environment (FOEN) to elaborate draft legislation concerning the reduc-
tion of atmosphericCO2 emissions. This chapter looks at the role and consequences
of scientific knowledge in the policy formulation of what eventually became the
Federal Act on CO2-emission Reduction (CO2 Act). This law, only enacted in 2000,
established the foundation of domestic climate change policy in Switzerland.
Swiss climate policy has continued to evolve since then, with Parliament later
approving the introduction of a tax onCO2 emissions engendered by burning fossil
fuels for heating. Subsequently, the original bill was completely revised in antici-
pation of an international climate policy regime to succeed the Kyoto protocol. But
it was during the 1990s that climate change was established as a political problem
(internationally as well as domestically), and that Swiss climate scientists began to
organize and to articulate political claims. This is why the present study focuses on
the pre–2000 period only.
Four contributions in existing literature cover the CO2 Act. Ingold (2008) uses
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the advocacy coalition framework as well as multi criteria analysis in order to ex-
plain policy output under the CO2 Act up till the mid–2000’s. While also looking
at the pre–2000 context, the 2002–2005 period is the central focus of this analysis
(Ingold, 2008: 418). In a study commissioned by the Swiss Academy of Techni-
cal Sciences, Lehmann and Rieder (2002) investigate the role of global change sci-
ence in policy formulation of the CO2 Act. They offer detailed descriptions of the
decision-making process, as well as organization and coordination between actors
from science and the federal administration. But their study does not address the
content of the policy itself. Thus, how such scientific knowledge ultimately came to
bear on policy formulation is not looked at. Moreover, their analysis does not take
into account the consultancy work done by research firms. Niederberger (2005)
discusses the Swiss Academy of Natural Science’s climate science advisory infras-
tructure. This treatment focuses on organizational specificities, and partly overlaps
with Lehmann and Rieder (2002). Finally, Audédat (2004) presents an analysis of
the domestic articulation of the climate change issue in terms of the science pol-
icy agenda that resulted from it. The present case study, however, asks different
questions, which it investigates independently of these other studies.1
The remainder of this chapter is divided into five sections. The first section pro-
vides an overview of the major milestones within the pre–2000 decision-making
process. The second section discusses the nascent energy policy domain and in-
ternational climate policy coordination as two ‘exogenous’ elements that exerted a
structuring influence on policy formulation and expertisemobilization. The follow-
ing section analyses the commitments and perspectives of the federal administra-
tion and the Swiss climate science community, and links this to the deployment of
scientific expertise. The penultimate section offers an account of where and how
expertise became an object of contention, and the final discussion draws together
the findings and discusses them in the context of the theoretical propositions for-
mulated earlier.
1Karin Ingold kindly shared her field notes, which were a helpful asset in planning interviews.
However, they do not constitute ‘data’ analyzed within this case study.
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7.2 Policy synopsis
The making of the CO2 Act is a two part story which began with the idea of intro-
ducing a tax on fossil fuels in order to reduce CO2 as well asNOx emissions caused
by their combustion. Air pollution was the main concern at the time, especially
since the 1986 clean air program was not effective enough. The Federal Office for
the Environment (FOEN) sought to address this policy failure and asked the envi-
ronmental policy consulting firm Infras for advice on clean air policy. The latter
came up with the idea of a CO2 tax (Interview XIV). Reducing CO2 emissions, the
argument went, reduces combustion of fossil fuels, which is the most important
source of harmful NOx emissions. Political support was not lacking as a draft pol-
icy report from fall 1990 shows. In fact, CO2 emissions had gained political salience
as, in October of 1990, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) was about
to hold its second conference on the climate. It was at this conference that the Inter-
national Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) presented its first assessment report. The
European Commission also thought about a CO2 tax. Moreover, a CO2 tax would
be relatively easy to implement given that Switzerland imports all of its fossil fuels.
Such fuels could be taxed at the border according to their respective carbon content.
The Federal Council approved the strategy (October 1990) andmandated FOEN
with the elaboration of legislation. There was one important caveat, though. Fos-
sil fuels are not only a pollutant, they are an economic production factor, and they
are a source of fiscal income. Levying such a tax pitched environmental concerns
against economic and fiscal interests. The Federal Council, the Federal Fiscal Ad-
ministration (FFA), and the Federal Office for External Economic Affairs (FOEEA)
took these interests very seriously. However, these actors did not perceive any cred-
ible progress on the European level to actually introduce some kind of energy tax,
as the European Commission’s plans gradually lost momentum. This nourished
domestic fears that a Swiss ‘solo effort’ would disadvantage the domestic export
industry, which would have to operate at a higher cost than their competitors.
In the absence of effective international policy coordination, this made domes-
tic political support for a CO2 emission tax elusive and contributed to the Fed-
eral Council abandoning an initial proposal submitted for public comment in 1994.
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Close observation of the European Commission’s intentions also led to intermittent
consideration of an expansion of the proposal to include the taxation of electric-
ity (after the EC announced a corresponding proposal in June, 1992). The federal
administration explored scenarios containing an energy tax (i.e. not a tax on the
carbon content but rather on the energy content of a fuel), which could, potentially,
also be applied to electricity. A Federal Department of HomeAffairs (FDHA)memo
addressed to the Federal Council (Jan. 4, 1994) notes that informal feedback from
economic organizations and political parties signaled resistance against taxing elec-
tricity. It further informed the Federal Council that the different policy alternatives
are virtually identical in their impact on the environment, energy demand, and eco-
nomic cost. The Federal Council followed FDHA’s situation analysis and decided
to submit only the CO2 tax proposal for public comment.
At the same time the federal government was battling problems of fiscal policy
which took precedence over any other tax-related policy proposal. The Swiss peo-
ple rejected a necessary renewal of federal taxation competencies on June 2, 1991,
because the government attached a proposal for the introduction of a value added
tax (VAT). The federal taxation competencies were finally approved in a second bal-
lot vote in 1993, after the VAT proposal was dropped. This rejection directly affected
the CO2 tax proposal, which was put on hold in order not to prejudice the second
renewal attempt (Interview XIV). In addition, a significant public finance crisis de-
veloped during the early 1990s, and balancing the budget became a political pri-
ority. For that purpose the government sought to increase duty on petrol in order
to increase fiscal revenue. Because the CO2 tax did not pursue a fiscal motive, the
project had to wait until the people validated the tax increase (ballot vote on March
7, 1993). Finally, in the spring of 1995, the FFA – a staunch opponent of incentive
taxes on energy because it considered energy a taxable source of fiscal revenue –
launched the idea of financing transalpine transportation infrastructure by increas-
ing duties on petrol. By that time the proposal had already experienced significant
loss of political support after having received negative feedback in public consulta-
tion.
The Federal Council proposal finally submitted for consultation in spring 1994
consisted of a tax on fossil fuels based on their CO2 emission values. Two thirds
Policy synopsis| 191
of the tax’s proceeds would be redistributed to the population and to the economy,
with one third being earmarked for financing environmental policy projects. The
tax would be introduced in increments and energy intensive branches of industry
would benefit from partial exemptions in order to avoid affecting their competitive-
ness on the world market. Furthermore, the official letter sent to the addressees
of the consultation procedure (dated March, 29, 1994) made it clear that the pro-
posal takes into consideration the recent increase of the petrol tax. For that reason,
the option of applying a higher tax rate for Treibstoffe than for Brennstoffe – respec-
tively, fuel for transportation and fuel for heating – was dropped.2 This distinction
is not so much about physical differences amongst different kinds of fossil fuels as
it is about the subdivision of the economy into different energy user groups, each
of which has different growth trajectories of energy consumption. The question of
whether to make such a distinction, and how to make it, is politically salient as it
engenders distributional consequences on who carries the tax burden.
The proposal drew wide criticism. It was denounced for its ‘solo effort’ ahead
of major trade partners, as well as of the mixing of fiscal and behavioral incentive
motives behind the partially redistributed tax proceeds. The need to do something
about climate changewas, however, almost universally recognized (and indeedwas
disputed only by the PetroleumUnion [Erdölvereinigung] (cf. Hartl, 1994)). However,
economic interests questioned the rationale of domestic climate change mitigation
efforts, advancing cost and effectiveness arguments aginst this, especially with re-
gard to the Swiss share of globalCO2 emissions, which is counted in permills rather
than percents (e.g. Fritsch, 1994). In the wake of the consultation procedure, a gov-
ernmental delegation sought to salvage the proposal in bilateral negotiations with
economic interest organizations. But just as no further support could be gained
outside government, internal resistance – especially within FFA – increased, too.
The story’s second part began in May 1995, as FOEN desperately sought to ob-
tain the Federal Council’s permission to finalize the proposal and submit it to Par-
liament, despite the political resistance. Meanwhile, an international policy agenda
around climate change had materialized. The 1992 earth summit in Rio resulted in
2Because the terms Brennstoff and Treibstoff were persistent in the debate, but lack a clear English
translation, I shall use the original German.
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the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which
Switzerland ratified in December of 1993. UNFCCC did not contain specific emis-
sion reduction targets, but Switzerland (together with Austria and Liechtenstein)
annexed a self-declared reduction target of minus 10 percent by 2000 compared to
1990.3 A decisive shift came in April 1995 when the UNFCCC’s first conference of
the parties (COP 1), held in Berlin, resulted in a declaration to develop binding emis-
sion reduction targets. This ‘Berlin mandate’ would ultimately lead to the signature
of an annex to UNFCCC during COP 3 in 1997, better known as the Kyoto proto-
col. Against this backdrop of domestic resistance and the newfound opportunity
of the Berlin mandate, FOEN director Philippe Roch and Federal Councillor Ruth
Dreifuss, debating strategy over a beer at the end of a FDHA senior staff retreat,
decided for a reversal of strategy. No longer should the tax be the priority of legis-
lation. Rather, the law should state a (to be defined) CO2 emission reduction target
and provide for the introduction of the CO2 tax as a subsidiary instrument should
existing and voluntary measures fall short of producing the necessary reduction
(Interviews VI and XXIV).
In a May 31, 1995 decision, the Federal Council endorsed the new strategy and
sent the administration back to work. It also decreed that the law was to be elab-
orated in close collaboration with interested parties, thereby giving official bless-
ing to a process that had already started some months earlier. In fact, confronted
with negative feedback from the consultation procedure, Federal Councillor Drei-
fuss and a FOEN delegation held direct meetings with the most important critics,
whose endorsement was required to break gridlock.4 Even before the consultation
procedure ended, the delegation met with the economic interest group Vorort, try-
ing to persuade it to endorse the (old) proposal. They also met with a group of
‘industry captains’ – top-level managers in Swiss industry – and consulted with the
major political parties, as well as representatives of the oil, gas, and transportation
industries. While these meetings did not produce a breakthrough, they lead to a
series of confidential meetings between a FOEN delegation and industry represen-
3The same reduction target had already been domestically integrated into the energy savings
program Energie2000, which the federal government launched after the 1990 adoption of the consti-
tutional provision on energy (cf. Fritsch, 1994).
4This information is based on the meeting preparation files contained in the FOEN archive.
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tatives under the auspices of the Vorort. It was the latter that primarily served as a
forum for interaction and which introduced cooperation rather than the previous
ex post consultation.
The timing of policy work now mainly involved coordination with other ongo-
ing energy policy projects, notably the draft Energy Act and two submitted pop-
ular initiatives resembling the earlier discarded alternatives. The proposal’s most
contentious aspect concerned the splitting of the reduction target according to dif-
ferent economic sectors. While an overall ten percent reduction target was fairly
uncontested (though judged insufficient by environmental organizations), much
haggling went on within the administration, as well as between the project team
and economic interest groups. Scenarios projected the biggest emission increase as
coming from transportation, and the relevant interest group was fiercely opposed
to sector-specific targets (they would have had to pay more). The Vorort advised
sector-specific targets, because it feared that the tax would engender redistribution
between different branches of industry. FOEN and FOEEA internally argued for
such sector targets, too, against FOE’s accusation of ‘supporting plan economy’ (In-
terview XVII). When the proposal was finally sent for public consultation, differ-
entiated reduction targets between Brennstoff and Treibstoff were maintained. Pre-
dictably, this drew criticism. In the swift, second consultation procedure, another
claimmaterialized: economic interest groups and the political parties close to them
demanded that Parliament, rather than the Federal Council, should have the pre-
rogative to decide if and when introducing the CO2 tax was necessary to achieve
the CO2 emission reduction goal of minus 10 percent by 2010.
The CO2 Act was finalized in March of 1997 and sent to Parliament for delibera-
tion. Committee deliberation in the Council of States started that fall, shortly before
the COP 3 meeting took place in Kyoto. The bill was barely contested; the Commit-
tee of Environment, Spatial Planning, Energy, and Transportation (CESET) of both
houses did not even conduct hearings.5 However, the parliamentary process took
until October 1999, with the business passing three times between the two cham-
bers because no agreement could be reached on whether Parliament or the Federal
5This is most unusual, but neither interviewees could recall such hearings having taken place, nor
is there any documentary evidence proving the contrary.
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Council would decide the moment for introducing the tax. Parliament secured this
prerogative in the end. The law, now lackingmuch of its intended bite, was enacted
in May of 2000.
7.3 Structuring elements
Policy formulation for the CO2 Act was subject to influences from other domestic
policy contexts as well as from international policy coordination. These influences
include the constitution of the federal energy policy prerogative, and its later de-
velopment; international climate negotiations, including the adoption of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); the fiscal crisis of
the early 1990s, and the need for infrastructure financing; and industrial policy re-
garding the competitiveness of export-oriented manufacturers. As discussed, these
elements engendered conflicting priorities and thereby substantially shaped the
policy process. As we shall see in section 7.4, they came to determine the organiza-
tion of policywork itself by forcing coordination among different public and private
actors. They also brought into being an infrastructure of energy policy modelling,
on which policy formulation drew. In what follows, I further outline the energy
policy field and international climate change negotiations between 1990 and 1997
with their structuring effects on the action situation of interest.
Energy policy and models
Energy policy has only beenwithin the competency of the federal government since
1990, when the necessary constitutional article successfully passed a ballot vote.
But it took two attempts to do so. The first oil shock prompted Parliament and
the Federal Council to set up an ad hoc expert committee with the task of develop-
ing regulatory recommendations for steering energy consumption. The resulting
master plan Gesamtenergiekonzeption (GEK) was publicly presented in 1978 (Kohn,
2003) and formed the basis for further discussion of the empowerment of the federal
government in energy policy. However, the people rejected the developed consti-
tutional provision in a 1983 ballot vote. In parallel to the energy scarcity issue, an
anti-nuclear protestmovement formed in Switzerlandwhose focuswas the planned
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construction of a new plant in the town of Kaiseraugst.6 In the wake of the 1986
Chernobyl accident, another ad hoc expert committee was formed to develop and
assess different energy scenarios about the possibility of a moratorium or exit from
nuclear energy.7 These scenarios, published in 1988, showed that an exit was possi-
ble, albeit at high economic cost. Not wanting to acknowledge these findings, three
members of the group left in public dissent. They were all professors whom Inter-
viewee XVII describes as ‘pro nuclear’. It was through Chernobyl that the project of
federal energy policy competencies finally found traction and won public approval
in a 1990 ballot vote. In the same vote, and against the will of the Federal Council
and Parliament, the public also accepted a moratorium on nuclear energy (Inter-
view XVII).
This foundational episode of federal energy policy contributed to the develop-
ment of a regime of energy modeling expertise, which, after being consolidated
in the early 1990s, has remained almost unchanged. Model calculations from this
regime have informed virtually every energy policy decision made, from projects
such as the CO2 Act to more recent post-Fukushima energy transition plans. This
regime comprises two parts. First, there is the process through which the scenarios
a model is supposed to compute are determined. Secondly, there is the technical
implementation of these assumptions and the development of the actual model.
The pre–1990 experiencewith energymodeling led to two lasting consequences.
Firstly, having ad hoc expert commissions develop the scenarios and assumptions re-
vealed that this is a highly political process. The members of the GEK committee
as well as the ‘Kaiseraugst Demand Assessment Committee’ were chosen accord-
ing to political representation criteria. The results reflected this staffing process.
Subsequently, Federal Councillor Schlumpf wanted a purely technical committee,
thinking that this would solve the ‘result by appointment’ problem. But it didn’t, as
the post-Chernobyl energy scenario expert commission demonstrates. Professors,
too, put values before facts on occasion. At FOE, the last minute expert dissent (for
covert political reasons) was not received well, and led to the decision to internalize
6Adiscussion of pre–1983 energy policy is offered byMironesco et al. (1986) andMironesco (1993).
On the history of nuclear power in Switzerland, see Kupper (2003). The Kaiseraugst project faltered
and the power plant was never built.
7A similar expert group had already developed electricity demand scenarios as part of the licens-
ing process for the Kaiseraugst power plant (Interview XVII).
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scenario development. Under this new regime, the computation of further energy
scenarios was completed in 1994 and updated in 1998 (Interview XVII).8 Secondly,
the federal administration never acquired its own technical competency to develop
such models. The development of models is strongly driven by availably comput-
ing power, whichwasminimal in the 1970s. While university-based academics con-
tributed early models (e.g. the University of Geneva’s ‘Centre universitaire d’étude
des problèmes d’energie’),9 the advent of so-called ‘bottom-up models’ established
the consultancy firm Prognos as a key player (Interviews XVII and XXVII). Bottom-
up models are capable of a very high resolution and are mathematically simple.
However, they are very labor intensive and require significant detail and expertise
on the data. FOE first started to collaborate with Prognos after Chernobyl and has
done so ever since. Prognos is now in a monopoly position concerning bottom-up
models in the Swiss and German market (Interview XXVII). Processes predating
work on the CO2 Act had thus already structured both the expertise available and
the interaction modalities between the administration and Prognos, as an expertise
provider.10
The development of a federal energy policy also came to influence policy work
on the CO2 Act structurally. While FOE was a partner on the project from 1990, it
was after the strategy reversal that the federal government started to coordinate
the timing of different energy policy projects. On the one hand, there was the
draft Energy Act, whose treatment was to be synchronized with the CO2 Act. On
the other, an initiative committee raised enough signatures to submit two energy-
related popular initiatives in 1995. One aimed at taxing non-renewable energy, with
the proceeds being redistributed to the population. The other proposed an energy
8The early 2000s saw another update (published in 2005), which acquired political saliency with
the Fukushima accident. For these new scenarios, a stakeholder panel was involved, however with
less competencies than the pre–1990 commissions, but replicating similar dissent (Interview XXVII).
9Interviewees provided several explanations about the predominance of commercial providers.
While academic providers are cheaper, there is less consistency in availability from university insti-
tutes. Consultancies deliver on time and are professionally run. Moreover, the academic offer is very
person dependent. The retirement of a single professor can lead to tremendous loss of know how.
Some interviewees also estimate that doing advisory work has lost prestige in the Swiss university
landscape, which they see as increasingly paced by international competition for excellence.
10Each update of the energy perspectives constitutes a multi year project in which several consul-
tancy firms are implicated. For instance, just like Prognos, Infras has also been a long time partner
in that enterprise. Interviewees XVII and XXVII estimate the costs of such an update between CHF 2
and 3 millions.
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tax as a way of raising funds for the development of alternative energy. As FOEN
memos show, Federal Councillor Dreifuss sought to convince her colleagues to de-
clare the CO2 Act an indirect counter proposal to the initiatives, but the Federal
Council ultimately recommended the initiatives’ rejection without any counterpro-
posal. Nonetheless, the draft Energy and CO2 acts, as well as the popular initia-
tives, became the foundations for different energy scenarios which needed to be
computed and evaluated.
The ‘domestication’ of climate policy
The synopsis has established how the international climate policy agenda around
UNFCCC provided repeated opportunities for the domestic CO2 tax project. The
main events during the 1990s were the second WMO world climate conference in
1990, the Rio earth summit in 1992, COP 1 in Berlin in 1995, and COP 3 in Kyoto in
1997. These events had both a direct signaling effect on the Swiss and an indirect
effect by shaping the EC’s policy strategy. It was the latter’s announcements in the
wake of UNFCCC conferences that had a strong effect on Switzerland.
Other than these timing effects, there are surprisingly few linkages between the
UNFCCC process (also coordinated by FOEN) and the CO2 Act project. Organiza-
tionally, the climate portfolio gradually shifted from FOEN’s international division
(established in 1988 in connection with Switzerland’s IPCC collaboration), to be-
come part of the more nationally focused ‘environment and economy’ division in
2001, and ultimately becoming the subject of its own division in 2008 (Lehmann
and Rieder 2002, Interview XIV). There was some personal overlap between the
CO2 Act and FOEN’s UNFCCC team. However, analytical projects pursued by the
latter in preparation for the Rio conference do not appear in records documenting
the policy formulation process. For instance, in 1989 the Federal Council tasked the
interdepartmental working group GIESC to elaborate a state of the art report on
Switzerland and climate change. GIESC’s membership included scientists from the
Swiss Academy of Natural Sciences and, after some delay, the group presented its
final report in 1994, after which it was disbanded. But the GIESC initiative and its
findings find no mention in FOENmemos connected to the CO2 Act, until they are
described in the dispatch (ca. 1996).
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7.4 Actors and commitments
Two groups of actors were primarily involved in decision-making about the mobi-
lization of scientific expertise and this section analyzes their perspectives as well
as commitments in the policy arena. This also entails the description and analysis
of the different instances of mobilized scientific expertise. The first group consists
of civil servants from different branches of the federal administration, who were
in charge of policy formulation. The second group consists of climate scientists,
loosely organized under the umbrella of the Swiss Academy of Natural Sciences.
Political parties as well as interest groups are missing because interview testimony
and documentary evidence indicate that they did not mandate their own scientific
expertise.11
A summary of mobilized expertise
Table 7.1 is a complete inventory of expert reports commissioned in connection
with the policy formulation process of the CO2 Act. This inventory has been com-
piled based on interview testimony and FOEN’s internal archive. The latter did not
contain all mentioned reports, but references to them appear in meeting minutes,
memos, and draft policy proposals. All these reports were mandated by the federal
administration and mainly authored by specialized consulting firms. The reports
that represent model calculations are linked to the larger and recurrent project of
energy perspectives, led by the FOE (cf. section 7.3). However, the pre–1995 re-
ports were administratively distinct sub-projects. They drew on the same models
as the energy perspectives, but were much smaller in scale and operated on a nar-
rower timeline (less than one year). The mandating agencies closely supervised
these tasks (Interview XIV).
Infras, one of Switzerland’s oldest environmental policy consultancy firms, de-
veloped the listed instrument tool kits. The first such tool kit addressed the policy
effectiveness problem in the domain of the federal clean air conception. It laid out a
series of instruments for further political evaluation, with the CO2 tax being one of
11In fact, there was a rather clear left-right dividing line between greens and social democrats,
who sided with environmental groups, and the ‘bourgeois bloc’, who emphasized economic interests
(Ingold, 2008; Lehmann and Rieder, 2002).
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Table 7.1: Scientific expertise produced in the making of the CO2 Act
Producer Issue Communication Principal Publics
Infras (ca.
1990)∗
Alternatives for enhancing
clean air policy effective-
ness
N/A FOEN Administra-
tion (FOEN)
Prognos
(Dec. 1991)
Economic impact of a CO2
tax
Report FOE & FFA CO2 tax
project team
University
of Geneva
(Feb. 1992)†
Energy perspectives 1990–
2025 in regards to CO2
emissions
Report FOE, FOEN
& FFA
CO2 tax
project team
Prognos
(Sep. 1993)‡
Impact of different policy
instruments on energy
demand and economic
development
5 volume report,
released to the gen-
eral public during
1994 consultation
procedure
FOE, FOEN
& FFA
CO2 tax
project team
Infras &
FOEN (Jan.
1995)
Variants for reducing im-
pact of CO2 tax on energy-
intensive industries
Mimeo FOEN FOEN
Prognos
(Nov. 1996)
Impact of Energy Act, CO2
Act, and popular initia-
tives on energy demand
and economic develop-
ment, 1990-2030
Report & detailed
explanation in gov-
ernmental dispatch
FOE Energy policy
projects of the
administration
Notes:
∗No copy obtained, but mentioned by Interviewee XIV; Publication: ca. early 1990.
†No copy obtained, by cited in a governmental policy report dated March 31, 1992; The report is
based on the larger ’energy perspectives’ project run by FOE, but required additional calculations
specific to the CO2 issue. The ’Centre universitaire d’étude des problèmes d’energie’, a partner in the
energy perspective project, provided the model for these calculations. It would later be substituted
by Prognos which had more powerful models.
‡The report has been commissioned for the CO2 tax project, but there are no indications by whom.
them. The second policy instrument-related report, produced by FOEN in collabo-
ration with Infras, addressed the issue of how the impact of the proposed CO2 tax
on the competitiveness of energy intensive industries could be minimized.
In addition to these reports, unreleased draft policy documents contain refer-
ences to the scientific literature concerning the constitutionality12 as well as the re-
gressive nature of an incentive tax. Further, the dispatch of 1997 (Schweizerischer
Bundesrat, 1997) contains a detailed scientific perspective on climate change. The
12Because each tax requires a constitutional provision, the case of a steering tax with partial, as
opposed to complete, refund may invite contestation. Whether or not the Constitution’s article on
environmental policy provides for allocating such tax revenues for environmental policy programs
was not challenged during the CO2 Act, presumably because the final proposal eliminated a partial
earmarking of the proceeds. During the 2000’s when the tax was actually introduced, earmarking its
revenues became an option again and engendered such a constitutional debate (Interview XIX).
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latter, however, has no link to the policy formulation process other than to illustrate
the problem. Meeting minutes show that it was written up by a civil servant after
the material content of the proposal had been finalized.
The federal administration
There is no unified commitment underlying policy-making within the federal gov-
ernment. In fact, finding support inside government appears to having been almost
as hard as doing so among economic interest groups. Formulating the CO2 Act did
not only take a long time, it was also a complex process because of the interdepen-
dencies an energy tax entails. This is directly reflected in the project’s organiza-
tion. While the Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN) led the project, phase
one (1990–1995) also saw the participation of the Federal Office of Energy (FOE),
the Federal Fiscal Administration (FFA), and the Federal Customs Administration
(FCO). With the strategy shift in May 1995, FCO was no longer a participant, and
was replaced by the Federal Office for External Economic Affairs (FOEEA). There
was a cooptation motive for inviting the participation of FFA and FOEEA, as the in-
terests they represented – respectively, fiscal income and economic competitiveness
– were potentially at odds with an energy tax for ecological reasons. While this
inclusion did not attenuate such opposition, Interviewee XXIV experienced FFA
and FOEEA civil servants involved in the project as being supportive and coop-
erative. Beyond that circle of project participants, several internal FOEN memos,
dating from various states of the process, report perceptions that the CO2 Act did
not enjoy exceptional popularity among the wider federal administration.
The project depended heavily on the advocacy of FOEN and the Federal De-
partment of Homeland Affairs (FDHA), to which FOEN belonged until the end of
1997.13 It was the FDHA head Flavio Cotti, supported by the Federal Council, who
declared that Switzerland intended to stabilize CO2 emissions before 2000, based
on a 1990 baseline (Blattmann, 1995), at the WMO’s second climate conference
(Geneva, 1990), as well as the Rio earth summit (1992). In fact, in 1989 the Federal
Council had already mandated the interagency working group GIESC to elaborate
13Starting in 1998, just weeks after COP3 in Kyoto and in the middle of the Council of States’ de-
liberation of the CO2 Act, FOEN was transferred into the Federal Department of the Environment,
Transport, Energy and Communications.
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a national climate change strategy. Ruth Dreifuss, who succeeded Cotti as FDHA
head, continued that engagement after 1993. Archival records indicate that she at-
tended COP2 in Geneva and Interviewee VI recalls that she proudly presented the
draft CO2 Act during COP III in Kyoto. Philippe Roch, who became FOEN director
in 1993 after having worked at WWF, also strongly supported the project. Intervie-
wee XIV portrays FOEN as a rather committed community of civil servants with
very low staffing fluctuations. S/he further remembers that discussions about a
CO2 tax coincided with a larger paradigm change in environmental policy. While
the latter was dominated by a legalistic and regulatory thought style until well into
the 1980s, economic policy instruments slowly started to gain traction. This would
eventually lead to FOEN increasingly hiring economists.
It can be argued that the repeated adaptation of the project’s declared policy
goals is an expression of the lack of a strong constituency in favor of aCO2 tax. First,
the draft law indicated compatibility with the European Commission’s plans and
the introduction of modern economic policy instruments as chief justifications.14
Further, clean air policy was added as a motive, because less fossil fuel consump-
tion also reduces the emission of other pollutants. Then, as Switzerland ratified the
UNFCCC in 1993, aCO2 taxwas portrayed as contributing to the convention’s goals.
After the change of strategy in 1995, earlier justifications were dropped altogether
and the UNFCCC became the dominant framework of justification. However, when
the slowing progress of the Berlin mandate invited doubts as to a successful agree-
ment containing binding reduction targets, Dreifuss urged industry representatives
to endorse the project regardless of an international agreement, given that costmod-
els showed no negative economic impacts from a solo initiative. Thus, while a com-
mitted core upheld the belief in the necessity ofCO2 emission reduction, its achieve-
ment required substantial political maneuvering.
Working with models
Different kinds of econometric models computed by contractors were a key analyt-
ical resource for policy work. They were used to evaluate different policy instru-
14The Federal Council made it already clear in 1990 that any such tax would have to take into
consideration international policy coordination.
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ments in terms of their impact on energy consumption and on economic develop-
ment. This evaluation of policy instruments informed strategizing by the director-
rank steering group. This group, and also the subordinatedproject team,was staffed
by representatives of the implicated agencies (cf. section 7.4). Regarding modeling,
there was a clear division of labor, as meeting minutes from the project’s second
phase show: scenario decisions were taken by the steering group and operational
supervision of the modeling projects was taken care of by the project team. Collab-
oration between policy workers and the model contractors was close and, as Inter-
viewee XIV recalls, at times rather time consuming for the administration.15
The policy-making and modeling processes interacted in different ways. The
CO2 emission reduction and cost scenarios the models produced fed back directly
into the decision-making process. Therewas no single big result thatwould dramat-
ically affect the project’s direction. Rather, multiple recursive loops between model
input decisions and computation results produced decisions, which, ontologically,
are best defined as empirical-strategic ‘hybrids’. The process of scenario elabora-
tion, justification of alternative selection, and determination of reduction targets
illustrates this well.
As a general pattern, itwas the policy process that generated scenarios to be eval-
uated in terms of environmental and economic impact through model calculations.
During phase I, initial consideration of a CO2 tax only broadened into a discus-
sion of whether or not to include Treibstoffe (i.e. petrol), and more substantially, the
evaluation of scenarios under which energy content, rather than emissions, would
be taxed, including electricity. As elaborated, it was the domestic and international
context that brought up these scenario changes, not the policy project team. The lat-
ter merely reacted to these changing circumstances. During phase II, the steering
group modeled the scenarios to be evaluated on the enlarged energy policy agenda
(draft Energy Act, draft CO2 Act, two popular initiatives, etc.). There was a base-
line scenario (I), a scenario that assumed the enactment of all government proposed
15The close supervision of expert mandates – a routine operation at FOEN, Interviewee XIV, XVI
and XXIV’s testimony suggests – is the administration’s solution to quality assurance. The process,
as outlined by Interviewees XIV, XVI and XVII, consists in a kickoff meeting, where the expertise
provider explains his/her understanding of the mandate and enabling the mandating agency to get
a sense whether both parties have the same questions in mind. This is usually followed by an inter-
mediary and a final report, with intense discussion of the results at each stage.
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measures, but without the introduction of theCO2 tax (IIa), and a scenario that pre-
sumed the introduction of a CO2 tax (IIb). Further, the contingency of the popular
initiatives being accepted shaped yet another scenario (III). An alternative scenario
(IV), presuming higher reduction targets, was dropped for lack of time.
During phase I of the project, determining the value of the proposed tax rate
started out from a rough suggestion of somewhere between one third and one sixth
of the cost the end user would pay for a given fossil fuel. In addition, there were two
further considerations: petrol should not becomemore expensive than in neighbor-
ing countries, lest people fill their tanks across the border (and not the other way
around). Moreover, the tax rate had to be low enough in order not to affect macro
economic conditions, or to make Swiss industrial production unilaterally more ex-
pensive than abroad. In its 1991 report, Prognos criticized the assumed tax rate as
too low, compared to IPCC scenarios. Nonetheless, it was maintained. The com-
putation of all possible scenarios (emission-based tax vs. energy content-based tax)
then revealed that they were equivalent in their environmental and economic out-
comes, and indicated that there was no negative economic outcome. These results
were used by the Federal Council to publicly justify its preference for the CO2 tax,
which it had chosen primarily in order to avoid political resistance. The Federal
Council also decided to publish the entire report.
The new strategy required the determination of aCO2 emission reduction target
to be written into the law. The federal government had made previous CO2 emis-
sion reduction commitments as part of UNFCCC and the domestic ‘Energy 2000’
program (cf. Fritsch, 1994). Butwhen the project team took upwork inAugust 1995,
all eyes were locked on the Berlinmandate and the anticipation of Switzerland’s po-
tential reduction obligation thereunder. The Berlin mandate was thus the first of a
list of criteria to guide the identification of a suitable reduction target. Amemo sug-
gested additional criteria such as previous reduction efforts by industry, as well as
technical feasibility. These criteria were also discussed in the FOEN/Vorortworking
group and approved by the latter.
There was one more element. It transpired that modeling a reduction target of
more than 10 percent would take a full year (!), due to recursive effects within the
model. As it turned out, even modeling the non-recursive scenario would delay
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the results by some months. Such time pressure was a perpetual concern, as the
policy project was required to react to the multiple opportunities and constraints
engendered by the interdependent energy policy field. Eventually, the 10 percent
target prevailed. Yet, when it came to winning stakeholder support for the reduc-
tion target, the administration mobilized ‘scientific evidence about climate change’
as another criterion, hitherto missing from the list. The use of this argument was
decided by the project steering group and subsequently appeared in files assem-
bled in preparation of stakeholder meetings. It also appeared in a draft version of
the dispatch, when the contributing author identifies the reduction target as merely
a first step in the right direction, which is as of yet ‘insufficient’ from a scientific per-
spective.
The question of whether or not Brennstoffe and Treibstoffe should be subjected
to different tax rates was a point of contention throughout the policy process. In
the second phase, it became a subject of debate within the steering group (FOEN
and FOEEA against FOE), and a central concern of economic interests. It was this
political debate that prompted the decision to model different alternatives, with or
without a split between the two. The calculations showed that the emission trend of
Brennstoffe decreased without a tax. But scenarios of the transportation sector pro-
jected strong growth. This nurtured a scenario of achieving the desired 10 percent
reduction, but with different sector targets. This split model assumed the stabiliza-
tion, but not the reduction, of the Treibstoff demand, with a higher Brennstoff reduc-
tion compensating the more modest target of the first sector. While the demand
for such a split by economic interests had a clear distributional motive, FOEN ulti-
mately justified it in communication with stakeholders as ‘factually legitimate’.
Finally, both the project team and the Vorort urged for the computation of the
economic cost of a 10 percent reduction target. Just as in 1994, the result was that
the effects were slightly positive, with only the energy and transportation sector
suffering a decline. When Dreifuss met again with the ‘industry captains’, before
the proposal was finalized and amid slow international progress, she urged them
to endorse the proposal, regardless of whether binding reduction targets could be
agreed on internationally. After all, went her sales pitch, there were no adverse
economic implications, only domestic benefits to be reaped.
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These vignettes clearly attest the contingent nature of how modeling and polit-
ical decision-making interact to produce a decision. It is quite conceivable that if
model calculations had resulted in different values, political strategizing and jus-
tification would have taken a different road. At the same time, the use of such
models as devices also artificially constrained the scenarios. Certainly, there had
always been the political will to minimize the tax’s potential effects so as to not
affect economic competitiveness. But the (time) constraint imposed by the model
also ensured that the results could not have been that surprising. Staying within
the boundaries of a 10 percent reduction scenario meant that no macro economic
feedback would be produced. Consequently, the results of the economic impact
model was rather unsurprising, given that the tax rate had to be set low enough
to preclude macro economic effects in the first place. But there is no evidence that
actors were aware of this, or that it constituted a deliberate strategy.
Climate science advice, a voice in the making
A strikingly counterintuitive fact about the CO2 Act’s policy formulation process
is the near absence of climate change advice. It is counterintuitive because climate
policy, as we know it, is inconceivable without the scientific inquiry that originally
established and drew attention to the issue of globalwarming and its anthropogenic
cause. It is also counterintuitive considering FOEN’s strong commitments in the
matter. But, with one exception, meeting minutes and memos reveal no traces of
hearings with climate scientists held in connection with policy formulation, either
within the administration or in Parliament. Interview testimony also backs this up
(Interviews VI and XIV).
There was no lack of interpersonal contact between scientists, organized un-
der the umbrella of the Swiss Academy of Natural Science (SANS), and the federal
administration. In fact, as archival records show,16 the previously discussed post-
Chernobyl energy scenario expert committee had already solicitedHansOeschger’s
opinion. Oeschger was an internationally renowned climatologist who pioneered
climate reconstruction with ice cores from Antarctica and Greenland as early as
the 1960s. FOEN’s former director Bruno Böhlen, predecessor to Philippe Roch,
16BAR E8190C 1990/2002 Bd. 11.
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also maintained close contact with some scientists (Interview XXV). Representa-
tives of the federal administration also participated in a SANS forum, held in 1987
in Gletsch, which resulted in the establishment of ProClim, SANS’ climate change
platform (Lehmann and Rieder, 2002: 31). ProClim later became a partner in the
administration’s interdepartmental climate change group (GIESC). ProClim ulti-
mately turned into an organizational platform of the Swiss climate change com-
munity, after the aspiration of organizing its own climate research project failed.
Instead, such research was funded by SNSF through the ‘National Research Project’
(i.e. NRP 31) and ‘Priority Program’ (PP Environment, NCCRClimate) frameworks,
not the SANS funding initiative (Lehmann and Rieder, 2002: 31).
While certainly cognizant of these developments, the CO2 Act project did not
reach out to climate scientists.17 It was on the initiative of SANS/ProClim that some
contact was established by 1996. Firstly, ProClim brokered a meeting between a
FOEN delegation and some 20 scientists from the major Swiss universities in or-
der to discuss the draft CO2 Act. This meeting came at the end of a series of talks
between FOEN and the major economic and environmental stakeholder groups,
held in spring of 1996 in order to present the new policy proposal. But unlike the
other talks, the administration had not planned to hear the scientists’ opinions (In-
terviewXXIV). Judging by FOEN’s record of themeeting, notmuch importancewas
attributed to it. The minutes of a project meeting in the wake of this hearing con-
veyed, in four lines of text only, that the scientific community broadly approved of
the proposal.
It was similarly in 1996 that SANS started to lobby the Federal Department of
Homeland Affairs (FDHA) for the establishment of an advisory body on climate
change. SANS imagined such a body as being close to the scientific community, a
kind of domestic IPCC. FOEN director Roch, however, would have none of it. Inter-
viewee VI recalls that SANS, thanks to an interpersonal connection and a late night
phone call, managed gain the support of FDHA head and Federal Councillor Drei-
fuss, who endorsed the idea and granted the necessary funds. Thus the Advisory
Body onClimate Change (OcCC)was born. Unlike an extra-parliamentary commis-
17Swiss scientists were part of UNFCCC delegations at least since COP II in Geneva. Moreover,
they have also actively participated in the IPCC since the second assessment report (Interviews XIII,
XXIII-XXV).
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sion, SANS positioned OcCC in the proximity of the scientific community, sharing
the same secretariat with ProClim, and in the beginning even the same president.
Moreover, OcCC was designed as a scientific commission that would issue consen-
sual statements and admitted representatives from the federal administration to
the ranks of membership in a consultative capacity only (Interviews XIII and XXV).
Lehmann and Rieder (2002) and Niederberger (2005) deliver somewhat celebratory
accounts of OcCC. Others are more pessimistic. Interviewees XIII and XXIII some-
what disappointedly attest the administration’s failure to take advantage of OcCC’s
services. While agreeing, Interviewee XXIV reminds us that this is a rather typical
condition of a federal advisory commission, where initial mission zeal gives way to
resignation about lacking political relevance.
ProClim launched yet another initiative when it established the Parliamentary
Group on Climate Change together with Gian-Reto Plattner. Plattner, a physics
professor and Councillor of States for the Social Democratic Party, was one of the
most outspoken political backers of climate change legislation. He also chaired the
parliamentary committee on the environment (CESET) when the CO2 Act was de-
liberated therein. Like many other parliamentary groups, the climate change group
organizes three events per year while Parliament is in session.18
This brief overview shows that more and better organization certainly strength-
ened the establishment of a climate advisory voice. However, it also demonstrates
that organization alone cannot solve the problem of political relevance, even if the
recipient is not of a contrary opinion. Therefore, claims that better interfaces solve
the relevance problem (e.g. Lehmann and Rieder, 2002; Niederberger, 2005) should
not be overemphasized. Nevertheless, regarding the CO2 Act, these mobilization
efforts came too late to have a material influence on the proposal.
18An event of the parliamentary climate change group comprises two presentations on climate-
related topics, rounded off with discussion (Interview XIII). The Energy Forum, another such group,
but defending the interests of the energy industry, also hosts such meetings. Its president at the
time, Councillor of States Vreni Spoerry, was also member of CS’ environment subcommittee. The
forum’s vice president, National Councillor Peter Baumberger, spearheaded the industry’s demand
that Parliament and not the Federal Council receives the prerogative to introduce the CO2 tax under
the CO2 Act.
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7.5 Contested expertise
Two consultation procedures, two waves of consultative meetings with stakehold-
ers, an administration-economy working group, and the parliamentary process:
this all provided ample opportunity for negotiations between the federal govern-
ment and civil society actors. Yet the data documents only a few instances when
scientific expertise was at stake. Climate change was hardly a subject of contention,
with the exception of some interest groups. In their responses to the first consul-
tation procedure in 1994, automobile clubs (ACS, TCS), the road transportation as-
sociation, and the petrol union discussed climate change at some length. None of
them denied the increasing atmospheric concentration of CO2, yet, by citing news-
paper climate science coverage (e.g. from the Neue Zürcher Zeitung), they advanced
the argument that the anthropogenic influence is uncertain. Moreover, in reference
to the Rio summit and the IPCC’s summary for policymakers, they claimed that
these constitute political and not scientific declarations. The Vorort’s statement also
contained a discussion of climate change, ultimately agreeing that precaution is in
order, but that domestic measures would be inefficient. Consequently, when policy-
makers from the federal administrationmet with the transportation industry group
inMarch of 1995 in order to negotiate its way out of gridlock, it came prepared with
the latest IPCC results.
Model calculations of the economic impact of a CO2 tax, prepared by Prognos,
developed into a briefly contentious episode. Since these computations demon-
strated a slight positive effect of the 1994 proposal, the Federal Council was happy
to make the report publicly available. In a Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ) article en-
titled ‘Consequences of a CO2 tax for the economy, a study on shaky foundations’
(my translation), two professors from the University of St. Gallen attacked the re-
port as ‘counterintuitive’ and methodologically flawed (Graf and Schlange, 1994).
This occasioned FOE director Kiener to send them a written reminder of how wel-
come confidential criticism is, but how unhelpful it is in public, especially during
the consultation procedure. In an internalmemo, FOENanalyzed every single point
of criticism and concluded that the attack was unfounded. Nonetheless, the Prog-
nos authors of the original report published a reply, also in the NZZ (Masuhr and
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Schlesinger, 1994). At stake was the so called ‘double dividend’, which claims that
environmental measures may have positive economic outcomes. Such a claim is at
odds with the conception of a linear relationship between economic development
and energy consumption. While this public encounter had no discernible conse-
quences, it was not the last time the double dividend would be discussed in the
pages of the NZZ.
7.6 Discussion
The analysis has thus far shown that, due to the multiple interdependencies with
other policy domains engendered by a fossil fuel tax, policy formulation on theCO2
Act took almost seven years. During that time, FOEN and SANS – as the two key
actors regarding expertisemobilization – barely changed their policy-oriented com-
mitments. The issue and the underlying conflict lines remained essentially stable.
Yet, FOEN and other participants in policy formulation from the federal admin-
istration were forced to adapt their strategy and engage in extensive negotiations
with stakeholders that far exceeded the framework of a simple consultation. Ul-
timately, it was international policy coordination under UNFCCC and the Kyoto
protocol that enabled the project to find closure, but not without economic inter-
ests and their allies in Parliament forcing an exit option into the law by taking away
the Federal Council’s prerogative to decide on the introduction of aCO2 tax, should
the set emission reduction target bemissed. In what follows I further refine the case
study’s findings and discuss themwithin the framework of the theoretical proposi-
tions articulated earlier. This begins with the discussion of issue structure and the
characterization of action situations. I then turn to the rationales underlying exper-
tise mobilization and finishwith consideration of the consequences of this expertise
on the policy formulation process.
Action context
It can be argued that the issue’s almost unwavering stability, despite multiple inter-
vening constraints and opportunities, originated from its semi-structured nature.
There was agreement on the scientific evidence at stake. The science of climate
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change, so central for the legitimation of policies to reduce energy consumption
and curb CO2 emissions, was barely present in the debate. This is true for the pol-
icy formulation process within the federal administration, where the fact of climate
change was never subject to debate as part of the policy formulation process (but
served only as an argument in interactions with stakeholders, and as justification
in the dispatch). In addition, with the exception of the transportation sector, the
scientific evidence for climate change was never seriously contested, either by the
Vorort or other interest groups. In Parliament, only a small minority mounted such
challenges, remarking that – in analogy to doomsday scenarios of the acid rain de-
bate – the forest still stands. Interviewees XIII-XVI all agree with this assessment,
not without some astonishment in retrospect.
There was less agreement, though, concerning the values at stake. To use In-
terviewee XV’s terms, while there was a general consensus that Switzerland had a
responsibility in the matter ‘beyond the shores of lake Zurich’, there was intense
debate about how to live up to this responsibility. Environmental interests and
FOENwere convinced that this responsibility starts with domestic reduction of en-
ergy consumption. Others, for pragmatic or self-interested motives, contended that
climate change requires a global solution, with domestic measures having only a
ridiculously small effect given Switzerland’s minuscule share in the global emission
pie. For the most part, the latter argument was motivated by concerns of economic
redistribution, should Switzerland introduce a unilateral CO2 tax. Economic im-
pact assessment computations could do little to dissipate this specter, regardless of
its positive projections.
This stable issue configuration is reflected in the action situations. Given the
lack of a popular referendum and the concentration of the government-society dia-
logue on the organized stakeholder community, interactions largely focused on the
policy subsystem. It was only with the first consultation procedure, in 1994, that
this community became actively enrolled in policy negotiations. But the contours
of the CO2 tax proposal had been publicly known earlier. More importantly, the
Federal Council decreed as early as 1990 that unilateral action must take into con-
sideration the Swiss export industry’s competitiveness. Hence, the government’s
general appreciation of the situation was rather static. While certain aspects of the
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policy proposal required concretization, the government’s perception of the situa-
tion was never cast as uncertain. Yet at times, the federal administration turned into
an action situation of its own, due to the interdependent nature of the issue. As far
as expertise mobilization is concerned, its administrative principals always acted in
concert. This supports the conclusion that the entire decision-making process took
place in a single and stable action situation.
Causes of expertise mobilization
Given the prevalence of a single, stable, and semi-structured action situation, ob-
served patterns of expertisemobilization are not counter to theoretical expectations.
To begin with, themarginal role of climate change science as a voice that the admin-
istration summoned only for battling or preempting challenges to theCO2 emission
reduction commitment can be explained by the lack of a salient domestic contro-
versy about the science of climate change. Given that multiple formal and informal
connections between the administration (especially FOEN) and SANS had existed
since at least the 1980s, it is doubtful whether earlier and better organization of a
climate change advisory forum would have fundamentally changed this situation,
as Lehmann and Rieder (2002) claim. Rather, in the absence of contestation, the jus-
tification repository – which included the ratified UNFCCC – was sufficiently well
stocked to make an external scientific voice superfluous. To further extend the ar-
gument, such a voice could well have proven counterproductive in finding closure,
given that the 10 percent reduction target was indeed judged to be insufficient by
the scientific community.
The persistent use of model-driven scenarios constitutes a different case from
climate science. As established, the organization of modeling work and the con-
tracting partners of the federal administration in this enterprise were shaped by
factors exogenous to the CO2 Act policy arena. Hence, the question of whether
the search for an external – and thus presumably neutral – voice motivated these
mandates19 cannot be divorced from this structurally given energy policymodeling
regime. At the same time, the modeling mandates delivered, especially in the first
19Interviewee XIV reports that the administration’s policy makers were generally eager for such
an outside confirmation, especially as business moved into Parliament.
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phase, were specifically for theCO2 tax project, which nonetheless depended on the
infrastructure in place. Archival records suggest that the primary function of these
scenario calculationswas to determinewhose political interestswere at stake, which
puts special emphasis on the modeling of a policy instrument’s economic impact.
Although there is no direct evidence available on the decision-making process con-
cerning the mandating of these scenarios during the first phase, intermediary draft
policy proposals put more emphasis on economic rather than ecological questions.
Further, the first consultation procedure saw criticisms of the economic rather than
the ecological scenarios. Finally, as the proposal neared completion in 1996, both
the steering group and the Vorort urged the calculation of the proposal’s economic
cost. Given the strong emphasis on redistributive issues from the beginning, this
state of affairs is also not surprising, given the theoretical assumptions.
Consequences of expertise mobilization
Not having been actively integrated by the federal administration into the policy
formulation process, climate change science could not have produced any effects
on policy or politics. Energy models, however, were mobilized and consequently
their effects have to be assessed. Qualifying the consequences of the mobilization
of these expertise resources is not an easy task. For a start, I have coined the term
‘empirical-strategic hybrid’ in order to capture the interlacing of political decision-
making and the modeling process. Some decisions may or may not have been dif-
ferent with models arriving at different conclusions. But such musings are of little
relevance, for models do not produce some empirical ‘truth’. They merely generate
scenarios based on assumptions that are necessarily value laden. FOE representa-
tives, for instance, were well aware of this and repeatedly cautioned fellow steering
group members against placing too much trust in the models as a prediction tool.
Ultimately, these hybrids were highly opportunistic constructs and, should their
argumentative performance fail, there was always the backup argument that the
CO2 tax would do no economic harm. The point is neither that these model com-
putations produced unnecessary information, nor that they were flawed. Yet as
representations of always multiple and possible futures, such scenarios cannot live
outside a normative interpretative context. In that sense, the observed hybrids con-
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stituted valuations of such possibilities. Valuation, however, escapes deterministic
necessity. In one instance, the deployment of models, paired with time constraints,
limited available computing power, and particular human resources led to the con-
straint that only a 10 percent reduction scenario could be calculated. I do not suggest
that this limitation is responsible forwhy a 10 percent reductionwaswritten into the
law, rather than some higher value. There were other political reasons that better
explain this target value (e.g. the Berlin mandate). Nevertheless, it illustrates that
analytical tools, like any technology, also shapes work in unintended ways. With
this statement we can conclude the analysis of the CO2 Act case and move on to the
case study concerned with fiscal equalization reform in the next chapter.

Eight
Reforming Fiscal Federalism
8.1 Introduction
In 1991, the Federal Fiscal Administration (FFA) made a disturbing discovery: the
disparity in fiscal capacity between rich and poor cantons had been continually in-
creasing since 1970 (Eidgenössische Finanzverwaltung, 1991). The revelation that
some cantons are better off financially than others was not itself the shocking fact,
for Swiss federalism is built on a diversity that includes unequal standards of living
(cf. Braun, 2003). Rather, it was the sheer extent of the disparity and the observa-
tion that inequalities continued to increase even as ever larger sums were put into
a transfer system. This fiscal equalization system, dating from 1959, was originally
designed to financially assist and compensate cantons facing (primarily) topograph-
ical adversity in the delivery of public services. FFA, the Conference of Cantonal
Finance Directors (CCFD), and a five person panel of academic experts (Frey et al.,
1994) agreed: the policy had failed and required complete redesign.
So began a reform project, the so-called new fiscal equalization reform (NFE). The
case study presented in this chapter takes a close look at NFE’s policy development
process and explores the role of scientific expertise therein. This is said to have
been of great significance (e.g. Braun, 2009), but has never been investigated in
depth.1 The reform as such was truly significant, for a legislative project of this
magnitude and complexity had not been achieved in Switzerland during recent
times. From inception to implementation, NFE’s decision-making process spanned
17 years (1991–2008) and at times involved as many as a hundred policy workers
1Prof. René Frey – whom we’ll encounter later as one of the central experts – has written on his
own experience (Frey, 2012). Moreover, an earlier and preliminary version of this case study can be
found in Himmelsbach (2012).
215
216| Reforming Fiscal Federalism
from the federal government and cantons (Wettstein, 2002). Materially, the reform
involved the amendment of over 20 constitutional provisions and the rewriting of
the fiscal equalization act. It also required the modification of numerous sectoral
laws, at the federal as well as the cantonal level of government.
This case study covers the period from 1991 to 2004. It encompasses the design
of NFE’s instruments and the approval of its normative core – the constitutional
amendments and fiscal equalization law – by Parliament and the people. It excludes
further policy work concerned with the necessary adaptation of numerous sectoral
laws and the endowment of the equalization funds established by the reform.
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section presents some back-
ground information. It elaborates on the reform’s intellectual foundation of fiscal
federalism (an area of political economy), before detailing the decision-making pro-
cess. The chapter then moves on to explore the perspectives of the sponsors of the
reform, as well as of the social democratic party, in order to analyze how theymobi-
lized scientific expertise. A section on sites of negotiation looks at the manifestation
and enrollment of expertise in parliamentary and public debate. The concluding
discussion characterizes the issue and arena structure present in the NFE reform,
summarizes the rationales for expertise mobilization, and looks at their effects on
the decision-making process.
8.2 Background
Fiscal federalism
This case study engages with the structure of Swiss federalism and the economic
theory of fiscal federalism. This section provides an overview of some key concepts
for the reader unfamiliar with these issues. I have outlined the main features of
Swiss federalism in an earlier chapter (section 5.2). Here I re-emphasize those fea-
tures particularly relevant to this case. Firstly, the member states (cantons) have a
strong standing in Swiss federalism. Any competence of the federal government
requires an explicit constitutional foundation. Thus, establishing a new federal
competency or reorganizing competency distribution between the federal govern-
ment and the cantons often requires modification of the constitution and calls for a
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mandatory referendum. This therefore turned the NFE project into a constitutional
reform, as well as requiring the complete renewal of a law (cf. Braun, 2009). Sec-
ondly, Swiss federalism is decentralized (Braun, 2003) and inequality among can-
tons is therefore accepted. Cantons dispose of fiscal autonomy and are free to set
their own tax rates, so as to be conducive to tax competition. Cantons such as Zug
and Schwyz were especially successful with their fiscal policies at attracting inter-
national capital during the 1990s. The existence of a fiscal equalization system from
1959 was not designed to eradicate these differences, but to remove special burdens
that come with a mountainous topography. Thirdly, Swiss federalism is coopera-
tive, and cantons implementmany federal policies (Kriesi and Trechsel, 2008: 40ff.).
Cooperative federalism describes a regime in which different levels of government
cooperate in the delivery of goods and services. In the Swiss case, a large number
of federal policies were implemented by the cantons, which were remunerated for
their services based on the cost of the latter. This provided an incentive to inflate
expenses in order to maximize subsidies.
When the NFE reform was discussed in the early 1990s, Swiss federalism was
suffering from several problems. There had been a creeping centralization of tasks
because many cantons were too small to fulfill them. Increasing social mobility af-
ter World War II had upended fiscal equivalence: facilitated by Switzerland’s small
geographic size, people increasingly worked in cities, where they also consumed
services and infrastructure. However, they paid their taxes in their residential can-
ton, which might be different to their workplace location. Fiscal income and expen-
diture therefore no longer overlapped geographically. In the absence of horizontal
compensation agreements between urban cantons and their suburban neighbors,
there was a strong incentive to delegate tasks to the federal government, rather than
carrying the burden alone (and the neighbors enjoying a free ride). In conjunction
with cooperative federalism, this creeping centralization created a complex web of
shared competencies and myriads of small federal subsidies which sought to in-
demnify the cantons. Finally, the wealth gap between cantons widened even as
more resources were allocated for fiscal equalization.
Overcoming these problems with stronger centralization (i.e. a harmonization
of cantonal tax rates in combination with stronger centralization of tasks) was never
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considered a serious alternative. However, SPS – the Social Democratic Party –
would later attack the NFE project with exactly such a proposition. Moreover, there
was a perception that merging cantons into larger regionswas bound to fail because
of lack of political support. The alternative that was finally adopted drew inspira-
tion from the economic theory of fiscal federalism (e.g. Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1968),
which, having been developed in the US, was taken up by Swiss economists as early
as the 1970’s (e.g. Frey, 1977). With the exception of tasks requiring substantial coor-
dination, fiscal federalism sees member states as inherently more efficient in policy
delivery, because of their greater proximity to the population they serve. This un-
derwrites the two principles of subsidiarity and fiscal equivalence. Fiscal equivalence
– that is, he who pays the piper calls the tune – postulates that public services are
delivered most efficiently when the circle of beneficiaries, governors, and sponsors
overlap. Subsidiarity commands that such a common denominator is to be looked
for at the lowest possible levels of government.
In line with these prescriptions, the NFE reform process developed a new fiscal
equalization system that separates compensation for special burdens from wealth
equalization between cantons. Income equalization is jointly financed by the federal
government and the cantons, with the cantonal contribution not exceeding a fixed
share of the federal contribution. It aims to complement the income of the poorest
cantons such that they do not fall below 85 points of the inter-cantonal mean, set at
100 points. In addition, there are two funds which compensate cantons with exces-
sive geographical or social welfare burdens (respectively, those with mountainous
terrain or a concentration of social welfare clients in urban centers). The reform
further introduced a system of horizontal cooperation between cantons in order to
address the spillover problem. Cantons contractwith each other for service delivery
and compensation, while a litigation framework discourages free-riding. In addi-
tion to these vertical and horizontal mechanisms of fiscal equalization and burden
sharing, the NFE reform also aimed to eliminate inefficiencies created by task cen-
tralization and cooperative federalism. This was accomplished by eliminating joint
tasks as far as was politically feasible, and by swapping the responsibility for cer-
tain policy domains according to efficiency criteria. Where joint tasks remained, the
efficiency problemwas to be solved with lump sum financing under a performance
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agreement.2 This means that the federal government would define the strategic
objectives of a policy, provide lump sum financing, and evaluate the achievement
of these objectives. In return, the cantons would enjoy operational autonomy re-
garding how to fulfill their obligations. Put together, these instruments eradicated
many spending restrictions for the cantons and endowed them with substantially
more opportunity to spend their means as they saw fit. In conjunction with a better
fiscal equalization system, cantons could dispose of enough resources to more thor-
oughly take advantage of their constitutional autonomy. A transitory compensation
fund was added to the end of the reform process but was not part of the original
design. This was the necessary political grease needed to obtain the support of can-
tons who were less well of as a result of the system transition.
Policy process synopsis
An initial disclaimer: as a landmark decision-making process, the NFE reform has
invited analysis and commentary from policymakers, observers and scholars. They
have primarily sought explanations for how such a far-reaching and complex re-
form project ultimately met with success in the face of the numerous institutional
hurdles the Swiss political system imposes on decision-making (e.g. Braun, 2009;
Cappelletti et al., 2014; Freiburghaus, 2001; Larpin, 2006;Wettstein, 2002, 2010). The
reform process’s individual episodes are therefore well documented.
The decision-making process of NFE’s first package may be divided into five
episodes: problem articulation and agenda setting (1991–1994), elaboration of ba-
sic principles (1994–1996), concretization of these principle (1996–1998), tweaking
(1998–2001), and ratification through Parliament and the people (2002–2004). These
sequences represent an ex post rationalization of the process and primarily serve to
orientate the reader. In practice policymakers did not anticipate the sheer length
and complexity the reform endeavor would take on (Interview XXXVI).
Episode I: Cantons, we have got a problem. Fiscal equalization was a relatively low-
key policy overseen by the Federal Fiscal Administration (FFA) and its cantonal
counterparts (Interview XXXII). But by the summer of 1988, FFA started to become
2The limits of the fiscal equivalence principle in the presence of multilevel policy networks and
their strong sectoral interests is the subject of a discussion between Mottu (1997a,b), Klöti (1997) and
Meier (1997).
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concerned about what it perceived to be a missing overall goal and lack of knowl-
edge about the old equalization regime’s effectiveness. The Conference of the Can-
tonal Finance Directors (CCFD) mandated FFAwith an evaluation, which the latter
published in 1991 (Eidgenössische Finanzverwaltung, 1991). It contained badnews:
the disparity between cantons increased even as more money was flowing into the
equalization scheme. Having been informed of this evaluation, CCFD started its
own interpretation process of the evaluation and arrived at the conclusion that the
present transfer system required a fundamental overhaul. CCFD’s proposal, the so-
calledOrientierungsrahmen 2000 (Finanzdirektorenkonferenz, 1992), called for three
instruments: an equalization of burdens between the federal government and the
cantons; an equalization of burdens between cantons of the same region; and an
equalization of fiscal income. In addition, the CCFD proposal urged a paradigm
shift: equalization payments should no longer be tied to the delivery of specific ser-
vices. Rather, cantons should be free to spend incoming equalization payments as
they saw fit. These suggestionsmet with approval from FFA and Federal Councillor
Otto Stich, head of the Federal Department of Finance. But FFA deemed the armory
of argumentation still too thinly stocked. While it did not fear a challenge to the in-
efficiency diagnosis of the status quo, it anticipated resistance from governmental
agencies which inadvertently benefited from these inefficiencies and who would
resist any reform. FFA reasoned that an external expert report would provide the
necessary justification for the reform.
The expert report (Frey et al., 1994), jointly mandated and paid for by FFA and
CCFD, unambiguously confirmed the need for reform. It argued that there were
inefficiencies in the system because transfer payments reflected a mix of redistribu-
tive and incentive goals. Moreover, it identified a lack of regional cooperation as the
main culprit in centralization of governmental tasks. It also diagnosed the lack both
of a general objective and of effectiveness evaluations, toomany small subsidies and
spending conditions, and an excessive transfer volume. The report recommended
the development of a new fiscal capacity indicator, measuring not what a canton
spends but how much it could potentially earn. Based on this, the cantons should
receive transfer payments as a lump sum and not as compensation for a particular
service. Further, cantons should establish regional cooperation in order to offer ser-
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vices they would not be able to provide on their own, rather than delegating them
to the federal government. In order to increase efficiency of service delivery, the im-
plementation of federal policy through the cantons should be remunerated under
a performance agreement rather than by how much a canton spends. Finally, there
was a tentative list of multi-level policies where allocating exclusive competencies
to either the federal or the cantonal level of governmentwould lead tomore efficient
service delivery.
Episode II: Let’s make fiscal federalism more efficient. With the expert report arriv-
ing at conclusions congruent with FFA’s evaluation and CCFD’s reform proposal,
sufficient backing had been obtained to receive the Federal Council’s endorsement
for starting with a legislative project. Moreover, the message could be relayed to
the media – with support from the experts themselves (Meier and Spillmann, 1994)
– that the existing transfer scheme had failed and required a complete overhaul.
By the end of 1994, policy work started in earnest. Four working groups were ini-
tially formed, deliberating under the supervision of a managing committee. En-
gaging with the expert report recommendations, they started to translate the ideas
into practical measures and a legislative framework (Interview XXXIV). The results
were presented for public consultation in early 1996 and advertised the reform as
enhancing the transparency of the relationship between the cantons and the fed-
eral government, bolstering federalism by following the subsidiary principle, and
producing CHF 3 billion in efficiency gains (Eidgenössische Finanzverwaltung and
Finanzdirektorenkonferenz, 1996).
Episode III: Assuring the survival of federalism. The consultation procedure re-
vealed general support, but also produced criticism concerning the fiscal policy
framing of the project, given that disentangling competencies and transferring tasks
from the federal government to the cantons and vice versa implicated many sectoral
policy domains. Not only would this affect the target publics of policy areas subject
to reorganization – this was most evident with the proposal to re-assign responsi-
bility for the special infrastructure needed by handicapped people (special schools,
housing, etc.) to the cantons – but would also affect vertical policy networks be-
tween the administrations of the two levels of government, which had developed as
a result of joint policy implementation. The Federal Council reacted to this criticism
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by urging for a stronger political branding of the project. Thus, some organizational
changes were introduced in the next round of policy formulation. CCFD, the can-
tonal partner of the project, was substituted by the Conference of Cantonal Govern-
ments (CCG) in the project’s steering group, with CCFD remaining in charge of the
more narrowly fiscal questions. Moreover, the number of working groups doubled
in order to integrate the sectoral policies now implicated. Henceforth, three work-
ing groups continued to detail the core instruments, while five others concretized
competency disentanglement in different policy domains. Their work was aggre-
gated by the management committee, which submitted it to a newly established
political steering group at ministerial level for approval. The material result of this
work was once again submitted for public consultation in 1999 (Eidgenössische
Finanzverwaltung and Konferenz der Kantonsregierungen, 1999).
Episode IV: Appease the opposition. As before, the second consultation procedure
produced strong support but also a platform for the articulation of grievances. The
social democratic party criticized the decentralization of federal competencies, es-
pecially in the social welfare domain. It considered the federal government a bet-
ter steward of the welfare state’s accomplishments and of social equality than the
cantonal governments. Stakeholder groups in old age and handicapped care also
protested the transfer of important policy programs to the authority of the cantons,
fearing unequal standards of care. Other interest groups affected by the reallocation
of competencies also saw their entitlements endangered. Urban communities also
lobbied for a say in the reform, having been deniedmembership of any the project’s
numerous committees and working groups. Finally, the first set of model calcula-
tions of the redistributive effects of the new system produced counterintuitive re-
sults, with some cantons unexpectedly ending up worse off under the new system.
Faced with these challenges, the project team went back to work to fix the transfer
system and disarm the accumulating ‘explosive charges’ (Breitenstein, 2000) – i.e.
opposition to some aspect of competence reallocation – which threatened to bring
the project down at the mandatory ballot vote. While convinced that the NFE only
had a chance to become reality as a unified project that contained the fiscal equal-
ization reform and the redistribution of competencies, the project team nonetheless
worked out some patches. It integrated the cities into the project and further per-
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fected the key indicator measuring potential fiscal income of each canton (based
on which the transfer payments would be calculated). This did not solve the issue
that some cantons, formally beneficiaries of fiscal equalization, were now suddenly
on the contributing end. A new fund for compensating these losses was therefore
created in order to save the project from shipwreck. To neutralize the looming dan-
ger of small claims uniting into a broad opposition front, several policy domains
were excluded from the reform. Concessions were also made to care-taking institu-
tions by promising federal and legally binding minimum standards cantons must
obey. After the project had taken this self-declared ‘leap of honor’ (Waber, 2000),
the Federal Council at last adopted the dispatch on November 14, 2001, following
earlier decisions within CCFD and CCG to endorse the project. Meanwhile, the so-
cial democratic party began to attack the proposal with a plan of its own: instead of
combating inter-cantonal inequality by providing cantons with more financial au-
tonomy and non-earmarkedmonetary transfers, cantonal fiscal authority should be
curtailed by federally mandating a tax rate within a certain bandwidth. The party
decided to launch a popular initiative based on this in order to exert pressure on
the upcoming parliamentary deliberations.
Episode V: Minor tweaking of a tightly integrated and perfectly balanced proposal. Par-
liament assigned special importance to the NFE project by constituting a special
ad hoc committee in both houses, rather than assigning the business to a regular
standing committee.3 Membership of the NFE committee was prestigious and the
different political groups filled the allotted seats with their most reputed members,
making sure that representatives from rich as well as poor cantons were adequately
balanced.4 Interviewees remembered the Council of States’ NFE committee, in par-
ticular, as staffed by a mix of unusually committed and competent representatives
(Interviews XXVIII, XXIX, XXXI, XXXII, and XXXVI). Moreover, these representa-
tives had the full trust of their respective parliamentary groups, which ensured that
the floor debate barely differed from decisions taken inside the subcommittees (In-
terview XXIX). Deliberating first, the Council of States introduced subtle changes,
dutifully adhering to themantra that the NFE is a single reformwithmutually rein-
3All three NFE dispatches, only the first of which is discussed here, were deliberated in such an
ad hoc committee.
4The NFE committees of both houses convened for nine, at times multi-day meetings.
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forcing pillars. The package had to be handledwith kid gloves, it was argued, lest its
effectiveness and the underlying compromise between the cantons and the federal
government shatter to pieces. While the Council of States took this to heart, delib-
eration in the National Council was more conflictual, as the social democrats were
comparatively stronger than in the upper house. They led awell-prepared and orga-
nized attack, particularly against the decentralization of some social policies under
NFE. On October 3, 2003, both houses accepted the new fiscal equalization law, as
well as the constitutional amendments.5 But the struggle was not yet over. The con-
stitutional amendments required popular consent in amandatory referendum vote.
Preparations to win the population’s hearts andminds for the project had been long
in the making. While the NFE project has been operating with a strategic informa-
tion management concept since at least the first consultation procedure, work on
the referendum campaign started in August 2000. Finally, all but three Cantons and
64.4 percent of the voting public accepted the reform on November 27, 2004.
8.3 Perspectives
For the first NFE reform package (which constitutes this case study’s empirical site),
several collective actors contributed to the mobilization of scientific expertise. The
project organization, the Social Democratic Party (SPS), and the fiscal administra-
tion of the cantonZugmandated expert reports. The project organizationmandated
the lion’s share of expertise, while Zug and SPS only did so once. In the following
discussion, I analyze these instances of expert mobilization by relating them to the
commitments the mandating actors defended in the policy arena. The discussion
of Zug is integrated into the illustration of the project organization’s expertise mo-
bilization, as the two are intimately linked. But before doing so, a tabular overview
details the instances of expertise analyzed by this research.
5The Council of States approved the law and the constitutional amendments with 38 to 2 votes.
The National Council voted 126:54 in favor of the constitutional amendements and 121:52 in favor of
the equalization law.
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Expertise synopsis
Table 8.1: Expert reports within the context of the NFE reform
Producer Issue Communication Principal Publics
Frey et al.
(1994)
Causes of policy failure
and reform concepts
Report; in person;
press conference;
press article by au-
thors
FFA &
CCFD
Stakeholders
Jeanre-
naud and
Blöchliger
(2000)∗
Alternatives for remu-
neration of joint fed-
eral/cantonal policy im-
plementation
Report; meeting
with working group
Project or-
ganization
Project organi-
zation
Biaggini
(2000)
Legal aspects of joint pol-
icy implementation under
performance agreement
Report; meeting
with working group
Project or-
ganization
Project organi-
zation
Fischer
(2001b,a)
Concretization of the can-
tonal fiscal resource index
Report; meeting
with working group
and CCFD plenary
Project or-
ganization
working
group ’re-
source index’;
CCFD
Zimmerli
(2001)†
Propositions for inter-
cantonal conflict litigation
Report Project or-
ganization
CCG
Inderbitzin
(2001)‡
Assessment of topo-
graphic burden equal-
ization
n/a n/a n/a
Frey and
Schaltegger
(2001b)
NFE goal and effectiveness
assessment
Report; Press article FFA & CCG CCG & FFA
Blöchliger,
Staehelin
& Partner
(2001)¶
Impact of NFE on canton
Zug
n/a Fiscal ad-
ministra-
tion Zug
NFE decision-
makers
Kirchgäss-
ner and
Hauser
(2001)
Assessment of risk of tax
payers moving abroad due
to the NFE
Report; hearing by
CCFD and by Par-
liament; TV debate
(Arena)
Project or-
ganization
Zug; Public
Informal
expert con-
tacts
Concerns of working
groups
Personal communi-
cation
Working
groups
Working
groups
Notes:
∗Commissioned in 1997; comprised the development of funding principles (part I) and their applica-
tion to the different policy domains under joint cantonal/federal implementation (part II).
†No copy obtained; only known from citations and interview testimony.
‡Listed in the dispatch (Schweizerischer Bundesrat, 2001); no further information could be obtained.
¶No copy obtained; only known from citation.
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The NFE reform process occasioned a long list of mandated expert reports. Ta-
ble 8.1 provides a summary.6 These reports are of three kinds: analysis of the entire
fiscal equalization system; reports making suggestions about specific policy instru-
ments; and economic impact assessments. While the first and third types have been
publicly discussed, the more sectoral reports largely remained within the realm of
the project working groups. In addition to these formal reports there were numer-
ous informal contacts between project working groups and external experts. Some
are documented in archival records, others have been conveyed through interview
testimony. They ranged from simple phone conversations to short written state-
ments.
With the exception of one report, all expert opinionswere solicited by the project
organization, with FFA and CCFD (later, CCG) as mandating and financing princi-
pals. The exception is canton Zug, which commissioned its ownNFE impact assess-
ment. A report commissioned by the social democratic party is also not listed here.
This concerned the alternative idea of reducing fiscal inequalities between cantons
by limiting the range of admissible tax rates. It had no direct formal connection to
the NFE decision-making process per se, as it was geared at arguing against fiscal
competition between cantons, but I will discuss this alternative proposition later in
the chapter.
Reform sponsors
The NFE reform affected the whole of the federal government, 26 cantons, and the
urban centers. It was primarily driven by two organizations: FFA and CCFD. In
what follows, I characterize the organization of this project and elaborate how social
coordination in pursuit of a single commitmentwas possible. Against this backdrop
I then elaborate three stages of expert mobilization: ensuring the credibility of the
reform commitment, supporting policy work, and substantiating the message that
the reform only produced winners.
6Most reports have been listed in the dispatch (Schweizerischer Bundesrat, 2001: 2550–1).
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Organization
The ‘project organization’ is an umbrella term for a complex collective action best
likened to an ad hocmulti-level executive branch of governmentwith cantonal, inter-
cantonal,7 and federal elements. Figure 8.1 depicts the project organization, in-
cluding its evolution between 1994 and 2001. It was composed of several technical
working groups, whose work was overseen by an administrative-political manag-
ing committee, which reported at first to the Federal Council and later to a political
steering committee. Each level (except the Federal Council) was staffed with an
equal number of delegates from the executive branch of the respective federal and
cantonal governments.
The origin of this organization of multi-level policy-making is the result of ear-
lier joint reform projects between the cantons and the federal government. There
hadbeenpast attempts to disentanglemultilevel policy domains that resulted in two
modest reform proposals, which were adopted during the 1980s (cf. Freiburghaus,
2001). For that purpose, the Federal Council, in 1978, established a ‘liaison com-
mittee’ between the federal government and the cantons (Freiburghaus, 2001: 12).
This approach to organizing projects of institutional reform was different from ear-
lier models of technocratic expert committees, and took into account the potentially
diverging interests of the cantons and federal government. This new mode of or-
ganizing multilevel cooperation became more widely adopted. In addition to the
NFE reform, it also underpinned the constitutional overhaul8 that started at the
same time as the NFE project, in 1994.9
Over time, the organization took on a significantly larger size and degree of
complexity than initially planned. This was caused by the increasing implication
of sectoral policies in addition to the fiscal policy core of the reform. The neces-
sity of a more cross-sectoral and integrative approach became evident in the first
7Inter-cantonal coordination in Switzerland is described in Bolleyer (2010: Chap. 4).
8The constitution’s overhaul (i.e. recasting its meaning and intent in a more comprehensive and
structured form) also provided an opportunity for coordination between the two projects. The confer-
ence of cantonal governments established a legal advisory council for this project and later suggested
integrating two of its members (professors Ruch and Schweizer) into NFE working groups.
9The Federal Office of Justice (FOJ) was the leading agency on behalf of the federal government
(Mader, 2008), and was also implicated in the NFE project. It discussed the project organization with
the Federal Fiscal Administration (Interview XXXVI) and several of its high-ranking members partic-
ipated in different working groups throughout the NFE reform.
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Episode II
1994–96
Episode III
1996–98
Episode IV
1999–2001
Political steer-
ing committee
Political steer-
ing committee
Managing committee Petit comité
Managing committee
Working groups:
1) Task and fiscal trans-
fer disentanglement;
2) Horizontal coopera-
tion between cantons;
3) Vertical cooperation
cantons/federal govern-
ment;
4) Improvement of can-
tonal fiscal capacity;
Working groups:
1) Subsidiarity and new
vertical forms of coopera-
tion
2) Horizontal coopera-
tion
3) Fiscal equalization
Task reorganization in:
4) Social security
5) Education
6) Energy and trans-
portation
7) Environment and
agriculture
8) Housing and public
order
ad hoc: Transfer impact
assessment
Working groups:
1) Fiscal capacity index
2) Joint implementation
Support:
1) Project secretariat
2) Units of cantonal and
federal administration
3) External experts
Figure 8.1: The NFE project organization. Source: author’s illustration, based on
Eidgenössische Finanzverwaltung and Finanzdirektorenkonferenz 1996: Annexe
1 and Eidgenössische Finanzverwaltung and Konferenz der Kantonsregierungen
1999: 53.
consultation procedure (Eidgenössische Finanzverwaltung, 1996).10
Despite its scale and complexity, and with the exception of symmetrical partic-
ipation,11 the project organization retained many elements found in the other case
studies, particularly with regard to the hierarchical layering. The political steering
10The petit comité, replacing the managing committee as a sleeker structure, also contained a rep-
resentative of the cities’ association.
11As the stem cell research regulation and the CO2 emission reduction case studies demonstrate,
to what extent different branches of the administration cooperate in policy formulation varies sig-
nificantly between issues. Yet, all agencies are ultimately accountable to the Federal Council, which
speaks with one voice.
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committee can be likened to the Federal Council’s role in a normal decision-making
process, for the latter did not articulate an official political opinion until signing off
the dispatch (Wettstein, 2010: 349). As will become evident, the basic organization
of expertise mobilization was also comparable to these other cases, as experts were
not members of working groups and had no decision-making authority. However,
they collaborated very closely with the working groups.
This organization of policy work had some interesting affordances. The hier-
archical organization and horizontal division of labor in the working groups effec-
tively regulated conflict. For instance, federal and cantonal delegates participating
in the project did not always agree on issues such as joint policy implementation
by contract. But they were bound to loyalty by a political mandate that left no exit
option (Interview XXXVI). After all, individuals participated in working groups as
public and not as private actors. This set the working groups apart from an ad hoc
expert committee, an instrument that past experience had demonstrated to be hard
to handle in the context of dissent (Wettstein 2002; section 7.3 in this study). Fur-
ther, symmetrical participation created a system of double affiliation, with project
participants defending the project’s aims and methods before their original con-
stituency (i.e. the federal administration or cantonal governments) while advocat-
ing the interests of that constituency within the project (Interview XXXVII). Finally,
when comparing the reform pillars suggested by Frey et al. (1994) with the the-
matic organization of the working groups, it becomes apparent that the different
instruments (vertical cooperation, horizontal cooperation, fiscal equalization) were
always worked on by distinct groups. This was certainly productive of the aston-
ishing coherence between 1994 and 2001.
Commitments
The characteristics of this project organization circumscribes the limits of the social
world it constituted, yet these formal elements say little about the commitment that
brought into being and perpetuated this organization. The seed of this commitment
consisted of CCFD and FFA’s shared perspective that the old systemwas broken be-
yond repair and that a new system should strengthen the cantons as providers of
key public services, because this was more economically efficient. This seed would
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eventually grow into the publicly defended and compelling conviction that the sur-
vival of federalism as a core institution of the Swiss state depended on the NFE
reform. On the conceptual level, this commitment was nourished by the two prin-
ciples of fiscal equivalence and subsidiarity that are at the core of the theory of fiscal
federalism (cf. section 8.2).
Several interviewees (XXXI-XXXIV, XXXVII) agree that the reform’s transmis-
sion through seven years of policy formulation (involving one of the most complex
processes Switzerland has ever seen), intense scrutiny in Parliament (involving a
dedicated ad hoc committee), and a referendum campaign was ensured by the sus-
tained involvement of a few individuals with great conviction. Some of these in-
volvement trajectories were deliberately enabled, others weremore spurious. While
the reform project was initiated under the auspices of Federal Councillor Otto Stich,
it was Kaspar Villiger, his 1995 successor to the helm of the Federal Department of
Finance, who became an ardent champion of the project, even beyond his retire-
ment at the end of 2003 (cf. Merki, 2004). He oversaw the most politically deli-
cate episodes of the decision-making process, including deliberations in Parliament
where he defended the project.12 Hanz-Rudolf Merz, his successor, led the referen-
dum campaign and the remaining policy adaptation work.
There was similar personal continuity at the head of FFA, which hosted and
coordinated the entire project. FFA was headed by Ulrich Gygi until mid–2000,
after which former deputy director Peter Siegenthaler succeeded him. This ensured
a seamless transition, not only because both strongly supported the project, but
also because Siegenthaler had been a member of various project committees since
their inception in 1994. It was Siegenthaler who, during committee deliberation in
Parliament, acted as the most authoritative expert on most aspects of the reform.
On the cantonal side, Peter Schönenberg, finance director of the canton St. Gallen,
and his colleague Franz Marty of canton Schwyz (both were CCFD presidents at
some point during the reform), sported strong support for the project’s objective
and instruments. Marty not only presided over a working group but was a member
of the managing committee. Schönenberger followed a similar career. In addition,
12Villiger’s commitment to federalism is captured in his book “Eine Willensnation muss wollen”
(Villiger, 2009).
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Schönenberger also became CCG president, and was named CCG delegate for the
NFE reform after his tenure in order to ensure institutional backing for his contin-
ued involvement in the project. Hans Lauri was a somewhatmaverick figure. While
deputy director at FFA, he was in charge of the old fiscal equalization scheme for
some time. After leaving the federal administration, he became cantonal finance di-
rector in the canton of Bern, where he oversaw an intra-cantonal fiscal equalization
reform. He also assumed CCFD presidency at a crucial stage of the project and was
member of the petit comité created to ‘tweak’ the project after the second consulta-
tion procedure. Finally, he was elected Councillor of States and became member of
the NFE ad hoc committee.
These individuals created a momentum that sustained the project through its
more difficult times. This momentum was conducive to bestowing the finalized
proposal with an aura of greatness and untouchability. To underline the reform’s
importance for Switzerland’s political institutions, officialswere not shy tomake use
of sweeping terminology, such as calling NFE a ‘once-in-a-century reform project’
(Associated Press, 1996) or likening it to ‘oxygen for the cantons’ (Mettler, 2004). In-
terviewees XXI, XXXII, and XLII also recall that the project team’s conviction proved
contagious for MPs (though less so for the social democrats. . . ) who felt they were
contributing to a reform of historic proportions.13 These electrified MPs, together
with cantonal members of the NFE project team, became the most important pro-
NFE ambassadors during the referendum campaign.
In need of an impartial voice
Mobilization of scientific expertise was intimately linked to the commitment of FFA
and CCFD to reform fiscal equalization, especially with regard to the unintelligi-
ble web of subsidies that had accumulated since 1959. The first expert report (cf.
Frey et al., 1994) was mandated in early 1994, when FFA and CCFD had already
concluded that reform was inevitable and had finished sketching out their (con-
gruent) ideas in terms of scope and general direction. The idea for such an expert
report grew out of FFA’s concern with its political credibility as a sponsor of reform.
13With hindsight, once-upon-a-time enthusiastic interviewees talked about the reform with a
much more cautionary note during our conversation.
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An internal memo reasoned that FFA was an interested party in such a reform, and
would not be able to push a reform agendawhichwould potentially lead to the elim-
ination of public sector jobs in other policy areas. Simultaneously, FFA preferred a
small cantonal/federal project team operating from within the bureaucracy in or-
der to maintain the coherence and focus of the reform agenda. It thus proposed the
joint mandating of an expert report to CCFD, which, to sustain political pressure,
could be published if necessary. With CCFD accepting FFA’s proposition, mandat-
ing this expert report became the first act of this joint venture. In order to draw the
maximum political benefit from the expert report, FFA informed the Federal Coun-
cil of plans for it. Once the report was released, it was first presented to the Federal
Council (26.4.1994), the next day to the wider federal administration, and finally to
a press conference in the presence of the experts themselves. A month later, two
members of the expert team also published a newspaper article (Meier and Spill-
mann, 1994). In subsequent policy documents – such as intermediary reports and
the dispatch – as well as in press coverage the expert report was persistently framed
as the confirmation of the need to reform fiscal equalization. FFA’s 1991 evaluation
and CCFD’s Orientierungsrahmen also tended to be mentioned at the same time.
Despite this carefully staged performance, the expert report was far from being
a performative artifact. Archival documents show that FFA recruited broadly, con-
tacting almost every professor in Switzerland with a suitable specialization. About
two thirds of the contacted professors were available and recruited for the task.
They were Prof. René L. Frey and his collaborator Andreas Spillmann (University
of Basel), Prof. Bernard Daﬄon (University of Fribourg), Prof. Claude Jeanrenaud
(University of Neuchâtel), and Prof. Alfred Meier (University of St. Gallen). While
having had knowledge of the evaluation and reform proposal preceding their own
work, the experts were oblivious to the political role their report was supposed to
play; indeed, at a dinner to celebrate the finalization of their report they joked that
their work was destined for the infamous drawer of the bureaucratic filing cabinet.
Moreover, despite the political motive, the perceived problem pressure was such
that FFA was genuinely interested in the experts’ recommendations. This is also
asserted through Interviewee XXXVI’s report that working groups during episode
II extensively engaged with the report.
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Supporting policy work
Policy work during the entire elaboration of the project (episodes II–IV) was orga-
nized as a two-way information flow. The managing committee assigned a task list
and schedule to each working group, which was to organize as it pleased and to
ask for external expertise if required. The working groups divided up the work
among its members, constituted subcommittees where needed, and met regularly
to deliberate.14 Each delivered intermediary reports to the managing committee,
which sent back feedback and made sure the project did not deviate from the pre-
defined mandate. The managing committee circulated propositions further up the
ladder to be approved by the political principal, first the Federal Council (episode
II), later the political steering committee (episodes III and IV). The working groups
documented their propositions in intermediary and final reports, which formed
the foundation for the public reports released after episodes II (Eidgenössische
Finanzverwaltung and Finanzdirektorenkonferenz, 1996), III (Eidgenössische Fi-
nanzverwaltung and Konferenz der Kantonsregierungen, 1999) and IV (i.e. the dis-
patch, Schweizerischer Bundesrat 2001). The authoring process of the dispatch was
in particular a process of intense negotiation between the federal and cantonal del-
egates, Interviewee XXXIV recalls. There is no evidence that external experts were
formally consulted during episode II of policy formulation.15 However, experts be-
came somewhat more involved during episode III. This concerned the three issues
of new forms of cooperative federalism, the development of an index measuring
fiscal resources available to each canton, and litigation procedures concerning inter-
cantonal contracts.16
The disentanglement of competencies and the search for forms of joint policy
implementation which would respect an efficiency criteria absorbedmuch of NFE’s
project resources. The 1994 expert report (Frey et al., 1994) had already provided
a tentative list, with policies best allocated either to the federal government or can-
tons according to the subsidiarity andfiscal equivalence principle. Aworking group
14Interviewee XXXVI describes these group meetings as always productive and cooperative, de-
spite hard negotiations between different perspectives and interests.
15This does not preclude informal exchange. I have been repeatedly told that Switzerland is a small
country, where information is easily obtained informally (e.g. Interview VI, XXI, and XXXIII).
16The latter led to a report by Zimmerli (2001) and ultimately concerned inter-cantonal policy-
making. For lack of data on its elaboration, I forgo discussion.
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during episode II further developed this list (Eidgenössische Finanzverwaltung and
Finanzdirektorenkonferenz, 1996). The translation work for these suggestions took
place between 1996 and 2001, when five different working groups wrestledwith the
task. While separating competencies was politically challenging, developing new
instruments for joint implementation engendered numerous technical questions. In
that context, Prof. Jeanrenaud and Andreas Spillmann, both members of the 1994
expert team, were commissioned in 1997 to develop an assessment tool that would
allow the adequacy of lump sum financing of joint policy implementation to be
judged for different policy areas. This tool was then to be demonstrated using a
concrete case from each of the five working groups dealing with task disentangle-
ment (BAR E4114A 2004/75 BD 376/1).
In addition to this decision tool, there were legal questions about performance
agreements between public entities. Customarily, joint implementation had fol-
lowed a one-size-fits-all approach in which federal law and ordinances would spec-
ify the same implementation modalities for all cantons (Interview XXXVI). Per-
formance agreements, however, would introduce case-specific contracts between
a branch of the federal administration and a given canton. Concerned about how
the cantons would fare under this new regime, and in order to ensure coordination
with the ongoing reform of the constitution, CCG petitioned the project organiza-
tion to include two of ‘their’ experts (InterviewVII). These experts, professors of law
Rainer J. Schweizer (who also played a central role in the stem cell research case)
and Alexander Ruch, were members of CCG’s working group on the constitutional
reform. While not formally members, Schweizer and Ruch assisted working group
1 (vertical cooperation) and 2 (horizontal cooperation), respectively, during episode
III. In that context, Prof. Schweizer elaborated a commentary on the constitutional
compatibility of performance agreements (BAR E4114A 2004/75 BD 376).17 Finally,
during episode IV (1999–2001), a newworking groupwas formed to develop a legal
template for such a performance agreement. As Interviewee XXX recalls, the group
quickly realized the need for expert assistance. It mandatedGiovanni Biaggini, pro-
fessor of law at the University of Zurich, with the task.
17Meeting minutes show that Ruch participated in meetings, but limited archival access did not
allow me to establish his exact role and contribution.
Perspectives| 235
The elaboration of the cantonal fiscal resource index was another area where an
external expert became involved. It was during episode IV that a special working
group was created to concretize such an indicator. By 1994 the expert report had
already discredited the existing ‘fiscal capacity index’ as inadequate to compute
how much a canton should contribute or receive as part of fiscal equalization, on
the grounds that it mixed elements measuring burdens (e.g. mountainous topogra-
phy) with those measuring costs (howmuchwas spent on policy). A new indicator,
the expert report argued, should measure the potentially taxable value private in-
dividuals and corporations created in a canton (income, fortune, natural resources,
etc.). The qualifier ‘potential’ is important, for the index should not measure how
much of that value a canton actually captures through taxation. As such, the index
would not set incentives for a particular fiscal policy. This valuation should also be
separated from the quantification of burdens, which should be compensated sepa-
rately. Hence, it would be imaginable that a canton could be simultaneously rich,
thus contributing to fiscal equalization, while suffering from heavy burdens, for
which it would be compensated. The concretization of such an index was tricky, as
it had to accurately capture the wealth of 26 very different cantons and be perceived
as unbiased by those cantons. Different concepts, such as the cantonal gross domes-
tic product, were evaluated and discarded as too complex. It was ultimately FFA’s
internal economic advisory council that came up with the idea of basing such an
indicator on the same assessment methodology as used to determine federal taxes.
This was a relatively simple and unbiased system, but did not capture fortunes and
other values not subject to federal taxes (Interview XXVIII).
At this point the project organization sought the help of Crédit Suisse’s economic
consulting division, one of the few specialists in regional economy. Its collabora-
tor Roland Fischer executed the mandate and delivered several reports (Fischer,
2001b,a). Fischer closely collaborated with a dedicated working group established
after the 1999 consultation procedure, and also presented his results at a CCFD
plenary session. FFA hired him just before the beginning of the deliberation in Par-
liament, where he assisted committee deliberation as a representative of the federal
administration and explained themathematically complex indicator directly toMPs
(Interview XXVIII). Interviewee XXXVII recalls Fischer’s work as important for the
236| Reforming Fiscal Federalism
concretization of the fiscal equalization mechanism. He also describes the leap of
faith required of politicians to embrace the formula (it contained an α and a β that
mystified MPs).
This, then, encompasses the bulk of work done by external experts within the
framework of the working groups. Some instances certainly eluded the data col-
lected in this study. However, there is no indication that any such undocumented
instances would have followed a radically different pattern. This pattern can be
characterized as follows: external experts, whether delivering formal reports or in-
person counseling, closely interacted with the working groups and presented their
work in inter-cantonal fora such as CCFD. But they had no public profile. Their
work was not discussed in the media, and even the dispatch contains only an in-
complete inventory of their involvement.
Taming redistributive politics
The final episode of policy work (IV) resulted in three distinct expert reports. Amid
mounting opposition, the project organization asked Prof. Frey in February 2001
to evaluate the results of policy work thus far, in terms of its compatibility with
the reform recommendations contained in the 1994 report (Frey and Schaltegger,
2001b). At the same time, Zug, the canton with the highest projected per capita
contributions to the equalization fund under the future NFE regime, was battling
the level of its future contributions. It enlisted the expertise of the consulting firm
B,S,S, (Blöchliger, Staehelin & Partner, 2001) to bolster its argument that the NFE
would force it to increase taxes substantially, which would lead to the exodus of the
foreign companies and high net worth individuals it had become expert at attract-
ing through very low taxes. The result, it argued, would be a loss in fiscal revenue
for Zug and the federal government (cf. Merki, 2001). To counter this challenge,
the project organization enlisted the professors Kirchgässner and Hauser (Univer-
sity of St. Gallen), who, within one month, had to empirically assess Zug’s claim
(Kirchgässner and Hauser, 2001).
These instances of expert mobilization share a common background. As the re-
form took shape, the cantons became eager to know how they would fare under
the new system. They exerted increasing pressure until the project organization
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gave in and quantified the fiscal consequences of the entire reform project (Inter-
view XXXIV). The project organization opposed this undertaking because it would
invariably draw the focus away from the benefits of the new system as a whole,
reducing the political struggle to its redistributive consequences. Further, such a
quantification could only provide limited insight given that much of the required
data had not yet been collected, forcing the use of simulations. The results of these
computations showed a group of unexpected ‘losers’: poor cantons that would fur-
ther suffer from the reform (Waber, 2000). This constituted a political roadblock,
whose elimination was imperative for the project’s success in Parliament. A solu-
tion was ultimately devised in form of a compensation fund that would indemnify
these cantons (Fontana, 2001). At the same time, the beginning of parliamentary
deliberations came within plausible reach and things got ‘hot’, to use Interviewee
XXXIV’s language. Amid this opposition, some leading supporters of the project
began themselves to have doubts (Interviews XXXII and XXXIII). At this point (Jan.
2001), Frey received a call from FFA, asking him to assess the project’s merit and
coherence. Frey and his collaborator submitted their final report in May, and after
a large majority of cantons approved the NFE for parliamentary debate on June 21,
Frey et al. published their findings in a newspaper article (Frey and Schaltegger,
2001a).
In the report, Frey and Schaltegger (2001b) reiterated the foundational principles
of fiscal federalism. They assessed theNFE reform project as in line with these prin-
ciples and with the original concept proposed by Frey et al. (1994). Pointing only
to a few minor flaws, they forcefully argued for the reform’s completion. The com-
pensation fund, as well as the bracketing out of some policy areas from the reform,
were, they argued, a price worth paying for political support, as they would not
fundamentally disturb the reform’s underlying concept. It was exactly this concept
– disentanglement of competencies, new forms of horizontal and vertical coopera-
tion based on contracts, the compensation of special burdens, and the equalization
of fiscal resources – that would empower the cantons to be autonomous, capable,
and sustainable political entities during the decades to come. This and only this
would reverse the trend of cantons turning into mere implementers of federal pol-
icy amid their fiscal incapacity to live up to their constitutional autonomy. When
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assessing the reform’s effects, cantons should have these benefits in mind, the au-
thors contended, and not the immediate redistributive consequences. The report
was a relief to the project (Interview XXXIII). It also established the argument of
‘looking at the NFE system as a whole and not at the bottom line of the balance
sheet’ in order to gauge its benefits, which the project organization repeated like
a mantra during committee deliberation in Parliament. It also used it to underline
the ‘win win’ nature of the project in public (e.g. Waber, 2001; Siegenthaler and
Wettstein, 2001).
Zug’s grievance regarding getting little direct benefit from theNFE reform,while
having to pay substantially more, was not addressed by the project, and Parliament
also refused to cap the contribution by an individual canton. Interviewee XXXIV
reports that Zug, in reaction to Frey’s advisory opinion, sought its own (cf. Blöch-
liger, Staehelin & Partner, 2001) to demonstrate that the NFE would lead to a loss of
fiscal income that would also affect the federal government. Frey and Schaltegger
(2001b: 19) had hinted at this possibility, pending empirical investigation, because
too much redistribution would force Zug – a tax haven by international standards
and the highest per capita contributor to the NFE – to increase taxes, thus becoming
less attractive in the international tax competition. Yet their report does qualify this
possibility as having the potential to seriously undermine the project’s benefits.
Nevertheless, spring 2001 was not an ideal moment for the project organization
to see their ‘win win’ argument attacked, given the upcoming votes within CCG
and CCFD. This was when Kirchgässner and Hauser were mandated to empirically
assess Zug’s claims. This report was very important for the project organization in
order to defend its credibility in front of CCFD. Kirchgässner andHauser (2001) de-
livered a clear message: Zug will clearly lose from the NFE reform, but not Switzer-
land as a whole, for its position in the global tax competition was second to none.
Their report also disqualified Zug’s own interpretation of Blöchliger, Staehelin &
Partner (2001), which was an inadmissible exaggeration in their eyes. As discussed
later, Kirchgässner was the only external academic expert Parliament invited to a
hearing. He was also the only such expert to appeared in the ‘Arena’ TV debate
preceding the ballot vote in November, 2004.
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The Social Democratic Party
Of all the major political parties, the social democrats (SPS) were the only ones to
formulate a critical stance toward the NFE reform project. It was not the problem
diagnosis of growing inter-cantonal disparities that SPS disputed – quite to the con-
trary, in fact – but the proposed cure. This emphasized federalism, which, according
to SPS, was conducive to creating inequalities. Consequently, the remedywasmore,
rather than less, centralization. It was only through federal policy that such impor-
tant institutions as the state pension scheme (AHV) and incapacity insurance (IV)
became possible, it was argued. Still worse was the tax competition between can-
tons, which was construed as further exacerbating the inter-cantonal wealth gap,
leading to people of an equal income paying several times more tax in the poorest
than in the richest canton. NFE was anathema to the SPS leadership because, if en-
acted, it would encourage more tax competition, rather than less. It would further
transfer collective benefits from the federally run incapacity insurance to the can-
tons. Collective benefits are public grants to institutions taking care of handicapped
people (i.e. fixed costs of building a school for special needs children), and to col-
lectively used services of this target group (i.e. dedicated transportation services).
There were strong doubts as to whether the cantons were willing and capable of
providing the previous level of care.
The party had already begun to articulate the position that a more effective fis-
cal equalization systemwas desirable, but should be coupledwithmore rather than
less centralization, during the first consultation procedure in 1996 (cf. Eidgenös-
sische Finanzverwaltung, 1996). By the second consultation procedure in 1999, it
started to claim that the reform should be tied to national tax rate harmonization,
for which it launched a failed attempt with a parliamentary initiative (Associated
Press, 1999; Schlumpf, 1999). SPS’s parliamentary group further articulated its posi-
tion in a retreat held in early 2000 (Schweizerische Depeschenagentur, 2000). Then,
in a July 24, 2001 press conference, it announced its plan to fight for tax harmo-
nization by means of a popular initiative, should its claims not be integrated into
the NFE project. It was at this press conference that the party presented a study it
commissioned from Prof. Hans Schmid of the University of St. Gallen. Schmid, a
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former National Councillor for SPS (1972–1985), sawmerit in NFE’s fiscal equaliza-
tion related instruments and was of the opinion that this system would effectively
reduce the differences between cantonal tax levels. He consequently encouraged
his party to contribute proactively to the NFE deliberation in Parliament, reserving
a popular initiative as a backup plan only (Rosenberg, 2001). Concretely, he sug-
gested complementing the NFE equalization mechanism with a bracket model that
would mandate cantons to set their tax rates within +/- 20 percent of a rate to be
defined by the federal government (Stalder, 2003). The party effectively prepared
such a backup initiative and its delegate assembly authorized the party secretariat
to launch it after the NFE ballot vote, if deemed necessary (Mettler, 2002).
In contrast to the public performance of SPS’s popular initiative as a political
threat, the preparation of NFE’s deliberation in Parliament by the SPS parliamen-
tary group followed a more habitual pattern, without the involvement of external
experts (Interview XXIX). Judging by committee deliberation in Parliament, even
Schmid’s report was secondary and was only briefly referred to on one occasion,
as meeting minutes show.18 The term ‘habitual’ refers especially to the analytical
resources available. Such resources consisted of retreats or seminars where mem-
bers of cantonal governments, as well as members of the NFE project organization19
of the same party, were invited to elaborate on the project. Such events were also
organized by the other major parties, which arrived at opinion formation in a sim-
ilar manner (Interviews XXXI, XXXVII, and XXXVIII). However, the preparation
process within SPS differed in terms of intensity, compared to SPS’s preparation
of regular legislative business as well as to the process in other parties. The SPS
parliamentary group set up a relatively elaborate division of labor, in which group
members prepared individual issues according to their competencies and political
specializations. This was an unusually refined process due to NFE’s implication
of many sectoral policy domains (Interviews XXIX and XLII). It also demanded a
substantial time commitment, with some of the party’s opinion leaders writing po-
sition papers during the summer holidays (Interviews XXIX). This led to effective
18The bracket or bandwidth model lost even support within SPS as it would have forced some can-
tons to raise taxes on low revenues. According to Interviewee XXIX, further pursuit of this alternative
would have been political suicide.
19NFE’s political steering committee actively encouraged such outreach activities by project par-
ticipants (Interview XXXVII).
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teamwork, which included academics such as Jost Gross (lecturer in law, University
of St. Gallen) and Stéphane Rossini (professor of social policy, University of Geneva
and HES-SO), and came to fruition during deliberation in the National Council’s
ad hoc NFE committee. While it was the same MPs who represented their political
group during all committee meetings, SPS representatives adopted a relay system
inwhich they substituted their regularmemberswithwhoeverwasmost competent
in the issue being discussed during a particular meeting.
In conclusion, it can be maintained that SPS did not really deploy different an-
alytical resources for the preparation of NFE deliberation than other parties did.
However, it deployed them in a very organized manner, and dedicated much of its
personal resources.20
8.4 Sites of negotiation
The NFE reform is a peculiar case regarding the position of scientific expertise. The
latter served as much as a substantial input for policy formulation as it did a co-
hesion function for the reform coalition. In that regard, expertise mobilization by
the reform sponsors was a reflexive act, which sought to strengthen the coalition
and not to convince coalition outsiders. Therefore, experts did not only interact
with project committees, one venue of the coalition, but also with CCFD and CCG.
While this has emerged from the discussion of the reform sponsors’ perspective,
Parliament and the public sphere constitute two additional venues where expertise
made an appearance. I discuss Parliament and the public sphere below. But before
doing so it is important to keep in mind that, unlike in other decision-making pro-
cesses, the NFE project organization involved most of the stakeholders (although
not the handicapped associations). Further, the certain knowledge that the reform
touched upon everybody in Switzerland and had to pass a mandatory referendum
made public communication a strategic imperative. Therefore, there was less of
a boundary clearly delineating a policy arena from the general public. Put differ-
20Despite this high level of engagement, it should not be forgotten that SPS as a party – in contrast
to its parliamentary group – was not speaking with one voice. Especially cantonal representatives did
not share the expressed doubt that the cantons would be less capable at implementing social policy
that the federal government. Moreover, some central individuals in theNFE project organizationwere
also SPS members (e.g. FFA director Gigy and his successor Siegenthaler).
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ently, the project was its own arena and communicated with the public at large.
This shaped the background of negotiations and transactions involving scientific
expertise outside the project arena.
Parliament
By all accounts, the parliamentary process was extraordinary. Not only was there a
special ad hoc committee for the task, committeememberswere also very invested in
the process and had no interest in sabotaging swift deliberation (Interviews XXXII
and XLII). Given the quantity of new or amended norms to be deliberated – a new
law and some 20 constitutional articles – the process was also very time consuming,
with the committee of each house holding nine meetings, each of which sometimes
stretched over more than a single day. This enabled a rather swift floor debate, with
the Council of States dedicating only two days to the business.
BothNFE committees held hearings, but they almost exclusively served the pur-
pose of giving concerned stakeholders – the cantons, the communities, and care
providers for the handicapped and elderly – the feeling that Parliament acknowl-
edges and takes serious their points of views and grievances. For instance, the NFE
committee of the Council of States (NFE-CS) openly discussed ‘referendum strat-
egy’ when deciding whom to invite. Moreover, while civil servants supplied an
exhaustive list of suggestions of hearing participants (such as professors Frey and
Zimmerli), NFE-CS was not interested in hearing them independently of questions
that deliberation might open up. Although the ‘scientific’ foundation of the reform
concept was underlined repeatedly, deliberationwas framed as engagingwith prac-
tical and not ‘academic’ business. One exception was Prof. Kirchgässner, who was
heard byNFE-CS onNFE’s consequences on tax rates in places like Zug. Hewas in-
vited, together with the finance department director from canton Basel (also an aca-
demic by background), because a committee member suggested inviting the CEO
of an international holding group that moved its headquarters to Switzerland, as
well as a representative from economiesuisse. The hearing itself was insubstantial
and short as the four did not fundamentally disagree. This hearing is a nice illus-
tration of positional symmetry with regard to hearing participants, which many
interviewees describe as standard practice: committees do not expect to get impar-
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tial testimony in a hearing (experts also have values they contend), so they invite
a representative of each major position, and then triangulate such testimony with
their own beliefs. Thus, a professor’s opinion is not inherently superior to that of
an interest group representative within a hearing.
In contrast to these hearings, expert support provided by the federal administra-
tion was essential to committee deliberation. As is customary with all business the
Federal Council presents to Parliament for approval, committee deliberation takes
place in the presence of the Federal Councillor in charge (Kaspar Villiger) and of
the director of the agency unit that has drafted the proposal (Peter Siegenthaler,
FFA), who is joined by a small staff (Gérard Wettstein and the newly hired Roland
Fischer). This delegation was completed with the unusual presence of CCFD secre-
tary Kurt Stalder andCCG staffmemberWalterMoser. Depending on the discussed
provision, staff from other branches of the federal administration were invited to
provide their expertise. This was notably the case for FOJ deputy director Luzius
Mader, one of the administration’s most accomplished constitutional experts, who
played a leading role in the NFE as well as in the constitutional reform. Together,
this team provided in-depth explanation and counsel to deliberating MPs. They
also authored substantive written responses to questions or alternative scenarios
suggested by MPs. The sheer number of these reports – approximately eight re-
ports, each measuring up to 40 pages, were produced for NFE-CS, and five for its
sister committee in the National Council (NFE-NC) – may be readily explained by
the project’s large scope. Such reports do not always contain new information, and
their compilation is sometimes perceived as redundant by the administration (In-
terview XXXVI). Yet Interviewees XXIX, XXXII, XXXV, and XLII share the view that
they addressed a substantive need for information by MPs and were not used to
delay deliberation.
While external academic expertise was not solicited by the committees, there
was an attempt to influence NFE-CS deliberation with a strategically positioned
(Interview XXXIV) newspaper article by René Rhinow (2002), former Councillor of
States and professor of law at the University of Basel. Rhinow, one of the archi-
tects of the constitutional reform, criticized what he perceived as the introduction
of a fourth territorial level into the Constitution which lacked democratic account-
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ability. This concerned the NFE instrument of ‘forced’ inter-cantonal contracting.
This means that when a qualified majority of cantons decides to establish a contract
for the joint provision and financing of a given task, they can petition the federal
government to force the remaining cantons to join that contract in order to prevent
free-riding. Alarmed, the project organization asked Prof. Rainer Schweizer to pro-
vide counter arguments to the committee, which he also published in the press as
a reply to Rhinow (cf. Schweizer, 2002c).21 According to Interviewee XXXV, Rhi-
now’s stunt did not much move committee members, for they already knew their
former colleague Rhinow and his position very well.
The public audience
From the beginning of the NFE project in 1994 to the ballot vote in 2004, press cov-
erage22 followed the project rhythm. In addition to coverage of the major events
– inception, consultation procedures, approbation by the cantons, parliamentary
debate, and the referendum campaign – newspapers like Neue Zürcher Zeitung of-
fered a platform for guest authors to (ap)praise and critique the project. Comparing
these contributions – which were often an affirmation occasioning a reply – with
non-public documentation from the decision-making process reveals that they of-
ten replicated behind the scenes discussion, making use of the limelight for addi-
tional leverage (e.g. the Rhinow/Schweizer exchange). It was by this mechanism
that the two most politically significant expert reports by Frey et al. (1994) and Frey
and Schaltegger (2001b) weremade public (cf. Meier and Spillmann, 1994; Frey and
Schaltegger, 2001a). In addition to this, Frey (2004) also wrote an article endorsing
the reform amonth before the referendum vote and accompanied governmental of-
ficials during some press conferences (Interview XXXIII). But there is no evidence
that the project used Frey or any other adviser as part of a campaign strategy. Inter-
viewee XXXIII asserts that Frey wrote these articles on his own initiative. Moreover,
Frey continued to write about the NFE beyond even after implementation began in
2008.23
21In the article, Schweizer is identified as long standing adviser to CCG.
22I mostly draw on the Neue Zürcher Zeitung for this assessment.
23This is indirectly corroborated by Interviewee XLwho reports that another important expert had
no media contact through the project.
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8.5 Discussion
This chapter has presented the background to the NFE reform, analyzed the per-
spectives of collective actors who mobilized expertise, and looked at sites of policy
negotiation involving scientific expertise. The remainder of this chapter takes stock
of the empirical analysis laid out in these preceding parts, and provides an eval-
uation in the light of the by now familiar concepts of issue and arena structure. It
further looks at the link between expertisemobilization and the broader policy com-
mitments of the actors behind this. It concludes with a look at what consequences
expert mobilization engendered on the policy formulation process.
Action context
Assessment of the NFE action context requires us to distinguish – rather more than
in the other cases – between the subjective perspective of key actors (i.e. the project
leadership) and the conflicts observed during the policy process. Making this dis-
tinction evident is important because the arena dominating the NFE policy process
was not so much given, as the product of constant strategizing. As an institutional
reform, the NFE was not rooted in an active and preexisting policy subsystem. One
of the first steps in the process was therefore to build a reform coalition around the
shared perception that reform was necessary, and that such reform should remedi-
ate inter-cantonal wealth disparities through enabling and empowering the cantons
in the exercise of their competencies and responsibilities. Attaining such a goal con-
sensuswas certainly not hindered by the fact that awareness of inefficiencies related
to multilevel governance did not materialize out of thin air: the NFE was preceded
by other reform attempts during the 1980s (Freiburghaus, 2001). Because of its in-
clusiveness and institutional (as opposed to sectoral) character, the reform coalition
was virtually identical with the policy subsystem. Nevertheless, a few elements
from past or parallel reform projects (e.g. the constitutional revision project) exer-
cised a structuring impact, thereby attenuating this importance of strategy. These
path-dependent influences inspired the project organization and contributed con-
stitutional legal expertise from inside and outside of the administration (e.g. FOJ
deputy director Mader and professors Schweizer and Ruch).
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Actual disagreement about the values at stake was rare and tended to concern
the reform instruments, some of which were incongruent with the parliamentary
delegation of the Social Democratic Party. Clearly opposing value pairs stood be-
hind beliefs in more decentralization (i.e. that fiscal equivalence and subsidiarity
equals more democracy, and that efficiency and innovation emerge through com-
petition) and the social democratic belief in greater centralization as the steward
of equality. This boils down to different concepts of justice, with the acceptance of
inequality in outcomes being more firmly rooted in Swiss political culture.
The reform concept’s epistemic foundation – that is, fiscal federalism – received
broad and sustained support, as it was congruent with the Swiss conception of fed-
eralism. Moreover, every major study and analytical report arrived at congruent
findings (the 1991 FFA report, the 1992 CCFD reply, and the 1994 expert report,
etc.). However, there were conflicts around what we might call ‘will be’ issues. The
reform sponsors always claimed that the NFE’s outcome would benefit the entire
country. This factual assertion was challenged by those who saw their interests as
better served by the status quo. Yet these conflicts did not result in a clear dichotomy
between losers andwinners. For instance, while small cantons feared the empower-
ment of large cantons through enhanced horizontal contracting, many of themwere
to benefit substantially from better financial compensations and the equalization of
topographical burdens. For the big net contributor Zurich, task disentanglement
and associated efficiency gains made its contribution worthwhile. Zurich and other
urban centers were also to benefit from the equalization of socio-economic burdens.
For Zug, although a fierce opponent, the NFE was still better than the social demo-
cratic menace of tax rate harmonization by the federal government. Finally, the
transitory compensation fund ensured that the system transition did not harm any-
body immediately. This leaves only sectoral interests, who did not mind the reform
as long as it took place outside their backyard. Some were ultimately exempt from
the reform while others received concessions in the form of the creation of joint
tasks (leaving multilevel policy networks in place) or guarantees (a three year tran-
sition period for the domain of handicapped care-taking institutions). Thus, while
a firm majority shared the reform’s general direction of ‘reviving’ federalism, there
was no shortage of (clearly anticipated) redistributive struggle.
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While such epistemic conflicts were only made manifest rather late in the pro-
cess, the project organization clearly anticipated them early on, as evidenced by
the rationale behind their mandating of the 1994 expert report. The project orga-
nization fought the outbreak and expansion of such conflicts with cognitive and
material resources. Its information policy was designed to preempt leaks while si-
multaneously reaching out to the public, whose approvalwas needed in themanda-
tory ballot vote. But when this public media debate was used to voice dissent, this
was immediately ‘policed’ by a public reply by the project organization. When the
project was criticized as too finance-centric (in the 1996 consultation procedure), it
was reframed in terms of a reform of federalism, a move motivated by the political
calculus that cross-sectoral reform was not possible without stakeholder integra-
tion. Andwhen the project almost died, due to the resistance of the French speaking
cantons, a transitory compensation fund was created. In sum, the action situation
was characterized by a latent semi-structured issuewith conflicts aboutwill be ques-
tions. It was mainly due to strategic maneuvering that this latent conflict structure
did not become manifest in a more virulent way.
Causes of expertise mobilization
The empirical analysis introduced a distinction between the mobilization of exper-
tise with or without a wider audience in mind. Not much remains to be said about
expert reports and in-person assistance, the demand for which originated in the
project’s working groups. These working groups had a clearmandate, operated un-
der a binding hierarchy, and lacked a public profile. They had to deliver a task and
when this task exceeded their capacity and competency, they called for expert assis-
tance. While the presentation of these reports to cantonal delegates within CCFD
and CCGmay have facilitated consensus formation, this coordinative function was
not part of the mobilization rationale. In contrast, the politically salient mandates
of 1994 (Frey et al., 1994) and 2001 (Frey and Schaltegger, 2001b; Kirchgässner
and Hauser, 2001) were mandated with a clear social coordination motive in mind.
While FFA and CCFD had established a shared problem diagnosis and reform ori-
entation, it was FFA’s anticipation of resistance and concern about its own credibil-
ity as an interested reform sponsor that motivated the mandating of the 1994 report,
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with its elaborate showcasing inside and outside the federal government. Similarly,
the 2001 reports originated in a situation where the project was in desperate need
of gaining political support (the cantonal approbation process within CCFD and
CCG, as well as the anticipation of parliamentary deliberation). Having established
technocratic as well as political contexts as drivers for expertise mobilization, we
can now turn to the final point: investigating the consequences of these instances of
expertise on the policy formulation process itself.
Consequences of expertise mobilization
Looking at the outcomes of scientific expertise in a project as large in scale as the
NFE is inevitably limited by the available data24 and by the complexity of the issue.
I am not in a position to trace what became of every expert report, particularly not
those that remained within the confines of the working groups. I am not alone in
this problem. Policy formulation in the working groups was a collective enterprise,
quickly rendering idea attribution to an individual source impossible (Interview
XXXVI). But, based on the general flow of information inside the project as well
as on information provided by various interviewees, it can be confidently assumed
that the core elements of working group related expert reports were integrated into
the respective group’s intermediary or final report. This content will therefore have
ended up in the dispatch after having been assessed, as part of these reports, by
the managing committee and the political steering committee. Given the overlap of
those who formulated the questions, hired the experts, and constituted the reports’
audiences, a kind of equivalence seems to have been at work.
This equivalence was not present in politically motivated instances of expertise
mobilization, because the intended audience of these reportswas not identical to the
group of actors who phrased the research questions and hired the experts. While
there is no measure of the extent to which the 1994 report effectively enabled the
necessary social coordination of the project, it became part of its official genealogy,
and is identified in every major policy document as a key element in the decision
to initiate the reform. This story line was taken up by the Neue Zürcher Zeitung and
24Access to meeting minutes of the work groups was limited by incomplete filing and restricted
archival access.
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repeated in every major article on the reform process. The later report by Frey and
Schaltegger (2001b) served a similar narrative purpose. It certified the project as
scientifically sound, providing a crucial argument for the necessary nature of the
reform.
In contrast to these coordinative effects, the extent to which the 1994 reform
concept proposed by Frey et al. (1994) retained its coherence as NFE’s backbone
demands explanation. Firstly, there was an ideational congruence of the proposed
reform instruments with Swiss political culture. The studies and the recommenda-
tions they underwrote were embedded within a set of economic policy ideas that
gained increasing acceptance during the 1990s (Afonso, 2007; Mach, 2002).25 On
the one hand, the effect of the economic slump of the 1990s on the budgetary situ-
ation afforded fiscal policy special salience. On the other, relatively young, liberal
civil servants with neoclassical economic training advanced to leading positions.
This provided fertile ground for the political uptake of new public management
and institutional economic concepts. Interviewee XXXIII reckons that most of these
concepts had several years, if not decades, of gestation within the academic com-
munity of Swiss economists before gaining public traction in the 1990s. In addition
to this ideational congruence, there are also organizational factors. There was one
dominant principal behind expertise mobilization – FFA and CCFD/CCG – who
gained coherence through doing so. This reduced the propensity of members of
the reform sponsorship coalition to criticize the findings of these reports. Further-
more, there was a relatively low risk of academic economists criticizing the project,
due to their strong investment in it.
Secondly, the 1994 report did not provide fundamentally new insights. In an
admittedly much coarser shape, all its major findings and reform ideas had been
articulated in the FFA evaluation and CCFD reform concept. These ideas then be-
came the initial input for the working groups, much of whose work was to trans-
late these economic concepts and instruments into the normative language of the
law. This is where I see the specific division of labor within the working groups
as important for the continued coherence of these ideas. Each group effectively
25See also the discussion of economic policy instruments in environmental governance in the pre-
vious chapter.
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operated within a silo, and these silos were fairly congruent with the individual
reform instruments. In addition, the managing committee applied course correc-
tion whenworking groups strayed from their mandate. The same system separated
instrumentation working groups from groups negotiating the disentanglement of
specific tasks after 1996. According to Interviewee XXVIII, the creation of the tran-
sitory compensation fund was an additional element preventing interference with
the reform’s core pillars.
We can only speculate what would have happened if the principles of fiscal fed-
eralism had been more contested, or if a different project organization had been
adopted. But it is important to recognize that expertise and ideas attain stability
through the social organization of their carriers. The 1994 report neither brought
into being the principle of symmetric participation between the cantons and the
federal government, nor was the hierarchical organization based on it. However, its
clearly articulated reform pillars – following the economist Jan Tinbergen’s rule of
separate instruments for each policy goal – were conducive to a thematic division
of labor that further increased the coherence of these instruments.
In concluding this chapter, the empirical evidence enables us to lay to rest an
argument between Braun (2009) and Cappelletti et al. (2014) about which factors
enabled the NFE reform to succeed. Braun (2009) argued that it was the strategy
of dividing policy design work and the settlement of distributional consequences
into two legislative packages that enabled a sustained focus on questions of design
and puzzling. Cappelletti et al. (2014) disagree. They see bargaining and deal-
making as dominantmodes of interaction throughout the decision-making process.
They content that compromise was only achieved through the accommodation of
interests (e.g. the transition fund and other side payments). Thus, this argument
focuses on whether puzzling or powering was the decisive mode of interaction that
helped the reform to succeed.
As I have argued earlier (cf. section 3.4), the premises of such an argument are
flawed. Powering and puzzling take place in any decision-making process, and are
often mutually constitutive. There couldn’t be a better empirical case than the NFE
reform to illustrate that puzzling and powering are both necessary, with one lay-
ing the groundwork for the other. For instance, Cappelletti et al. (2014) argue that
Discussion| 251
the different reform pillars produced an interlocking system of interest compen-
sation. As an illustration, the canton Zurich became a top contributor concerning
fiscal equalization with NFE. But forced inter-cantonal cooperation, with spillover
compensation and the compensation fund for social welfare expenditures, repre-
sent a gain for Zurich. There is no doubt that such package deals were decisive.
But the system of interlocking reform pillars was largely a product of puzzling by
CCFD and the 1994 expert report. Similarly, when Cappelletti et al. argue that side
payments (i.e. the transition compensation fund) and resizing of reform ambitions
were necessary as concessions, they are also correct. But they neglect the nexus of
puzzling that took place simultaneously to these negotiations in form of the 2001
expert report by Frey et al., which was crucial for reminding the individual parties
of the project’s overall goals and benefits. This list is not exhaustive, but it demon-
strates that the ‘NFE system’ is a hybrid construct between rational and political
elements. Powering was by no means absent, but the segmentation into different
thematic silos had the (unanticipated) effect of containing conflicts during policy
formulation.

Nine
Conclusion
9.1 Introduction
In this thesis I have set out to study the causes for and consequences of themobiliza-
tion of scientific expertise, as it occurs in policy formulation processes at the Swiss
federal level of government. In the light of the continuing importance of scientific
expertise as a decision support for a broad range of policy domains, I have argued
that studying scientific expertise is relevant because it is perceived as dysfunctional;
because its practice has implications for democratic accountability; and because its
social processes take place at the interface between science and politics. I have fur-
ther argued that there is a significant research gap because the multidisciplinary
literature has privileged a micro-sociological approach, inquiring into individual
attitudes about research utilization and conducting single-site studies of organiza-
tional behavior as it is related to expertise production. There is a genuine shortage
of empirical studies that focus on the role of scientific expertise in policy formu-
lation and which adequately treat it as a phenomenon of collective action. This is
especially true for Switzerland, with its unique decision-making process and legacy
of informal contacts between public and private actors.
Consequently, the study took policy formulation as its empirical site in order to
investigate the questionswhat instances of scientific expertise occur during policy formu-
lation?, what causes their manifestation?, and what are their consequences on the policy
process? My core assumption was that scientific expertise – understood as contain-
ing both informational and symbolic properties – constitutes a resource for political
actors, which they value according to its utility in the pursuit of their commitment
in the policy arena.
I developed a two tier approach for the investigation of the causes of expertise
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mobilization. By looking at the institutions of the policy process and the organi-
zation of expertise production, I inquired into the distribution of access to scientific
expertise in order to learn which public and private actors exert control over its mo-
bilization. This institutional analysis also aimed to elucidate whether the political
system is conducive to a predominantly coordinative or communicative discourse
of legitimation. Identifying the dominant discourse allows us to situate expertise
as predominantly being addressed either to members of the policy subsystem or to
the public at large.
The analysis of three policy formulation processes constituted the second layer
of the study. Inspired by an interpretive account of political life, I argued that de-
cisions about scientific expertise are always taken in concrete situations, which col-
lective actors assess against the backdrop of their commitments within the policy
arena. I further contended that the expected structure of an action situation makes
political actors (capable of mandating expertise) value expertise more or less as an
action resource. The structure of an action situation is defined by the presence or
absence of conflicts about values (goals) and the relevant knowledge at stake.
Recognizing that scientific expertise can only ever be an intermediatory factor
in an explanation of policy coordination and design, I advanced the argument that
the effective structure of policy problemsmaymediate such effects. Themore struc-
tured a problem is, the more overlap there is between the principals of expertise
mobilization and its intended audience, rendering an influence on policy design
more likely.
Having synthesized this study’s conceptual framework, the rest of this chap-
ter will draw together the findings from the four preceding empirical chapters and
scrutinize them with regard to the theoretical expectations. Consideration of the
scope for generalization of these findings will follow, providing a basis for address-
ing the study’s relevance in terms of the efficiency of scientific expertise and the
democratic implication of expertise mobilization. The chapter concludes with an
appraisal of the study’s contribution to theory on scientific expertise in public pol-
icy.
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9.2 Findings
The distribution of expertise
Beginning with the institutional effects of organization and distribution of access to
scientific expertise, the analysis arrives at a single key conclusion. Both the analysis
of the institutional setup of the political and advisory system, and that of the three
case studies, have shown that the capacity to mobilize scientific expertise in pol-
icy formulation is strongly concentrated in the hands of the federal administration.
The lion’s share of policy relevant research is funded by the federal government,
with the federal administration exerting direct control over the budgets of agency
research and short term expert mandates. Moreover, it is the executive branch of
government that controls the establishment of extra-parliamentary committees and
their staffing.
Within the three cases, direct demand by federal agencies accounted for the ma-
jority of expert intervention. In the stem cell research case, the existence of two
independent and actively engaged advisory committees to some extent counterbal-
anced the administration’s expert monopoly. Civil society actors such as the po-
litical parties did not generally mandate independent expertise. Instead, parlia-
mentary groups of the political parties made do with the resources of the semi-
professional militia system. They sought competence within their own networks
by hearing cantonal ministers and civil servants from their own parties. Occasion-
ally they enlisted the help of professors from amongst their ranks, as was the case
for Hans Schmid’s tax harmonization report for the Social Democratic Party, or, in
the stem cell case, invited relevant scientists to a hearing. Similarly, Parliament’s ca-
pacity to mobilize expertise independently has proven very small. Such expertise
was almost entirely provided by the federal administration. The latter even played
(and by most accounts continues to play) the role of key informant in determining
whom to invite for a committee hearing. Such hearings, however, are designedmore
to elucidate the spectrum of available positions and convey to stakeholders that Par-
liament recognizes their grievances. It is thus not uncommon that a scientist and an
interest group representative would be heard on equal terms.
This strongly biased distribution of access to expertise also adds evidence in
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support of the contention that the electoral arena has virtually no importance for
expertise mobilization. Federal Councillors are elected by Parliament and do not
have to appeal directly to the population. The federal administration is similarly
largely sheltered from the electoral cycle. Further, legislative projects regularly span
across multiple legislatures, as was clearly the case with the NFE reform and the
CO2 Act. In addition, the three studied policy formulation processes took place un-
der the successive responsibility of several Federal Councillors. The stem cell case
began under Dreifuss, who handed over the dossier to her successor Couchepin. It
was Cotti who originally pushed for a Swiss CO2 reduction initiative, handing over
to Dreifuss midway, with Leuenberger taking over during parliamentary deliber-
ation. Finally, the NFE reform began under Stich, was refined under Villiger, and
concluded by Merz.
The fairly low policy relevance of the electoral arena and the political system’s
diffusion of power (due to numerous veto points), should – according to the theoret-
ical expectations – be conducive to the mobilization of expertise primarily in order
to rally policy subsystem participants around a shared frame, rather than asserting
a policy’s rational foundation in public. Indeed, a coordinative/persuasive intent
behind expertise mobilization can be clearly identified in all three case studies. The
political assessment of a situation always preceded the decision tomandate an expert
report, and in several instances there is clear evidence – the ‘political’ NFE expert
reports, FOPH’s solicitation of Rainer Schweizer, the production of economic im-
pact assessments for the CO2 Act – that such decisions were driven in anticipation of
challenges to the federal administration’s positions. This is in contrast to the referen-
dum arena, where the executive did not advance expert arguments for legitimating
its position. However, the referendum debates in the NFE and stem cell cases were
not entirely devoid of expert appearances (e.g. in the pre-vote ‘Arena’ program on
national television), but occupied a rather small space.
Having established the federal administration as the main principal behindmo-
bilization of scientific expertise, and the pre-parliamentary phase as themain venue
for this, the next sectionwill discuss the impact of political polarization on scientific
expertise.
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Is expertise becoming politicized?
As chapter 5 has shown, the Swiss political system is undergoing transformation
due to internationalization and political polarization, with the consequence that po-
litical inclusion during the pre-parliamentary phase is in decline. As shown in the
same chapter, pre-emptive inclusion has been used to reduce the decision-making
uncertainty derived from direct democracy. But what impact do these transforma-
tions have on scientific expertise? Does increased media scrutiny of the policy pro-
cess and increased political polarization lead to increased expertise pluralism and
the politicization of science? To followWeingart (1999), such a development would
have detrimental effects on scientific credibility.
There is, to my knowledge, no hard data that would allow a clear answer to
this question. For instance, we do not know whether scientific experts and their
activity receive more media coverage today than 15 or 30 years ago. Moreover, we
are dealing with complex causalities. Changes to the Swiss political system are not
the product of a single factor (Papadopoulos, 2008), and the proposed notion of
an advisory system is connected to the political system in multiple ways. We may,
however, attempt to trace certain causal pathways.
We can begin with the declining importance of political inclusion during the
pre-parliamentary phase, and the increasing functional differentiation of the polit-
ical elite. This reduces the interface between the federal administration and inde-
pendent expert commissions, as the latter have no dedicated access points to venues
of policy formulation. While there is no data enabling a comparison through time,
it is conceivable that independent advisory bodies now have to rely more on the
media to spread their message, because the informal core of the political system is
breaking up due to functional differentiation and less inclusive policy-making. At
least for the three advisory bodies (NACBE, TA-Swiss and OcCC) analyzed in this
study, media relations are important, and they all maintain active connections to
the news media.
Another avenue to explore concerns the decline of expertise produced within
elite networks, and the rise of (professionalized) mandate-based expertise. This
shift in the organization of expertise production is driven by functional differentia-
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tion of the elite, and by dynamics endogenous to the scientific community. This or-
ganizational shift empowers the principals of expertisemobilization –whichmostly
means the federal administration in connection with federal-level policy – because
public visibility of expertise mobilization can be better controlled. For instance, the
contract governing an expertise mandate includes provisions about result publi-
cation and ownership. Unless otherwise negotiated, publication decisions are the
prerogative of the mandating party (e.g. the federal administration). This informa-
tion control is not absolute because of the new transparency regulations discussed
earlier: the administration eventually has to publish commissioned reports, but the
exact timing of publication can remain a discretionary choice. Consequently, the
public visibility of expertise mobilization is to no small extent dependent on the
federal administration’s interest in publicity, and increased political polarization
may affect such interest. As Parliament has become less inclined to rubber stamp
legislation proposed by the executive, and as such proposals struggle to find legit-
imation through claims of political inclusion during the pre-parliamentary phase,
the executive may findmore use for expert pronouncements as a way of backing up
its claims in Parliament. This may, in fact, fuel the politicization of expertise. But
there are limits to such politicization. Members of Parliament are only in a posi-
tion to rhetorically attack and question expert-backed arguments proposed by the
administration, as they mostly lack the necessary resources to counter them with
their own expertise. In that sense the demand monopoly character of the Swiss ad-
visory system works against the politicization of expertise: a US-like adversarial
culture of expertise is simply impossible in such a context.
Independently ofwhether themobilization of expertise has been receivingmore
media coverage as a result of recent transformations to the political system, we have
to construe media publicity as a phenomenon that is instrumentalized by partici-
pants in policy formulation for their own purposes. For instance, all three cases
have shown that a consultation procedure is a moment ‘to go public’, not only in
the sense of presenting a project, but also in order to woo support. In all cases,
academic experts have participated in publicized debate during the consultation
procedure. Moreover, the referendum campaigns of the stem cell and NFE cases in-
cluded public pronouncements by advisers (e.g. René Frey in the NFE case). These
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public contributions, I have been assured, were not commissioned by the federal ad-
ministration, but were self-motivated. But theCO2 andNFE cases also demonstrate
that the administration takes active measures to counter criticism of their expertise
by facilitating public reply articles. The question then becomes who these contribu-
tions target. Are they addressed at other subsystemparticipants, with themessage’s
public visibility acting as leverage, or, conversely, is publicity-seeking motivated by
wanting to address the general public? The available data does not allow for a clear
answer to this question, but it suggests that controlling information flow in the me-
dia is also part of the coordinative discourse. If we take the NFE case, with its con-
stant need to ensure the coherence of the reform coalition (at its peak, I was told,
a hundred people actively participated in the reform) information control and an
explicit media policy become indispensable instruments.1 Assuming that commu-
nication through the media is indeed a feature of the coordinative discourse, we
may speculate that the increasing social distance among the elite induced by func-
tional differentiation even increases the need for communicating through themedia
in order to obtain coordination.
In sum, the transformations in the Swiss political system may have an influ-
ence on the advisory system, but the directions of the effects are not always clear.
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that expert argumentation ultimately
remains specialized argumentation, addressed at a specialist audience. The federal
administration may have much power in that regard, but its legitimate place rests
within the political subsystem. The Federal Council and Parliament ultimately jus-
tify their choices in public, and there is no evidence that wooing the people with
expert-backed arguments would enhance the legitimacy of such decisions, given
the place of science in Swiss political culture.
Cases and their issue structures
I have argued that agreement anddisagreement about values and the relevant knowl-
edge at stake provides varying incentives to draw (or not draw) on scientific exper-
tise as a resource for the actualization of particular policy commitments. In other
1While the NFE case is certainly exceptional in its amplitude, its participant network featuring a
single dominant coalition corresponds in fact to the most common power structure among the most
important decision-making processes during the early 2000s in Switzerland (Fischer, 2012).
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Figure 9.1: Issue structure of the three case studies. Source: author’s illustration.
words, whether or not scientific expertise is regarded as useful for achieving a pol-
icy goal is a function of an actor’s perception of the situation which s/he is in. An
action situation, in turn, is determined by the structure of the issue at hand.
The empirical analysis shows that in all three cases studied, issue structures and
their perception by the actors whomobilized expertise remained stable once a prob-
lem had been framed. Important strategical maneuvers, such as the introduction of
an emission reduction target instead of a fixed emission tax in the CO2 Act case, or
the rebranding of the NFE from a fiscal equalization to a federalism reform, were
reactions to an underestimate of the intensity of political opposition. They came
about neither because resistance as such had not been anticipated, nor because the
issue changed in structure. Thus, each case had a single and stable issue structure.
It is also important to note that scientific expertise neither caused nor modified the
structure of issues because, in all cases, the mandating of external expertise took
place after the federal government had internally articulated the broad direction
that policy formulation should follow. However, while not affecting the perception
of interaction dynamics, expertise in the NFE case deviates somewhat from that
assessment, as it contributed to stopping latent conflicts becoming too salient.
Figure 9.1 illustrates the issue structure of the three cases, as obtained by ana-
lyzing the commitments of actors who had mobilized scientific expertise. I qual-
ified the stem cell research issue as relatively unstructured. Important epistemic
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questions, such as the transdifferentiation potential of adult stem cells and the con-
stitutionality of the stem cell research act, as well as the core normative questions
surrounding the instrumentalization of unborn life, remained contested through-
out the process. However, as I have demonstrated, the federal government treated
the issue more like a semi-structured value controversy by relegating substantive
decisions concerning stem cell science to policy implementation. TheCO2 emission
reduction case was semi-structured. It showed little signs of disagreement around
the central epistemic premise that climate change is a fact, and that human activity
plays a discernible role. However, the economy/ecology goal conflict and asso-
ciated questions about the distribution of a countermeasure’s burden had always
been anticipated, and could only be contained through international policy coordi-
nation. The NFE case was also semi-structured. Unlike the CO2 case, its conflicts
were located on the epistemic rather than the normative axis and revolved around
diverging projections about the reform’s outcomes (‘will be’ questions). The reform
sponsors clearly anticipated such challenges and constantly (and ultimately suc-
cessfully) devised strategies to prevent the degeneration of the problem structure.
In sum, the cases studied turned out to not be quite ideal typical, in the sense
that they converged toward the center of the typology, rather than its corners. As
a consequence, each case also displays some traits of a neighboring issue structure.
This, and the fact that issue perception can deviate from actual structure – as was
evident in the stem cell case – is not incompatible with the premises of the issue ty-
pology (Hoppe, 2010: 75). Moreover, it should not be taken as a contradiction tomy
earlier statement that the studied cases had a single and stable issue structure, for
it refers to the fact that however mixed the cases may have been, they nonetheless
remained the same throughout the decision-making process. This fulfills the con-
dition (postulated in section 4.2) of treating the empirical decision-making process
as identical with the conceptual case.
Causes of expertise mobilization
This classification of the cases according to their issue structure allows for the evalu-
ation of the theoretical predictions regarding expertisemobilization. As a reminder,
decisions about expertise mobilization are not so much influenced by actual issue
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structures as they are conditioned by the always situated (and anticipatory) per-
spectives of policymakers. This distinction between perceived and actualized issue
structures can now be put to analytical use.
Beginning with the stem cell case, I argued that issues of science policy involve
scientists because they are a central target group. Indeed, scientists and institutions
of science played a prominent role in the stem cell case overall. However, this offers
little indication of expertise mobilization decisions. Here we need to differentiate
between the motives of the federal government and of institutionalized advisory
bodies. As elaborated, the government conceived the issue more in terms of a value
controversy than a fully unstructured issue. Its ensuing strategy of depoliticization
is congruent with theoretical expectations, although the specific strategy of proce-
dural settlement has to be viewed in the light of Swiss democracy (where a conflict
that is not settled may engender a popular initiative), and in connection with past
experience of preemptive depoliticization of xenotransplantation. FOPH’smandate
for Rainer Schweizer served as an insurance in that strategy, rather than to provide
fundamentally new information to the administration. The involvement of other
expertise on science governance has a lot to dowith past politicization of biotechno-
logical issues (e.g. GMOs), as a response towhich Switzerland (and other countries)
fostered an approach to science policy controversies that seeks to engage publics so
as to democratize scientific governance. Science et Cité and TA-Swiss (and to a lesser
extent NACBE)were organizations committed to such an approach to scientific gov-
ernance. However, the government only controlled the activities it mandated from
Science et Cité.
The CO2 emission reduction issue always contained a goal conflict with redis-
tributive implications, which, according to theoretical expectations, lowers the value
of scientific expertise. There is enough evidence to substantiate the argument that
the Federal Council and the different offices of the federal administration impli-
cated in policy work clearly anticipated this issue structure. FOEN’s limited inter-
est in climate change research, which it only referred to in potentially contentious
situations, is therefore not surprising. On the other hand, both the Federal Council
and industrywere equally interested in learning about distributional consequences.
This created a sideshow of conflict about the assertion thatCO2 emission reduction,
Findings| 263
at a certain rate, could be economically beneficial. However, it is necessary to con-
sider that energy modeling, unlike other instances of advisory demand for expert
knowledge, is tightly integrated with bureaucratic routines. During the 1990s, the
administration decided on the model parameters, while the technical implemen-
tation was outsourced for path-dependent reasons. Moreover, the computation of
environmental and economic outcomes was intrinsically linked to the incentive tax
as a policy instrument.
In the NFE case, the reform sponsor’s issue perception (primarily of FFA) clearly
anticipated a semi-structured issuewith possible challenges to claims about thewel-
fare outcomes of the reform. The theoretical expectations that expertise is valued
for persuasive purposes in such a case fits well with the reform coalition’s expertise
mobilization behavior. Several mandated studies were intended to enhance the re-
form’s credibility andwere deliberately given a public profile in order to convey the
message that the NFE system benefits the country as a whole. Within the working
groups, where problems were clearly structured, expertise mobilization followed
the rationale of complementing missing technical competencies. This again fits the
expectations for more structured issues.
In sum, the empirically observed patterns of expertise mobilization are rather
congruent with the theoretical expectations. However, the model cannot account
for specific historical lessons of how to deal with a problem (e.g. science policy con-
troversies). A case similar in structure to the stem cell controversy would probably
have inspired depoliticization strategies through active inclusion of stakeholders,
rather than the strategy of going public.
Consequences of expertise mobilization
As argued in the theory chapter (section 3.5), scientific expertise can only exert an
influence on policy design and politics if it has actually been mobilized. Moreover,
any such influence is mediated by path-dependent structural elements, processual
dynamics, and serendipity. There is plenty of evidence of such influence in the
data. Every case study showed that expertise mobilization followed, rather than
preceded, the articulation of a general position by the federal administration. More-
over, mobilized expertise engendered consequences only in conjunction with other
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factors, regardless of whether such consequences were cognitive or social in nature.
Such interdependencies may be endogenous to an action situation, such as when an
expert report relied on a predecessor report. For example, many of the NFE reports
materially relied on the foundations laid out by the 1994 report. This also concerns
clusters where a report was mandated in order to dispute another one (e.g. Zug
mandated its study in reaction to Frey’s 2001 assessment. The project organization
in turn hired Kirchgässner and Hauser to challenge Zug’s contention).
But there are also factors which intervene from outside the action situation. For
instance, the NFE project organization – which was important for the continuing
coherence of the proposed reform pillars – came about because of similar past and
parallel modes of organizing collaboration between the federal government and the
cantons. Similarly, the organization of energymodeling in theCO2 Act case was the
product of earlier energy policy formulation. Moreover, the advisory arrangement
in the stem cell case was entirely the product of past biomedical policymaking.
In addition to these endogenous and exogenous elements, rather contingent fac-
tors were also at work. Schweizer’s important role during committee deliberation
of the stem cell act, for instance, could never have been foreseen when the adminis-
tration mandated him in the first place. The importance of such interdependencies
seems to have been least where the principals (i.e. the mandating agency) and the
intended audience of an expert report were identical. This was the case for studies
mandated by the NFE working groups. But this has to be immediately put in per-
spective, since the existence of these working groups was itself dependent on other
factors. These findings clearly show that the mobilization of expertise is a neces-
sary, but far from sufficient, condition for explaining any kind of expertise-related
outcome.
But what can we say about the influence of issue structures on the outcomes of
mobilized expertise? The suggested causal mechanism construes issue structures
as translating into particular network structures in the policy arena, which in turn
mediates the cognitive and social consequences of expertise. For an issue, like the
stem cell research case, located between a semi-structured problem with disagree-
ments about values at stake and an unstructured issue, theory predicts that experts
in the capacity of a mediator or – if more unstructured – of a ordinary participant
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engender an influence on policy politics, rather than design. To a large extent this
was the case. Schweizer, aided by his professionalmonopoly and high status among
politicians, came to play a mediating role. By stressing procedural rather than sub-
stantive arguments, NACBE also played such a role, despite being too young to
have such a reputation. This mediating role was most strongly felt in the Council of
States, and also left some traces in the bill (reduction of scope, patenting, etc.). But
this mediating role was not all-powerful. Opponents invariably stuck to the line
of argumentation they deployed from the very beginning. Whichever arguments
fitted their line of thought were adopted as evidence, which demonstrates to what
extent advisory reports are subject to interpretive flexibility.
Assessment of the CO2 case remains relatively limited in this context, as ex-
pertise was largely left at bay. The use of energy and economic impact assessment
models was intrinsically linked to the proposed steering tax as a policy instrument,
and the federal administration was strongly implicated in their production process.
In the light of the strong goal conflict between the environment and the economy,
it is not surprising that arguments about distributional outcomes, backed with ev-
idence from model computations, could not change entrenched convictions. The
controversy about the ‘double dividend’ of CO2 emission reduction is a good illus-
tration of this.
The NFE case – with its significant goal consensus and disagreements about
knowledge related to the outcomes of the reform instruments – should lead to de-
sign and coordination effects of scientific expertise. This was indeed the case. De-
sign work drew inspiration from the 1994 expert report, and the working groups
relied on the support of several external consultants. There is also evidence that
mobilized expertise had a stabilizing effect on the reform coalition, although always
in concert with other factors. For instance, if we consider Frey’s 2001 report, which
reportedly reinforced convictions of the project’s merits, we simultaneously have to
recognize that the transitory compensation fund established at the same time had
a similarly cohesive effect.
These findings support the theoretical predictions that issue structure matters
for explaining the consequences of expertisemobilization. This evidence also shows
that the more conflictual the value dimension of an issue is, the less effective that
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mobilization of expertise is for social coordination. Themediating impact ofNACBE
and Prof. Schweizer in the stem cell case are not a contradiction in that regard, as
their testimony shaped the opinion of actors without a preconceived position, while
having virtually no traction on committed critics.
Summary of results
The findings of this study can now be summarized in three broad lessons. Firstly,
this research has shown that the ability to access and control scientific expertise
is strongly concentrated in the hands of the federal administration. Civil society
actors have weak capabilities to mobilize scientific expertise, and the autonomy of
institutionalized advisory bodies is limited. Moreover, the production of scientific
expertise is undergoing a process of professionalization which strengthens the po-
sition of the federal administration as the (main) mandating principal. Secondly,
despite increased political polarization and less inclusive decision-making, scien-
tific expertise remains anchored in the policy subsystem, rather than being used as
an effort towards legitimation in the wider population. The monopolistic demand
structure for scientific expertise, the relatively low relevance of elections for policy,
and the absence of a link between trust in political institutions and trust in science all
work against the politicization of science. Thirdly, the structure of a policy problem
matters both for expertise mobilization and for the latter’s impact on the policy pro-
cess by conditioning conflict structures and their anticipation. Structured problems
result in a greater overlap between the principal of expertisemobilization and its in-
tended audience, thereby increasing the chance that expertise shapes policy design.
Conversely, less structured problems, especially those that involve conflicts about
values and goals, reduce the impact of mobilized expertise. Whatever the conse-
quence of mobilized scientific expertise may be, it is always mediated by structural,
organizational, and serendipitous factors.
9.3 Generalizability of the findings
Having summarized the research findings, we can now discuss their robustness by
probing the limits of their generalizability. This is not a straightforward operation
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as the research design builds on a contrasting, and not a sampling, logic. Conse-
quently, the question is less whether a particular case is a representative choice for
one of its kind, but to what extent the observed dynamics correspond to findings
from other studies.
Many of this research’s findings regarding the basic traits of the Swiss advisory
system receive empirical confirmation through Frey’s (2010a: 235, 266) study on
the use of policy evaluation evidence in reform processes. The fact that the policy
domains she analyzed (road transportation safety, asylum policy, drug policy, and
health care) do not overlap with the cases this study investigated but nevertheless
share the same timeframe allows for useful comparison. In essence, Frey confirms
that the federal administration is themost important principal of scientific expertise,
which it mainly mandates from external providers. Moreover, she also finds that
Parliament is dependent on the federal administration in the consideration of policy
analysis.
As this research demonstrated, the Swiss advisory system has changed over the
past two to three decades as a result of changeswithin the political and scientific sys-
tem (though changes to the latter have not been investigated systematically). This
makes it important to consider the obstacles to generalization over time. As we look
into the future, the advisory systemwill most likely continue to be professionalized,
as the structural foundations for scientific public engagement in the republican tra-
dition continue to erode. Amid high tenure uncertainty for young researchers in
Switzerland (cf. Buchholz et al., 2009: 97ff.), a practice-oriented research agenda
is only viable if it translates into the acquisition of project funding. This, however,
puts academic suppliers in competition with private sector providers and forces
professionalization. Moreover, the federal administration is likely to maintain its
central position in the advisory system, as there are no indications that resource
distribution might shift (e.g. public financing of political parties).
What canwe say about the generalizability of the researchfindings regarding the
influence of problem structuring on expertise mobilization and its consequences?
The first point to acknowledge is that, even though the findings were largely con-
gruent with the theoretical propositions advanced, the cases tended to gravitate to-
wards the center of the typology, rather than taking on ideal typical extreme values.
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However, given that such ideal typical cases are likely rare, the decision-making
processes analyzed are more representative of ordinary decision-making patterns
in Switzerland. But how representative they really are is difficult to assess. Fischer
(2012), for instance, shows that policy network structureswith a dominant coalition,
as was the case in the NFE reform, appear in the majority of the most important
decision-making processes during the early 2000s. Fischer, in the same study, also
assesses the reputation of different actors, including scientific experts. However,
due to conceptual differences and the fact that he does not distinguish between ex-
perts and other participants, his data cannot be used to assess validity of this study’s
findings (cf. section 9.4).
Frey’s (2010a) study is more useful in that regard, as it explicitly attempts to
assess the impact of the political context on the use of policy evaluation evidence.
There are conceptual differences with this study, too, but just as with the problem
structure typology, Frey’s consideration of goal conflicts as an explanatory variable
offers some comparability. She shows that evaluation evidence, if present, impacts
politics rather than policy as the competition between policy goals increases (Frey,
2010a: 255). The same basic dynamic is also observed in the present study when
comparing theNFE case, on one hand, and theCO2 and stem cell cases, on the other.
Moreover, Frey’s (2010a: 267) observation that the occurrence of parliamentary ar-
gumentation referring to evidence requires a certain level of conflictmatches similar
observations regarding the NFE and stem cell cases. Parliament showed very little
interest in the evidentiary foundation of the NFE reform, while extensively arguing
about legal and biomedical facts pertaining to stem cell research.
This leaves the question to what extent the findings of this study may be gener-
alized beyond the Swiss context. As I have argued in the introductory chapter (sec-
tion 1.3), Switzerland was not chosen as the empirical site for this research because
its political and advisory system display particular, theoretically relevant, traits;
rather, in the absence of a cross-country comparative heuristic, Switzerland repre-
sents one among other possible candidates for theory building. However, through
theory development I came to identify specific traits of an advisory system, includ-
ing supply side elements (i.e. control over access to scientific expertise) as well as
the primary arena of expertise mobilization for social coordination (subsystem vs.
Implications of the findings| 269
public). As I demonstrated, control over expertise mobilization in Switzerland is
strongly concentrated, while at the same time being a feature of the coordinative
discourse in the policy subsystem. Themost straightforwardmeans of assessing the
validity of these advisory system-related effects involves choosing another country,
similar to Switzerland regarding these two dimensions of the advisory system, for
comparison. Assuming that such a similar case does exist, the next step would then
be to look at a case study similar in problem structure to the ones I analyzed. Should
there be no similar case – and I am not aware of another countrymatching the Swiss
lack of pluralism in expertise control – the validity of the theory as a whole would
have to be assessed (though not the robustness of the findings). Such an assess-
ment, however, exceeds the available resources of this dissertation project and will
have to be addressed within the framework of future research. Thus, whether or
not the research findings can be generalized beyond Switzerland remains an open
question.
9.4 Implications of the findings
In the light of these findings, canwemaintain that there are right andwrong uses of
expertise in policy formulation? Moreover, do these findings lend support for the
view that proffered advice is only inadequately considered? My answer requires
some qualifications. For instance, it has to be assumed that the supply of expertise
is capable of meeting demand. While I have not conducted a structured assessment
of whether this is the case in Switzerland, it transpired from the case studies that,
owing to the country’s small size, supply is limited and, if not provided by consul-
tancy firms, strongly relies on academics’ intrinsic motivation to engage with prac-
tical issues. Further, we have to keep inmind that policy advice is only one pathway
by which science comes to bear on society. The limiting factor is not necessarily the
effectiveness of advisory processes, because scientific advice can only be as effec-
tive as the policies it inspires (Mayntz, 1994) and such policies need to be adopted
in the first place in order to have an effect (Knott and Wildavsky, 1980). Based on
these qualifications and on my findings, I contend that an efficiency perspective on
scientific expertise in policy formulation is misconceived. The fact that advisory de-
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mand is a necessary but never sufficient factor in accounting for any kind of outcome
makes it necessary to adopt a broader view, reaching beyond the design of ‘inter-
faces’ and other advisory instruments to include structuring elements of the policy
subsystem in question. Such political contextualization requires a good amount
of tacit knowledge about politics. I further contend that talking about knowledge
utilization is inadequate as a descriptor because it stipulates that expertise seeking
and its outcome is a deterministic coupling. Instead, I suggest that talking about the
valuation of expertise better reflects such processes, especially since values require
context. Finally, we need to keep in mind that, even if valued, scientific expertise
is no substitute for politics when a consensus about the common good is missing.
These are lessons of special relevance to institutionalized expert committees, who
are well advised in developing strategies for the political contextualization of their
work.
For an assessment of whether or not the findings of this study have implica-
tions for democratic accountability, we need to separate it from the more general
phenomenon of policy formulation in venues with little democratic accountability,
driven by internationalization and multi-level governance. It is further important
to remember that this study looked only at policy formulation and not implemen-
tation. All things being equal, this study has therefore produced no evidence that
the mobilization of expertise made policy formulation processes less accountable.
Experts consistently played ‘second fiddle’ as they never acquired decision-making
power during policy formulation. They closely collaborated with federal agencies,
but were always kept at arm’s length. While this also applies to the stem cell case, it
was somewhat paradoxical that the government’s public engagement initiative re-
sulted in a highly professionalized discourse. But this ‘capture’ seems to have been
the specific effect of science policy, and not of expertise mobilization as such.
That experts played second fiddle in the analyzed decision-making processes
may, in fact, be used as a more general descriptor for the position of scientific ex-
pertise in the contemporary Swiss political system. Today, experts have less direct
power than during the 1970s, and the cost of dissent is higher. The weakening of
the informal core and the professionalization of the (short term) advisory system
leads to a shift from advice provided through what I termed the ‘network’ to that
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provided by the ‘mandate’ pillar. Any advisory mandate delivered through the lat-
ter has less autonomy, as it is delivered under a procurement contract controlled in
the vast majority of cases by the federal administration. Moreover, as expertise pro-
duction becomes professionalized, it has to be economically viable for commercial
providers and academics alike. Consequently, alienating the federal administration
through dissent is risky in a system with a monopolistic demand structure.
Playing second fiddle also has implications for research on Swiss politics, which
should be sensitive to the fact that the political influence of experts is increasingly
mediated by the federal administration. A practical consequence of this is that,
when assessing the influence of a provider such as the consultancy firm Prognos,
peer reputation as a measurement proxy for influence (used in studies employing
social network analysis (e.g. Fischer, 2012; Ingold, 2008; Ingold and Varone, 2012))
likely induces a bias by neglecting the mediating role of the federal administration.
While the position of scientific expertise in the Swiss political system is, from an
accountability perspective, rather unproblematic, it is debatable whether the strong
control of the federal administration on scientific expertise is desirable. That polit-
ical parties and Parliament are endowed with few resources to access scientific ex-
pertise is the result of political preferences. Nevertheless, a renewed political debate
about the desirability of the status quo and the limits of the ‘militia’ system in the
face of complex issues is not unwarranted by this research. This status quo also af-
fects independent advisory bodies, such as NACBE, TA-Swiss, and OcCC. The case
studies demonstrated that, in comparison to interest groups, such independent ad-
visory bodies are not in a privileged position in terms of institutional access. They
have to rely on informal mechanisms in order to be heard in the competition for the
scarce attentions of political decision-makers. At first sight it may seem like a good
solution to follow the Dutch example, where the provision of scientific expertise is
concentrated in a very small number of institutions, all with strong constitutional
prerogatives that grant them access to venues of policy formulation. But an indis-
pensable condition for the Dutch system is a matching political culture, which sus-
tains the authority of advisory institutions in public (Bijker et al., 2009; den Butter,
2011). In Switzerland there is little reason to believe that concentrating expertise
providers into a small number of institutes would receive broad support. More-
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over, as evidence about public trust in science suggests, it is unlikely that a political
culture interested in underwriting extended constitutional prerogatives for such an
integrated advisory body exists in Switzerland.
9.5 Appraisal of the theoretical approach
This study has provided a wealth of empirical insights about the role of scientific
expertise in Swiss decision-making. It thereby contributes to closing the knowledge
gap on contemporary science–policy relations in Switzerland. More broadly, it also
makes contributions to wider understanding of Swiss politics. As outlined, these
insights may also be of relevance for practitioners engaged in mandating and pro-
ducing scientific expertise. This study also makes some theoretical contributions,
which attempt to improve on existing theorizations of the role of scientific expertise
in public policy.
The key to these theoretical contributions is the combination of actor-centered
institutionalism (ACI), the problem governance approach (PGA), and discursive
institutionalism (DI). The common denominator that holds these three theoretical
foundations together is the assumption that a social rationality is an intrinsic part
of action motives in political action situations. This is expressed in ACI through the
notions of interaction orientation, while the PGA postulates that actors are not only
sensitive to interaction dynamics, but also to how their principals perceive them.
The concept of legitimacy, which is central to DI, is the most explicit expression of
social rationality that political theory has to offer.
Each of these theoretical foundations is complementary to the others. ACI is an
ontological framework, not a theory. It does not offer empirical propositions about
scientific expertise in political action situations. Instead, it provides the conceptual
basis for identifying expertise as an action resource, it enables the description of the
theoretical mechanism linking this resource to commitments in the policy arena,
and it allows for the development of a political economy of expertise distribution.
The fact that the PGA is an actual theorywith concrete propositionsmakes it a valu-
able complement to ACI, especially with regard to the concept of action situation.
This concept is a rather generic construct in ACI, and the notion of problem struc-
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tures in the PGA – together with the participatory dynamics they engender – con-
stitutes a significant improvement. Conversely, ACI and DI offer the means for the
consideration of structure, which the PGA, with its pluralistic outlook, is missing.
By taking into consideration the contingent effects of institutions, the theory can be
situated in particular national contexts, which enables us to think about advisory
regimes in a comparative manner.
The ensuing theoretical framework improves on the other frameworks reviewed
in two areas. Firstly, it offers the means to make the institutional and cultural con-
texts that scientific expertise is embedded in explicit. This not only enables showing
how the institutional allocation of access to expertise and the distribution of power
in a political system affect expertise mobilization. More importantly, it offers an av-
enue for analytically informed comparative study across different countries, which
represents one of the biggest gaps in the literature on scientific expertise. This is
a theoretical claim, for this study has merely provided the tools, and has not itself
embarked on a cross-country comparison. But, even if studying a single national
context, thinking comparatively forces the clarification of taken for granted assump-
tions about the political context that one studies.
Secondly, this study’s assumptions concerning science and scientific expertise
are inspired by contemporary social scientific understanding about science and its
relationship to wider society, and not by a prescriptive philosophical account (i.e.
positivism). Such an account emphasizes the social transactions inherent in the val-
uation of the cognitive product of science. Facts do not speak for themselves, and
cannot be made to speak for somebody’s cause without simultaneously invoking
the social arrangement that bestowed themwith credibility. Much past scholarship,
inspired by the KU literature, ignores this social dimension, preferring instead to
construe knowledge utilization in cognitive terms alone. This enables an (explicit
or implicit) distinction between proper and improper knowledge use. This, in my
opinion, is inappropriate, as it fails to recognize that knowledge use can only ever be
instrumental in the pursuit of political objectives. Consequently, the roles that sci-
entific expertise enacts in the policy arena are not the product of deliberate agency
on the part of an individual, but of interaction dynamics. Recognizing this not only
improves analysis, but also helps to remediate against a scientistic misrepresenta-
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tion of science in politics that continues to circulate within the scientific community.
This theoretical framework has also blind spots, most notably with regard to the
internationalization of policy problems – for instance in the case of trans-boundary
pollution – and associated expertise. Internationalization does not only engender
power shifts among domestic actors (as discussed earlier with reference to Switzer-
land), changing how a political system works, it also engenders very interesting
questions about the supply of expertise. For instance, how does the international-
ization of expertise affect the domestic economy of expertise supply and demand?
Are there different resource requirements to access expertise located outside one’s
political system compared to domestic sources? And how does the bigger social
distance between producer and user affect the economy of credibility? These are all
relevant questions that future inquiry should engage with.
This opening toward future research possibilities concludes this thesis. While
much remains to be said on the topic, and many empirical aspects have been left
unexplored, this research was nonetheless able to empirically substantiate a clear
message: we should not judge scientific expertise based on abstract cultural notions
of rationality, for this will inevitably invite disappointment. Instead, we must come
to recognize it for what it is, and to understand what can be realistically expected of
it. This, and only this, provides fertile ground for effectively harnessing the power
of science for social problem solving.
AData Sources
A.1 Const. Art. 119
Constitutional Article 119 was called Const. Art. 24novies prior to the overhaul of
the constitution in 2000. It is titled “Reproductive medicine and gene technology
involving human beings” and states that:
1. Human beings shall be protected against themisuse of reproductivemedicine
and gene technology.
2. The Confederation shall legislate on the use of human reproductive and ge-
netic material. In doing so, it shall ensure the protection of human dignity,
privacy and the family and shall adhere in particular to the following princi-
ples:
a) all forms of cloning and interference with the genetic material of human
reproductive cells and embryos are unlawful.
b) non-human reproductive andgeneticmaterialmayneither be introduced
into nor combined with human reproductive material.
c) the procedure for medically-assisted reproduction may be used only if
infertility or the risk of transmitting a serious illness cannot otherwise be
overcome, but not in order to conceive a child with specific characteris-
tics or to further research; the fertilisation of human egg cells outside a
woman’s body is permitted only under the conditions laid down by the
law; no more human egg cells may be developed into embryos outside
a woman’s body than are capable of being immediately implanted into
her.
d) the donation of embryos and all forms of surrogate motherhood are un-
lawful.
e) the trade in human reproductivematerial and in products obtained from
embryos is prohibited.
f) the genetic material of a person may be analysed, registered or made
public only with the consent of the person concerned or if the law so
provides.
g) every person shall have access to data relating to their ancestry.
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A.2 List of interviews and archives
Table A.1: Place, date, and duration of interviews
Id Location Date Duration
I Lausanne 13/04/2011 02:30:00
II Basel 25/03/2011 01:40:00
III Genève 28/02/2011 01:30:00
IV Bern 23/03/2011 01:40:00
V Lausanne 05/09/2011 01:35:00
VI Genève 18/07/2011 02:30:00
VII Bern 11/03/2011 01:30:00
VIII Bern 05/04/2011 01:15:00
IX Zürich 21/03/2011 00:55:00
X Luzern 20/05/2011 02:00:00
XI Bern 25/03/2011 01:45:00
XII Bern 09/05/2011 01:00:00
XIII Bern 20/06/2011 02:45:00
XIV Bern 06/07/2011 02:30:00
XV Zürich 14/07/2011 01:30:00
XVI Itingen 15/06/2011 01:30:00
XVII Herrenschwanden 08/08/2011 01:15:00
XVIII Phone 08/08/2011 00:10:00
XIX Basel 10/08/2011 01:20:00
XX Ottenbach 11/08/2011 01:30:00
XXI Horgen 16/08/2011 02:00:00
XXII Pfäffikon SZ 18/08/2011 01:10:00
XXIII Bern 22/08/2011 01:40:00
XXIV Bern 23/08/2011 01:15:00
XXV Bern 25/08/2011 01:50:00
XXVI Bern 05/09/2011 01:20:00
XXVII Basel 07/09/2011 02:15:00
XXVIII Bern 23/07/2010 01:30:00
XXIX Zürich 03/08/2010 01:00:00
XXX Zürich 13/08/2010 01:10:00
XXXI Zug 13/08/2010 01:15:00
XXXII Bern 17/08/2010 01:30:00
XXXIII Basel 17/08/2010 02:00:00
XXXIV Bern 19/08/2010 01:10:00
XXXV Bern 20/08/2010 01:00:00
XXXVI Bern 24/08/2010 01:30:00
XXXVII Ittingen 25/08/2010 01:30:00
XXXVIII Bern 26/08/2010 01:10:00
XXXIX Bern 15/09/2010 01:15:00
XL Neuchâtel 08/12/2010 01:15:00
XLI Bern 15/12/2010 01:30:00
XLII Lausanne 28/08/2010 01:24:00
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BMethodology
B.1 Interview topic guide
Table B.1: Interview topic guide (extended version)
Topics P A E
I. Introduction
• Introduction of interviewer
• Presentation of research
• Explanation of the interview procedure
• Permission to record/confidentiality
× × ×
II. Background of interviewee
• Professional background
• Relationship to decision-making process
– Personal role
– Beginning of engagement
– Reasons for engagement (identification of issues of personal or pro-
fessional importance for the interviewee in regards to the decision-
making process)
× × ×
III. Preparation process
• Personal preparation of the interviewee
– Consultation of documents? What kind of documentation, obtained
how?
– Presentation of a list of advisory reports in relation to the issue.
Which ones has the interviewee heard of, seen, or studied?
– Consultation of specialists? Whom? Why trust this person?
– Presentation of names of expert advisers. Whom is the interviewee
aware of or has talked to?
• Preparation of the political party or group the interviewee is member of
– At what point did the political party/group pick up on the issue?
– Organization of special events like hearings or retreats?
– Who has been invited to such a hearing?
– Special division of labor in the parliamentary group?
×
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
Topics P A E
IV. Organization of policy work during the pre-parliamentary phase
• Organization of drafting process (intra or inter-agency team, participation
of people external to the federal administration?)
• Identification of participants in the drafting process
• Authoring process of the dispatch
• Formal and informal consultation process
×
V. Consultation of extra-mural science-based policy advice during the pre-
parliamentary phase
• Intramural expertise on the issue, does it exist, to what extent, is it judged
to have been substantially sufficient?
• Consultation of extra-mural science-based advice
– Itemization of the different occurrences of external advice
– Timing of advice in relation to policy work
– Occurrence of uninvited advice
– Judgement about rationales behind contracting external advice and
its timing
• Organization of extramural advice
– Criteria for selecting of individual experts or advisory organizations
(academic or commercial)
– Previous history of collaboration between agency and ex-
pert/advisory organization
– Characterization of the expert pool in the policy domain
• Management of expert mandates
– Formulation of research questions
– Monitoring and quality assurance of advisory mandate
– Autonomy of the expert
– Timeframe and budget of an advisory mandate
– Place and time of result publication and general publication prac-
tices
× ×
VI. Hearings in parliamentary subcommittees
• Rationales for conducting hearings
• How are hearings organized
• Who is invited to testify in a hearing?
• Identification strategies of relevant experts by the committee
• Subjective evaluation of in what way and in relation to which issues hear-
ings are useful
× × ×
VII. Policy deliberation in the parliamentary subcommittee
• Perception and role of the delegation from the federal administration dur-
ing committee deliberation
• Importance of ideological orientation of experts or civil servants for the
assessment of their work
• Rationales for mandating the administration to compile additional reports
× ×
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
Topics P A E
VIII. Production of science based-advice
• Media relations of advisers
• Individual experts
– Motivation
– Required skills and professional biography as an adviser
– Autonomy and expected behavior: dos and don’ts
• Institutionalized advisory bodies
– Remit and addressee of advice
– Kind of institutional organization of advisory body and legal foun-
dation
– Recruitment of members
– Formal relationship to the princial
– Operational rules and practice of advice production
×
IX. Politics of expertise
• Process of establishing a new advisory organization
• Selection process of members for advisory organizations
• Context of advice. Are there transformations in time?
– Tender requirements
– Transparency
× ×
X. Perception of expert advice
• What is expected of an expert adviser?
• Strategies of assessing the credibility of an expert
• Ideological orientation and objectivity
• Conception of the role of science in society
× × ×
XI. Conclusion
• Recapitulation of key points
• Invitation of the interviewee to address issues perceived as relevant and
important but not touched upon during the interview
• Trailing off conversation, usually off-record
× × ×
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B.2 Carrying out the interviews
Switzerland’s small size affords easy accessibility to its political elite. Locating and
contacting people by letter, email, and a follow up phone call was straightforward.
Only in two cases was I unable to locate somebody. Further, only seven people
declined to be interviewed because of time constraints or because they declared to
no longer recalling events sufficiently well. All interviews took place between July
2010 and September 2011 in locations like cafés, offices, or interviewees’ homes. An
average interview took 1 hour and 30 minutes, the shortest 55 minutes, and the
longest 2 hours and 45 minutes.
Extensive preparation preceded each interview. I acquainted myself with the
interviewee’s person and the organization he or she represented in the policy pro-
cess through internet and newspaper archive searches. Moreover, the compilation
of an event timeline and of attendance lists to these events lent me an approximate
picture of the interviewee’s role in the decision-making process and the scope of
events he or she might be familiar with. In addition, the study of meeting minutes
and policy reports ensured that I had a solid understanding of the policy issue at
stake.
Several reasons necessitated such extensive preparation. Firstly, demonstrating
a solid knowledge of the actors, policy instruments, and context of a particular pol-
icy issue was important for leveraging my personal authority. Asserting compe-
tence in such a way was helpful in bridging the asymmetries of age and personal
authority that shaped the interaction situations,1 and favored trust building. Sec-
ondly, since the interview neither followed closed questions nor a fixed succession
of topics, having developed a mental map of the issue made it easier to allow for
such a structure and to refocus the discussion should it have strayed off topic or to
revisit a particular point of it. Thirdly, I could provide elements of context to the
interviewees (names, dates, etc.) which helped them to remember specific things,
or conversely, to detect inconsistencies which could then be directly addressed.
Every interviewee consented to the recording of the conversation. This allowed
for fully focusing on the conversation and produced better data than note taking.
I informed the interviewees that their identity is protected by assuring exclusive
use of the audio recording and the associated transcript for my own research only.
Moreover, I agreed not to publish their names or quote them in an identifiable way.
The latter constitutes a challenge due to the small size of the Swiss political elite. In
some instances, this forces me to omit an interview identifier or to refer to interview
data in a vague way. But only few discussed issues were of sensitive or ‘off the
record’ nature. One interviewee declared to only sharing generic impressions in
order not to jeopardize ongoing work. But mostly people were only reluctant to
name persons or organizations they negatively referred to.
All interviews were conducted in the native tongue of the interviewee, which
was for the most part Swiss German (also my native tongue). Alternatively, either
French or standard German was spoken.
1As a 29 year old PhD studentwithout any prior experience in dealingwith the Swiss political elite
I was in no obvious position of authority. This is not to exclude that being interviewed is potentially
stressful, too.
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B.3 Analysis protocol
Chapter 4 has provided a description of the ontological assumptions and analytical
steps underlying the empirics of this research. The aim of this section is to provide
a more in-depth account of the analytical process that took place after the data was
acquired and coded.
The actual analytical process started out with two empirical resources. Firstly,
there was the database of events, which had been continuously fed during data col-
lection and reduction. This database enabled the building of a timeline for each
case that served as a chronological map. It provided information about concrete
sequences of events, and allowed a preliminary grouping of these events according
to their venues. Secondly, documentary records and interview testimony had been
coded in such a way that substantially similar chunks of data could be grouped
together, and thus to enable the identification of thematic clusters (section 4.4 de-
scribes the coding process).
This was the empirical basis for engaging in a first round of the building of an
ontological inventory, also called a situational map, by laying out all the elements
that appear in the data. In this first version, I collected and graphically represented
these entities in an unordered state. These were then ordered according to a classi-
fication grid (cf. Clarke, 2005: 90), as follows:
• Individual human elements/actors: key individuals in the situation;
• Nonhuman elements/actants: technologies, infrastructure, knowledge;
• Collective human elements/actors: groups, organizations;
• Implicated/silent actors/actants;
• Discursive constructions of individual or collective human actors, as found in
the situation;
• Discursive constructions of non-human actants;
• Political and economic elements: the state, particular industries, rule systems,
parties, politicized issues;
• Sociocultural/symbolic elements: religion, race, gender, symbols, icons;
• Temporal elements: trajectories, moments of crisis;
• Spatial elements: geographical aspects, levels;
• Major issues and debates;
• Discourses related to but not originating in the situation.
Figure B.1 represents a working version of a situational map, taken from the
analysis of the CO2 Act case study. The utility of situational maps does not only re-
late to their inventory and classification functions (plotting timelines does much of
this, too). Rather, it is the exploration of relationships between elements that brings
focus to the analysis, as relationships become explicit andmay be further examined.
In a sense, making ontological inventories – as exemplified by themore formal tech-
nique of making situational maps – was an activity that was ongoing throughout
the research process. During data collection and interviewing, in particular, a men-
tal map emerged of well-known elements and their associations, and of gray areas
that warranted further probing.
The key outcome of this construction of inventories of the entities present in a
situation, and the ensuing exploration of their associations, was the identification of
the artefacts of expertise mobilization (reports, discourses, people, organizations)
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and the discovery of basic networks between these artefacts and other elements.
This analytical step also led to the identification of other, previously overlooked,
actors.
The most important analytical step was arguably the exploration of different
actors’ perspectives and commitments, and of the sites in which different actors en-
countered each other. Clarke (2005: 124ff.) understands social worlds/arena maps
as a form of organizational analysis which aims to elucidate meaning making and
the organization of commitments. Moreover, as a substitute for grounded theory’s
‘conditional matrix’, such maps are can be used to uncover broader constraints, op-
portunities, and resources at the disposal of a particular social world.
I have not produced visual representations of actors and arenas, as is the con-
vention in situational analysis. The policy process provides a highly structured en-
vironment, with clearly defined actors, arenas of interaction, and procedural rules;
it was thus possible to proceed directly with writing memos about different actors’
perspectives, having identified these actors from the raw data and from the produc-
tion of situational maps. Moreover, I was especially interested in actors that were
linked to artefacts of expertise mobilization. For this process of memo writing, the
questions suggested byClarke (2005: 115) regarding socialworlds/arenamapswere
particularly helpful in structuring analysis:
• What is the work of each world?
• What are the commitments of a given world?
• How do its participants believe they should go about fulfilling them?
• How does the world describe itself – present itself – in its discourse(s)?
• How does it describe other worlds in the arena?
• What actions have been taken in the past and are anticipated in the future?
• How is the work of furthering that social world’s agenda organized?
• What technologies are used and implicated?
• Are there particular sites where the action is organized? What are they like?
• What else seems important about this social world?
The samememowriting process also applies to the arena itself, for which Clarke
(2005: 115) also proposes a list of questions:
• What is the focus of this arena?
• What social worlds are present and active?
• What social worlds are present and implicated or not present and implicated?
• Are there any worlds absent that you might have expected?
• What are the hot issues/contested topics/current controversies in the arena’s
discourses?
• Are there any surprising silences in the discourse?
• What else seems important about this arena?
It was these memos concerning actors and arenas of interaction that eventually
became the basic narrative structure for the case study chapters. In most cases, I
limited the description of actors’ perspectives to those who acted as a principal of
expertise mobilization.
The final focus of the situational analysis framework consists of positionalmaps.
A positionalmap is the laying out of those positions taken and not takenwith regard
to the salient issues in an arena. It thus requires the identification of salient, but not
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necessarily conflictual, issues. Each issue then becomes a dimension of a space in
which positions are located (Clarke, 2005: 128). The distinctive character of posi-
tional maps in situational analysis is that positions are not necessarily associated
with ‘a knowing subject’, such as a person or organization. Instead, Clarke (2005:
126) defines them as a ‘position in discourse’. There are two reasons for severing the
link between subjects and discursive positions (though note that such a link may be
established at a later point in the analysis). First, actors can hold multiple and even
contradictory positions. A straightforward representational account of actors and
their positions risks ignoring this ambiguity, which may in fact be highly relevant
in understanding meaning making. Second, linking positions to actors only allows
for the representation of those positions that were actually taken: those that were
not articulated are invisible. Such silent positions may or may not matter, but there
may be an analytically important reason for their absence from the action situation.
Clarke (2005: 136) attaches especial importance to the latter point.
Figure B.2 is a stylized version of a positional map. My observation has been
that deliberation in Parliament produces the most clearly articulated version of the
different discourses present within an action situation. Identifying them, and then
tracing them back in time, has been a useful technique for exploring their origins
and construction processes. This has thus enabled me to reconstruct how expert
arguments become woven into such discourses.
These tools for interrogating the data created the foundation for memos, which
eventually turned into paragraphs and sections of the text. But analysis did not stop
there. What had beenwritten so far amounted to a reconstruction of selected aspects
of action situations as they had been experienced in situ. It was on the basis of
this reconstruction that more theoretically informed interpretations could bemade.
This took place at the end of each chapter, and in the concluding chapter of this
thesis, which also offers a comparison of the cases.
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Figure B.1: Exemplar of a situational map regarding the pre-1995 period of policy
work on the CO2 Act.
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Figure B.2: Positional map from the case study on stem cell research regulation.
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